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


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WILLIAM JAMES (1842-1910)

AN INTRODUCTION TO LIVING PHILOSOPHY

A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO
CONTEMPORARY TYPES AND PROBLEMS

BY

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
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TO MY WIFE
AND
OUR DAUGHTERS
JOAN AND SYDNEY CAROLINE

74259

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PREFACE

Is it possible to chart a straight course through the dense thicket of contemporary philosophical thought, where so many voices are crying, "Lo, here!" and "Lo, there!"? I have long believed that it is, providing one follows a suitable principle of selection, and this book is an attempt to substantiate that conviction.

Each Part of the book is practically an independent unit. Those who have never been initiated into the mysteries of philosophy should certainly begin with Part I. Others may omit this entirely, or browse through it and proceed to the exposition of the separate types in Parts II, III, and IV. These may be read in any order the reader prefers. Or the first chapter of each Part may be read together, and then the second, and so on. Reading by this latter method gives the problems approach, whereas reading each Part through separately gives the type of philosophy approach. The fact that the material is organized so that it may be read either way, will, I hope, make the book more useful.

Throughout I have tried to make the exposition interesting without making it superficial, and informative without making it intolerably technical. If critics find it dull, or too intricate and profound, I shall be disappointed, for it is especially intended to create and instill in the reader that love of philosophy which comes only to those who attain some sense of mastery of the subject. Even though philosophy cannot be made dead easy without ceasing to be philosophy, it should be possible to make it interesting. Although I have tried hard to be fair in the exposition of each type, and to keep my own opinions out of the exposition, I am aware that I have not entirely succeeded. Yet I trust that critics who do not share my own philosophical creed,

will appreciate the value to the student and general reader of a survey such as I have here given.

The selections contained in my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy* are arranged to parallel the chapters of this book, and they provide adequate source-material to supplement the expositions contained herein. The two books together contain a sufficient amount of material for discussion for a year course in philosophy. The first semester may be devoted to *Orientation* and one of the three main types, and the second semester to the other two main types. The material on *Other Types* may either be left until the end of the course or be introduced wherever the teacher prefers.

The selections contained in my *Anthology of Modern Philosophy*, especially those from the great philosophers of the nineteenth century, may also be used to advantage for supplementary reading.

Teachers will find it a good plan to assign to each student a typical representative of each type of philosophy for a written report, either on his philosophy as a whole or on some aspect of it. In preparing this report the student should be required to read extensively in the books of that philosopher. Additional suggestions, which will be of special interest to teachers and students, will be found at the end of the book under the heading *Suggested Supplementary Work*.

Most of Part I, Chapter II appeared under the title, *The Chief Types of Motivation to Philosophic Reflection*, in *The Journal of Philosophy* (Vol. XX, pp. 29-41), and I am obliged to the editors for permission to reprint it here.

My thanks are due to my teachers, to my colleagues who are teaching philosophy, and to my students. I am also especially indebted to Professors Carroll D. W. Hildebrand and James Hall Pitman and to Mr. Christian Knecht, who kindly read the manuscript and offered valuable suggestions.

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PART ONE
ORIENTATION

CHAPTER I

EVERYMAN'S PHILOSOPHY

I. THE WORD PHILOSOPHY

THE word *philosophy* came into English from the Greek language. It is a combination of the Greek words φιλεῖν, to love, and σοφία, wisdom. Hence its literal meaning is the loving of wisdom. The philosopher is one who ardently loves wisdom. Tradition attributes the origin of the Greek word for philosopher to Pythagoras, who preferred to call himself φιλόσοφος, one who loves wisdom, instead of σοφός, a sage. Note that the possession of wisdom does not make a person a philosopher but rather the possession of a passion, an ardent longing for wisdom. Socrates, the first martyr to philosophy, claimed that the highest wisdom is to know that you know nothing. No true philosopher boasts of having wisdom. Every true philosopher humbly seeks and passionately loves it.

To a philosopher wisdom is not the same as knowledge. Facts may be known in prodigious numbers without the knower of them loving wisdom. Indeed the person who possesses encyclopedic information may actually have a genuine contempt for those who love and seek wisdom. The philosopher is not content with a mere knowledge of facts. He desires to integrate and evaluate facts, and to probe beneath the obvious to the deeper orderliness behind the immediately given facts. Insight into the hidden depths of reality, perspective on human life and nature in their entirety, in the words of Plato, to be a spectator of time and existence—these are the philosopher's objectives. Too great

an interest in the minutiae of science may, and often does, obscure these basic objectives.

Philosophers assume that the love of wisdom is a natural endowment of the human being. Potentially every man is a philosopher because in the depths of his being there is an intense longing to fathom the mysteries of existence. As we shall presently learn, this inner yearning expresses itself in various ways prior to any actual study of philosophy as a technical branch of human culture. Consequently every human being, in so far as he has ever been or is a lover of wisdom, has, to that extent, a *philosophy of life*. This is especially true of young people who are in the process of developing a genuine self-consciousness. During the period called "teen-age" there is a keen interest in the profounder problems both of human life and of natural existence, which fructifies in an amateur philosophy of life. Chesterton and William James were surely right in holding that the most important thing to know about any person with whom you may have dealings is his, to him often unconscious, philosophy of life.

2. THE BASIC PROBLEM OF THE TEACHER OF PHILOSOPHY

To the professional philosopher the philosophies of life of all people who have not mastered the technicalities of the field of philosophy are naïve. This applies quite generally to the philosophies of life of mature, educated people, as well as to those of young men and young women. The philosopher thinks that many highly educated and worldly successful people are subject to naïveté in philosophy. And he has a rather contemptuous name, or set of names, for all amateur speculation. He calls it *naïve realism*, or *the philosophy of the man in the street*, or *the philosophy of the unphilosophical*, or *common sense*. The beginning student may perhaps find comfort in the fact that his own philosophy of life is only a few degrees more naïve than that of a Senator or President of the United States. Then, too, the philoso-

pher's contempt for naïve realism is really mollified by a dash of fear that the views of the amateur may, after all, be as near the truth as his own. This makes him frequently overanxious to placate common sense by trying to argue the naïve person into thinking that the philosopher's views are really the same as those held by everybody.¹ Many a thinker has been horrified by the thought that he is not in accord with common sense, whereas many another has been equally horrified by the suspicion that the man in the street may be right.

Recognizing this fundamental distinction between the philosophy of life of the man in the street and the philosophy of those who have mastered the technicalities of the subject, the teacher of philosophy is confronted with a serious problem. How can he lead the student, from the naïve philosophy he has at the beginning of his study, over to a comprehension of the subject as it is understood by the professional philosopher? Here is the supreme and the perennial problem of the teacher who would introduce young people to what he regards as the holy of holies of the temple of knowledge. What method can be used to release the prisoner from the bonds of common sense, that he may make the steep ascent to those sublime speculative heights where he may breathe the rarefied atmosphere of divine philosophy? This is the basic pedagogical problem confronting the teacher.

3. VARIOUS APPROACHES TO PHILOSOPHY

One method is to indoctrinate the student as soon as possible with some special brand of philosophy. By this means he may soon learn to substitute for his common sense views the views of his teacher. This method has been rather

¹ There is nothing more tragic-comic in the whole history of philosophy than Bishop Berkeley's attempt, in the *Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous*, to prove that the gardener, to whom the naïve Hylas and the idealistic Philonous both appealed, really looked on the world as did the good Bishop himself. Yet this attempt has been oftentimes repeated in the discussions of philosophers.

widely used. Perhaps it has a value for students who have neither the inclination nor the leisure to devote themselves permanently to philosophy, but who need to have their minds settled before they enter professional life. There is unquestionably a great deal of this type of instruction in philosophy in American colleges today, and by no means all of it is confined to class-rooms in philosophy. This method is too often used by naïve philosophers, who are supposed to be teaching other subjects, to indoctrinate the student with views that are slightly less naïve than those the student already has. This method never produces a philosopher. It may, and often does, produce considerable pompous conceit. It often makes cads in philosophy. It is almost certain to close the mind of the student to the realm of philosophy, because it stills the disinterested passion for wisdom into a peaceful slumber of acquiescence in the views of some school or person. All of the great problems of philosophy are solved for the student by a distinguished authority. His own thinking is unnecessary. All he needs to do is to learn the jargon of the particular school in which he is being indoctrinated. How dare he speak, or even think, on a problem which has already been correctly answered? Let him content himself with learning the answer! However important learning the answer may be, no student will become a philosopher until he learns to think as an independent solver of problems, and those who resort to the method of indoctrination always fear that kind of thinking.

Another method is to take the student through a rapid survey of all the systems of philosophy in their historical sequence. This is undoubtedly much better than indoctrination in the tenets of some one school. Sooner or later a philosopher will have to learn the history of philosophy. Contemporary philosophies cannot be adequately understood by one who is entirely ignorant of this history. Perhaps those institutions which require of all students a be-

gining course in the history of philosophy, as a prerequisite to any other course in philosophy, are pursuing the wisest policy. The chief danger in such a survey course is that the student will get only a smattering of the various systems, with very little comprehension of what philosophy is. When the course in the history of philosophy has this effect, the method is bad. But it need not have this effect if the student is serious, alert, and willing to work, and the teacher a real philosopher, and not a pedant with an axe to grind in the form of a philosophy of his own he is trying to inculcate.

A third approach is to bring out the relation of philosophy to the other aspects of culture with which the student is presumably more familiar. Those who use this method elaborate on the similarities and differences between science and philosophy, or between religion and philosophy, or between art and philosophy. Teachers favoring this method frequently develop introductory courses in the philosophy of science, or the philosophy of religion, or aesthetics, instead of a general course in the introduction to philosophy. This method also has great value. It is extremely important that the student get an idea at the outset of the similarities and differences between philosophy and other aspects of culture. The danger here is that the student will come to think that these peripheral parts of philosophy constitute philosophy, and that all philosophy is simply a general interpretation of science, or of art, or of religion. A philosophy which is departmental in its basis and outlook is likely to result. Such a philosophy ignores the central problems, and falls short of that total interpretation of all aspects of culture which constitutes the heart of philosophy. (For a fourth approach see Chapter V.)

4. EVERYMAN'S PHILOSOPHY

Let us return to the philosophy of the unphilosophical and attempt to understand it. For the chief defect in all of

these other approaches to philosophy is that they do not give any attention at the outset to the student's own philosophy. Surely this is important, for this is the philosophy of such a large number of human beings, and precisely of those who aspire to know technical philosophy. Let us not be contemptuous of it, but rather let us give it a dignified name and attempt to indicate what it is. Perhaps the best introduction one can get to philosophy is to become conscious to the fullest possible extent of the philosophy he has when he begins the serious study of the subject. Since this philosophy is shared by many, let us call it *Everyman's Philosophy*. What is it?

In trying to answer this question the philosopher is confronted with a peculiar difficulty. He has been so long a student of technical philosophy that he is almost certain to give a prejudiced statement of *Everyman's Philosophy*. Then, too, he may use technical language which Mr. *Everyman* himself cannot understand. The way out of this difficulty would seem to be to let Mr. *Everyman* state it himself. But he is not a philosopher and does not know very well what his philosophy is, just because he does not know what the word philosophy means. Perhaps this explains why philosophers have been so prone to use some other approach. For here is a genuinely paradoxical situation. The philosopher cannot fairly expound *Everyman's Philosophy* because he is too much of a philosopher, and Mr. *Everyman* cannot tell what his own philosophy is because he is too ignorant of philosophy. Can we escape this paradox?

One way to escape it is to search, and to have the student search, for the sources of *Everyman's Philosophy*. Is there, as was suggested above, any craving, rooted deep in human nature, to which the teacher can point the student as the real fountain-head of his and of *Everyman's Philosophy*? What are the experiences of childhood and early youth which lie at the bottom of the philosophy of life students have when they begin a course in technical philosophy?

What are the beliefs they have accepted from parents, teachers, and associates as the guiding principles of their lives? Is Everyman's Philosophy rooted in individual experiences? Is it merely the expression of the civilization and the social environment in which he was reared and is now immersed? Or should both factors be taken into account? These are the questions the answers to which might bring to light something of the nature of Everyman's Philosophy.

Professor Hoernlé writes: "There is a deep-seated need in the human mind, the roots of which strike far beneath all other needs and interests. This is the need to feel at home in the universe. From this source spring all philosophies."² Many other philosophers have expressed a similar idea. If it is true, then every student should be able to find, by profound reflection on his own nature, this ultimate spring of Everyman's Philosophy. Do you personally feel this need to be at home in the universe? Do you have an itching curiosity to know why you are living and what the world is which surrounds you? Do you feel any deep urge to explain, or to find out how others have explained, the ultimate significance of human life as a whole, and of the physical world in which human life is rooted? Locate such feelings in yourself and become conscious of them, and you will discover at least one of the primary sources, not only of Everyman's Philosophy, but of all technical philosophy as well. For all the great systems of philosophy, living and dead (if, indeed, any of them have ever died) are but the streams that have trickled from the inexhaustible fountain of the human spirit.

Think, too, of the various experiences of your childhood and youth in which you were provoked to reflection on any of the mysteries of existence. Josiah Royce, one of the ablest teachers of philosophy this country has produced, used to ask his students at Harvard to write up detailed accounts

² R. F. A. Hoernlé: *Idealism as a Philosophy*, p. 23 (R. C. Smith, Inc.).

of experiences of this sort. He then used these accounts as a starting point for his philosophical discussions. His method was sound just because every life is enriched with experiences which cry out for philosophical interpretation until they get it. Every youth has had such experiences. Some intimate friend or close relative came to a tragic end; or a great danger was suddenly faced; or some community-stirring event happened where you lived; or you dreamed an unforgettable dream; or plumbed to the depths some major passion like anger, revenge, or love; or you came under the influence of a magnetic and inexplicable personality; or you read a gripping story, or saw a powerful play; or you felt for the first time the presence of beauty or God or felt remorse over having drained some of the dregs of life. Such experiences drive men to thought far oftener than to drink or to suicide.

Such are the experiences which generate the thinking at the basis of Everyman's Philosophy. Even one crucial experience may initiate a philosophy of life. Mr. Everyman will talk it over with his friends. He will read widely to find an answer to the questions to which it gives rise. By so doing he forms fixed ideas, prejudices, and beliefs. These become essential ingredients in his philosophy. Only Mr. Everyman does not know this. He has not yet learned that "the act of thought by which we believe a thing is different from that by which we know that we believe it" (Descartes). Once he learns this he will know that he is a philosopher.

In his able address at the *Sixth International Congress of Philosophy*, as well as in his essay on philosophy in *Whither Mankind*, Professor John Dewey has rightly stressed the significance of the general social life and culture of a people in the development of their philosophy. Indeed, he would define philosophy as a civilization becoming conscious of its ideals and aspirations. Whatever one may think of Professor Dewey's idea of the connection be-

tween philosophy and civilization, it at least suggests another highly important source of Everyman's Philosophy. For if social environment conditions the growth of technical systems of philosophy, it is even more powerful in creating the stock of ideas which make up Everyman's Philosophy, since this philosophy is the unconscious absorption of all sorts of ideas and opinions from every conceivable source. The process begins in the cradle, and it ends only with death. Mr. Everyman inevitably fits whatever he reads or hears or experiences in any other way into this set of opinions and fixed ideas which has been gradually accumulated. Hence Everyman's Philosophy is a more or less ordered set of unexamined premises and assumed truths, partly obtained by reflecting upon the significant experiences of life and partly absorbed from the social environment. It is the sum-total of all the prejudices, superstitions, maxims, hasty generalizations, proverbs, ideals and aspirations which actually operate in an individual's reactions to the situations of everyday life. It is continually being modified, especially in young minds. What is believed today may be rejected tomorrow, but the new belief which replaces it will be as dogmatically proclaimed tomorrow as was the old yesterday. Such is the general character of Everyman's Philosophy.

5. THE RELATION OF TECHNICAL PHILOSOPHY TO EVERYMAN'S PHILOSOPHY

Technical philosophy differs from Everyman's Philosophy in the first place by being *critical*. It assumes as a methodological principle that the beliefs of Mr. Everyman need to be systematically examined. They must be traced to their various origins, and the original experiences which they were devised to explain must be studied. Their grounds or evidences must be sought. Why is each one held? Is it justifiable? By this critical attitude philosophy encourages doubt. But it is a "motivated doubt"—a doubting for the sake of

finding whether there are any beliefs which can survive the critical activity of the doubter. Technical terms are invented, beliefs are rearranged according to some principle, and the outcome is a technical philosophy.

Many philosophers never get beyond the purely critical attitude. They become so enamored by this task of examining popular beliefs, with the idea of rejecting them, that they reach the one moving dubiety that there is no well grounded belief. This is scepticism. It characterizes many philosophers of the present day. Indeed, such a position is the besetting sin against which the lover of wisdom must be forever on his guard. For to take this position is to reject the basic idea of "motivated doubt" and to make doubting the be-all and end-all of philosophizing. The philosopher thus turns cynical and sits in the scorner's seat, proud and puffed up over his ability to pick flaws in the beliefs of the man in the street. But he has no philosophy to offer. The sceptic is a pitcher broken at the fountain.

Yet scepticism in the complete and thorough-going form of doubting absolutely everything is really the starting point of technical philosophy. No student will ever understand any of the great systems of philosophy, or appreciate the thinking of any first class philosopher, who is afraid of scepticism. Be a sceptic, only be one consistently. Give up all of your beliefs which will not stand criticism, those of science as well as those of religion. This must be the advice of every philosopher to the youth who wants to be a philosopher. Above the gateway to this temple of wisdom there is carved the motto: "Let none enter here concealing prejudices!"

It must be conceded that none of the philosophers of the first rank have remained permanently in scepticism. With the possible exception of David Hume, every supremely great thinker has gone beyond this type of thought to a set of grounded beliefs from which he has built up a coherent scheme of ideas. At the same time he has bowed before

the ultimate mysteries with a sense of humility. The philosophies which result when criticism yields fruitful beliefs from which further significant deductions can be made may be called systems of *speculative philosophy*, to distinguish them from scepticism, or purely critical philosophy. Thus technical philosophy has two tasks set for it by the body of unexamined beliefs which constitute Everyman's Philosophy. One is the critical and the other is the constructive or speculative task. If the philosopher gives up the latter as impossible, he becomes a sceptic. If he follows up his exercise of the critical attitude by stating and developing the consequences of a new set of *examined* and *substantiated beliefs*, to take the place of the unexamined ones constituting Everyman's Philosophy, he becomes a speculative philosopher.

However, it should be pointed out that there is a hybrid type of philosopher, produced by combining a radical scepticism with respect to the beliefs of religion and everyday life and the ultimate mysteries with which speculative philosophy deals, with a dogmatic acceptance of the teachings of science, which is called by such thinkers *positive knowledge*. Consequently such philosophers have come to be known as positivists. But they are also called agnostics because they profess ignorance of, or proclaim the unknowability of, ultimate reality. During the last fifty years agnosticism and positivism have been among the most fashionable of philosophies.³ From the viewpoint of the speculative philosopher these philosophies are practically on a level with Everyman's Philosophy, for they rest on an uncritical acceptance of the beliefs of science. They exaggerate the importance of human scientific knowledge in comparison with other aspects of human endeavor. That is why every teacher of philosophy insists that the student be

³ Positivism is the name of the philosophy founded by the French philosopher, Auguste Comte. Herbert Spencer is the leading defender of agnosticism. See the selections from these two philosophers in my *Anthology of Modern Philosophy*.

a sceptic to the very end, if he would become a philosopher. When his scepticism is not thorough-going, he falls an easy prey to agnosticism. The cure for agnosticism is more scepticism, but the cure for scepticism is deeper reflection and profounder insight.

CHAPTER II

WHY MEN PHILOSOPHIZE

I. COMPLEXITY OF HUMAN MOTIVATION

HAVING explained the general nature of Everyman's Philosophy and its relation to technical philosophy, we may now turn to a consideration of the chief types of motivation which lead people to devote their lives to philosophic reflection.

That all human motivation is highly complicated and curiously mixed is a fundamental and generally accepted truth. The noblest deed may be, and often is, the consequence of a chain of motives some of the links of which are prosaic and commonplace, if not even sordid. Nor need a person be a student of criminology to know that many a crime is the result of an entanglement of motives some of which are really praiseworthy. The good and the bad acts which men do are both made out of the same stuff: they flow forth from that common fountain-head of mental life—the undifferentiated emotional, instinctive, and sensational congeries which constitutes what, for want of a better name, may be called the momentary active self.

This well-known fact puts a special limitation on any attempt to isolate and to analyze the motivation which leads a particular human being to devote himself to the life of philosophic reflection. Indeed the problem here is even more insoluble than in the case of a single act, for the life of philosophic reflection is a highly involved set of activities comprising many single acts. And if it is difficult to unravel the complicated motivation behind a single act, it is *a fortiori* far more difficult to separate out the diverse ele-

ments entering into the motivating process which sustains through the years the career of a philosopher. In fact it must be frankly admitted that the greatness of the difficulty makes the task practically impossible so far as any individual philosopher is concerned. And since every philosopher knows full well that he does not sufficiently understand himself to trace out in detail the thread of motivation which sustains him in that life, he could hardly be so presumptuous as to claim to be able to analyze that which is behind the reflective activity of another. Instead of men choosing philosophy it often seems that philosophy is a great over-individual which chooses certain human beings to voice its message and to articulate its insights. That these men are motivated in their philosophizing we cannot question, but we must also admit that the motivation is too living and intricate for anyone to analyze sufficiently well to be able to say: "This man was motivated by this and that man by that." The truth is that the motivation of every real philosopher is compounded out of both this and that, and the more human and genuine the philosopher the more labyrinthine his motivation.

Nevertheless, every student of the history of philosophy must recognize the existence of distinct types of motivation, even though it is impossible to say that any particular thinker was guided by one rather than, or to the exclusion of, any other. We are here concerned with these dominant types of motivation, and we are restating the sources of Everyman's Philosophy as they appear at the level of philosophic reflection.

2. THE HEDONIC TYPE OF MOTIVATION

A great philosopher, one who has made important contributions to philosophy and who is quite generally respected for his intellectual ability, once said to me that he could not accept any of the existing systems of philosophy (we were talking especially of idealism), because to do so

would mean that the gates of all further speculation would be closed, philosophizing would resolve itself into rethinking what other men have already thought, and consequently *there would be no fun in it*. This suggests what I mean by the hedonic motivation.¹ It is philosophizing for the fun there is in it or building up a speculative system in order to have something interesting to do. From this point of view a philosophical *Weltanschauung* is an imposing toy, constructed by the human intellect to satisfy a kind of play instinct or fun-loving disposition. And naturally there is more fun in fabricating your own toy than in playing with one someone else has constructed. Just as many find enjoyment playing a parlor or an outdoor game, so the philosopher, having fallen in love with dialectical subtleties, finds an unadulterated mental pleasure in playing the one-man game of juggling intellectual abstractions.

Josiah Royce gave fitting and beautiful expression to this type of motivation when, concerning the joy that philosophical students take in the reflective life, he wrote: "Let me admit frankly: it is indeed the joy, if you like, of playing cat and mouse with your dearest other self. It is even somewhat like the joy, if so you choose to declare, which infants take in that primitive form of hide and seek that is suited to their months. 'Where is my truth, my life, my faith, my temperament?' says the philosopher. And if, some volumes further on in the exposition of his system, he says, 'Oh! *there* it is,' the healthy babies will be on his side in declaring that such reflections are not wholly without their rational value. But why do I thus apparently degrade speculation by again deliberately comparing it with a game? Because, I answer, in one sense, all consciousness is a game, a series of longings and of reflections which it is easy to call superfluous if witnessed from without. The justification of consciousness is the having of it. And this

¹ *Hedonism* is the technical term used by philosophers to name the ethical theory that pleasure is the highest good.

magnificent play of the spirit with itself, this infantile love of rewinning its own wealth ever anew through deliberate loss, through seeking, and through joyous recognition, what is this, indeed, but the pastime of the divine life itself?"²

For a melancholic temperament this type of motivation will inevitably take on a more sombre hue. In fact it seems to be able to fructify equally well in an extreme and shallow optimism or in a thoroughgoing and dismal pessimism. Whether one holds philosophizing to be a form of pleasure among many, no one of which is more ultimate than another, or the only vocation capable of producing a durable satisfaction; or whether he holds the world to be wholly and radically evil and philosophy a kind of negative good in that it may alleviate to a certain extent the dreadful misery of existence; or whether he holds some view in between these extremes, this type of motivation is in any case active. It underlies Epicureanism and Stoicism and some forms of Scepticism. Wherever and whenever men turn to philosophy as a kind of mental paradise or city of refuge, situated within the domains of a veritable hell, this type of motivation is in evidence.

In *Paradise Lost* there is an excellent illustration of the extreme pessimistic form of this type of motivation. Milton is describing the various occupations of the devils in the nether regions during the interim while Satan is absent on his journey to earth to beguile man. And it is with genuine respect that he writes of a certain group of imps who turned to philosophizing in order to mitigate their torments:

Others apart sat on a hill retired,
In thoughts more elevate, and reasoned high
Of Providence, Foreknowledge, Will and Fate;
Fixed fate, free will, foreknowledge absolute,
And found no end, in wandering mazes lost.
Of good and evil much they argued then,

² Josiah Royce: *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, p. 21, 2nd edition (Houghton Mifflin Co.).

Of happiness and final misery,
Passion and apathy, and glory and shame,
Vain wisdom all, and false philosophy!—
Yet, with a pleasing sorcery, could charm
Pain for a while or anguish, and excite
Fallacious hope, or arm the obdured breast
With stubborn patience as with triple steel.

Is there not here a fairly accurate poetic description of the hedonic motivation to philosophic reflection? Nor is it so very far from this to the ideas expressed in Bertrand Russell's much-quoted and justly praised *Free Man's Worship*. Only for Russell men are in much the same position as the Miltonian devils. Confronted with the indubitable scientific knowledge that mankind is foredoomed to destruction, individually and collectively, thinking men may yet find freedom, and therewith a certain grim resignation in the contemplation of the awful impending catastrophe. Even though he knows with absolute certainty that physical processes are at work which will utterly efface from the universe, not only all man's manifold works, but man himself as a spectator of the cosmic drama, nevertheless, in philosophy the individual thinker may find a light that will illumine his little day. Substitute for the devils of Milton Russell's free men, and the poet's account of the motivation to philosophic reflection in hell may be transferred back to earth, for it goes without saying that Milton's portrayal was anthropomorphic.

The fact that the devil philosophers and free men are hedonically motivated should not be taken as a complete disparagement of this type of motivation. For there is a sense in which every philosopher is a devil philosopher as well as a free man. Some of the noblest and keenest thinkers in philosophy's Hall of Fame entered through this portal. Forasmuch as philosophy offers to men an interesting and pleasurable form of intellectual activity, one which is capable of calling forth the very best in human nature, and since in philosophy men can somehow find a balm for sor-

row, an assuagement for grief, a relief, however momentary, from torment—yes, thanks to the fact that there is fun in philosophizing—it follows that every true philosopher can and should rejoice that the subject he loves is not wholly devoid of practical value.

And yet he whose quest for metaphysical truth is impelled by this type of motivation must be forever on his guard. Here lurk the subtle dangers against which Francis Bacon warned in his famous idols.³ Actuated by this motive we may build a neat system which is not in accord with reality, because, forsooth, an ordered and systematic world is more pleasing than a chaotic one. Or, sharing Russell's preference for a philosophy which has something of the character of a hair shirt, perhaps we may be in danger of making the world out to be a great deal worse than it actually is. How often have the speculations of philosophers been condemned as arbitrary constructions, fantastic play or dream-worlds, *idola theatri*! And if too frequently the charge has been true, it has sometimes been due to the fact that certain systems are the results of an excessive hedonic motivation. And I, for one, am glad that Royce corrected his too great emphasis on philosophy as play with the statement: "I confess to you that, although I myself often take a certain personal delight in the mere subtleties of speculation, although I also enjoy at times that miserliness which makes the professional student hoard up the jewels of reflection for the sake of gloating over their mere hardness and glitter, I find always that when I come to think of the thing fairly, there is, after all, no beauty in a metaphysical system which does not spring from its value as a record of a spiritual experience."⁴ The hedonic motivation is peripheral and anthropocentric. It will not, because it cannot, take one into the heart of reality. It stands con-

³ See my *Anthology of Modern Philosophy*, pp. 94 ff.

⁴ *Loco citato*, p. 23.

demned for its insufficiency and for sacrificing philosophy on the altar of pleasure.

3. THE THEOLOGICAL TYPE OF MOTIVATION

Philosophy presupposes a relatively high state of civilization. It cannot come into existence until a people has first developed a literature, a legal code, and a religious liturgy and dogma. This means that it follows, both logically and temporally, the development of social, moral, and religious customs and manners, creeds and beliefs. Because men are necessarily deeply rooted in a highly cultured environment before they begin philosophic reflection, all the ideas which are characteristic of that environment have entered into the making of the mind of the thinker long before he becomes a philosopher in the technical sense of the word.

Now in many minds it is precisely the religious ideas peculiar to the civilization in question which exercise the dominant rôle during the years preceding the rise of reflective self-analysis and speculative thought. And to begin with beliefs about religion which are dogmatically and uncritically asserted as eternal truths, and then to engage in the kind of arbitrary speculation which will harmonize and substantiate these beliefs without first subjecting the beliefs themselves to critical analysis, is what I mean by being theologically motivated to philosophic reflection. There are numerous illustrations of this type of motivation in the history of philosophy. The stock illustration is Mediaeval Scholasticism, but Neo-Scholasticism and much Protestant Christian Philosophy is permeated by the same type of motivation. Accepting the religious ideas current in one's own environment as unassailable truths, and working out a philosophical doctrine or system which will justify them, is philosophizing prompted by this theological type of motivation, be the thinker Mohammedan or Confucian, Jew or Gentile, Catholic or Protestant.

I hasten to add, however, that this does not mean that every theistic philosophy is theologically motivated. This is a radically mistaken inference which is too frequently put forward as a basic truism. A theistic philosophy is not theologically motivated when it is the result and an expression of a thinker's deepest and sincerest thought about the problems of philosophy, and represents his acutest insight into the nature of things. It is theologically motivated only when it is adopted at the very beginning of reflection as a dogmatic assumption. As Santayana has well remarked, Royce was a "person with no very distinctive Christian belief."⁵ Nevertheless, he reached a philosophical position which he deliberately called theistic, and which would generally be regarded as true to the spirit of Christian philosophy. And yet Royce could hardly be charged with being theologically motivated.

Nor does this mean, as is too often implied, that every theologically motivated system of thought or philosophic creed is theistic, or even friendly to religion. There are negative as well as positive religious beliefs. There are highly intellectual environments in the modern world in which philosophic minds are germinating that are through and through anti-religious. There is an atheistic as well as a theistic dogma. Whoever philosophizes in order to disprove a religious conception of the world is just as much theologically motivated as he who philosophizes in order to establish such an interpretation. "Religion is a dangerous superstition which ought to be stamped out," are the words of a young graduate student in philosophy. Here is the negative type of theological motivation at work. And it is always at work in the thinking of those philosophers who regard it as the unique task and bounden duty of philosophy to uproot religion.

What, now, is to be thought of the theological type of

⁵ George Santayana: *Winds of Doctrine*, p. 189 (Scribners). But see Santayana's criticism of Royce below, pp. 143 f.

motivation? It is logically dependent upon the hedonic type and consequently shares its weakness. If the religious beliefs of men are not philosophically defensible, human happiness is impossible; therefore philosophy must by all means justify them—so argue those who are motivated by the positive form of theological motivation. If the religious beliefs of men are justifiable, human happiness is impossible; therefore it is the business of philosophy to make away with these absurd superstitions—so argue those who are motivated by the negative form of theological motivation. And the cynic might make a perfect simple destructive dilemma. If human happiness is possible, either religious beliefs must be proved true or they must be proved false, but they can neither be proved true nor false, ergo human happiness is impossible. Admit that the cynic is right and the theological type of motivation resolves into the negative hedonic type. Thus, either in its positive or negative form, the hedonic type of motivation is really the tap-root of the theological type. Consequently, the latter is just as anthropocentric and peripheral as the former. It, too, sacrifices philosophy on the altar of personal satisfaction.

Moreover, it is a contradiction for a philosopher to withhold any of his beliefs from the crucible of rigorous thought. The belief that there is a God, and all other religious beliefs, must be thrown in with all the rest of the equipage of naïve realism. But so also must the belief that there is no God. Anti-religious or naturalistic dogmatism is just as reprehensible as religious dogmatism, just as intolerant and dangerous, too. The ideal of a philosopher is to start *de novo*, without a prejudice to nurse or an axe to grind.

And yet the theological type of motivation has its good fruits. Here, too, is one of the fairest and most attractive of the approaches to philosophy. Many a student has made his way into the profoundest depths of metaphysical truth be-

cause of a zeal to establish impregnably his religious views. And, on the other hand, philosophy could ill afford to lose the stimulus of its Nietzsches. Whoever condemns the theological type of motivation without reservation proves himself ignorant of its potential power to create new and valuable philosophical interpretations. But while no true philosopher can afford to ignore the thought-systems which theologically motivated thinkers have given to the world, there is, I think, a more excellent entrance into the domain of philosophy.

4. THE SOCIOLOGICAL TYPE OF MOTIVATION

However, before taking up this more excellent type of motivation, it is first necessary to deal with another which is sometimes mistakenly identified with it. This is the sociological type of motivation, and in expounding it let us expose the fallacy of treating it as being equivalent to the scientific type.

There is a theory abroad that our whole social structure is a product of a haphazard and irrational growth, and is therefore *ipso facto* radically wrong. Owing to the fact that science (which is assumed to be a synonym for rationality) is a comparatively new development, or at least has only in our day reached its full fruition in a science of society, little or no rationality is supposed to have been at work in the processes which produced the various institutions and ideals, customs and laws which constitute the very essence of our modern civilization. Consequently, the real business of modern men, who, just because they are modern, must be alive to the existing chaotic social, industrial, and international situation, is to create, on the foundation of modern physical and chemical science and under the immediate direction of modern social and political science, a rational social order to supplant the existing irrational order. The present order is held to be all out of joint because it is based on the principle: "Every man for himself

and the devil take the hindermost." Let us apply our scientific knowledge to the task of making a better world, based on the principle of satisfying the largest possible number of desires or interests.

The world is out of joint. O cursed spite
That ever I was born to set it right,—

Shakespeare has Hamlet say, but, admitting the truth of the premise, many men today would say: O blessed privilege that modern man was born to set it right. And since the sick world is to be healed by an application to it of the poultice of modern scientific knowledge, which presumably is the only remedy capable of drawing out the rottenness and corruption, this type of thought does a prodigious amount of talking about science and scientific method—so much, indeed, that a novice could easily be deceived into thinking that it must be a scientifically motivated philosophy.

Now whoever accepts this current theory as an indubitable truism, and indulges in philosophic reflection for the express purpose of constructing a philosophy which will support it, is sociologically motivated. That it is not really scientifically motivated is shown by the fact that it says that the old problems which arose when men philosophized from a *disinterested* desire to know what the world actually is—the problem of the one and the many, of change and permanence, of mechanism and teleology, of form and matter, et cetera—are all obsolete. It holds that any philosophy built up in the attempt to answer such questions thereby proves its inadequacy and antiquatedness.

Who does not rejoice over the progress made in modern social and political science? Who does not freely admit that there are glaring imperfections in the present social order? Who does not sympathize with the helpless poor, the suffering widows, the homeless orphans, the aged and infirm, the nameless and numberless starving refugees in-

habiting the earth today? But why should all this cause anyone to surrender himself to the vain hope that in this temporal span of events a stage may be reached, through the instrumentality of human manipulation of the vast cosmic mechanism, in which there will no longer be any poor, sorrowing, and suffering mortals, and that when such a stage is reached it can be permanently sustained and continually bettered (!) by the intellectual activity of the new humanity which is constantly being born to enjoy it? Here, surely, is a philosophy of life which no deeply profound philosopher could ever hold. To adopt it is to admit that the real world is past finding out and to withdraw clamorously into a realm of fantastic dreams. Santayana has said that theologically motivated philosophy is "in the region of dramatic system-making and myth to which probabilities are irrelevant." But he recognizes that it is no whit more so than a sociologically motivated philosophy. "If one man says the moon is sister to the sun, and another says that she is his daughter, the question is not which notion is more probable, but whether either of them is at all expressive. The so-called evidences are devised afterwards, when faith and imagination have prejudged the issue."⁶

5. THE SCIENTIFIC TYPE OF MOTIVATION

I said above that a disinterested desire to know what the world is originally brought to light the great problems of philosophy. And this purely disinterested desire to penetrate to the inmost essence of reality I call the scientific motivation to philosophic reflection because precisely the same motivation actuates a theoretical scientist in carrying on his special experimental investigations. Every student of philosophy knows that science and philosophy originally arose together and that the special sciences only gradually split off from philosophy as human knowledge increased. Consequently, philosophy is rightly named "The Mother

⁶ *Loco citato*, p. 210.

of the Sciences." Whatever the differences between philosophy and science—and differences there certainly are—this fact that both arose together suggests that the proper motivation to philosophic reflection is the same as the motivation to science. And that is simply a disinterested and insatiable desire to know all there is to be known.

Plato and Aristotle both understood this. After enumerating to Theætetus some of the most abstruse and technical questions of philosophy, Plato has Socrates say:

"I suspect that you have thought of these questions before now."

"Yes, Socrates, and I am amazed when I think of them; by the Gods I am! and I want to know what on earth they mean; and there are times when my head quite swims with the contemplation of them."

"I see, my dear Theætetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said that you were a philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder."⁷

And Aristotle probably had this passage in mind when he wrote: "It was owing to wonder that men began to philosophize in earlier times just as it is today, wondering at first about the problems that lie close at hand, and then little by little advancing to the greater perplexities. . . . But one who is perplexed and filled with wonder feels himself to be in ignorance. . . . And so if men philosophized in order to escape ignorance it is evident that they pursued wisdom just for the sake of knowing, not for the sake of any advantage it might bring. This is shown too by the course of events. For it was only after practically all things that are necessary for the comfort and convenience of life had been provided that this kind of knowledge began to be sought. Clearly then we pursue this knowledge for the sake of no extraneous use to which it may be put."⁸

⁷ Plato's *Dialogues*. Jowett's translation, 4th ed. Vol. IV, p. 210.

⁸ *Met.*, I. 2, 982 b 12. Translation from Bakewell's *Sourcebook in Ancient Philosophy*, p. 217 (Scribners).

Now it must be admitted that the satisfying of this desire to know just for the sake of knowing carries with it a high degree of pleasurable experience. Consequently, it is very easy to confuse the scientific type of motivation with the hedonic. But we are here confronted with the famous paradox of hedonism. If we desire to know for the sake of the pleasure it gives, we are not likely to get the real pleasure accompanying the cognitive experience. It is only when we desire to know just for the sake of knowing that we can reasonably expect the desire to be satisfied. For any ulterior motive whatsoever is apt to get in the way of the fact, so that instead of knowing what reality is as a matter of fact, we only take it to be what it pleases us for it to be. And this criticism is applicable even to such a saying as Paulsen's: "The ultimate motive impelling men to meditate upon the nature of the universe will always be the desire to reach some conclusion concerning the meaning, the source and the goal of their own lives. The origin and end of all philosophy is consequently to be sought in ethics."⁹ Knowledge for the sake of knowledge is the only adequate and worthy motivation to philosophic reflection, and this is the scientific motivation. The philosopher is one who, like Theætetus, wants to know what on earth the answers to philosophical questions are. He is one whose head at times quite swims with the contemplation of such questions. But this does not mean that he deliberately contemplates such questions for the sake of getting mentally drunk. It is because he is simply built that way. As long as man is man, burning by nature with insatiable curiosity, there will be individuals who will devote themselves to philosophy even though they find there no special pleasure or relief from pain, even though theological dogmas lose completely their appeal, even though trying to make a better world seems

⁹ Friedrich Paulsen: *A System of Ethics*, Eng. trans. by Frank Thilly, p. 3 (Scribners).

utterly futile. As long as the actual world looms awful and mysterious above the mind of man, philosophy will nobly flourish. For, being by nature intelligent, man cannot rest until his mind has pierced the veil.

CHAPTER III

HOW TO STUDY PHILOSOPHY

I. THE TECHNICAL VOCABULARY OF PHILOSOPHY

THERE are certain peculiarities about the technical vocabulary of philosophy against which the beginning student should be forewarned. These peculiarities may be brought to light by distinguishing the chief types of technical terms with special reference to their origin.

(A) *Common Words Used in a Technical Sense.* Philosophers are in the habit of adapting common ordinary words into bearers of highly technical meanings. Or they may combine two or more ordinary words into a phrase having a special connotation in philosophy which the uninitiated would never suspect. Or they may differentiate several nuances of meaning of some word which is usually supposed to be unambiguous. These three distinct ways of dealing with the ordinary common words of our language, or of any language, are especially confusing to the student, because he reads the words to mean what he has learned them to mean from general usage, and thereby misses what the philosopher really intends them to convey. This creates the illusory experience of thinking that the writer's meaning is perfectly clear, whereas, as a matter of fact, the deeper insights are entirely beyond the student's ken. Every teacher of philosophy is familiar with the experience of having a student say that he understood an assignment in philosophy, only to find that the essential ideas in the reading were never even grasped. One or two examples of each of these ways of using ordinary terms as bearers of entirely new

meanings may help to put the beginner on his guard against this particular self-deception.

Every person with an elementary education supposes that he knows what the word *event* means. He has studied historical events from childhood, and he naturally associates the word event with the important occurrences in human history, such as the signing of the Armistice or Lindbergh's flight to Paris. Or he may think of some important occurrence in nature, such as an eclipse of the sun or a volcanic eruption, as an event. Or he may think of some social affair, such as the junior prom, or of some athletic meet as an event. In ordinary life we use this word to refer to happenings in history, in social life, and in nature. But let the student read Dr. Whitehead's *Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge*, in which the term *event* occurs over and over again in a highly technical sense, and he will find it well-nigh impossible after weeks of study to comprehend what that distinguished philosopher means by this little and ordinary word. Special articles have been written by students of Dr. Whitehead's writings discussing what he means by an event.¹ It is doubtful whether some teachers of philosophy have a very clear idea of what he means by this term. Indeed, it is even doubtful whether he himself knows fully what he intends it to convey. For it implies his whole philosophy, and to know what he means by it one must have fully mastered this extremely difficult and intricate philosophy. Moreover, this philosophy is still in a fluid condition. Dr. Whitehead is changing the connotation of the word event as his philosophy develops. Consequently even he himself does not know all that this word may come to mean in his philosophy. Numerous other illustrations of this fact could be given from the writings of contemporaries as well as from those of the great philoso-

¹ See my article "Dr. Whitehead's Theory of Events" in the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXX, pp. 41ff.; and *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1922-23, pp. 229ff.

phers of the past. One of the main problems of the student is to discover what ordinary terms are used in a special technical sense by a given philosopher. He must also note that philosophers of other schools may not use the particular term always in this technical sense, but only when they are referring to the teachings of the philosopher who invented the special meaning. In other contexts they may use the word in its ordinary signification, or they may even give it some technical meaning of their own that is quite different from the usage of the other philosopher. Every type of philosophy has its special technical terminology, not employed by philosophers of other schools except when they are referring to the views of their opponents. This fact alone has caused many a student to become disgusted with the study of philosophy and to condemn the subject as mere verbiage.

As an example of the second type, consider *the doctrine of primary and secondary qualities*, one of the most influential doctrines in the development of modern philosophy. The average man knows the meanings of each of the words. But just what a philosopher like John Locke or Bishop Berkeley meant by a primary quality and by a secondary quality, and by the distinction between them, is still a matter of contention among students of their writings. This is only one example of the way in which common words have been combined to form a highly technical term. The hyphenated word *space-time* in the writings of Samuel Alexander is a conspicuous example in contemporary philosophy.

Consider next such terms as *idea*, *good* and *experience*. There are at least four different meanings of the word *idea* in philosophy and as many of the word *idealism* as the name of a general type of philosophic thought. The word *good* has as many meanings, and they are as incompatible as are the various meanings of the word *idea*. The term *experience* is especially baffling. In the philosophy of prag-

matism it has a highly technical and specialized meaning, which is as difficult to comprehend as is the word *event* in the philosophy of Whitehead. But the same word is used in an entirely different, and yet in a special technical sense, by various other philosophers. The student must realize the importance of learning the technical meaning of such words in the setting of the philosophy in which they are used. Never assume the popular to be the same as the technical meaning nor one technical meaning to be identical with another.

(B) *Technical words from other fields of knowledge used in a different technical sense in philosophy.* The situation just described in reference to ordinary words in common everyday usage is duplicated with regard to many of the technical terms in science, theology, art, and other aspects of knowledge and culture. Many of the technical words of philosophy have been taken over by philosophers from some special natural or social science, or from some branch of culture; and the meaning of such terms in philosophy is often quite different from their meaning in the field from which they were taken. The reverse process is also common both for ordinary words and for technical terms. Technical philosophical terms are adapted to the special sciences and to the "man in the street," and lose much, and sometimes all, of their philosophical import in the process. The term *realism* means one thing in literature, painting, music, and politics and quite another thing in philosophy. In fact this word, like *idealism*, has several meanings in philosophy. The term *God* means one thing in popular speech, another thing in Christian theology, and quite a different thing in an idealistic type of philosophy such as Hegelianism. The term *energy* is a technical term in science which many philosophers have taken over and adapted to their purpose, changing its meaning. The term *evolution* has entirely different meanings when used in the biological sciences from what it has in the philosophy of

creative evolution of the distinguished French philosopher, Henri Bergson, or in the philosophy of Herbert Spencer. Numerous other examples could be given of technical words taken over from some special field of knowledge by philosophers, who adapt them to their own purpose, and thereby invest them with a new technical meaning. The well-known list of Aristotelian categories or general class names, namely, *substance, quantity, quality, relation, time, place, situation, state or condition, passivity and activity*, as well as such Kantian categories as *causality, necessity, possibility* and *probability*, are good examples of technical philosophical terms which have filtered down to common usage. William James has given an interesting discussion of these in his chapter on "Common Sense" in *Pragmatism*, in which he attempts to show how they were originated by prehistoric geniuses, formalized by Aristotle, polished and made precise by the mediaeval schoolmen, and through this process were made the basic general ideas of Everyman's Philosophy. (See Part IV, Chap. III, 3.) Examples such as these show how the student must be forever on his guard against assuming that the philosophical usage of a technical scientific or theological term is the same as that of the scientific or theological usage.

(C) *Technical terms invented by philosophers.* Philosophers also claim the right to invent special technical terms to convey their meanings. In fact, as was suggested above, many of the technical terms of special fields and many of the common words of the vernacular were originated by some philosopher. The number of words we owe to Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient philosophers is simply unbelievable to anyone who has never studied the question. Every great philosopher in our circle of culture has enriched the language with various words, having in his philosophy a technical sense and originally used by him for a special purpose. This is not only true of the thinkers of the past, for the philosophers of today are constantly

creating special technical terms. The terms *neutralism* and *subsistence* are good examples. So also are Nietzsche's terms *superman* and *transvaluation of all values* (*Umwertung aller Werte*), Spengler's distinction between the *Copernican and the Ptolemaic theories of history*, Bergson's term *élan vital* or *vital impetus*, Driesch's term *entelechy*, adapted from Aristotle, and the term *logistic* which is frequently used to designate the new symbolic logic to distinguish it from other types of logic. Technical terms originating in philosophy can only be understood by reading them in their philosophic context. Since so much of our language has been created by philosophy, the mother of the sciences, every student of literature and philology finds some knowledge of philosophy highly desirable. Chiefly for this reason the study of philosophy has enormous cultural and practical value.

2. HOW TO DEAL WITH THE TECHNICALITIES OF PHILOSOPHY

Every student of philosophy should keep a special philosophical dictionary in which he writes down from time to time the technical terms he finds especially baffling, with some quotations illustrative of the different senses in which the term is used. It is also a good plan to make a special glossarial index of each book or technical essay which you read in the field of philosophy. List the important terms and phrases used, and differentiate the various meanings. Do not depend upon small one-volume dictionaries. Consult the new Murray *Dictionary of the English Language* or the *Century Dictionary and Encyclopedia*. The definitions of philosophical terms in the latter were originally prepared under the direction of, and many of them were written by, Charles S. Peirce, one of the greatest American philosophers. This fact alone makes that work of permanent value to students of philosophy.

Reading dictionary definitions of technical terms in philosophy will not suffice. Discuss the words you do not under-

stand with other students and find out whether they interpret them the same way that you do. Ask your teacher, or tutor, or some older well-read person what he thinks the term means. Do this regardless of the fact that the word may seem to you to be so simple that you are ashamed to ask what it means. Do not assume that the philosophical usage of a term is simple, just because the word itself is one everybody is supposed to comprehend. As was pointed out above, the commonest terms in everyday use frequently have some profound philosophical import entirely different from their usual meaning. For example, George Santayana has written an important philosophical discussion on the various meanings of the word *is*.² The essential point for the student to grasp at the outset of the study of philosophy is the absolute necessity of assuming that any word he reads in a book on philosophy, even though it be the most innocent-looking word in the language, may have some special signification for a philosopher. To be fully cognizant of this fact is to be armed for the struggle with the thorny technicalities of this field of knowledge.

Stress as one must the necessity of learning the technical terms of philosophy, yet it must also be strongly emphasized that the beginning student cannot hope to make headway in the subject by a pedantic quibbling over what particular terms mean. Many a potential philosopher has fallen so deeply in love with the game of making the meaning of philosophical terms absolutely precise and clear to himself that he has missed the fundamental insights of the great thinkers. Others have become so discouraged that they have abandoned the attempt to learn what philosophy is and says.

The student must go on reading, even though there are many ideas that are not altogether clear to him. They will become clearer later. Get what you can from a passage and read on further. Remember that a philosopher is in-

² See the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XII, pp. 66ff.

clined to put his whole philosophy into practically everything that he writes. If you do not get an understanding of his philosophy from one essay or book, read others. If you are working on a late writing, look up his earliest writings where you can get a statement of his philosophy before his views matured. Check the latest by the earliest writing of a philosopher on the same subject. Following this rule will frequently throw light on a thinker's obscurities and technicalities. Live with a philosopher until you get beyond the mere technicalities of his system of ideas and absorb the deeper spirit of his philosophy. This is absolutely essential if one would master the subject.

Choose some first-rate representative of a school and carefully read what he says over and over again, until you have fully appreciated the spirit and the general viewpoint of the man. But reserve judgment on what he says. Do not believe him. Entertain his ideas sympathetically, without accepting them as final. Remember that he is only one philosopher among many. He represents just one type of philosophic thought. There are equally great representatives of other types. Do not let any single philosopher beguile you into thinking that he alone possesses the "philosopher's stone," which to possess opens the mind to an understanding of all philosophic mysteries. For you must seek that stone for yourself. You dare not surrender to the bewitchments of any philosopher who may seem to you to write as though he had found it. Philosophy is an endless quest, an age-long search for the hidden depths of reality. No single school, much less any single philosopher, however great, has a monopoly on all of its wisdom and all of its knowledge. It cannot be confined within the peanut shells of technical terms. It cannot be exhausted by any finite mind nor by any group of minds. It bursts all bounds. *Sub specie aeternitatis*—to see all things from the viewpoint of the eternal—this was Spinoza's absorbing ambition. If this be judged too difficult, encouragement may be found in

another of his immortal sayings: "*All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.*"

3. THE CYCLICAL THEORY OF LEARNING APPLIED TO THE STUDY OF PHILOSOPHY

In a penetrating discussion of education entitled "The Rhythmic Claims of Freedom and Discipline," A. N. Whitehead has developed a highly interesting and valuable theory of learning, which has special application to the study of philosophy.³ Let us call his theory *the cyclical theory of learning*.

Three requirements must be met, he thinks, in the mastery of any field of knowledge. These are *interest*, *discipline* and *freedom*. The student will not devote his energies to that which does not interest him. Every subject that is really mastered must appeal to the student and draw him on to the point where he wants to comprehend it through and through. But mastery requires that the student shall break the backbone of the subject in a wrestling bout with its technicalities. The details must be learned by patient, plodding, laborious study. This is discipline. Yet all of these details cannot be retained permanently. They will drop out of mind after they have been mastered, many never to return again. Indeed they must drop out if the student is to become a sure wielder of the type of power embodied in that field of knowledge. For he must penetrate to its laws and principles, and the details must be considered just the instruments by which he gets a firm grasp on these fundamental principles. This deeper insight makes for freedom, because it gives one control over the field of knowledge in question to such an extent that he can create additions to it. Mastery of any subject requires that one pass from interest through discipline to freedom. This is Whitehead's theory of learning.

³ See A. N. Whitehead: *The Aims of Education and Other Essays*, Chapter III. Reprinted from the *Hibbert Journal*, Vol. XXI, pp. 657ff.

He recognizes, however, that all three of these requirements must be met for each student at each stage in his learning. This is the reason for calling his theory a cyclical theory. Every student must feel something of the freedom of the master as he advances in his study. He must also continue to retain and satisfy his interest in the field he is endeavoring to master. Unless interest and freedom are both being satisfied, even while he wrestles with the details, the student will lose his enthusiasm for the subject and his sense of its importance. His work will become an unrelieved and meaningless drudgery. Hence studying a subject must alternate between interest, discipline, and freedom from the beginning to the end. There must be a cyclical movement all along the line of advance to the goal of complete mastery. That is why Whitehead is right in saying that we can never educate our youths by hiring professors to spout at them. Some study must be motivated wholly by the desire to satisfy interest. Other study must center on the mastery of details to satisfy discipline. But this must yield to periods of study to satisfy freedom. The principle of self-education is assumed throughout.

Applying this cyclical theory of learning to the study of philosophy the student will find that he can best satisfy its demands, and thereby get the most value and benefit from his work, by reading each assignment three times. Read what is required through once for interest. Do not attempt to understand everything. Merely note the ideas that are not clear to you. Explore the passage with the sole aim of locating in it whatever it contains that may interest you. Let your fancies play over the various ideas as you read. Aim deliberately to get as much enjoyment out of this precursory reading as you can. For it is to be a reading to satisfy interest only. After finishing this fairly rapid reading lay the book down for a moment and change your mood. Resolve that now you are going to do your very best to understand the selection. Then read it again slowly

and carefully to satisfy this resolution. Read it for discipline. This will be quite arduous, for you are setting your mind against that of the author. Do not become discouraged if he seems to have the advantage. Wrestle with his technicalities. Underline his key phrases and sentences. Outline and analyze his argument. If he could spend the time it took him to write the selection, and if his publisher could go to the expense of publishing what he wrote, surely you can afford to exert yourself enough so that you can think his thoughts after him. The burden of proof is upon you if you think he does not know what he is talking about. You may possibly be too stupid or lazy to fathom his ideas. Surely you must think twice and tackle him again before admitting this. You have now presumably finished this second hard reading, and you have satisfied the demands both of interest and of discipline. Change your mood again and get ready to satisfy freedom. Develop a critical or questioning attitude. Carry on a dialogue between yourself and the author. Ask yourself whether you agree with his basic ideas as you now understand them. Put various mental questions to him. Try to formulate the assumptions you think lie behind his written statements. Form some definite reaction to what he has said, at least provisionally. Turn over the pages of his article slowly and summarize his main line of argument. This third study will satisfy your demand for freedom. You should now be prepared to go to the classroom, or to some tutor or friend, for a purposeful philosophical discussion of what you have read. You will have a certain sense of mastery over the assigned work. Of course one cannot change himself from one mood to another as one turns on or off an electric light. But to recognize the three significant requirements of learning, and to make oneself as malleable as possible to their influence is of the utmost importance.

Repeat this cyclical process with each new assignment, and by the time you have finished a course in the subject

you will find yourself beginning to appreciate philosophy and to see into its depths. It can satisfy all three of the fundamental demands of your nature, a thing which can hardly be said of every subject. Study it faithfully to the point of mastery, and you will experience the supreme intellectual enjoyment which especially accompanies philosophic attainment.

CHAPTER IV

PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

I. THE IMPORTANCE OF METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY

ARE there practical technical methods in philosophy? Are there definite ways of reasoning which will lead him who understands how to use them into the inmost recesses of ultimate reality? Few questions in philosophy are more important than this, since the answer given to it determines whether philosophy is to be relegated to the intellectual junkheap of antiquated pseudo-sciences like alchemy and astrology or whether it is to be given a permanent status among modern branches of human knowledge.

Every type of philosophy which has attained standing in the modern world has been developed methodically. The best approach to an understanding of each type is through an understanding of its basic method or methods of reasoning. The thinkers who have made the most valuable contributions to each type of philosophy have been those who have deliberately pursued their investigations by means of characteristic methods. Moreover, it is the fact that they have employed essentially the same method or methods, which really justifies grouping philosophers together as representatives of one type. For such thinkers frequently differ considerably from one another in their development of specific doctrines and theories.

A good test of the quality of a thinker is whether he has reached his conclusions haphazardly or by following definite procedure. Philosophers always apply this test. Philosophies of life expounded by the unphilosophical are de-

nied recognition because they are merely aphoristic and lack the consistency of a philosophy built up by a definite method. Many an obscure passage in the writings of the great philosophers becomes clear only to those who read widely enough in their writings to grasp their method. Consequently that the student know what philosophical method is in general, as well as what the special methods are which are employed by separate schools of philosophy, is of supreme importance.

2. THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF DEDUCTIVE SYSTEMS

Thanks to the patient investigations made by penetrating mathematicians and logicians in recent years the general, formal structure of deductive systems of thought has been made clear and precise. Such systems are constituted by a set of postulates or assumed principles. The general ideas used in these postulates and in the systems are accurately defined. They are called "primitive ideas." The postulates and the definitions of a deductive system are regarded as independent within their own system, even though they may not be within some other system. On these definitions and postulates various theorems are based. Ultimately the proof for each theorem rests back upon the primitive elements of the system, but these theorems may form series such that one is used in proving another. The deductive system consists of the entire set of theorems, and includes the proofs for them and the primitive elements upon which they are based. When the reasoning by which the theorems are established is rigid and valid, the entire deductive system has internal consistency. An important test of this consistency is the substituting of an entirely different set of entities within the system. If such a substitution can be made *without the form of the system being changed*, we know that the system in question has a high degree of internal consistency.

An example of such a deductive system is plane geome-

try. The five axioms and the definitions of the terms used in the axioms are the primitive elements of the system, and the various propositions which are proved by means of these axioms are the theorems. All together constitute the system of plane geometry—a system which possesses almost perfect internal consistency. In recent years many other geometries, for example, Riemann's geometry, have been built up by using other primitive ideas. Each of these geometries can be shown to possess a high degree of internal consistency. Aristotelian syllogistic logic is another deductive system having a genuine self-consistency, but in recent years logicians have discovered many other logics which are equally or even more consistent.

3. PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEMS AS DEDUCTIVE

Now all philosophical reflection is essentially deductive in structure, however much induction it may exhibit. In other words, no matter how much a philosopher may insist upon starting with concrete facts, with what is given in sense experience, with particular data that are open to the observation and inspection of all, he nevertheless uses certain basic principles to interpret or to categorize these data. Immanuel Kant, the great German philosopher who wrote *The Critique of Pure Reason* and who really made philosophy *critical* and *methodical*, called the principles used to interpret data *a priori principles* because he regarded them as being logically prior to sense experience. They are the conditions which make human knowledge possible, according to Kant. Some of these *a priori principles* he called *categories* and that is why philosophers sometimes speak of categorizing sense data. Kant called other general principles *schemata of pure reason*, *regulative ideas*, and *pure intuitions*. But regardless of what he called them, they were all conceived by him to be the indispensable and minimum requirements of any thinking whatsoever. When Kant asked his famous questions: How is human knowledge possible?

What are the *a priori* or logically necessary principles which make knowledge possible? What are the conditions that are indispensable to any knowing whatever? he became the founder of a new way of approaching philosophical problems and the father of *critical philosophy*. He simply took it for granted that these *a priori* principles—categories, schemata, intuitions—are just as fundamental as a mathematician thinks axioms and definitions are. Hence it is all-important to know what the primitive principles are on which knowledge rests.¹

Modern philosophers pretty generally agree that philosophical thinking does make use of and elicit principles of interpretation or categories, even though some have grave doubts about the accuracy of Kant's particular analysis of the human knowing machine. Philosophical thinking is *reflective*. It gathers up the various data of common sense, of science, of art, of religion, and rethinks these data with more general categories than are used in any special branch of knowledge. It is important to know what these more general categories are. Any genuine understanding of a philosopher's reasoning depends absolutely upon one's grasp of that philosopher's basic principles of interpretation. What are the primitive ideas of a given philosopher's writings? This is the question the student must never cease asking.

4. THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF ALL PHILOSOPHIC REFLECTION

The question naturally arises as to whether there are any general principles which underlie any and every type of philosophy. We have just suggested that each individual philosopher always employs such a set of basic categories. But is there a set that every philosopher, regardless of the type of philosophy he personally represents, must acknowledge? Is there a set of common universal postulates on which all philosophy rests?

It must be frankly admitted that there are extreme rela-

¹ See the selections from Kant in my *Anthology of Modern Philosophy*.

tivists and adamantine sceptics who deny that there is a common set of principles at the basis of all philosophizing. Such thinkers argue that philosophy is bound to be determined either by personal and individual idiosyncrasies or by the social pattern of the group to which the philosopher belongs. There is, according to such thinkers, no hope whatever of reaching any agreement on philosophical questions. Our philosophy will be what we are or what our social order is. One or the other of these is the ultimate source of every philosophical system, and general unanimity is impossible.

Now there is certainly much ground for this view in the actual differences that have always existed, and that still exist, between philosophical systems of the past and of the present. The beginning student of the history of philosophy soon forms the idea that every successive philosopher demolished the views of his predecessors, and then proceeded to construct a speculative system just as vulnerable as the ones he destroyed. At least later thinkers were able to pick it to pieces. On first acquaintance with the history of philosophy one gets the impression that iconoclasm has dominated it with a vengeance.

It must also be admitted that those philosophers who attempt to state what they think are the common presuppositions of the philosophic quest almost invariably read into these presuppositions those which are really characteristic of their own type of philosophy. It is extremely difficult for any philosopher to separate the basic presuppositions of all philosophical reflection whatsoever from those of the type of philosophy he holds. This is evidenced by the fact that a philosopher dislikes being labeled as belonging to one type rather than to another. Deep down in his heart of hearts every philosopher knows that there is much truth in the theories of other philosophers; so he likes to think that his view is unique in the sense that his philosophy more adequately comprises the truths in opposing views than does

the philosophy of others. Calling such a thinker an idealist, or a realist, or a pragmatist, or any other philosophic name is often as much of an insult as waving a red flag in the face of a bull. Yet he who would tell the story of philosophy so that it can be understood must run the risk of offering this insult. He must use labels. And he is justified in so doing by the fact that philosophers themselves are guilty of mixing up with the general principles of all philosophic reflection those that are peculiar to some one type of philosophy or even to their personal viewpoint. When philosophers differentiate carefully among these kinds of principles, it may be possible to make a new label for objective and universal philosophy, reserving the old labels for specialized views or discarding them altogether. It is the fault of philosophers themselves that the common principles on which they agree have never been clarified and that there is no apparent unanimity among philosophers. However, the fact that these principles have never been clarified is no proof that they do not exist or that they are by nature unknowable. To be a philosopher at all one must at least make the assumption that there is such a thing as philosophy to which one is justified in devoting his energies. Here is one principle that, it would seem, no genuine philosopher could really seriously doubt.

5. HOCKING'S STATEMENT OF THE PRESUPPOSITIONS OF PHILOSOPHY

In his presidential address at a recent meeting of the American Philosophical Association W. E. Hocking called attention to the crying need of formulating the basic presuppositions of the philosophic enterprise, and he made a serious and highly commendable effort to bring to light these presuppositions. Let us briefly consider his interesting list.

First, *the philosopher must assume that there are particular meanings in the world.* To deny that there are any meanings cuts the very taproot of philosophy. And those

who come to the conclusion that all meanings are evanescent or of doubtful reality find their enthusiasm for philosophical reflection waning away. Their originality withers, they become mere pedants, or they turn towards some other quest than that of philosophic truth. But we must not interpret this postulate to mean that there are only particular meanings and that the totality of particular meanings is meaningless as a whole. If there are particular meanings, there must also be a single meaning, or, at least, the world as a whole must have meaning in order for particular meanings to exist. For, as Hocking rightly says, "Unless the whole of a life has meaning, the meanings of the parts are illusory";² and the same is true, only more strikingly, of more inclusive wholes: state, humanity, world. The fact that meanings, especially those of the larger wholes, leak away when we would quaff them, must not blind us to the reality of the meaning of such wholes. The wider meanings are like Tennyson's gleam. This is especially true of the most inclusive meaning of all—the meaning of the whole. It is elusive or afar, and we must pursue it all the harder when the meaning of some lesser whole grows dim and disappears.

Not of the sunlight,
 Not of the moonlight,
 Not of the starlight!
 O young Mariner,
 Down to the haven,
 Call your companions,
 Launch your vessel
 And crowd your canvas,
 And, ere it vanishes
 Over the margin,
 After it, follow it,
 Follow the Gleam.

The second postulate every philosopher must accept is *the competency of human beings, with their reason and*

² Quoted from my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, p. 37, where most of Hocking's presidential address is reprinted from the *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXVII, pp. 140-155.

other equipment, to grasp particular meanings and the meaning of the whole, or some of it. Even though in a particular case we may fail to see any meaning, nevertheless we must assume that it is there, and that we would be able to find it could we but see it *sub specie aeternitatis*—from the point of view of eternity. Talk as we will about “the abysmal mystery of existence”—the phrase is Cohen’s—still we must not give up hope that we can dispel with our human reason some of this mystery. This second postulate rests back on the first, for “to suppose that the world has produced meaning-seekers incompetent to assess meanings is to suppose a typically meaningless situation, such as our first postulate forbids us to assume.” (Hocking).

The third and last postulate is that *it is worth while to know the meanings of things and that we as thinkers are under a kind of obligation to inquire after them.* We are driven by the reality of meanings and of meaning to seek these meanings and this meaning until we find them and it. As we have already learned, there is a restless curiosity in the nature of man, a deep craving to know, which drives him on in the quest for philosophic comprehension of the meaning of each particular experience, and of the meaning of the world as a whole. Even what is often regarded as a meaningless fact must be faced, must be caught up into a larger whole and thereby be given a meaning. Here, then, are three ultimate postulates on which Hocking thinks the entire philosophic enterprise rests.

Is he not right? Some philosophers may think that he has woefully erred in that he has stated his three postulates so as to give them a twist towards idealism and in that he has failed to define the terms used in them. Undoubtedly he has. But if these three postulates constitute idealism, is not every philosopher committed to that much of idealism? In any event we are forced to recognize that philosophy dries up at the roots whenever we conclude that

we live in a meaningless world and that our pursuit of meanings is doomed to failure.

6. HOW TO CRITICISE A PHILOSOPHER

There are, however, certain other more restricted postulates at the basis of every particular philosopher's writings. These are sometimes explicitly stated, but frequently they are kept in the background. What the individual philosopher usually does is first to state all the objections he can think of to the views to which he is opposed, and then to construct his own interpretation as though it were entirely free from the errors he has pointed out in others. His own ultimate premises are often kept in the background and have to be brought to light by his reader. Hence the student of philosophy must learn to think critically so that he can discover what are the covert premises and presuppositions on which an author's general theories are based. And, in particular, he must learn that a philosopher is never as fond of, or as sympathetic with, the views of others as he is with his own. It is a peculiarity of philosophers to write as though no one else ever fully comprehended the problems of philosophy adequately and as though they alone had penetrated the veil of mystery. And it is another peculiarity of philosophers to assert that they are never really understood by a critic, for if they were how could he find fault with their view? This is not pompous conceit in a philosopher nor is it mere vanity, guilty though some philosophers may be of these two faults. It is rather the inevitable result of the attainment of a real insight into philosophic truth. Let me illustrate what I mean with a criticism Bernard Bosanquet has made of William James's *Pragmatism*.

"It just illustrates the difference between looking at philosophy from without and working at it from within, that after some hundreds of pages of discussion James finds himself, in essence, affirming the view the acceptance

of which by Leibniz he began by treating with contempt." I think that it would be generally agreed that this is a valid criticism of James, but let us think rather of the principle used in making the criticism. The distinction here made, between a philosopher looking at philosophy from without and working at it from within, is of the utmost importance. It may be taken as a general rule that when a philosopher is criticising another philosopher, he is looking at that man's philosophy from without. Likewise it may be taken as a general rule that when he is expounding his own view he is working at philosophy from within. And there is a vast difference. A philosopher may charge another philosopher with making an egregious blunder in his thinking, as James charged Leibniz with doing in expounding his theory that this is the best of all possible worlds. Yet that same philosopher may actually adopt almost the same position as the one he criticised, as James did when he said that, after all, this world of contingency in which we live is just the kind of a world we want. Many illustrations of this fact could be found in the writings of philosophers.

It follows that the student must attach much less importance to the controversial parts of a philosophic treatise than to the constructive parts. The former are valuable because they frequently give a clue to what the author dislikes. In them we find the ideas he would like to discredit or subordinate to some idea he regards as more suitable. But the constructive parts give us the philosopher's own views, and these we must examine critically to ascertain whether they are as free from the errors he has pointed out in others, or from other types of error equally bad, as he would lead the reader to believe. No philosophical discussion should be swallowed whole—bait, hook, and sinker. Let me repeat and reëmphasize what was said at the end of the preceding chapter. Reserve judgment while you read and try to understand. Resist with all your power the effort

every philosopher consciously or unconsciously makes to indoctrinate you with the idea that he has found the true philosophy. *The greatest philosophers want you to be independent in your thinking.* They seek for disciples only among those who know their system of ideas through and through, and who see its limitations as well as its strong points. They like to have a reader reserve judgment. They want their statements examined and criticised. They want the life view you get to be yours, not theirs. Beware of the propagandist type of philosopher. He has missed his calling. He belongs either in the pulpit or in the journalistic profession. Follow the man who you are sure has reached a fundamental insight, not that you may slavishly and abjectly worship him, but that you too may rise to that level of self-consciousness where you can achieve an insight of your own. As W. E. Hocking puts it: "There you may find or recover the vision which nullifies all imposture of the Established, the Entrenched, of all the self-satisfied Toryisms, Capitalisms, Obscurantisms of the world. And there you may find what is not less necessary for originality: unity in the midst of necessary and unnecessary flux, quiet confidence in your own eye-sight in the presence of the Newest, the Noisiest, the Scientificelest, the Blatantest, all the brow-beating expositions of pseudo-Originality, pseudo-Progress."³ It is not among the least of the values of philosophy that one who assiduously devotes himself to philosophical reflection obtains such a vision.

³ W. E. Hocking: *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, 2nd ed., pp. 278 f. (Yale Press).

CHAPTER V

BRANCHES, PROBLEMS, AND TYPES OF PHILOSOPHY IN OUTLINE

I. THE CHIEF BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHY

A SURVEY of the field of philosophy reveals many branches. Moreover, as the mother of the sciences, philosophy has vitally influenced every great science. Indeed the special sciences were all parts of philosophy until they developed specific content that was precise and definite enough to enable them to stand on their own feet as separate disciplines. For example, even as late as the eighteenth century physics was known as natural philosophy and formed a part of the department of philosophy in colleges. In many institutions psychology and education are still included in the philosophy department, although they are now generally regarded as independent disciplines. Undoubtedly this tendency for separate subjects to form within the field of philosophy, and then gradually to split off and become independent, will continue as human knowledge grows. The fact that philosophy has been, and still is, the matrix for the generation of special sciences, makes it all the more imperative that students who plan to devote their lives to scientific research should gain an acquaintance with the subject-matter of philosophy and an understanding of its scope. In this preliminary survey of the field those subjects which are still a part of philosophy will be considered, but those that have already achieved a separate status will not be discussed.

Following the suggestion at the end of Chapter I, let us make the fundamental division between *critical* and *specu-*

lative philosophy. The former is primarily concerned with the critique or criticism of human knowledge and with the study of the general methods and principles of human reasoning. Hence its two chief branches are *epistemology* and *logic*. Epistemology is a combination of the Greek words *ἐπιστήμη* and *λόγος* and means literally the science of knowledge. This branch of philosophy studies the human knowing machinery with a view to determining how men think and what the underlying conditions or the implicit assumptions in knowing are. Since the time of the great French philosopher, René Descartes (1596-1650), and especially since the time of David Hume (1711-1776), and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), this branch of philosophy has been generally recognized by philosophers of all schools as being of paramount importance. One may subdivide epistemology into *Psychological* and *Metaphysical Epistemology*. The former deals with the knowing processes analytically and descriptively. The latter studies the fruits of these processes, inquiring into the nature of meaning as embodied in human knowledge and its status in the universe as a whole. To put it differently, psychological epistemology is chiefly interested in knowledge as an aspect of human mental activity, raising the question of how knowing arises in the evolution of mind, its relation to, and status among, other phases of mind. Metaphysical epistemology, on the other hand, is chiefly interested in the place of knowledge in the wider universe, in whether or not it is identical with reality as a whole. One is *subjective*, looking at knowledge as related to the subject who has it; the other is *objective*, looking at knowledge as related to the content known. Since both approaches to epistemology are necessary to an understanding of what knowledge is, these two branches of critical philosophy are by no means mutually exclusive, but, on the contrary, they are mutually supplementary. The student should note especially that some philosophers use the terms *cognition* and *cognitive*

process in preference to the terms knowledge and knowing, whereas others use all these terms interchangeably.

Logic is a much older branch of philosophy than epistemology, and formerly included the latter in its own subject-matter. The earliest type of logic is the *Aristotelian Formal Logic*, named after Aristotle, who was the first to formalize and to organize into a separate branch of philosophy such logical theories and ideas as had been developed up to his time. He also developed the method of reasoning known as the *syllogism*, in which, by comparing two logical terms first with a common or *middle term*, a conclusion is then drawn about their relation to each other. Aristotelian Formal Logic well exemplifies the fundamental purpose of logic, which is to bring to light and to develop systematically and formally the essential axioms, rules, and principles of human reasoning. Some philosophers think that syllogistic logic is still important, even though they believe that it should be supplemented and modified to take account of modern developments. Others think that Aristotelian Logic is an anachronism in modern life, and they would junk it entirely. Hence other types of logic have arisen.

One of these is *Metaphysical Logic*, which is chiefly a development of the logic of Hegel (1770-1831), who expanded the epistemology of Kant into a theory that reason is the essence of the natural order as well as of human nature. To comprehend reasoning in men is to comprehend rationality as exhibited in and through all reality. Metaphysical logic is practically identical with metaphysical epistemology, according to this type of logic. In my opinion the so-called *Experimental Logic* of John Dewey and his school is a metaphysical logic, although it differs considerably from the Hegelian type. In recent years, under the leadership of such logicians as Boole, Venn, Schröder, and later of Peano, Couturat, Whitehead, and Russell, a branch

of logic known as *Mathematical* or *Symbolic Logic* has been evolved. It abandons ordinary language in favor of a highly technical set of symbols, similar to those used in higher mathematics. Thus it seeks greater precision and formal exactness in expressing all logical relations, which are thought to possess a validity independent of the human mind. To indicate the kind of reality such relations have some logicians use the word *subsistence*. This means that such relations constitute a logical order of reality which does not exist either in the subjective or in the objective sense, either as mental or as physical. Yet in a sense the world of subsistence is more real than the world of existence, since it is the framework on which the latter is hung. At bottom, therefore, symbolic logic is also a metaphysical type of logic. It is highly technical and abstract, and it cannot be discussed in detail in a course in the introduction to philosophy.

A fourth type of logic is *Applied Logic* or *Methodology*. It is frequently referred to as *Inductive Logic*, in contrast with the *Deductive Logic* of Aristotle. This type of logic examines in detail and criticises the various methods of research used in investigating any field of facts. It includes a study of the statistical method, the genetic and comparative methods, sampling, classification, the experimental and observational methods employed in the physical sciences, and the methods of hypothesis, explanation, and analogy. In fact, a critical evaluation of *all* of the *general* methods of scientific research may be said to constitute the branch of philosophy known as methodology or applied logic.

Logic is so complicated, and is such a closed system of philosophical knowledge, that a separate course is really required to introduce students to it. Such a course is usually a combination of the traditional Aristotelian Formal Logic, modified to suit the taste of the instructor, and a study of

methodology.¹ Metaphysical Logic and Symbolic Logic, as well as epistemology, are so intolerably technical that they are usually not studied very assiduously outside of the leading Graduate Schools, but they form essential parts of the curriculum of advanced courses in philosophy.

Turning now to *speculative philosophy* we find here two chief divisions, *metaphysics* and *theory of value*. The word metaphysics is sometimes used as a synonym for philosophy. The word arose from the designating of certain of Aristotle's writings as *metaphysica*, "meta" meaning that which comes after and *φύσις* being the Greek word for nature. In this rather accidental way our word metaphysics arose as a designation of that branch of philosophy which studies *all ultimate problems*. It is highly speculative because it seeks to answer the deepest problems which arise in connection with separate studies of nature, like physics, chemistry, biology, and psychology, but which cannot be answered without going beyond the data and the special laws of any single science. Metaphysicians are often in bad repute even among professed philosophers, especially among those who are sceptical of our ever finding an answer to ultimate problems.

Thou vainly curious mind which wouldst guess
Whence thou didst come, and whither thou mayst go,
And that which never yet was known wouldst know.

Thus might some characterize the metaphysician. Many contemporary thinkers are firmly convinced that the metaphysician wanders in a "no man's land," discovers only "the night in which all cows are black," or the "lion's den into which all tracks enter and from which none ever return."

Three distinct branches of metaphysics may be distinguished. *Cosmology* is the science of the cosmos or universe

¹ See my logic text-book, *The Principles of Reasoning, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method*, 2nd ed., 1930, and my logic sourcebook, *Illustrations of the Methods of Reasoning*, 1927, both published by D. Appleton & Co. R. M. Eaton's *General Logic* contains a section devoted to Symbolic Logic.

in its entirety and consists of speculations about the origin and nature of the vast space-time world. Einstein's theory of relativity is revolutionizing present-day cosmology.²

Ontology is the science of pure being. It deals with the ultimate nature of existence and of subsistence, and attempts to determine the various types of being, the various levels of reality, the basic kinds of existence or subsistence constituting the world of our human experience. Are *life* and *mind* ultimately real? Is energy the root of all other forms of being? Is the universe *monistic* or *pluralistic*, i.e., one or many? These are samples of the questions dealt with in ontology.

Metaphysical Psychology deals with the ultimate nature of mind or spirit or soul or personality. Is there a pure self or ego, transcending the separate experiences of our lives? If so, what is its nature? Is it a timeless self without a body? Is it eternal? Did it preëxist and will it continue to exist after the death of the body? Is there ultimately only one true self, or are there many selves? These are samples of the questions dealt with in metaphysical psychology. Metaphysics and all of its branches are among the most ancient parts of philosophy.

Theory of Value is that branch of speculative philosophy which inquires into the nature and status of value in the universe. It may be subdivided into *General Theory of Value* and the *special departmental philosophies*, each dealing with some one type of value. *General Theory of Value* is a new branch of philosophy, just separating itself from metaphysics, as is made clear in R. B. Perry's recently published and valuable treatise entitled *The General Theory of Value*, as well as in W. C. Urban's important *Valuation—Its Nature and Its Laws*. (See Part II, Chap. VI and Part III, Chap. VI below.) They and their followers hope

² For an example of the effect of the new physics on cosmology see A. S. Eddington's *The Nature of the Physical World* and Sir J. Jeans's *The Mysterious Universe*.

that this branch of philosophy may soon become a separate science. It attempts to get at the generic nature of value, presumably present in every type of value. There are different theories as to what this generic character is. Some writers identify it with one thing, and others with another, and some deny that there is any generic value. One's general theory of value determines his attitude toward each of the branches of philosophy concerned with some specific type of value.


The *departmental philosophies* of value are especially important because each is concerned with the philosophical interpretation of some special aspect of culture. *Ethics* studies the nature of moral value, and the source and nature of moral obligation or duty. *Social and political philosophy* are concerned especially with economic and communal values so far as these involve the interpenetration of minds in business and in play, and conflicts between races and nations and cultures. *Aesthetics* studies the value and nature of art in the broadest sense of the term, as covering every expression of beauty in literature, music, the fine arts, and in nature.

In addition to these three ancient branches of the philosophy of value a large number of other departmental philosophies should be mentioned. The *philosophy of science*, including some account of the history of science, is rapidly coming to the front. The *philosophy of religion*, which differs from theology by attempting to give an unprejudiced interpretation of all religious experience and of all religions, has become extremely important with our increased knowledge of the world's great religions. The *philosophy of law*, or *jurisprudence*, is growing in importance as society becomes more complicated. Recently a great impetus has been given to the *philosophy of history* by the publication of Oswald Spengler's *The Decline of the West*. The *philosophy of education* is of special importance today in America. These various departmental phi-

losophies inevitably overlap more or less, and it is impossible to study one without raising questions which belong under some of the others. For all of our human cultural values are perforce inextricably interrelated.

The following outline map of the branches of philosophy may serve as a graphic summary of the above exposition.

AN OUTLINE MAP OF THE BRANCHES OF PHILOSOPHY



2. THE GENERAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

Each branch of philosophy has special problems which are dealt with in separate books and courses. In a general introduction to philosophy these special questions have to be subordinated to the more general problems which overlap more or less the various branches. Consequently, it seems best to organize the material around four of these

general problems, instead of attempting to develop the content of each of the separate branches *per se*.

(1) *The Problem of Knowledge and Existence*.—The general problem of knowledge and existence is concerned with the various theories of the nature of knowledge and of the ways of knowing, as well as with the theories of the nature or meaning of existence, subsistence, and the types, levels, or degrees of reality. What kind of reality is to be attributed to space, time, physical objects, and their qualities, psychical images, life, energy, beauty, God, et cetera? What are the various ways human beings know the forms of being? It is such questions as these that comprise the general problem of knowledge and existence.

(2) *The Problem of Truth and Error*.—A closely related general problem is that of the nature of truth and error. This is also a complicated problem analyzable into many others. It involves the various theories of the nature of truth, the different criteria by which we distinguish truth from falsity, the relation of truth to reality or to existence or to subsistence and to value, and the problem of the metaphysical status of human error, including the illusions of perception as well as false beliefs or delusions.

(3) *The Problem of the Relation of Mind and Body*.—Every philosopher has ultimately to face the problem of the relation of the mind to the body, called the body-mind or the mind-body problem. Various theories as to the nature of mind and body have been set forth. A controversy between the behavioristic and mechanistic interpretations of mind, and the purposive and teleological interpretations has long been raging with unabated fury, involving philosophers of all schools. This problem has important bearings on the problem of free-will in ethics and the philosophy of religion, and this makes the solution of this body-mind difficulty decisive in the development of an ethical and religious philosophy of life.

(4) *The Problem of Value and Evil*.—Another general problem of the greatest practical importance is that of the nature and status of value in the universe. What do we mean by value? What are the chief types or kinds of value? Are values man-made and entirely relative to our creaturely life, or are they non-human, eternal realities? And what about evil in general and specific evils? What ultimate status is to be given the evils of existence in one's philosophy? How are we to define evil? How are we to get rid of it, if at all? Such are the questions raised by the general problem of value and evil.

3. THE CHIEF TYPES OF PHILOSOPHY


The way in which a given philosopher solves for himself these four general problems largely determines the type of philosophy which he holds. This is true even though there is considerable agreement among philosophers of different schools in the solutions given of these problems. For beneath the outward agreement there will be a variation in emphasis and interpretation which makes one man a representative of one and the other of another type of philosophy. Moreover, in determining the chief types of philosophy we have to consider the way in which the solution of one of these general problems dovetails into those of the other problems. Even though some thinkers strongly object to being classified, and bitterly condemn all philosophic labels, it cannot be denied that distinct types of philosophy exist today. An understanding of contemporary philosophy depends upon one's gaining some insight into the differences and similarities among these types.

We shall, therefore, organize our expositions around the chief types and make use of the four problems listed above to subdivide the material presented on each type. The reader who so desires may read the separate discussions of each problem successively, thereby making the problems

the main principle of organization instead of the types. It may be found advantageous to study the material both ways, using first one and then the other approach. Three main types are distinguished: (1) *Idealism*, (2) *Realism* and (3) *Pragmatism*, and each is dealt with at some length in Parts II, III and IV respectively. In addition to the three main types it will be necessary briefly to consider in Part V some important movements under the general heading *Other Types*.

It should be added that the *History of Philosophy* is a distinct branch of philosophy which was not included above. There are at least four different angles from which the study of the history of philosophy may be approached. One may trace the chronological development of philosophy in each of the great cultures, thus obtaining a bird's-eye view of the main trends in philosophic development. Or we may trace the history of the treatment of each of the general problems of philosophy, especially those listed above. And lastly, we may trace the history of the chief types. It is not our purpose here to go into the history of philosophy, since this really requires a separate course.³

Following is a graphic presentation of the four angles of approach to the history of philosophy.



³ For selections from all the great classical philosophers from 1600-1900 see my *Anthology of Modern Philosophy*, Crowell, 1931.

II. *Branches.*

- 1. History of Logic and Epistemology.
- 2. History of Ethics.
- 3. History of Aesthetics.
- 4. History of Psychology.
- 5. History of Science.
- 6. History of Social and Political Philosophy.
- 7. History of Education.
- 8. History of Religion.

III. *Problems.*

- 1. History of the solutions of the problem of knowledge and existence.
- 2. History of the theories of truth and error.
- 3. History of the mind-body problem.
- 4. History of the problem of value and evil.

IV. *Types.*

- 1. History of Idealism and Mysticism.
- 2. History of Naturalism, Materialism, and Realism.
- 3. History of Positivism, Humanism, and Pragmatism.
- 4. History of Scholasticism and other types.

PART TWO

IDEALISM

CHAPTER I

WHAT IDEALISM IS

1. THE WORDS IDEA, IDEAL, AND IDEALISM

PERHAPS the best approach to the nature of idealism as a philosophy is through a discussion of the meanings of the words *idea*, *ideal* and *idealism*. Hoernlé has devoted a chapter to the elucidation of the meanings of these words in *Idealism as a Philosophy* (Ch. II), and there are excellent articles on each of these terms in Hastings's *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics* and on the word *idealism* in the 14th edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. All that can be done here is to summarize the various significant meanings of these words and in so doing these sources are followed.

A. *Idea*.—In popular speech the word *idea* means any object we think about. The term came into popular speech from the philosophy of John Locke, but it has lost the definite and precise connotation it had in Locke's *Essay Concerning the Human Understanding*. He defined an *idea* as "whatsoever the mind perceives in itself, or is the immediate object of perception, thought or understanding" (Bk. II, Ch. VIII, 9). In psychology the term *idea* has a technical sense. The three stages in the growth of human knowledge are called sensation, perception, and *ideation*. Ideas appear in the third stage. According to the definition given in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* an *idea* is "the reproduction, with a more or less adequate image, of an object not actually present to the senses." This traditional psychological meaning of the word *idea* really comes from the philosophy of David Hume. He defined an

idea as a copy of an impression, and by an impression he meant a sensation or what is "actually present to the senses." But the word idea is much older than the philosophy of Hume or that of Locke. It originated, we do not know exactly how, in the Greek language, in the fifth century B.C., but it was probably first used as a technical philosophical term by Plato. And to him it had an entirely different meaning from the two already given. His ideas are "essences" or "real things," of which particular objects are "copies." For example, there is a universal essence or idea of horse or elephant, which contains all the essential attributes of horse or elephant, and particular horses and elephants participate in the nature of this essence of horse and of elephant. That is what makes them horses and elephants. To Plato there is a world of eternal and non-temporal essences or ideas, and it is far more real than the world of sensation. Later students of Plato, especially the so-called Neo-Platonists and Christian philosophers, like St. Augustine, changed Plato's conception by subordinating the world of ideas to God. The ideas are intelligible essences, or archetypes, in God's mind of the created objects making up the visible world which surrounds us. This was the meaning of the word idea which prevailed through the Middle Ages and which still prevails among Platonists. There are, then, four quite distinct meanings of the word idea. With Plato an idea was an eternal pattern, more real even than God; it was subordinated to God and was regarded as an archetype in His mind by the Neo-Platonists; it was made the immediate object of man's mind when he thinks by Locke; and it was defined as a faint copy of a sense impression by Hume. Thus there has been what may be called a degrading of the meaning of the word idea in the history of philosophy.

B. *Ideal*.—In popular speech the word ideal sometimes means what is excellent of its kind, as when we say this is an ideal day or an ideal situation. The word comes from



Photo Brown Bros.

JOSIAH ROYCE (1855-1916)

late Latin. Long after the word *idea* had been taken over from the Greeks, the Romans formed the term *idealis*, and it is the source of our word *ideal*. The word also has the meaning of that which would be perfect could it but be realized, with the implication that it cannot be, as when we speak of an ideal university or college fraternity. All existing universities and college fraternities fall a little short of being ideal. It is with this connotation that the word is most frequently used in philosophy. Ideals are perfect patterns which we strive to attain but never wholly realize. The word is also frequently used in this sense in art. In *Peele Castle* Wordsworth speaks of

The light that never was, on sea or land,
The consecration and the poet's dream.

Here the ideal is a perfection never actually realized in existing things, yet it forever lures men on to higher achievement. There is a third meaning of the word *ideal* where it is used, somewhat in derision, of visionary schemes that are altogether impractical, as when we speak of a fanatic as an idealist. Henry Ford's plan to get the boys out of the trenches by Christmas, involving his sending of the Peace Ship to Europe, would be regarded by many as a fantastic and visionary scheme and hence as being an ideal in the bad sense. To the cynic even the noblest ideals are of this type.

C. *Idealism*.—The popular meaning of idealism is determined by the meaning of the term *ideal*. Thus the term has three popular senses—(i) visionary and unreal speculations, (ii) lofty and unattainable moral, aesthetic, and religious standards, and (iii) high but attainable human goals.

The philosophical meaning of the term *idealism* is determined more by the meaning of the term *idea*. It refers to those theories of the ultimate reality of the universe which make that reality *consist of ideas* in any of the senses defined above. Thus idealism may mean *mentalism* or *subjec-*

tive idealism or *phenomenalism*. According to this theory the ultimate reality is either spirits and their ideas or a heterogeneous collection of floating ideas, sometimes called the stream of consciousness. On the other hand, idealism may mean *Platonism*, the theory that behind the veil of sense experience there is an ideal world of eternal essences, ordered according to some definite principle, usually conceived of as moral. Often this is referred to as the world of truth, goodness, and beauty. Then, again, idealism may mean *Absolute Idealism*, the theory that reality is a rational process of the unfolding of ideas in nature and in human history—a process which originated out of the Absolute Idea and will return into it. Or the term idealism may mean a *Theistic Idealism*, which makes God the supreme reality and takes His ideas to be the patterns by which the world, and all that is therein, are continuously being created and sustained. Thus idealism as a philosophy is truly a coat of many colors. We shall return to the question of the types of idealism later, but first let us attempt to formulate the general or common characteristics of idealism.

2. THE GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF IDEALISM AS A PHILOSOPHY

It is extremely difficult to formulate a definition of idealism that will cover all its forms. In fact it is so difficult that many idealists will not even make the effort to define it. And too often the critics of idealism pick what they regard as the most vulnerable type, identify this with all idealism, and then cast their lances at it, leaving the impression that in refuting it they have disposed of idealism.

There is one thing that can be said of all forms of idealism and that is that they profoundly respect culture. All idealisms are deeply rooted in human culture and their adherents know it. Hence idealists are likely to talk less about progress and more about order and stability than other philosophers. Idealism subordinates all pursuit and love of comfort, ease, and personal pleasure to the more

objective ideals of culture. It strives to comprehend the meaning and purpose of human history and of its institutions. It regards the whole universe as under the control of moral, religious, and aesthetic ends, and thinks of these cultural values as being both *supra-individual* and *supra-social*. Each particular person, and the politico-economic social order as a whole, exists that these cultural ends may be attained. Yet these general characteristics of idealism are also characteristics of the world's great religions, and they are entirely too widespread to be identified with idealism as a philosophical doctrine. Nevertheless it is important to stress the fact that idealism as a philosophy shares these views. Idealism is unquestionably that philosophy which is most sympathetic with the religious attitude toward life, and with the deep and far-reaching spiritual aspirations of mankind, with man's longing for eternity and for a real comprehension of the profound meaning of the world. Idealism is almost the only philosophy which has not abandoned the belief that every man has a destiny and the assurance that ultimate reality is friendly to him in the realization of that destiny. To its critics this is its most serious weakness, but to its adherents this is its undying and deathless strength.

When the attempt is made to get nearer to the heart of idealism as a philosophy it is necessary to begin by asking the all-important question: *What is the ultimate reality that is given in experience?* Now how does philosophical idealism answer that profound question? "Metaphysical idealism, in the only technical sense that we can ascribe to the term, . . . implies that the relation of subject and object is one of the essential starting points of philosophy, and in its view of that relation it lays down the decisive principle that objects can exist only for a subject, and that the subject, which carries the objects within itself, is the higher category, and as such must determine the process

of philosophical thought.”¹ Here is one way of answering the basic question of philosophy, and this way has generated diverse forms of idealism.

One of the most novel and interesting of these forms is *solipsism*—the view that the agent or subject doing the thinking and his ideas are the only realities, and that all the outer world is but a dream of the subject. Edgar Allan Poe has well expressed this attitude in his little poem, *A Dream Within a Dream*, only for Poe the subject is also a dream.

Take this kiss upon the brow!
And in parting from you now,
Thus much let me avow—
You are not wrong, who deem
That my days have been a dream;
Yet if hope has flown away
In a night, or in a day,
In a vision, or in none,
Is it therefore the less *gone*?
All that we see or seem
Is but a dream within a dream.

I stand amid the roar
Of a surf-tormented shore,
And I hold within my hand
Grains of the golden sand—
How few! yet how they creep
Through my fingers to the deep,
While I weep, while I weep!
O God! can I not grasp
Them with a tighter clasp?
O God! can I not save
One from the pitiless wave?
Is *all* that we see or seem
But a dream within a dream?

The critics of idealism take great delight in attempting to show that such a view is the only logically consistent form that idealism can take; and since such a view is absurd, they hold that all idealism stands condemned because really

¹ Ernst Troeltsch: *Hastings's Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. VII, p. 90 (Scribners).

based upon an absurd starting point. But Bradley, an outstanding idealist, is the one who has shown most clearly the logical absurdity of solipsism, which is that the solipsist begs the whole question in asserting his own existence, since the ego or self is never an immediate datum of experience but an extremely complex entity. As Hoernlé puts it: "Immediate experience, the solipsists' 'I' and 'self,' is always both 'that' and 'what,' both 'this' and 'such,' both particular and universal, and it is the universal in it that ever carries it beyond itself—the life in it of the whole of which it is part."²

What, then, is this whole of which the self or subject is a part? Have we not given the wrong answer to our basic question when we say that "the subject, which carries the objects within itself, is the higher category"? Would this not commit us to solipsism? Yes, if we mean by the subject an individual finite mind. When we reflect deeply upon the subject-object relation we are driven to this definition of idealism. "Idealism as a philosophical doctrine conceives of knowledge or experience as a process in which the two factors of subject and object stand in a relation of entire interdependence on each other as warp and woof. . . . *Without mind no orderly world*: only through the action of the subject and its 'ideas' are the confused and incoherent data of sense-perception (themselves shot through with both strands) built up into that system of things which we call Nature, and which stands out against the subject as the body stands out against the soul whose functioning may be said to have created it. On the other hand, *without the world no mind*: only through the action of the

² R. F. A. Hoernlé: Hastings's *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. XI, p. 680. The article from which the sentence is taken is entitled *Solipsism*. It is very valuable, tracing the source of the word and the history of the doctrine. It should be pointed out that Brightman, in making the self an immediate datum, (see my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, p. 140) and "the primary datum," logically commits himself to solipsism. He attributes this view to Bowne and "most idealists." Perhaps he should have said "most personalists." I think that this is a serious defect in personalism.

environment upon the subject is the idealizing activity in which it finds its being called into existence. Herein lies the paradox which is also the deepest truth of our spiritual life.”³ This way of answering the basic question of philosophy certainly leads us away from solipsism. But where does it conduct us? Straight into the jaws of *absolutism*—so say the critics. Thus the pendulum of idealism swings from the extreme of solipsism to the extreme of absolutism. According to Absolute Idealism the whole of reality is a single, self-ordered and intelligent whole of which finite subjects and objects are but tiny parts. That whole was called the *Absolute* or the *Absolute Idea* by Hegel. Absolute Idealism has never really been refuted, although its enemies have said that they are going to refute it. Its basic principle has often been ignored or declared absurd, but it has never been overthrown.

However, one can be an idealist without holding either of the extreme positions. Here, as in many other matters, the mean position is the true one. Hence a refutation of the two extremes would leave idealism still essentially unscathed. It would be like trying to kill a giant by cutting off his hair and his toenails. Even though Samson’s strength left him when they cut off his hair, he was able to get it back again. Idealism is a giant like Samson. It may be grinding at the mill of its enemies today, but tomorrow it will cast the pillars and roofs of their temple upon them. It is hardly likely that twenty-five or more years of the twentieth century will destroy a philosophy that has nobly flourished for twenty and more centuries. When idealism dies opposing views will die too, and philosophy itself will be no more.

3. SOME RECENT CLASSIFICATIONS OF IDEALISM

In *A Philosophy of Ideals* E. S. Brightman distinguishes four chief types of idealism. The first of these is *Platonic*

³ J. H. Muirhead: *Encyclopedia Britannica*, 14th ed., Vol. XII, pp. 65 and 69.

Idealism, which is characterized by the fact that it asserts the objective reality of our human ideals and values. The second is *Berkeleian Idealism*, named after its founder, Bishop Berkeley. It holds that all that we can know as human beings is of the nature of mind or consciousness. But it also asserts that the probabilities are that all reality is also mental in essence, including any part we do not know. The third type is *Hegelian Idealism*, which argues that the perfect coherence of one single intelligent system is the only genuine reality or value. The fourth type is *Lotzean Idealism*, named after the great German philosopher Lotze. This type holds that selfhood or personality is the only ultimate and fundamental reality. The third of these types is sometimes called *Speculative Idealism*, and the fourth *Personalistic Idealism*, or simply *Personalism* or *Theism*.

Hoernlé in *Idealism as a Philosophy* also distinguishes four types of idealism that are similar to the four distinguished by Brightman, with exceptions that will be pointed out presently. *Absolute Idealism*, which corresponds to the Hegelian Idealism of Brightman, Hoernlé acclaims as the highest form which idealism has attained. Next to this in importance is *Spiritual Pluralism*. This is the view that spirits, or rather a "Society of Spirits" with God as supreme, constitutes the ultimate reality. This includes Personalism, which Brightman would rank highest, and Berkeleian Idealism. Hoernlé's third type is *Spiritual Monism*, which "regards Reality as a single, impersonal, spiritual force, manifesting itself in all things." He uses Schopenhauer and Bergson and their followers to exemplify this type. Brightman's classification omits this kind of idealism, but it certainly should be included in a complete classification. For his fourth type Hoernlé names *Critical Idealism*, which is founded upon the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. This type is sometimes called *Scientific Idealism*. Brightman would probably put this under

Hegelian Idealism, but it is really a distinct form of idealism.⁴

Another important difference between these two classifications is that Brightman rightly regards Platonic Idealism as a unique type. Here would belong the philosophy of Dean Inge and other contemporary idealists. It would be misleading to bring these men under any of the types differentiated by Hoernlé. On the other hand, both writers omit the new idealism which has been developed in Italy by Croce, Gentile, and others. While this is based on Hegelianism, it is so distinct from the Absolute Idealism of Germany, England, and America that it deserves special mention. Accordingly, I would suggest the following classification of contemporary idealism.

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|---------------------------------|---|--|
| I. <i>Absolute Idealism.</i> | { | 1. The Absolute as Spirit.
(Croce and Gentile. See Part V,
Chap. I, 1.)
2. The Absolute as Intelligence.
(Bradley, Bosanquet, Creighton,
Hoernlé, Paulsen, Windelband
and others.)
3. The Absolute as Intelligent Personal
Self or Will.
(Royce, Hocking, Leighton, Miss
Calkins, Pringle-Pattison and
others.) |
| II. <i>Spiritual Pluralism.</i> | { | 1. Personalism.
(Bowne, Flewellyn, Brightman,
McConnell and others.)
2. Theism.
(Ward and others.) |
- III. *Spiritual Monism.* (Bergson and his followers.)
- IV. *Scientific Idealism or Neo-Kantianism.* (Natorp, Cassirer, and others.)
- V. *Platonic Idealism.* (Dean Inge and others.)

⁴ See M. P. Mason in *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. III, pp. 449-457.

CHAPTER II

THE METHODS OF IDEALISM

I. DOES IDEALISM HAVE A METHOD?

THE reaction against idealism, which began near the end of the nineteenth century and which has culminated in the development of realism and pragmatism, has been motivated partly by the desire to make philosophy scientific. The commonest charge of representatives of both of these types of philosophy against idealism is that it lacks a genuinely scientific method of procedure. Is this charge valid?

One might get the impression that it is from what some of the idealists themselves say, as well as from the failure of many of them to state clearly what their method is. Frequently such method as idealists have is kept in the background in the interest of the exposition of idealistic theory and doctrine. This practice gives some substance to the claim of critics that idealism is unmethodical, traditional, and essentially a literary or parlor philosophy. But, so the critics argue, since a sound philosophy should be progressive, scientific, and methodical, idealism stands condemned as essentially an antiquated philosophy. Now when as great an idealist as Bosanquet can write: "I confess that all this talk about method in philosophy seems to me rather foolish and wearisome," this charge of the critics might be thought to be valid. E. S. Brightman has rightly called attention to the fact that many idealists attach too little importance to method. His essay entitled "The Personalistic Method in Philosophy" is a good account of method from the stand-

point of personalism, and should help to correct the mistaken belief that idealists are unmethodical in their thinking.¹

For this is undoubtedly a mistaken impression, and many have been misled by it. Idealism has always had at least one method and that is the *dialectical method*. Although hoary with age this is a method still continually used by leading idealists. Let us briefly consider this traditional method.

2. THE DIALECTICAL METHOD

In Western Culture the first great monist was Parmenides, a Greek philosopher who preceded and laid the foundation for Plato. Now Parmenides and his pupil, Zeno, employed a method of reasoning which was essentially dialectical when they pointed out various contradictions that are involved in various common-sense ideas. Let us think especially of the idea of motion. The contradictions in this idea are known as "Zeno's paradoxes"; and they have been famous in philosophy ever since he formulated them. One of them is known as the paradox of the flying arrow, and another as that of Achilles and the tortoise, Achilles being a hare. Zeno argued that an arrow can not move, because it must either move in the place where it is or into the place where it is not, and neither is possible. Similarly he argued that a hare can never overtake a tortoise. Thus he sought to prove that motion is impossible and that being is immovable. This is the first known use of the dialectical method, which consisted at the beginning simply in pointing out contradictions or paradoxes in ideas, and in treating any idea as absurd that contained such contradictions. The method was greatly extended in the Socratic method of questioning and answering as set forth in Plato's *Dialogues*. Both Socrates and Plato employed this method to reach definitions of concepts that are free from contradiction. They

¹ The quotation from Bosanquet is from *Three Lectures on Aesthetics*, p. 3 (Macmillan). See E. S. Brightman in the *Methodist Review*, Vol. CIII, pp. 368-380.

first brought to light the ambiguity in a given definition and then in another and another, but they usually either ended by giving a good definition of the thing under consideration or by leaving it to the reader to formulate one. Such a definition included the truth in the various rejected definitions and excluded the error. Thus Socrates and Plato made the dialectical method constructive.

Centuries later Hegel took up this ancient dialectical method and perfected it as a fundamental metaphysical method of reasoning. And it is his use of this method more than any other single thing that has made him the "father of modern idealism." He argued that every idea whatsoever, when its meaning is reflected upon, generates an opposite idea. These opposed ideas contain the two aspects of the truth embodied in the idea which generated them, and they must in turn be reconciled in another and higher idea, —higher, that is to say, in the sense of being freer from contradiction than the original idea. For example, starting with the idea of *being*, we are led to its opposite *nonbeing*; and we find these reconciled in the idea of *becoming*. This process of finding the positive and negative aspects of the meaning of any given concept, and of reconciling these in some higher concept, Hegel called the dialectical movement of thought. It culminates in the *Absolute Idea* which is the complete reconciliation of all contradictions that have appeared in the process.²

In the Introduction to his *Hegel Selections* Loewenberg takes the position that this method is essentially sound, but that the philosophical system which Hegel constructed by using this method is really fallacious. This at least proves that the dialectical method of Hegel is still recognized by a competent philosopher who is not an Hegelian. Now when Bosanquet immediately added to the comment quoted above, "I only know in philosophy one method; and that is

² See the first selection from Hegel in my *Anthology of Modern Philosophy*, especially the "Table of Categories."

to expand *all* the relevant facts, taken together, into ideas which approve themselves to thought as exhaustive and self-consistent," he endorsed the dialectical method perfected by Hegel. And throughout his writings he simply took this method for granted and continually applied it in the solution of philosophical problems. Hence it is a serious mistake for any critic or reader to conclude that idealism has no method. He will make little progress in the study of modern idealism who does not discover that all the writings of idealists are more or less dominated by the Neo-Hege-
lian form of the dialectical method. It takes patient study to discover this, but it is the secret to the understanding of idealism.

Yet there is also another traditional method of idealism, and that is the method of intuition. Let us now consider it.

3. THE METHOD OF INTUITION

The method of intuition in one form or another has been stressed by idealistic philosophers ever since Plato and Aristotle. The word intuition is used in different senses, but common to all of them is the idea of direct or immediate apprehension of truth as contrasted with the analytical or discursive, step-by-step method of ordinary reflective thinking. Among ancient thinkers, Plotinus (205-270), the great Neo-Platonist philosopher and mystic, insisted that rational knowledge reached by discursive reasoning exists only for the purpose of bringing the mind up to the point where it can attain an insight into reality which transcends the separate formulations of the discursive reason. St. Augustine, and all Christian mystical philosophers, held a similar view. In the Middle Ages St. Anselm (1033-1109) first used the Latin term *intuitus* in the technical sense to mean immediate knowledge of the present as such. He especially applied it to St. Paul's saying: "Now I know in part, but then face to face," holding that intuitive knowledge means know-

ing face to face. Even Voltaire, the enemy of scholasticism, has Cato say:

Oh, heavenly Truth,
Now I shall see thee bright and clear, not hid
As when life holds us in its deadening sleep.
Life is a dream! Death wakes us to the light!

Other scholastic philosophers used the term intuitive knowledge as did St. Anselm. In his excellent biography of Descartes, Chevalier has proved conclusively that the great founder of modern philosophy and discoverer of analytical geometry, employed this method along with rational or discursive reasoning. Pascal said: "The heart hath its reasons which the reason knoweth not." Spinoza spoke of a third type of knowledge above perceptual and conceptual knowledge, calling it *scientia intuitiva*, and to him this was the immediate intuition of the whole of reality or the intellectual love of God. Fichte and Schelling, the great German contemporaries of Hegel, especially stressed intuition as a method of knowing.

Recently the distinguished French philosopher and winner of a Nobel prize for literature, Henri Bergson, has come out strongly in defense of intuitive knowledge on the ground that it gives a far deeper and truer insight into the nature of reality than does the analytical method of science. He defines intuition as "instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely." Intuition makes good the defects in intelligence, which is really only a tool for dealing with the more solid parts of reality. Intuition gives us the inner and vital soul of reality. Although human beings use intellectual apprehension or discursive reasoning far more than they use intuition, the latter always functions when our deepest interests are involved. "On our personality, our liberty, on the place we occupy in the whole of nature, on our origin and, perhaps, also on our destiny, it throws

a light feeble and vacillating, but which none the less pierces the darkness of the night in which the intellect leaves us." ² We must build philosophy on science, but we must also build it upon our untutored and tutored intuitions, using them as gateways to the inner essence of the real. Today no one can hope to understand idealism who neglects its use of the method of intuition as a way of attaining philosophic truth.

4. THE METHOD OF INTENSIVE CONCRETION

Let us now attempt to formulate as the essential method of idealism *the method of intensive concretion*, building it out of the dialectical method and the intuitive method. I call this method the method of intensive concretion, in order to contrast it as sharply as possible with *the method of extensive abstraction* of realism, which is expounded in Part III, Chapter II.

The word *intensive* is used here in much the same sense as it is used in logic in the doctrine of the intension of a logical term. One gives the intension of a term when he lists all of the various elements or factors entering into the constitution of any example of that term. Using the term intensive in this sense, the metaphysical reality of any entity whatsoever includes all of its qualities, relations or aspects, no matter what they may be or how far they may be separated in space or time. The intensive characteristics in their completeness and depth, and seen in relation to each other, is the aspect of the method which the word intensive would convey. This might be expressed as viewing the aspects of a thing *synoptically*. The word *concretion* emphasizes particularity and uniqueness. Every entity has just as much reality as it possesses uniqueness. The word concretion is used to signify that the intensive qualities are fused together in a unique manner, so as to constitute an

² Henri Bergson: *Creative Evolution*, p. 268, translated by A. Mitchell (Holt).

individuality or a concrete whole. Thus the method of intensive concretion seeks the concrete whole, which unifies the seemingly irreconcilable aspects of a thing. This concrete whole is the metaphysical reality of that particular thing. We may, therefore, refer to the realities reached by the method of intensive concretion as *concrete universals* or *implicative systems*. These are the irreducible units of reality when reality is metaphysically, rather than biologically or physically, conceived.

Note that this method assumes reality, in the sense of metaphysics, to be constituted of concrete universals. It denies at the outset that there are any isolated and unrelated "hard atoms" or "soft souls." To be at all is to be a synthesis of aspects or qualities. The absolutely simple is inconceivable. Whatever has any reality is held together with something else so as to form a synthetic whole. Pure identity and pure difference are unthinkable. Identity in difference or concrete universality is the essential structure of any entity that can claim any metaphysical reality whatsoever.

The problem with which every thinker is confronted is that of discovering the particular concrete universal to which any given aspect of experience belongs. He must follow the clues of the given aspect until he is led to enough other aspects to enable him to discern the pattern to which this and its related aspects belong. He must start with the assumption that there is such a pattern and that his mind is capable of discovering it. And he must use intuition and feel his way into the essence of this concrete whole as well as think his way into it. But the important point about the method of intensive concretion is its emphasis upon seeing all of the appearances or aspects in relation to a pervading identity which unifies them so that together they form, not a mere aggregation or totality, but a concrete universal.

An example will make this clearer. What is the meta-

physical reality of Lindbergh's flight from New York to Paris? From a common-sense viewpoint this is an epoch-making event in the history of aviation. What would an application of the method of intensive concretion yield as the metaphysical reality of this actual event, which every well-informed person would undoubtedly have to admit had occurred?

Many *physical qualities*, or whatever physicists would resolve physical qualities into, formed part of this event. There was the airplane, the Spirit of St. Louis, with its elaborate and precise mechanism, the materials out of which plane and motor were constructed. Here, too, belong the fuel and the oil the motor used, the food Lindbergh ate, the clothes he wore, his physical body, and the atmospheric and climatic conditions he met on the journey, the landing field from which he made his take-off and the one where he landed, and the compasses and other instruments he used to chart his course. Using recent terminology we may call all of these aspects of Lindbergh's flight the *macroscopic* physical entities of this metaphysical reality or concrete universal. But we may accept the physico-chemical theory that all these gross objects were composed of swarming multitudes, unnumbered and innumerable, of protons and electrons in various orbits of motion. Yet these were unified in one great system of motion towards Paris, controlled by the lone pilot. The method of intensive concretion would say that the metaphysical reality of Lindbergh's flight included all of these *microscopic* entities as well as the macroscopic.

Biological and *physiological* factors were also involved, which were both macroscopic and microscopic. The food the pilot ate was assimilated by his stomach and was distributed through his body by the incessant beating of his heart. His nerves, brain, and other bodily organs had to be functioning perfectly. Only a being vibrant with life could have made such a flight. And who knows how many other living

organisms were connected in one way or another with this flight? Yet all of these macroscopic biological and physiological objects may be analyzed by scientists into innumerable microscopic entities. Howsoever many there were of both macroscopic and microscopic biological and physiological factors involved in the making of this flight, all are included in its metaphysical reality, according to the method of intensive concretion.

The *spatio-temporal relations* involved are obvious enough. The duration and distance traversed, the height the plane was in the sky, the speed with which it traveled, these and all other spatio-temporal aspects are part of the metaphysical reality of that historic flight. And the *values* involved can not be ignored. The cost of the airplane, and of the fuel, oil, and food, and of the ticket Lindbergh purchased to bring him home, the prize money he won, the increase in the value of airplane stocks—these economic values are unquestionably a part of the metaphysical reality of that flight. But so also are the aesthetic and moral values created by it. A hero for countless youths to admire and to imitate emerged at the end of the flight. All of these values connected with this flight are a part of its reality according to the method of intensive concretion. The *mental factors* are even more important. The mind of Lindbergh which conceived this particular flight, the careful plans he made and carried out in detail, the consummate skill acquired through years of assiduous practice, the technical knowledge of aeronautics, the memories he yet retains—all of these and all other mental factors are to be included in the metaphysical reality of that flight. Nor can the *social factors* be omitted. The crowd of people who saw Lindbergh take to the air and those who saw him emerge from the sky, the spontaneous acclaim of an astounded humanity—all these and other social factors are a part of the metaphysical reality of that memorable flight, according to the method of intensive concretion.

Yet what would all of these diverse factors be without the unity which holds them together? Idealism holds that there is such an ideal order-system, and that it is this concrete universal, of which all of the above-mentioned factors are constituents, which is the metaphysical reality of Lindbergh's flight. This whole is not a sensuous object. No one can touch it or see it or hear it or smell it or taste it or discover it with the sense of equilibrium or any other "sixth sense," known or unknown. It is not a spatio-temporal type of object. Spatio-temporal ingredients are included in it; but when we call it merely an event in aviation, we are ignoring many other elements that are important and taking its temporal character alone as a clue to its reality. As a concrete universal its event-character is only one of its aspects. And the same must be said of every other aspect. Every physical and mechanical factor, every biological and physiological factor, every spiritual and social factor is to be regarded as an intensive quality of this concrete whole and is never to be identified with this whole itself. *The metaphysical reality cannot be identified with any single aspect nor with any group of aspects nor with any collection of aspects constituted by selections from each group, just because it can only be identified with the totality of all aspects of all groups, conceived of as unified into a concrete whole rather than as a mere aggregation or totality.* To discover this whole is to comprehend Lindbergh's flight as a metaphysical reality in distinction from comprehending it as an event in the history of aviation. The method of intensive concretion is a method of sweeping into one dynamic and organic whole all of the various elements belonging to that whole, and of holding this unified and ideal order-system to be the ultimate reality. To the objection that such a concrete universal is a myth or figment of the philosopher's imagination the idealist would reply that it is embodied in every one of its aspects, since we recognize each of them to be an aspect only because we have a grip

upon the concrete universal to which it belongs. Knowing them as aspects or fragments implies a knowledge of the concrete whole of which they are fragments. And this is an irrefutable proof that concrete universals are real.

Many other names have been given to the method of idealism besides that of intensive concretion. Bradley refers to it as the principle of identity in difference, the method of finding the whole which is constituted by a pervading identity inherent in manifold differences. Bosanquet refers to it as the principle of individuality and value, and also as the principle of the concrete universal and of self-relatedness. Royce refers to it as interpretation. Hoernlé calls it the synoptic method. But all idealists agree that the essence of the real is always that whole which includes all of the appearances or aspects of a thing. And they also agree that we must both think and feel our way into that whole. We must use the rigorous dialectical method of finding and reconciling contradictions, but we must supplement this with intuitive insight.

CHAPTER III

IDEALISM'S SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXISTENCE

1. THE LEVELS THEORY OF REALITY

THE essence of the idealistic theory of existence is the levels theory of reality. This theory has recently been reformulated; but it is as old as idealism, or at least as old as the *Dialogues* of Plato and the writings of Aristotle. When Plato in the *Symposium* distinguished different levels of the experience of beauty, the highest being the love of the absolute idea or form of beauty, he was stating this theory. It is also the central idea in his theory that the ideas are arranged in an hierarchy, with the idea of good at the top. And when Aristotle distinguished the vegetative or nutritive soul of plants from the sensitive soul of animals, and both from the rational soul of man, holding that higher souls contained the capacities of the lower, he was also stating this levels theory. And it was also the essence of his notion that reality is a gradual development from potentiality to actuality, in which form comes more and more to regulate and to dominate matter. Plotinus elaborated the theory in his doctrine that each of the lower levels of being *emanates* from God. Through his influence the doctrine became the essence of the early Christian philosophy and of practically all of the various philosophies of the Middle Ages—Christian, Jewish and Arabian. We find it especially in Scotus Erigena, the first great scholastic, and in all of the great Christian mystics. We find it permeating the Jewish Cabala, which was the Jewish mystical philosophy of the Middle Ages. And we find it in Arabian Mediaeval phi-

losophy, especially in the writings of Averroës, Avicenna, and Al-Gazali. Bruno and Spinoza adapted this levels theory to the thought of their ages, as did Hegel to the thought of the early nineteenth century. Since the rise of the theory of evolution the doctrine has again been restated in terms of that concept, notably by Bergson. But from the dawn of idealism to this hour there has been a levels theory of reality, and this still remains the very inmost essence of idealistic metaphysics.

According to this theory the way to understand reality is not to treat it as beginning and ending nor as evolving in a straight linear direction only. We must rather treat it as consisting of a series of levels the higher of which includes the lower. We may look at each level genetically, if we like, and treat each as emerging out of the lower level which serves as its structural basis. But we may also treat all levels as existing simultaneously, and we may rise from one level to another by means of rational reflection and intuition. Reality is like a New York skyscraper. We have to use an elevator to ascend from one level to another. Bergson argued that the only elevator by which we can make this ascent is intuition, and in taking this position he was not far from Plato and Plotinus. But even though we admit that intuition is the express elevator, still there is the slower moving freight elevator of the discursive reason. Most idealists hold that intuition and discursive reasoning are both legitimate methods of ascending from one level of reality to another, and, as we shall see later, some hold that there is a third way of knowing called interpretation.

The title of R. F. A. Hoernlé's book, *Matter, Life, Mind, and God* suggests what the chief levels of reality are. We may group matter and life together as forming what is usually called Nature, when that word is used to mean pre-human nature. And we must think of mind as being a unity of the individual and of the social mind. We must also think of God as being above all of the other levels and as

including them all. In other words, the basic principle of the theory of reality of all idealism is that *we can explain the lower by including it in the higher but that we can never explain the higher by reducing it to the lower*, or by developing a metaphysics in terms of a lower level which precludes the possibility of acknowledging the higher. In some form or other this principle is recognized by all idealists and is the central postulate of all idealism. It follows that idealism reaches a single, all-inclusive whole as the highest reality. We may call this God, or the Absolute, or simply Reality, depending upon the way it is interpreted by special idealists. But generally speaking all idealists would agree that we reach a complete *metaphysical* definition of the reality of anything whatsoever only when we say what it is at every level, which means saying what it is at the level of reality as a whole, since that level includes the lower ones. Bradley and Bosanquet state this principle when they say that any judgment about any particular thing always has as its ultimate subject Reality as a whole, so that we might restate every judgment: *Reality is such that so and so is true*. The general assumption on which the levels theory rests is that Reality is a rational and self-consistent whole.

2. MATTER AND LIFE

The idealist is willing to let the physicists and chemists say what matter is provided they do not then proceed to reduce everything else in the universe to that level. And he is willing to let the biologist say what life is provided he does not then forthwith proceed to reduce all other levels of reality to that of biological organisms. No idealist is especially concerned over the effects of the Einstein theory of relativity, nor over the effects of the Mendelian theory of heredity, on metaphysics. But every idealist is very much concerned over those philosophical theories of the universe, which, basing themselves on the new physics or the new

biology, proceed to level everything down to what physics and biology call real. Generally speaking this is the attitude of idealists towards the existences dealt with in the natural sciences, physics, chemistry and biology, and the branches of human knowledge derived from them or obtained by combining them.

How then does the idealist conceive of matter? He thinks that the word is highly ambiguous. Hoernlé distinguishes four primary meanings, which are sufficient to show how ambiguous the term is, as well as the characteristic attitude of idealists towards this level of reality. But all of these meanings arise from the "central situation": "physics, as an empirical science, finds its subject-matter within the field of what we perceive by our senses." In other words, physics abstracts out of sense data all mental relations and aspects and constructs a world of nature that is, to use the expression of Whitehead, "closed to mind." Consequently four meanings of matter arise: (i) Matter is often taken to mean whatever is opposed to mind or spirit. (ii) Matter taken as equivalent to the material world is a general name for the totality of all normal sense objects—chairs, houses, rocks, mountains, valleys, clouds, seas and what not, in contrast to dreams, ghosts and such-like fantasies. Such sense-objects are what constitute gross matter or macroscopic physical reality, and hence this may be taken as the common-sense conception of matter. (iii) But to the scientist, and to those who have absorbed scientific ideas, matter means atoms and molecules, protons and electrons, entropy and inertia and whatever other entities may be postulated by scientists to explain what we perceive. (iv) Matter may be taken to mean some single and imperceptible substance or cause of what is perceived. It was this fourth sense of the word which Berkeley labored so hard to refute with his subjective idealism or mentalism. As a matter of fact no philosopher believes it today. As Broad says: "Any competent philosopher nowadays, whether he asserts

or denies the independent existence of matter, is asserting or denying something far more subtle and far better analyzed than anything which Berkeley or Descartes would have understood by the same form of words." From the standpoint of idealism matter is the lowest level of reality dealt with in physics and chemistry, the elements of which are well-known and the properties of which are extremely pervasive. It is partly composed of macroscopic and partly of microscopic entities. There is no fundamental opposition between matter and mind, but matter is reached by abstracting away the organic and mental factors of the field of perception. This is a legitimate abstraction if it is recognized as an abstraction, but it becomes illegitimate when it is made the only reality and all else is reduced to it, as is done in all forms of naturalistic metaphysics.

Now how does the idealist conceive of life? Does living matter contain unique properties, or, at least, functions, which justify us in treating it as a distinct level of reality higher than matter as just discussed? If so, is this distinction absolute, or does matter gradually emerge into life? Here idealists differ. Some are vitalists, who hold that life is original and unique. Others hold that there is a gradual emergence of life and that matter is temporally prior. But both groups agree that life is not the highest level of reality, and that a biological naturalism is based upon just as vicious an abstraction as a physical naturalism. As Wheeler has pointed out, there are three groups of extremists among the interpreters of biological phenomena—the *mystery-mongers*, by which phrase he means those vitalists who treat life as a mysterious force, sometimes called *entelechy*, within each organism; the *simplicists*, who reduce all life to the simplicity of a one-celled organism and regard this as essentially constituted by physico-chemical processes; and the *humanizers*, who read human qualities and purposes into animals of the simplest type. To the idealist all of these biological interpretations of life are fallacious

because they are one-sided. He seeks a conception of living beings which has room in it for all forms of life and which will, at the same time, do justice to the uniqueness of living, as contrasted with purely physical, matter. Such a concept may be found in J. S. Haldane's conception of a living being as "an active autonomous whole," or in General Smuts's concept of *holism*. When this is generalized we get Bergson's *élan vital* or vital impetus theory of life. (See Part V, Chaps. I, II, below).

We cannot here enter into the details of the controversy between mechanism and teleology in biology. Both of these terms are highly ambiguous; but, in general, mechanism is the extreme view which Wheeler attributes to the simplicists. It reduces life to physico-chemical processes and thereby explains the living with the concepts of physics and chemistry. On the other hand, teleology insists that living organisms manifest the characteristic of directing their actions towards an end, although a teleologist need not think of this end as equivalent to a conscious purpose. Most idealists are teleologists in some sense of that much abused word. Yet no idealist would identify the level of life with the whole of reality, any more than he would identify the level of matter with the whole.

3. MIND OR THE SOCIAL ORDER

That organisms capable of a civilized culture represent a higher level of reality than life is a basic tenet of idealism. How are we to conceive of this level? Leaving out of consideration the much debated, but purely academic, question of whether individual or social mind is more fundamental, let us briefly sketch the idealistic theory of what culture or the social mind as a whole is. This whole of human society consists fundamentally of three distinct orders. In the first place there is the *public order* based upon man's *ambition*. This order is composed of the basic institution which organizes the competitive interests of men into a single whole,

namely, the political state. But within the political state there are various other institutions which help to form the public order, such as all branches of government, federal, state and local, all military organizations, all economic and industrial organizations, and all trade groups. All these together give to men a scope for the realization of their ambitions, and together they constitute the public order. But in the second place, there is the *private order*, which is built upon *love*. The fundamental institution of this order is the family, for it is within the family that man finds the fullest scope for the realization of love. Sex-love, parental love, and filial love all reach their highest expression within and through the institution of the monogamous family. But all friendship groups, and social fraternities, and other human associations which develop friendliness among men and women and boys and girls form this private order. In normal life each individual's daily activities alternate between these two orders. Man goes out into the public order to do his work, but he returns to the private order for recuperation and recreation. He cannot find happiness if he restricts his activities to one of these orders and entirely disregards the other. Participation in both is essential to self-development and to self-realization.

Yet both of these orders presuppose the reality of another which, for want of a better name, we may call the *third order*. The word third is misleading here because it implies that this order is dependent upon the other two. But the truth is that it was originally the only order and that the other two have split off from it. And today it still remains the ultimate source of the stability of the other two orders. This third order is based upon *reverence* for, and *appreciation* of, the higher cultural values, and its basic institutions are religion, art, science, and philosophy. It transcends the distinction between the public order and the private order, and gives to every human being a scope for those creative energies which do not find adequate oppor-

tunity for expression in either of those orders. Yet it is the family and the state which foster culture and make it possible. And they do this because they get from culture the strength and vitality which maintains them. Thus the human level of reality culminates in making man a member of a community of creative minds working for the conservation and enrichment, as well as for the widest possible distribution, of culture.¹

What is the distant goal of this human and cultural level of reality? Fichte well expressed this when he said that it will be reached only when "the existing culture of every age shall have been diffused over the whole inhabited globe, and our race become capable of the most unlimited intercommunication with itself." And "when that final point shall have been attained, when every useful discovery made at one end of the earth shall be at once made known and communicated to all the rest, then, without further interruption, without halt or regress, with united strength and equal step, humanity shall move onward to a higher culture, of which we can at present form no conception."² Yet no idealist would identify this cultural level of reality with the whole of reality. There is, there must be, a still higher level which gives meaning to the cultural level. Fichte went on from the passage quoted above to insist upon this, and every idealist follows him in this. That higher level is a transcendental level in the sense that it is non-finite, but nevertheless it includes all that is real in the levels below it.

4. GOD OR THE TRANSCENDENTAL LEVEL OF REALITY

If we call this highest level God, we are faced with a difficulty. The term God has a popular anthropomorphic meaning which it gets from mass religion. When a philosopher uses this word, he never means by it what, for

¹ For a fuller discussion of these three orders see W. E. Hocking's *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, 2nd ed., Part VI (Yale Press).

² Quoted from my *Anthology of Modern Philosophy*, p. 549. The original source is Fichte's *Vocation of Man*, Part III.

example, any naïve person would mean by it. This fact must be especially stressed because the critics of idealism often leave the impression that idealism holds to the idea of God of the man in the street. Now an idealist may well rejoice in the fact that there is a popular idea of God, since it proves that he is not really going against common sense when he asserts that there is a level of reality above, yet inclusive of, the human. But no idea of God of any idealist is to be identified with the vague and crude conception of the unreflective.

As a matter of fact many idealists do not even like to use the word God. It carries with it the idea of personality, which some idealists regard as too human an idea to use in referring to the highest level of reality. Moreover, all idealists recognize that this highest level of reality is most intricate and rich, and that any single characterization of it is entirely inadequate. And it may also be said that all idealists recognize that this level of deity is composed of other levels. God is conceived of as a Spirit immanent in history—the Absolute Spirit. This is especially the view of Croce and his British disciple, J. A. Smith. Such idealists are inclined to deny that God is anything else but the immanent reason that pervades all nature and manifests itself in the innumerable forms and creations of the other levels, culminating in culture. But God is also conceived of as *Perfection*—that all-inclusive, self-consistent whole in which all contradictions are reconciled in Truth, all evils transmuted into Good, and all ugliness harmonized in Beauty. Such idealists treat God as a transcendent and perfect being, at the same time that they regard Him as immanent in history and in cosmic and organic evolutionary processes. But other idealists ask how immanence and transcendence can co-exist in deity unless both are subordinated to the idea of divine (not human) personality. Accordingly such idealists retain both immanence and transcendence as aspects of the divine nature, but they regard both as unified

in the divine personality. To them God is the unified totality of all spiritual values, and as such He is an infinite Person, inclusive of all reality. Human persons form a society of unique persons within the personality of God. Although this has been called spiritual pluralism, it should be especially noted that it is more monistic than it is pluralistic, since it especially stresses the unity of persons in God.

5. INTERPRETATION AS A THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE

Having briefly summarized the idealistic levels theory of reality, we may now turn to the idealistic theory of the way we know these levels and the separate objects peculiar to each level. There are many statements of the idealistic theory of knowledge, and there are important differences among them. The group known as personalists, or at least some of them, hold to *epistemological dualism*, treating human ideas as representative of some extra-mental reality. Others hold to *epistemological monism*, identifying ideas with their objects or meanings. It is not here possible to develop the various forms of idealistic theory of knowledge. Let us rather expound a theory which aims to do justice to both of the above-mentioned points of view, namely, Josiah Royce's theory of interpretation. This theory was the last, and in some respects the greatest, contribution which Royce made to idealism. It is set forth in his *Problems of Christianity*, Vol. II, but it appears in a somewhat later form in his article entitled *Mind* in Hastings's *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, an article which was written during the last year of Royce's life.

The familiar distinction between perception and conception—a distinction which has haunted philosophy ever since Kant made his famous statement that perceptions without conceptions are blind, but conceptions without perceptions are empty, and which has reappeared in somewhat different form in recent philosophy under the names "knowledge by acquaintance" and "knowledge by description"—is

Royce's starting point. He shows that neither of these cognitive processes is ever found in absolute purity, but that they are always found together. And he says that it is "an extraordinary example of a failure to reflect in a thorough-going way upon the process of knowledge that until recently the third type of cognitive process to which we want next to refer has been neglected, although every one is constantly engaged in using and in exemplifying it." This third type Royce calls interpretation. A good illustration of it is understanding a word or sign which some one uses. Suppose some one cries "Fire!" To understand this I must hear the cry. That is the perceptual element. My existing conceptual knowledge of what fire is, is the conceptual element. But I do not understand the cry "Fire!" unless I *interpret* the sign to mean an idea different from mine and which I refer to a mind in some way distinct from mine. Now how do we know these minds that are in some way distinct from our own? We come to know them just by this process of "interpreting the signs which these minds give us of their presence." Charles S. Peirce was the first to call this process by the name interpretation, and Royce says that he took the term from Peirce.

Now Royce explicitly connects this conception of interpretation with the levels theory of reality when he goes on to say that the natural objects of perception are sense data and feelings; and that those of conception are general scientific categories, for example, such mathematical and logical concepts as number, identity, et cetera; but that those of interpretation are "signs which express the meaning of some mind," which mind may be that of the interpreter himself. To treat self-knowledge and knowledge of the minds of others as direct perception or intuition, as Bergson and some other philosophers do, is to use a type of cognitive process especially designed for the lowest level of reality to reach a knowledge of the higher levels. When we do this we run the risk of losing the uniqueness of the higher levels,

and we tend to reduce them to the lower level to which perception as a cognitive process is especially suited. Like perception and conception, interpretation is subject to error. But our own minds are enlarged by the process of interpreting the signs given to us by other minds. And it is essentially by this cognitive process that we know the upper levels—self, society, and God. In his article entitled *Mind* Royce makes this perfectly clear in the following significant passage: "In dealing with other minds, I am constantly enlarging my own mind by getting new interpretations, both of myself and of my neighbor's life. The contrasts, surprises, conflicts, and puzzles which these new ideas present to me show me that in dealing with them I am dealing with what in some respects is not my own mind. The coherence of the whole system of interpretations, ideas, plans, and purposes shows me just as positively that I am dealing with a mind, *i.e.*, with something which through these expressions constantly interprets itself, while, as I deal with it, I in turn constantly interpret it, and even in and through this very process interpret myself. It will and must be observed that this Alter, with which I have to deal, both in reflecting on my own mind and in seeking for new light from my neighbor, is never a merely single or separable or merely detached or isolated individual, but is always a being which is the nature of a community, a 'many in one' and a 'one in many'." And he concludes: "Only in terms of a theory of the threefold process of knowledge can we hope fully to express what is meant by that form of idealism which views the world as 'the process of the Spirit' and as containing its own interpretation and its own interpreter."³ Here, then, we have a highly original and modern statement of the idealistic theory of knowledge, and one that is definitely related to the idealistic theory of levels.

³ Hastings's *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. VIII, pp. 654 f. and 657.

CHAPTER IV

IDEALISM'S SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND ERROR

I. GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

THE problem of truth and error is one of the most complicated problems in philosophy, but it is quite generally admitted that two different questions that are often confused must be kept distinct. One of these is the age-old question of Pilate: What is truth? What constitutes the essential nature of truth? What is the definition of truth? To make this question sharp and precise some writers prefer to use the abstract term *trueness*, and they attempt to tell what trueness is. The other question concerns specific beliefs, asking what ones are true and what ones false. Given definite and particular beliefs or statements, judgments or propositions, which of them are true and which are false? In attempting to answer this question philosophers are led to formulate tests, or, as they are more frequently called, *criteria* of truth.

Among philosophers there are four theories of the nature of truth or trueness which have been and still are especially significant. They are (i) the *coherence theory*, (ii) the *correspondence* or (in some of its forms) the *copy theory*, (iii) the *pragmatist theory* and (iv) the *intuitionist theory* or the *theory of self-evidence*. Now when a philosopher adopts one of these theories to answer the first question, he is very likely to use the principle of one or more of the others as criteria of truth, thus using them to answer the second question. This fact often makes philosophic discussions of truth especially difficult to unravel.

The student should always ask which theory is being made the definition of trueness, and which principles are being used merely as criteria of the truth of specific beliefs.

There are certain requirements which any theory of truth must meet if it is to be adequate. Philosophers usually state these requirements so that they will be most favorable to their own theory. Since idealism advocates the coherence theory of truth, let us state these requirements as advocates of that theory would state them. (i) The theory of truth we adopt must be capable of truth as judged by its own standard. (ii) Truth must be so defined that it will be possible to discover what specific beliefs are true. Both of these requirements are frequently violated. But a theory of truth which is not capable of being true on its own principle would thereby imply a kind of truth not provided for in the theory. And what is the sense of defining truth in such a way that you never can tell when you have it? It would be far better to adopt a purely sceptical attitude and refrain from theorizing. Yet it is possible to define truth in such a way that no one ever could know whether any particular belief is true or false; in fact this has actually been done. (iii) Our definition of trueness must be such that the principle used in it can also be used to define falsity. (iv) Our definition of truth must be such that it will be possible to explain how a specific belief can be held true at one time and false at another. In other words, our theory of truth must take account of the so-called relativity of truth, and it must specify wherein this relativity consists. With these requirements of a theory of truth in mind, let us examine in some detail the coherence theory of truth.

2. THE SIMPLEST FORM OF THE COHERENCE THEORY

In its simplest form the coherence theory says that any proposition is true which is consistent with other accepted propositions or other propositions that are known to be true. This theory is involved in the so-called principle of

implication: Any proposition that is implied by a true proposition is true. Let us call this the *formal consistency theory of truth*, to distinguish it from a form of the coherence theory which will be considered presently. Now suppose that we know certain definitions and axioms of geometry to be true. Then we can say that the theorems we prove by means of these definitions and axioms are true, by showing that they are implied in and are consistent with them. Thus the truth of the Pythagorean theorem, that the square on the hypotenuse of a right-angled triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the other two sides, is constituted by its consistency with the rest of Euclidean Geometry on which it is based. We can think of this consistency as being confined to a specific body of knowledge such as Euclidean Geometry or Arithmetic, or we may extend it to a wide field such as the whole of mathematics, or we may apply it to the whole system of Formal Logic. In the latter case certain formal laws of thought are held to be the underlying axioms on which the whole system rests. Consistency with these laws is what is supposed to constitute truth. How many basic laws of thought are there? On this question logicians are not in accord. In the traditional Aristotelian Logic three are recognized, namely, *the law of contradiction, the law of identity and the law of excluded middle*. The law of identity says: A is A or a thing must be identical with itself. The law of contradiction says: A cannot be both A and Non-A at the same time or a thing can never be identical with itself and with its opposite at the same time. And the law of excluded middle says every object of thought must be either A or Non-A and that there can be no middle ground. The great German philosopher, Leibniz, added to these laws his famous *law of sufficient reason*, that there must be a sufficient reason why A is A or Non-A, as the case may be. The idealistic logicians are inclined to reduce all of these laws to the

principle of consistency. So much for the traditional statement of the laws of thought.

Let us now express the formal consistency theory of truth differently, and less traditionally, by distinguishing between a belief and a proposition. When a belief is true we may call this true opinion because there is a relation to the believer involved. But when a proposition is true, no relation to a believer is implied. Hence, as far as propositions are concerned, both truth and falsity are equally objective and equally purely formal. Logic lays down four defining principles to explain what propositions are: (i) Every proposition having a precise and definite meaning is true or false and cannot be both. (ii) To every proposition there corresponds another that is its contradictory or opposite. (iii) In general the relation between contradictory propositions is reciprocal or "symmetrical" in the logical sense of that word. (iv) Given any two contradictory propositions, one is true and the other is false. Now if we take propositions collectively, that is to say as forming a class or system, the relations of truth and falsity are formally inseparable, since in the class of all propositions there are just as many true as there are false ones. Such a system, however, is an abstraction from the real world. Any particular proposition that is believed need not have an opposite that is believed. But when a proposition that is believed to be true is actually false, our belief is erroneous. Consequently error is subjective and a matter of belief, whereas falsity is objective and a matter of formal logical relation between opposite or contradictory propositions.

This formal consistency theory of truth is a form of the coherence theory which is generally accepted, at least as a test or criterion of truth. But the question has to be asked, What truth is constituted by the relation of formal consistency? For in this theory the original defining principles, or laws of thought, or whatever other "primitive propositions" are used, are not true because of their consistency

with what is obtained from them. There is only a one-way consistency. Consequently this theory is only able to define the truth of the derivative or implied propositions in terms of consistency. It has to take the basic laws on which the derivative propositions are based as self-evident or axiomatic. But that presupposes the intuitive theory of truth. Hence, as Royce used to say repeatedly in his lectures on logic, self-evidence is a dangerous principle. And it is especially dangerous for an advocate of the coherence theory of truth, since it forces him to hold that there are two essentially different kinds of trueness, only one of which is constituted by coherence. Consequently this simplest form of the coherence theory is inadequate. This every idealist freely admits.

3. METAPHYSICAL FORMS OF THE COHERENCE THEORY

The only way out of the root difficulty in the formal consistency theory of truth is to make the consistency between primitive propositions and derivative propositions reciprocal. We must take the position that the derived propositions are true because of their consistency with the primitive propositions, and that the latter are true because they are consistent with what is derived from them. This leads us to the idealistic principle of consistency according to which truth is a reciprocally consistent system of propositions, *each of which gets its truth from the whole system*. And such an internally consistent system our body of human knowledge ever strives to become. But what guides this struggle of knowledge in becoming wholly self-consistent? The answer which idealists give to this important question is the all-inclusive and self-consistent whole of reality. And they add that it is the consistency of our human beliefs with that whole which makes them true when they are true. Thus purely formal consistency such as one might get in a system of suppositions is abandoned and coherence with reality is made the essence of truth. It is this fact which

justifies calling this a metaphysical form of the coherence theory. Whoever holds that "judgment must transcend supposition," whoever appeals to the self-consistent whole of reality to establish the truth of any belief, whoever adopts the metaphysical form of the coherence theory, thereby becomes an idealist. No other group of philosophers accepts a metaphysical doctrine of coherence, but idealists are in general agreement that this is the real meaning of the coherence theory.

This metaphysical form of the coherence theory always has been the theory of truth implicit in idealism. It is to be found in Plato. In Book I of the *Republic* he argues from abstract premises to abstract conclusions about justice. But when he undertakes in the rest of the dialogue to work out his own definition of justice he uses the conception of the whole social organism and asks what conception of justice is forced upon us by the nature of that whole. And there are other evidences that Plato reasoned from the nature of the whole to the truth of particular propositions, and held that their truth is constituted by their relation to the whole. Bosanquet points out that the germ of the coherence theory is to be found in Bishop Butler's writings. The Bishop argued that "every work both of nature and of art is a system." Understanding a thing consists in discovering "the idea of a system, economy, or constitution of any particular nature, or particular anything." Further he said that such a system "is an one or whole made up of several parts, but yet, that the several parts even considered as a whole do not complete the idea, unless in the notion of a whole you include the relations and respects which those parts have to each other."¹ This is a highly significant passage because it shows that the coherence idea existed early in the history of British philosophy and prior to the development of the coherence theory in Germany. For that theory domi-

¹ Quoted by Bernard Bosanquet: *Implication and Linear Inference*, p. 113, (Macmillan).

nates the writings of the great German philosophers, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. In the Preface to his *Phänomenologie* (Phenomenology of Spirit) Hegel enunciated the famous principle, *Das Wahre ist das Ganze*, the truth is the whole. From the German idealists this theory passed to the British Neo-Hegelians—the two Cairds, T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, J. E. McTaggart, Bernard Bosanquet, and others. Josiah Royce took the coherence theory from Hegel and developed it in a unique way in this country, just as the British Neo-Hegelians did in England. Croce did the same in Italy, and Cousin and others in France. As a result the coherence theory has become the most generally accepted theory of truth among idealists of all the countries of Western Civilization.

In his article entitled *Error and Truth*, in Hastings's *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Royce has given an excellent summary of the coherence theory that was worked out in his earlier writings, and especially in his Gifford Lectures on *The World and the Individual*. He holds that truth consists of "a harmony between the partial expressions of a meaning which a proposition signifies and the whole of life, of experience, or of meaning, which, according to this theory, ideas and propositions intend to embody so far as they can." And he uses the analogy of the relation of an organ in a living body to the whole of the organism to show that he regarded this relation of a proposition to the whole as functional and organic, rather than as static and mechanical. He especially emphasizes the fact that every proposition, taken by itself, is an abstraction, which has to be completed by other propositions that express the meanings omitted in it.

Bernard Bosanquet freely acknowledged that he built his interpretation of the coherence theory upon that of his friend, F. H. Bradley, whose monumental *Principles of Logic* created a veritable "New Logic." Bosanquet early developed his conception of truth in *Knowledge and Real-*

ity, where he subjected Bradley's *Principles of Logic* to careful critical examination, and in his great two volume treatise on *Logic*. Later he expanded the theory, and reinterpreted it in his Gifford Lectures (*The Principle of Individuality and Value*, and *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*). And shortly before he died, he restated it again in his valuable little book entitled *Implication and Linear Inference*. Bradley and Bosanquet certainly possessed minds of the highest quality, and they spent a lifetime developing the coherence theory of truth. Consequently their writings will always remain primary sources for this theory.

Bosanquet's theory is also organic and functional like that of Royce. He lays down the fundamental principle: "Truth, in short, is not merely an antecedent framework, but a spirit and a function. You cannot understand it unless you explore its operation and identify yourself with its effort."² He speaks of truth involving two systems, one of which is always indented with or excluded from the other. Every judgment refers only to a partial system and this need not even be actual. It may be suppositional. Yet every judgment must transcend supposition. Hence every judgment refers to the whole of reality for its truth. Truth means apprehending the partial or fragmentary system as being continuous with the whole of reality. Consequently every judgment we use must ultimately assert "either this is true or nothing is." We always use our knowledge of the whole to determine whether any given assertion is true. If such an assertion will fit or cohere with reality we say it is true, and if it will not we reject it as false. Thus "This or nothing" is a test applied to every judgment to determine whether it is true.

R. F. A. Hoernlé has recently restated this theory of Bosanquet as follows: "The act of judgment must be concerned with what really is. It is something real which we intend to characterize in judging, and we intend to charac-

² *Loco citato*, p. 163.

terize it as it really is. . . . The object and its character may be either directly presented, as *e.g.*, in perception, or they may be indirectly referred to by means of symbols with the help of which we 'consider', or 'only think' of, it. In both cases the mental attitude of judging is 'similar'. In both cases we intend the same object, *viz.*, the real object. In both cases we affirm in principle that the object is really what we perceive or think it to be. But there is the difference between perceiving the object 'itself' and thinking of it by means of symbols. The object perceived is the fulfilment of the meaning of the symbols. . . . The judgments which are possibly erroneous are judgments in which we do, indeed, intend the object 'itself' but have it present in mind only as the meaning of a set of symbols. And this meaning may or may not be completely fulfilled by the object itself. If it is fulfilled, we have the coincidence or identity which constitutes truth. In proportion as it is not fulfilled, because the real object is other than by means of our symbols we had thought it to be, the judgment is false. But the character falsely ascribed to the object has none the less its place in the universe somewhere, and is in that sense a 'possibility'. In a false judgment such a character is misplaced, so to speak; but even after the mistake has been discovered and corrected, the character, as a possibility, continues to belong to the constitution of the universe."³ And this statement may be regarded as expressing the essence of the coherence theory as it is held by contemporary idealists.

It follows from the coherence theory that there are *degrees of truth*. Since every proposition is a fragmentary meaning, abstracted from the whole of meaning, it is always one-sided and possesses only that degree of truth corresponding to the amount of meaning which it expresses. We are required to complete the meaning of every proposition by making other assertions that embody other meanings.

³ *Mind*, Vol. XL (July 1931), pp. 232f.

In this process we get a series of propositions, each with a degree of truth; and it follows that the totality of these propositions would possess more truth than any one of them taken separately. And that is why Hegel said that the true is the whole.

4. DIFFERENT IDEALISTIC INTERPRETATIONS OF ERROR

According to Hegel and many present day idealists the essence of error is taking a partial view, which has a degree of truth, to be the whole truth. Every partial view in its unfolding reaches a stage where it is sharply enough defined to exclude all other views. In many cases the mind stops in this abstract stage of reflection and thinks that it now has the truth. This is error. A mind caught in such error may remain there indefinitely, but *if reflection continues*, difficulties will come to mind which will cast doubt upon the truth of this partial view; and these will drive the thinker onward to a larger view from which the error of the previous resting place will appear obvious. Hegel delighted in tracing the rise from more fragmentary to less fragmentary views in the history of philosophy and in the evolution of religion, and the consequent gradual elimination of error as higher conceptions were attained.

Many of the Neo-Hegelians, and especially Bradley and Bosanquet, do not altogether agree with this Hegelian interpretation of error as a phase of the dialectical movement of thought. They agree that error is a disharmony between the part and the whole, but they regard every human apprehension as sharing in this disharmony or as being fragmentary. Consequently all our human judgments, all our fundamental concepts in science are shot through with contradictions and hence are partly erroneous. Consequently what we know by these judgments and with these concepts is only a *world of appearance*. In the end human knowledge of truth must become harmonized with other aspects of reality in the whole which is more than truth, and more than

beauty, and more than goodness, just because it is a unity in which all aspects are completely harmonized.

Royce points out that this solution of the problem of error is the weakest part of the idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet. He lays down certain requirements of a theory of error which this theory does not meet. Let us briefly summarize these, since they constitute Royce's criticism of the Bosanquetian form of idealism, and indicate the direction in which Royce's own thinking was turning at the close of his life. (i) A theory of error must not soften the contrast between truth and error, but must make that contrast just as sharp as it is between truth and falsity in the formal consistency theory. (ii) Our theory of error must recognize the unity of the cognitive and the volitional processes of the human mind. (iii) We must retain the coherence theory of truth. To get a satisfactory theory of error we must treat truth as a relation between a proposition and the whole of experience, and we must never look on it as a relation of a proposition to some wholly external object. (iv) We must stress the whole of experience, and not some purely momentary or relatively transitory part of experience, in determining the truth of a proposition. (v) Error must be definitely connected with such things as finitude, evil, individuality, and conflict in general; and it must be explained in the same way that these are explained. (vi) Theoretical and practical error are to be treated as on the same footing. (vii) To get a satisfactory solution of the problem it is not enough to modify Hegel. We must synthesize Hegel, formal logical theory, and the new empirical tendencies of modern thought.

After stating these requirements Royce briefly and succinctly states his own solution of the problem of error as follows: "An error is the expression, through voluntary action, of a belief. In case of an error, a being, whose ideas have a limited scope, so interprets those ideas as to bring himself into conflict with a larger life to which he himself

belongs. This life is one of experience and of action. Its whole nature determines what the erring subject, at his stage of experience, and with his ideas, ought to think and to do. He errs when he so feels, believes, acts, interprets, as to be in positive and decisive conflict with this *ought*. The conflict is at once theoretical and practical.”³

Although it cannot be said that all idealists would accept Royce’s solution of the problem of error, it is certainly an original theory which removes some of the difficulties of the appearance theory of Bradley and Bosanquet.

³ Hastings’s *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. V, p. 373.

CHAPTER V

IDEALISM'S SOLUTIONS OF THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM

I. RESUMÉ OF EARLY IDEALISTIC THEORIES

THE body-mind problem, that is to say, the nature of the relation between psychical or mental processes and physiological or bodily processes, especially interested the great philosophers of the rationalistic school, which preceded the critical philosophy of Immanuel Kant. Descartes, the founder of the school; his two disciples, Geulincx and Malebranche; Spinoza; and Leibniz developed four distinctive theories, each of which continues to influence speculation on this age-old problem. To pave the way for a discussion of contemporary idealistic theories, let us briefly state each of these four classic theories.

Descartes defended the *theory of interaction*. According to him the pineal gland at the base of the brain is the place where the vital fluids of the body come into direct contact with the soul. He chose this gland as the locus of the interaction because it is single, whereas all of our sense organs and the brain itself are double; and he thought that the soul, being single, would have to reside in some single part of the body. His idea that the soul has a special seat in the body is still held by some idealists, while others reject it. Geulincx and Malebranche developed the *theory of occasionalism*. They thought that it was impossible for two such different substances as body and soul to act on each other directly, so they argued that on every occasion that it is necessary for the two to act together God intervenes and establishes the connection. Every case of body and

mind acting together is really a case of a miraculous intervention by God in human behavior. Spinoza abandoned the idea of there being any definite connection between the two, holding with the occasionalists that two entities so entirely opposite in nature as are body and mind or, as he preferred to call them, thought and extension, can not be conceived as interacting. He sharply criticised Descartes's pineal gland idea as ridiculous and absurd. Yet he was not an occasionalist. He originated the *theory of psycho-physical parallelism*, which says that there are two entirely distinct events, one in the body and one in the mind, but that neither in any way influences the other. All that we can say is that they are parallel in the sense that when one occurs the other occurs also. But God does not need to intervene each time to establish this correlation. The very nature of mind and body is such as to make this parallelism inevitable, for both are attributes of the one substance—God or Nature. Leibniz, who substituted a theory of individual and windowless monads for the one substance and two attributes of Spinoza, and who held that every monad, even the simplest, possesses both perception and appetition, *i.e.*, psychological characteristics, developed the famous *theory of preëstablished harmony* to explain how the monads of the body and the soul monad are related. But this theory really did a double duty. God not only made the entire collection of monads so that each would always act or change its states in unison with every other, but He also created each monad so that its internal states would change in harmony with each other. Thus preëstablished harmony meant for Leibniz a harmony among the separate states of each monad, and also a harmony between the separate monads in the entire collection of monads, as well as between the monads of the human body and its soul monad.

In one form or another all four of these theories have recurred again and again in philosophy ever since they were

originated. Hence it is especially important that the student familiarize himself with them.¹

2. RECENT ADVANCES IN OUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM

Since these classic theories were formulated, enormous advances in our knowledge of the nervous system have been made, which have to be taken into account in any modern solution of the body-mind problem. Let us briefly indicate what the more significant of these advances are.

The *doctrine of cerebral localization* has been formulated as a result of these researches, and it may be said to embody the essence of the discoveries that have been made by such specialists as Ferrier, Sherrington, Head, and others. This doctrine is especially concerned with the specific parts of the brain with which the chief types of physical activity are definitely associated. But it also implies, in its most developed form, that the conscious or psychical processes are definitely correlated with these specific physiological occurrences.

The cerebral cortex is the part of the brain where this localization is centered, since it acts as a receiving area for all nerve currents coming from the sense organs, as well as a transmitter for all centrally aroused currents going out to the muscles. Nerve fibres run out to the spinal chord from the cerebral cortex and from there currents reach the muscles. Other nerve fibres run into the cerebral cortex from centres in the nervous system which are directly connected with the sense organs. Still other but shorter fibres

¹ Selections dealing with each of these theories, from the writings of the philosophers who originated them, will be found among the selections from Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza and Leibniz in my *Anthology of Modern Philosophy*. The selection from Spinoza contains his criticisms of Descartes, and at the end of the selection from Malebranche will be found an important footnote quoting a significant passage from Geulincx. The selection from Lotze in the same volume is also important because it shows a later form of the theory of occasionalism. Teachers would do well to assign one of these theories to each student for a special oral or written report, based upon an actual study of the sources.

link up the parts of the cortex. These latter fibres seem to be connected with the conscious experience known as "recent memory," since recent memory is lost when these fibres are impaired, as in chronic alcoholism. There are still other fibres that connect the cerebral cortex with other parts of the brain. Among these the so-called "corpus callosum" is especially important, since it links the two hemispheres of the brain together. Sherrington called the whole system of linkages the "integrative action" of the nervous system.

Now it has been discovered that all consciously initiated movement is localized in one part of the cortex, and that this is so precise that a spatial difference for different muscles can be detected. In another part of the cortex the local area for the cutaneous senses has been located. The auditory, visual, and, with less certainty, the gustatory and olfactory sensory brain areas are also known. While the motor and the sensory areas are not sharply separated and do not form definite distinguishable patterns, the probabilities are that there is "depth localization" not so easily observable, as well as the "surface localization" which has just been explained. It must not be supposed that this theory is water-tight in all of its details, but it is now generally accepted for sensory and simple voluntary processes, and it is also generally accepted that there is less precise localization of brain changes for the higher forms of mental activity.

Behaviorists like to use this theory to prove that the psychical can be identified with the physiological or neurological processes. But this is entirely unwarranted, and brain specialists like Head and William Brown hold that there is no exact point-for-point correspondence between the two kinds of processes. The truth is that this doctrine of the localization of cerebral functions cannot be used to support any particular theory of the body-mind problem. Yet every modern theory must be modified to take account of it. For example, in view of these discussions interactionism must

at least change the place of interaction from the pineal gland to the cerebral cortex and the corpus callosum. But some forms of parallelism, occasionalism and preëstablished harmony may be as compatible with our present knowledge of brain processes as is interaction. Hence we still find all of these theories vigorously advocated by present-day idealists, who are well-informed as to the recent discoveries in brain anatomy and brain physiology. And behaviorism, which is simply a modern form of the materialistic theory of Thomas Hobbes, is no whit more empirical than are these theories. The body-mind problem remains unsolved scientifically. We still have to fall back upon a metaphysical theory, or methodological assumption, as well-informed people know, however much some psychologists may try to give the opposite impression.

3. PANPSYCHISM

One of the most important general metaphysical theories of the relation of body and mind is known as *panpsychism*. (The word is sometimes spelled *pampsychism*.) This general theory is popular with idealists because it is consistent with the levels theory of reality, or can be readily adapted to that theory, and because it can be interpreted so that it is favorable either to spiritual pluralism or to spiritual monism. Let us first state this theory in general and then expound briefly some of its special forms.

Panpsychism is a modern doctrine closely related to the *hylozoism* which was accepted by some of the ancient Greek philosophers. Hylozoism is the theory that matter (*ὑλη*) is living and has the characteristics of living organisms. Panpsychism is the theory that every ultimately real entity is psychical or mental and has the characteristics of a spiritual being. Theodore Flournoy defines it as follows: "Panpsychism is the doctrine which rejects the metaphysical existence of the material world as material, and which holds that our entire universe, mineral as well as vegetable and

animal, consists at bottom of realities that are immaterial, psychic, mental, conscious, either in an individualized and more or less personal form, or in a more diffused and amorphous state ('mind-stuff', psychic atoms, etc.)."² The monadism of Leibniz is usually regarded as the prototype of all panpsychic theories. But James Ward quotes Spinoza's statement, "All individual things are animated, albeit in diverse degrees," and refers also to Spinoza's having maintained that "every individual thing, so far as in it lies, endeavors to persist in its own being." Ward calls this the panpsychist view. He also names Nicolaus of Cusa (1401-1464) as a panpsychist, quoting as proof his saying, "There is nothing in the universe that does not enjoy a certain singularity, which is to be found in no other thing." But Ward also refers to the philosophers Haeckel, Renouvier, Paulsen, and Wundt as holding panpsychist views. And he holds that panpsychists agree in treating physical entities, with their attraction and repulsion "as implying impulses initiated and determined by feeling."³ If we use the principle of continuity, these physical entities may be regarded as the lowest level of minds in the series extending from them, through plants and animals, to man and God. C. A. Strong defines panpsychism as "the view that things-in-themselves are of a psychological nature," using the term "things-in-themselves," as Kant did, to mean the real things behind the ideas or appearances of things.

In this broad sense there can be no doubt but that panpsychism is a view widely held by idealists. Eisler, in his *Wörterbuch der Philosophie*, distinguishes four senses of the word, namely, *realistic*, *idealistic*, *monadistic*, and *pantheistic panpsychism*. The last three of these are all idealistic types. Haeckel and Strong hold the first type, which is

² Theodore Flournoy: *The Philosophy of William James*, p. 95 (note). Translated by Edwin B. Holt and William James, Jr. (Holt).

³ James Ward: *Realm of Ends*, pp. 21 and 64 (Putnam).

expounded below under realism. Eisler's distinctions are worth noting, but let us suggest another way of subdividing panpsychism into different types, which is more closely related to the traditional theories of body-mind given above.

A. *Parallelistic Panpsychism*.—Accepting the view of Spinoza and Theodore Fechner, "the hypothesis of *universal parallelism*," Friedrich Paulsen says, "No psychical process without concomitant movement, no process of movement without a concomitant psychical process. . . . Two sides of reality are coëxtensive with each other; for every fact in the one there is a corresponding fact in the other; the psychical processes a b c correspond to the physical processes a' b' c'. A causal relation exists between the members of the same series." But there is no causal relation between the two series. This is clear from Paulsen's further statement: "Since, however, there are breaks in both series, we substitute for them the members of the corresponding series." But he had previously written and italicised this statement: "*No causal relation obtains between physical and psychical processes. States of consciousness are neither effects nor causes of physical occurrences.*" So far we have strict parallelism.

Yet elsewhere Paulsen calls this view panpsychism and argues at length to show that there is soul-life even in purely mechanical movements. "As we gradually descend the scale, we find that the presentative side gradually vanishes, the memory becomes narrower and narrower, perception scantier and scantier. At the same time, the will gradually loses the form of anticipating ends, of conscious craving or desire, until finally nothing is left over as the content of soul-life except a momentary impulse, which is aroused by contact with the environment. Inner processes like these would have to be assumed as the concomitants of all movements, even of those beyond the limits of organic

life.”⁴ This, then, is the parallelistic form of the theory of panpsychism.

B. *The Interaction Form of Panpsychism*.—James Ward and others follow Paulsen so far as the last statement quoted is concerned, and think of atoms as being bare monads with psychical life of a rudimentary sort. And they also accept the idea of a series of monads, culminating in soul or conscious monads. The human being is a collection of monads of varying levels of psychical complexity, but with one soul monad that is dominant. The body-mind problem is concerned with the relation of this soul-monad to the other monads constituting the human body. But there is also the problem of how the psychical part of a bare monad is related to its body. Ward speaks of “an immediacy of interaction,” by which he means “interacting directly without any intervening medium, doing in fact, what according to the Newtonian mechanics is impossible.” “This immediacy of interaction,” he continues, “is held to characterize the bare monad of the modern pluralist the monad that is, so to say, its own body.” Thus there is interaction even within the bare monad. But there is also interaction between the soul monad and the other monads of the human body. “The relation of a dominant monad (A) to any monad of its organism (or of its brain, when its organism is so far differentiated,) is different in kind from the relation to the same monad of the dominant monad (B) of another organism. The one relation we may call an internal, functional, or vital, the other an external, foreign, or physical relation. The totality of these internal relations at a given time answers to A’s objective experience at that moment. Certain changes in this whole are, so far as A is concerned, initiated by certain of the subordinate monads: these changes answer to A’s sensations, and as to these it is receptive or passive. Certain other changes, on the other

⁴ Friedrich Paulsen: *Introduction to Philosophy*, pp. 91, 80, and 144. Translated by Frank Thilly (Scribners).

hand, are due to A's active initiative: these entail sensations in certain subordinate monads, and their response is what we call A's movement." ⁵ These passages show clearly that Ward holds to an interaction form of panpsychism.

C. *Occasionalism Form of Panpsychism*.—The great German idealist, Lotze, originated a form of panpsychism widely held by theists and personalists today, which differs from that of Paulsen as well as from that of Ward, and it may be called the occasionalism form of panpsychism. According to Lotze there is reciprocal action between mind and body but no interaction. On the occasion of a bodily movement the mind acts, and on the occasion of an idea arising in the mind the body acts, but while physical and mental action are reciprocal there is no causal relation between them. Yet Lotze's occasionalism is not identical with the classic theory of Malebranche and Geulincx. He writes: "Occasionalism . . . cannot be accepted as a *metaphysical* theory. The notion that it can is one that has only been ascribed to me by a misinterpretation which I wish expressly to guard against . . . I can only regard 'Occasionalism' as a precept of Methodology, which for the purpose of definite inquiries excludes an insoluble question—one at any rate which does not press for a solution—in order to concentrate effort upon the only attainable or only desirable end. If it is a question of the reciprocal action between soul and body, it is of importance to investigate the particular spiritual processes that are in fact so associated with particular bodily ones according to general rules that the manifold and complex occurrences, presented to us by our inner experience, become reducible to simple fundamental relations and thus an approximate forecast of the future becomes possible." ⁶

⁵ *Loco citato*, pp. 256 and 257 f. See also Ward's *Essays in Philosophy*, edited by Sorley and Stout, pp. 239 f.

⁶ Hermann Lotze: *Metaphysics*, p. 111. Translated by Bernard Bosanquet (Clarendon Press).

4. ABSOLUTE IDEALISM'S SOLUTION OF THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM

It is not necessary to accept panpsychism in order to be an idealist. Fashionable as this view has been among idealists of the twentieth century, it has nevertheless been subjected to severe criticism by the theistic absolutist, Pringle-Pattison, and by the non-theistic absolutist, Bernard Bosanquet. One brief quotation from the latter will indicate why many absolute idealists are unwilling to accept panpsychism. If we adopt the panpsychist theory "what becomes of the material incidents of life—of our food, our clothes, our country, our bodies? Is it not obvious that our relation to these things is essential to finite being, and that if they are in addition subjective psychical centers their subjective psychical quality is one which, so far as realized, would destroy their function and character for us?" After quoting this statement of Bosanquet Pringle-Pattison adds: "Absolutely nothing is gained, and much confusion is introduced, by resolving external nature into an aggregate of tiny minds or, still worse, 'small pieces of mind-stuff'." ⁷ What, then, do idealists who reject panpsychism have to offer in the way of a solution of the body-mind problem?

To these thinkers mind is not shut up within atoms or monads or human bodies. Mind is coëxtensive with the totality of known objects. Consequently the body is in the mind and not vice versa, albeit the spatial meaning of enclosure is really inapplicable to mind. It would be better to think of mind as a cross-section of all levels of reality, since any of the objects of any of these levels may be an object of human knowledge. What the body does the mind does, but the mind does much more besides. We can never iden-

⁷ A. Seth Pringle-Pattison: *The Idea of God*, p. 188 (Oxford University Press). In his recently published Gifford Lectures, entitled *Mind and Matter*, G. F. Stout admits that Bosanquet's criticism of Ward is valid. He writes: "How can what is really a system of monads be immediately experienced as a material world? To this question Ward gives no answer and no answer seems possible. This being so, his peculiar version of monadism is untenable" (p. 174).

tify any mind with its physical organism as a whole, nor with the cortical area of the brain. We can briefly state the relation of the mind or self of a human being to his body and to nature, of which his body is a part, if we use the analogy of a gateway leading to a beautiful estate in the center of which is the dwelling-place of the owner. Man's body is the gateway, the estate is nature, and the owner is God or the Absolute. The body is within the human mind and yet it is also within nature. By means of the body we are able to communicate with nature, and when we do we find nature already infused with another mind—God. Hence both man's body and physical nature as a whole are within the mind of God. When we rise to the highest level of reality we have attained an insight into a kind of reality which transcends the distinction between body and mind. That distinction belongs to a lower level.

5. SOME COROLLARIES OF THE IDEALISTIC SOLUTIONS OF THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM

A. Freedom of the Will.—It follows from either of the idealistic solutions of the body-mind problem that the human self is free in some sense. On the parallelistic theory of panpsychism this freedom is not a part of the physical processes. According to that type of theory the human will is at once a member of two distinct series. On its physiological side every act is a member of a causal series in the physical world and is, therefore, completely determined. But on its psychical side every act is a member of a value-series of a transcendental world and as such it is free. But from the standpoint of the interactionist freedom consists in our ability to create new events in the physical world. Every monad is free in a limited sense, and the higher monads are freer than the lower. But the unified totality of a group of monads coöperating with a soul monad, such as man is, has a high degree of freedom in the initiation of action.

Hocking has developed an interesting theory of freedom on the basis of the body-mind theory of absolute idealism. He holds that there is an interval between the suggestion to act and the decision to act. This interval he calls "*the threshold of consent*." Man's freedom is in this interval. No consciously initiated act can avoid the threshold of consent. Every conscious act must pass across it to become an overt act. And in crossing this threshold it gets the stamp of the self's approval, however much it may later be regretted and recognized as wrong. By effort and exercise every individual may lengthen or widen his threshold of consent and increase his effective freedom. And by neglecting habitually to take thought before he acts one can shorten or narrow the threshold of consent, thereby diminishing his effective freedom. But in both cases he is free, because he did the lengthening and the shortening, the widening and the narrowing of the threshold. We choose what our threshold of consent is to be, as well as the specific acts that we perform.

B. *Immortality of the Soul*.—It follows from panpsychism that the monads are all immortal, since they are all ultimately and metaphysically real. Consequently the soul monad of the human body is immortal. The monads making up the human body will be dissociated from the soul monad at death, but it is capable of forming other associations and its psychical existence is eternal. But for the absolute idealist finite individuality is destined to be transformed in the total experience of the Absolute. Only strong-willed personalities, only those who achieve a highly integrated self-hood are immortal in this view. Hocking has well stated this doctrine of *conditional immortality*: "Unless in its use of freedom a self has freely resigned freedom and made itself 'a part of nature and not something in contrast with nature' there is no presumption, scientific or otherwise, that *this* nature must circumscribe its destiny. The life of the unsatisfied self, whose importance

the contemporary psychologist has discovered, and before him, Schopenhauer, and before Schopenhauer, Hegel and Augustine, Plato and Paul, Buddha and Lao Tze, is the best assurance that in the hidden arrangements of the universe this persistent flame, half choked and fitful in the present order, may continue its quest of breath and freedom in another.”⁸ But some theists, who are not panpsychists, refuse to accept this theory of conditional immortality, and defend the view that every self or personality is immortal by virtue of its being a part of the unified totality of all personality, which is God.

⁸ W. E. Hocking: *Self—Its Body and Its Freedom*, p. 177 f. (Yale Press). The threshold of consent idea is expounded in the same volume.

CHAPTER VI

IDEALISM'S SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF VALUE AND EVIL

I. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM OF VALUE

THE problem of value as a separate problem of philosophy has only recently come into general recognition. It is true that under the name of good the problem has been a part of that branch of philosophy called Ethics from the time of the Greeks. But no philosopher, prior to the end of the nineteenth century, ever singled out value as a special category and worked out a general theory of its nature. It has been largely due to the modern emphasis on economic and social theory that the nature of value has become a real problem for philosophers of all schools. The German philosopher, Lotze, and the German theologian, Ritschl, are entitled to the credit for having initiated this line of investigation, but the German thinkers, Meinong and von Ehrenfels, were the first to devote their lives to the attempt to formulate a general theory of value. Because of their influence a new branch of philosophy has been created which is sometimes called *General Theory of Value*, but which is also known as *Axiology*, or the *Science of Norms*. The idealist, Wilbur M. Urban, who studied with Meinong and von Ehrenfels as a graduate student, wrote the first treatise in English in this field, *Valuation—Its Nature and Its Laws*, and the term axiology was first used in that book. Urban is today one of the recognized authorities on axiology, having made many important contributions to the

various technical journals in addition to his early treatise.¹ He has recently published an important Ethics text-book, *Fundamentals of Ethics* (Holt), in which he has made the concept of value central. But many other idealists have been interested in this subject and have made significant contributions to the development of idealistic theory of value. Especially significant are the writings of Hastings Rashdall, Josiah Royce, Bernard Bosanquet, DeWitt Parker, W. E. Hocking, and J. S. Mackenzie.

With the development of axiology as a separate science the word evil has come to mean negative value, and the effort has been made to formulate a general theory of value which will cover both positive and negative value. In so doing two other important distinctions are emphasized, namely, those between instrumental and ultimate value, and extrinsic and intrinsic value. Let us combine these two distinctions and speak of *instrumental* and *intrinsic* value. By the former is meant the value which aids one in the realization of other values. But these other values may be other instrumental values. Let us call such instrumental values second order instrumental values to distinguish them from instrumental values that are not ends. Then it is obvious that instrumental values will often shift from first order to second order. What to one man is a means to something else is to another an end in itself. Do we ever escape this circle and reach a type of value which is intrinsic, ultimate, absolute? This is one of the most fundamental problems of value theory.

Now it is commonly held that all values are relative to persons or to desires or to interests, and that there is no absolute or ultimate value that is so apart from its relation

¹ See Urban's article on *Value* in the new 14th edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* and the references there given. On page 16 of *Valuation—Its Nature and Its Laws* Urban says: "On the analogy of the term epistemology we have constructed the term axiology." Howard O. Eaton: *The Austrian Philosophy of Value* (University of Oklahoma Press) gives a good account of the views of Meinong and von Ehrenfels.

to some person or desire or interest. Consequently values are held to be wholly relative. They are additions to things that are due to human or other living beings interested in those things. Hence they are sometimes called *tertiary qualities* to distinguish them from *secondary qualities*, such as color and warmth, and from *primary qualities* such as motion and extension. By calling them tertiary qualities the fact that they are man-made additions to reality is stressed. Apart from the relation of an object to some living being—plant, animal or human—no value would ever exist. *Idealism denies these views on the ground that persons themselves have intrinsic value.* According to this view things have value only in so far as they serve the ends of persons. But persons themselves have intrinsic value (or worth), as is indicated by Kant's famous moral law, that one should always "so act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only." Thus idealism reaches the theory that self-realization, or the development of personality, is the one intrinsic value to which all other values are instrumental.

Yet this seems to make value more subjective than ever, since selves or persons are the results of the natural processes of organic or biological evolution, and are, therefore, notoriously transitory as compared with non-living objects. No, says idealism, this interpretation of the self or personality is abstract and one-sided. The self is a transcendent reality which is not entirely subject to the forces of biological evolution. To be a person is to be a member of a non-biological spiritual world. In that world intrinsic values are rooted. Hence such values are genuinely transcendental and in no sense are they purely subjective. They refer to the abode where the eternal are. What is the central source of this eternal spiritual world? To the idealist it is the perfection of God. God as a unifying principle of the world of spiritual values thus becomes for the idealist the source of all intrinsic value. Each person gets his value

from his relation to God or the Absolute Perfection, the transcendent being who is nevertheless immanent in the mind of every finite self. Kant's moral law means this, as he made clear by his theory that God, freedom, and immortality are the necessary postulates of that law. As Felix Adler says: "To rate anyone as an end *per se* means that in a world conceived as perfect his existence would be indispensable. The world we know may not be perfect, is not perfect, but we do conceive of an ideal world that is. And to ascribe to anyone the quality of worth, to denominate him an end *per se*, is to place him into that world, to regard him as potentially a member of it."² In his *Higher Pantheism* Tennyson has beautifully expressed the central theme of idealism's theory of value.

The sun, the moon, the stars, the seas, the hills and the plains,—
Are not these, O Soul, the Vision of Him who reigns?

Is not the Vision He, tho' He be not that which He seems?
Dreams are true while they last, and do we not live in dreams?

Earth, these solid stars, this weight of body and limb,
Are they not sign and symbol of thy division from Him?

Dark is the world to thee; thyself art the reason why,
For is He not all but thou, that hast power to feel "I am I"?

Glory about thee, without thee; and thou fulfillest thy doom,
Making Him broken gleams and a stifled splendor and gloom.

Speak to Him, thou, for He hears, and Spirit with Spirit can meet—
Closer is He than breathing, and nearer than hands and feet.

God is law, say the wise; O Soul, and let us rejoice,
For if He thunder by law the thunder is yet His voice.

Law is God, say some; no God at all, says the fool,
For all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool;

And the ear of man cannot hear, and the eye of man cannot see;
But if we could see and hear, this Vision—were it not He?

² Felix Adler: *An Ethical Philosophy of Life* (Appleton), pp. 101 f. (note).

2. THE TRINITY OF TRANSCENDENTAL VALUES

What becomes of the values of art, science, and morality on this view? Are not aesthetic values realized in this earthly, finite existence? And is the same not true of the values of science and morality? Here, where we toil and mingle in the intimate associations of human life, are high cultural values which need not dwell in the empyrean. To make the perfection of God the ultimate goal of the human will is to substitute an attitude of other-worldliness for that of strenuous participation in the enhancement and conservation of the cultural values that have been, and are being, evolved here upon the earth. No charge against idealism is commoner than this. John Dewey repeats it *ad nauseam*. But the idealist is not scared by it. For he holds that these cultural values are intrinsic just as much as he insists that self-realization, culminating in the perfection of God, is the supreme intrinsic value. The idealist is not an abstractionist. He does not strip away from the reality of a self all cultural values, and then turn that naked soul hungrily towards an abstract God who lacks these cultural values. For the idealist's God unites within Himself these values appreciated in art, science, and morality. God is the unity of a trinity of transcendental values. If He is Himself the supreme transcendental value, it is just because apart from Him there is no meaning to truth or to goodness or to beauty.

For what is knowledge when the ideal order system, or concrete universal involved in it, is ignored? It sinks to the stimulus and response mechanism of behavioristic psychology. It becomes a transitory biological phenomenon. Knowledge that does not go beyond the cognitive process of stimulus and response and reach an objective order system is not knowledge. But knowledge which does attain an objective order system is already participating in the reality

of the self-consistent whole of reality. Truth is that whole, and God's essence includes the essence of truth.

And what is beauty when the objective reality is taken away from the aesthetic experience? It sinks to a purely transitory and evanescent bodily titillation. The artist embodies the beautiful in his creations only in the degree that his work is real. He must not slavishly copy nature or aspects of nature. He must penetrate to the universal pattern or harmonizing principles in his material. Art is never the externalization of a subjective wish. "The most general name for the specific objects of art is the *beautiful*; and the beautiful may be defined as *that which demands to be possessed by reproduction*. . . . Art could thus be described as the *completion of the possession* of the beautiful." (Hocking). And if this is what art is, then art is not possible unless the beautiful is real. And the beautiful cannot be real unless the spiritual world is real. And the spiritual world cannot be real unless it is sustained by, and infused with, that "living Will, which shall endure, when all that seems shall suffer shock." Hence beauty is real because it is a part of the essence of God. According to idealism beauty is the second member of the trinity of transcendental values.

A recent statement by Fritz Kreisler confirms this idealistic theory of beauty. He said: "Some of the loftiest aspirations of the human soul are reserved to those who have the great gift of musical expression, for they thereby lift themselves out of a material world and enter a spiritual one. In holding communion with the great composers, who were surely instruments in the hands of a divine power, we are enabled to express something of the infinite. Whether I play in public in the midst of thousands or in the privacy of my own room, I forget everything except my music. Whenever I am lifted out of the material plane and come in touch with another, a holier world, it is as if some hand other than mine were directing the bow over the strings."

And what is moral goodness when it is dissociated from an objective spiritual realm? At the best it would sink to the level of a shifting adjustment of conflicting interests in a rapidly evolving social order. Unless there is some spiritual order, some kingdom of ends, some city of God, some Church triumphant, where the spirits of just men are made perfect in love, how can goodness have any real existence? Royce's idea of the blessed community, which transcends every finite social order and constitutes the essence of God, is absolutely necessary if moral goodness is to be anything but a biological and sociological phenomenon. As the great English idealist, Hastings Rashdall, puts it: "Only if we believe in the existence of a Mind for which the true moral ideal is already in some sense real, a Mind which is the source of whatever is true in our own moral judgments, can we rationally think of the moral ideal as no less real than the world itself. Only so can we believe in an absolute standard of right and wrong, which is as independent of this or that man's actual ideas and actual desires as the facts of material nature."³

Thus the idealist is led to the view that the supreme intrinsic value is the perfection of God, and that the purpose of human life is the development of a harmonious and rich personality, and the bringing of that life into harmony with God, whose will absolutely pervades all reality, while at the same time His perfect being transcends all finite events and processes. And included in the very essence of God are the eternal values of truth, beauty, and goodness. That is why the finite self which devotes itself to the realization of these eternal values achieves the eternality which these values possess.

3. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

Anyone who asserts, as does the idealist, that there is a transcendental level of reality, which is inclusive of all

³ Hastings Rashdall: *Theory of Good and Evil*, Vol. II, p. 212.

goodness, beauty, and truth, and the essence of which is a Spiritual Personality or Absolute Perfection, is confronted with a most perplexing problem. That problem is that of reconciling the existence of perfection with the facts of evil everywhere so apparent in the experiences of men. Some thinkers have been so impressed with the pervasiveness of evil in human life as to answer Leibniz's classic statement: "This is the best of all possible worlds," with the rejoinder: "No world would be better." And such thinkers must also be numbered among the idealists! Schopenhauer, von Hartmann, and their disciples defend the thesis that "the world is my idea," but they supplement it with the statement, "the real essence of the world on its inner side is a blind, unconscious, irrational, willing activity." A similar form of pessimistic idealism was developed by the great thinkers of India. We cannot meet idealistic metaphysical pessimism with a blind metaphysical optimism such as is represented by Christian Science. The facts of evil are too numerous and too poignant to be ignored and denied. Neither idealistic metaphysical pessimism nor idealistic metaphysical optimism can be said to be satisfactory solutions of the problem of evil. Both are rather extreme views to be condemned for their one-sidedness. Goodness is real. There are many specific values in human life. Evil is real. Negative values are just as factual as are positive values so far as human experience is concerned. Yet transcending the finite experiences of both negative and positive values, idealism asserts that there is a realm of perfection in which truth, goodness, and beauty, united to form the being of God, alone are real. And this leaves the idealist with the problem of explaining why there is evil. *Si Deus bonus est, unde malum?* If God is good, why evil?

Excluding the two extreme views of metaphysical pessimism and optimism, there are three solutions of this problem offered by contemporary idealists. Let us briefly consider each.

A. *Metaphysical Dualism*.—One solution is to interpret ultimate reality as involving a permanent conflict between two opposite forces—good and evil. We may soften this conflict, as Royce does, by insisting that the Absolute is conscious of victory even in the midst of conflict. On Royce's theory of the Absolute as the Being with an infinite time-span, who has an immediate knowledge of all facts, evil has to fall within the *totum simul*, or eternal present, which is the experience of the Absolute. Royce therefore accepts evil as real and praises Schopenhauer for having given a deeper analysis of its nature than any previous thinker. And when Royce says that evil is real, he means that it is metaphysically real. In the Absolute's own eternal consciousness there are evil facts. But the Absolute has conquered them. They are in the position of vanquished enemies. Hence Royce would deny that his solution of the problem is dualistic. The experience of the Absolute is perfectly unified and harmonious just because He is master over all evil and recalcitrant facts.

Another way in which metaphysical dualism may be softened is to think of God as entirely separate from and superior to evil, while still holding that evil is metaphysically real. This is the finite God idea of Rashdall and other idealists. God is supremely good—the very essence of perfection. In Him is no experience of evil or taint of sin. He fights evil continually. But evil is real and has not yet been overcome. There is contingency or chance in the universe itself. (This is the doctrine which Charles S. Peirce called *tychism*.) Even the ultimate outcome is not absolutely assured. Let men of good will throw all of their strength to the side of the good; then, under the leadership of God, this good will finally prevail. This solution of the problem of evil makes God a relatively limited being, but it puts Him on a higher level of reality than man and excludes from His nature all evil.

Yet the logical consequence of dualism is to make evil

just as real as good. Both are ultimate facts and both must be given a place in ultimate reality. When one accepts this principle, he is unable to escape a genuine metaphysical dualism.

B. Evil as Appearance.—Another way in which the problem of evil is solved by contemporary idealists is to regard it as an appearance that is real to finite minds but not to the mind of the Absolute or God. This is the solution offered by Bradley and Bosanquet. We have here a modern form of the old theory that evil is primarily negative. It is due to our seeing things from a restricted point of view. If we could but see all facts as they are in the whole, they would not be evil. Condemned as we are to use the body as an instrument for our intercourse with the spiritual world of value, we are often lost in wandering mazes. When our minds are merged completely with the mind of God, these illusions, which the finite mind calls evils, will disappear. In God all moral distinctions are transmuted. Perfection is "beyond good and evil." This follows from the principle that the higher level is a reorganization and transformation of the experiences of lower levels. Bosanquet holds that good and evil are both made out of the same stuff, and that good is simply more consistent with reality than evil. But even good is not wholly consistent with reality. When it becomes so it will cease to be good because it will share in the other aspects of the whole. Bradley says that truth ceases to be truth in the whole of reality because it there takes on the characteristics of beauty and goodness, as well as those of truth. This solution of the problem of evil has had a wide appeal, and many contemporary idealists accept it.

C. The Gradational View of Evil.—Radoslav Tsanoff has recently formulated what he calls a *gradational view of the nature of evil*. Using the levels theory of reality, he argues that "in a world of things and processes different in character, difference and conflict-in-relation are just what

we should expect." We have to assume some sort of hierarchy as a basic presupposition of valuation. And when we think of the world as consisting in a "hierarchy of activities" or as "gradational," "evil is literally *degradation*, the surrender of the higher to the lower in the scale of being, the effective down-pulling incursion of the lower against the higher." Tsanoff claims that this theory admits evil to be real without producing pessimism and despair. And on this view what is good on one level becomes evil on another. "It is a fact that what at a lower level and from a lower point of view passes for good and at that level is good discloses from a higher point of view its insufficiency, and adherence to it at the higher level becomes evil." Thus at each level of reality good is what is appropriate to that level, and evil is what is appropriate to a lower level trying to destroy the higher level. Now God is the "Apogee of Value." He is not the perfect being theologians have supposed Him to be, for that conception of perfection implies a static condition. We must think of God's perfection as dynamic. Hence we must call it perfectibility rather than perfection. "The core of reality is this eternal perfectibility: the heavens declare it; evolution, cosmic, biologic, or human-social discloses it; man's logical, aesthetic, and moral activity reveals its sublime range. Man's idea of God is his gesture towards the dizzy utmost of value, the infinite reach and endless span of it."⁴ This original and interesting recent solution of the problem of evil seems to me to combine Bosanquet's idea that evils are transmuted into good in God, and Royce's idea that God's own being is a constant and "ever-heroic redemption of the world from the hazard of settling back."

This gradational theory of evil is perhaps as good a solution of the problem as can be offered when we look at evil from our own human level of reality. What evil would be

⁴ Radoslav Tsanoff: *The Nature of Evil* (The Macmillan Company), pp. 391, 397 and 399.

when looked at from the level of "the dizzy utmost of value" it is not given to many mortals to know. But if we may believe the true mystics, who claim to have experienced the "dizzy utmost of value," no evil is there. There is what eye has not seen and what ear has not heard and what the mind of man has not conceived; there is the calm of real power, eternal peace, and blessedness; there is the God who has made man for Himself and who is forever calling restless spirits home.

I, therefore, venture to suggest that one way out of the problem of evil is to be found by making negative value or evil the opposite, not of all value, but only of instrumental value. In so far as selves are realized by their experiences these experiences have positive instrumental value, and in so far as the realization of selves is thwarted by their experiences, these experiences have negative instrumental value. But all selves have intrinsic value and the destiny of all selves is communion with the infinitely perfect essence of all reality, the unified totality of all intrinsic value—God. He is engaged in the redemptive process of bringing spiritual personalities to self-consciousness and to God-consciousness, and of unifying all such personalities in Himself. In this sense we may speak of God as the eternal perfectibility. But His being engaged in this process of soul-making is not to Him an evil but a good. Hence there is and can be no evil in God. In Him all evil is transmuted into good, but in Him instrumental values only are transmuted into perfection. Intrinsic values are the essence of the Being of God.⁵

⁵ Compare this suggestion with the exposition of Croce's theory of concrete universals below, pp. 319 f.

CHAPTER VII

TYPICAL OBJECTIONS TO IDEALISM

I. GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE REACTION AGAINST IDEALISM

DURING the last half of the nineteenth century idealism may be said to have attained the enviable position of being the dominant philosophy of West European Culture. The influence of Hegel made it supreme in Germany, and from Germany it spread to France, Italy, and England, where great original thinkers developed new and distinctive interpretations of idealistic doctrine. In the United States, under the leadership of W. T. Harris, for many years Commissioner of Education of the Federal Government, idealism became the officially recognized philosophy in teachers' colleges and other higher institutions of learning. But before the end of the century there were increasing signs of revolt, and the first third of the twentieth century will be characterized in the history of philosophy as a period of reaction against idealism. Proponents of this philosophy have gradually been thrown on the defensive, and today to proclaim oneself an idealist is a far more risky undertaking than it was thirty years ago, when for a philosopher not to proclaim himself one was the more ominous. In fact the critics of idealism today occupy the strongest position in the philosophic world that they have ever attained, and the trend of the times certainly appears to be against idealism. However, the probabilities are that this is the best time for young people to devote themselves to a study of idealism, since there is every reason to believe that the wave of reaction has about spent its force, and that the next forward movement in philosophy will be a revival

of idealism under a new form. The world now waits for the genius who can create a new idealism, capable of absorbing the truth in the anti-idealistic philosophies of our day, but capable also of creating an original and constructive statement of the essential principles of idealism.

The reaction against idealism has been fostered by representatives of realism and pragmatism and has been in the interest of these two types of philosophy. This fact must be kept in mind as we consider some typical objections to idealism. The student must remember what was said above (see p. 50) about how to criticise a philosopher. He must not forget that it is easier to point out defects in a theory than it is to formulate a theory which is free from defects. The idealist is aware of the fallibility of the human mind, and he knows full well that the one-sidedness in idealism will have to be corrected. But he also knows that the critics inevitably fall into worse one-sidednesses when they become constructive. Hence their constructive efforts are destined to be superseded by a better idealism. This is the inevitable outcome of the movement of philosophic reflection. Let us not make the mistake of thinking that idealism is being finally rejected by contemporary critics. It is only being chastened.

Thirty years ago G. E. Moore published his now celebrated *Refutation of Idealism*. The enemies of idealism at once hailed it as final. When Moore republished this essay in his *Philosophical Studies* twenty years later, he wrote in his Preface: "This paper now appears to me to be very confused as well as to embody a good many down-right mistakes; so I am doubtful whether I ought to have included it." This does not mean that the refuter of idealism is now himself an idealist. But it does mean that verbal refutations of idealism, based upon an inadequate knowledge of the profounder literature of that philosophy, are less final than they seem at the time they are written.

2. SOME REALIST OBJECTIONS TO IDEALISM

A. *Perry's Refutation of Idealism*.—R. B. Perry, in *Present Philosophical Tendencies* (Longmans), makes an interesting attack on idealism which is characteristic of the attitude towards idealism of the so-called new realism. He holds that the cardinal principle of idealism is "the priority of the cognitive consciousness" or that "being is dependent on the knowing of it." Moore, in the essay mentioned above, takes the same view as Perry when he says that the *esse est percipi* (to be is to be perceived) principle of Berkeley and Schopenhauer is the major premise on which all idealism rests. Both Moore and Perry vigorously attack this principle.

Perry says that it rests upon the *fallacy of initial predication*. By this he means that we take some accidental feature of a thing as essential to its definition. Being perceived is an accident of an object, but Berkeley takes it to be essential to an object. There are many other characteristics of things which Berkeley might have hit upon besides this. Perry here assumes that being perceived is an accidental characteristic of a thing and this is the realistic assumption. But he justifies this assumption by pointing out our human *ego-centric predicament*. This predicament is that we can never refer to any object without making it our idea. But this fact does not justify us in identifying the object with our idea of it. In fact the ego-centric predicament proves nothing at all. Yet idealists always use it as a proof of their cardinal principle. Perry then proceeds to identify all idealism with this cardinal principle. "To anyone who refuses to permit the issue to be confused, it must be apparent that the theory with which Berkeley startled the world in 1710 is essentially the same as that which flourished in the nineteenth century in the form given it by Fichte and Hegel" (p. 134). What the objective or absolute idealist did was to unite the cardinal principle of idealism with the principle of absolutism.

This principle rests upon a purely *speculative dogma* that there must be one general and all-sufficient principle of explanation. Absolutism sets up a cosmic unity as the standard or limit of all thinking.

Perry then proceeds to show that there are three root defects in absolutism as thus defined. These defects are *formalism*, *equivocation*, and *dogmatism*. To escape any one of these defects the absolutist falls back on one of the others. By formalism Perry means resting the mind in unlimited generalities, which it is the merit of idealism to have discovered, but in which no mind can rest. For any category of unlimited generality is "grossly inadequate to everything to which it applies." Perry holds that the more general a concept is the less sufficient it is, and the less general it is the more sufficient. Now in order to avoid formalism idealism uses words borrowed from common sense to give meaning to these concepts of widest generality. Such words as "over-self," "super" and "absolute" mean one thing in common speech and another in idealistic philosophy. Idealists use them in their technical sense and their readers take them in the familiar sense, and this gives idealism a hold on the thinking of common people. But equivocation is the price the idealist pays for this hold. When equivocation is entirely avoided, no specific meaning can be given to the formal concepts. In asserting the reality of the Absolute idealists become dogmatic. Perry quotes Joachim and Royce to show that idealists simply lay down this doctrine dogmatically and loosely and without any proof for it.

Perry concludes by pointing out the practical defects in idealism. It is opposed fundamentally to the characteristic faith of our times, which is a belief in the "gradual amelioration of life through the human conquest of nature," and clings to an outworn and antiquated faith in "the perfection that was from the beginning and is forevermore." It is excessively individualistic and slights society in the interest

of "that absolute self in which a man is encouraged to find his true sphere and only genuine reality." It discredits progress as a real ideal. Moreover, there is a leveling tendency in idealism that is pernicious. If things find their real meaning only in the Absolute all the "flat differences and uncompromising oppositions that guide the empirical and practical intelligence" are ignored. Perry thinks that this leveling tendency accounts for the fact that idealism has contributed little or nothing to the solution of special problems and has no interest in special empirical discoveries.

B. *Objections of British Realists to Idealism.*—Many of the objections Perry makes to idealism are to be found in the writings of other realists, and especially in those of the British realists. But Bertrand Russell, Moore, and other British realists have especially attacked the coherence theory of truth. According to Russell this theory rests upon the useless and false assumption of the *internality of relations*. By this he means the theory of Bradley, Bosanquet, and Joachim that "every relation is grounded in the nature of the related terms." Thus, in order for two objects to be related there must be a complexity in each on which the relation in question is based. On this theory or axiom, for so the idealists treat it, is based the theory of an absolutely self-consistent whole of reality, and therewith the whole coherence theory of truth, with its corollary that there are degrees of truth and error. But no satisfactory proof of this axiom of internal relations can be given. It is merely an assumption idealists make. Moreover, one cannot carry out the doctrine in practice without either becoming involved in an endless regress or reaching a relation not grounded in its terms. In the latter case we refute the theory and in the former we fail to reach the Absolute. Then, too, the axiom of internal relations conflicts with the conception of the concrete universal, the idea that every reality is an identity in difference. As Russell puts it: "The whole conception of identity and difference is incompatible with

the axiom of internal relations, yet without this conception monism can give no account of the world, which suddenly collapses like an opera hat. I conclude that the axiom is false, and that those parts of idealism which depend upon it are therefore groundless." And Moore pays his respects to the theory that the concrete universal is a unity of differences. "The principle of organic unities, like that of combined analysis and synthesis, is mainly used to defend the practice of holding *both* of two contradictory propositions, wherever this may seem convenient. In this, as in other matters, Hegel's main service to philosophy has consisted in giving a name to and erecting into a principle, a type of fallacy to which experience had shown philosophers, along with the rest of mankind, to be addicted. No wonder that he has followers and admirers." ¹

C. D. Broad has recently formulated certain significant criticisms of the idealistic theory of value, in his lengthy review of A. E. Taylor's *The Faith of a Moralist*. Idealists like Taylor use the disjunctive argument that "either the purely naturalistic view of human nature and destiny is false or the profoundest ethical convictions of the best and wisest men throughout human history are mistaken." Broad admits the truth of the disjunction, but he argues that the younger generation of educated people have definitely chosen the naturalistic view, even though it does make human effort "rather a sorry business." He imagines the younger generation of students and tutors at Cambridge University saying: "Our own wisest course is to try to exorcise, by psycho-analysis and similar means, the ghosts of those moral ideals which still haunt us from the dead past of our individual and racial infancy. We can then at least set about making the best of a bad job, undiverted by the lure of an impossible perfection, and untroubled by the

¹ The exposition of Russell's criticism of the doctrine of internal relations is based upon his essay on the monistic theory of truth in *Philosophical Essays*. The quotation is from pages 168 f. The quotation from Moore is from *Philosophical Studies*, p. 16 (Harcourt, Brace & Co.).

stings of irrational remorse." Although Broad does not entirely agree with this position as thus stated, he thinks it fairly represents the modern attitude toward the idealistic theory of transcendental values, and he is inclined to sympathize with it. He holds that a man can get from himself the incentive to reach a higher moral level. Our condemnation of the secular life as most people live it may be due to our looking at it from the outside, whereas those who are living it probably find it quite satisfactory. The idealist's view that such a life is meaningless is based upon "a quite exceptional standpoint which a few exceptional people take at a few moments in their lives." The people who are actually living the secular life cannot even understand the criticism of the idealist. To argue that a "beatific vision" of absolute truth, goodness, and beauty is the highest happiness of man is to apply to all mankind what would only be true of a few very unusual individuals. And for all we know we may be idealizing eternity. "The denizens of eternity, if such there be, may for all we know have troubles of their own which do not affect the creatures of time."² This is the characteristic attitude of realists towards the claim of idealism that only a belief in the reality of transcendental values can give adequate meaning to human life.

C. *Objections of Critical Realists to Idealism.*—George Santayana, the most distinguished of the so-called critical realists, has often subjected idealism to examination. We have space for only two of his interesting criticisms of the idealism of Josiah Royce.

Santayana holds that Royce's transcendental conception of the Absolute is incompatible with his social realism. According to the former, individual minds and social minds alike are *ideas* only. Only the Absolute Mind is real. But according to the latter, individual minds and social or group minds are empirically real and just as much so as anything else. For Royce the Absolute is "an actual synthetic univer-

² *Mind*, Vol. XL, pp. 371 f. The quotations above are on page 367 f.

sal mind, the God of Aristotle and of Christian theology." Yet Royce was a social realist. He admitted that "there are many collateral human minds, in temporal existential relation to one another, any of which may influence any other, but never supplant it nor materially include it."³ But these two views are radically opposed. In trying to harmonize them Royce attempted the impossible.

Royce's famous analogy between a self-representative system and the Absolute is attacked by Santayana. Royce used this analogy to show that an individual can be a part of the Absolute and yet retain his individuality. His famous example of a self-representative system is a map of England spread out on English soil, which would be a part of England and yet would reproduce every detail of England, including itself. If we then made a map of the map and kept repeating this process, the original map would keep reappearing in each successive map as an element in it. Santayana holds that this does not solve the problem of the relation of the individual to the Absolute. For either all of the maps are merely parts of the surface of England which, in being, for example, continually washed by the sea, is radically different from the maps, or there is no England at all but only a series of maps. In the latter case, too, the Absolute would be the entire series, and therefore radically different in character from any member of the series. Thus in either case the Absolute is entirely different from the individuals. Moreover, there is a difficulty in the fact that all of the maps are exactly alike, whereas individual human beings are notoriously different. Hence the analogy completely fails to clarify the relation of individuals to the Absolute.

³ For these criticisms of Royce see the chapter on Royce in Santayana's *Character and Opinion in the United States* (Scribners). The quotations are from p. 132. For other criticisms of idealism see Santayana's *Egotism in German Philosophy, Scepticism and Animal Belief*, and *The Genteel Tradition at Bay*. The latter is quoted below, p. 227.

3. SOME PRAGMATIST OBJECTIONS TO IDEALISM

All of the pragmatists have attacked idealism, but it will suffice here to summarize the objections of William James and John Dewey.

James called idealism *noetic monism*, because it insists that the entire universe is the realm of objects of a single knower, and is unified by the cognitive activity of this single knower, the Absolute. In *Some Problems of Philosophy* James lists four radical defects in this view: (i) It fails to account for finite minds. We know one thing without knowing another thing, whereas the Absolute Mind knows everything at once. Hence we are different from the Absolute, and we "know differently from its knowing." (ii) For other philosophies the one problem of evil is how to get rid of it, how to throw it overboard like ballast from an airship. This is a purely *practical* problem. But for idealism, which asserts the reality of Perfection, there is an *insoluble theoretical* problem of how there can be imperfection. In his *Collected Essays and Reviews* there is a short discussion by James entitled "The Mad Absolute," which shows how he thought the Absolute would have to be conceived in view of the presence in His world of so many glaring imperfections. (iii) To us change is most real and a highly essential ingredient in what we experience. But the experience of the Absolute is said to be timeless and beyond our powers of comprehension. It follows that Absolute Idealism has to make our world of experience an illusion, like the Maya of Hindu Idealism. (iv) Absolutism is fatalistic and excludes possibility from reality. It asserts that all that is, is necessary and that all else is impossible. This sharply conflicts with our human consciousness of freedom that "the next turn of events can at any given moment genuinely be ambiguous, *i.e.* possibly this, but also possibly that." Thus all real novelty and uniqueness is excluded by the idealistic view.

Dewey has been a persistent critic of idealism and all of his books are filled with objections to its various detailed theories. He especially likes to show that idealism is merely an intellectual defense of emotional attitudes that come down from the past. In his opinion all the types of idealism are conservative and more or less out of touch with modern life and modern developments in science. He thinks that the supposed transcendental values of idealism are superimposed upon experienced goods. But the latter have been so greatly expanded and multiplied by modern science that "the sense of transcendent values has become enfeebled; instead of permeating all things in life it is more and more restricted to special times and acts. . . . Whatever men say and profess, their tendency in the presence of actual evils is to resort to natural and empirical means to remedy them." ⁴ This is Dewey's way of saying that idealism is gradually "petering out" as a philosophy.

In his little book entitled *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Holt) Dewey summarizes his attack on idealism under three headings: (i) It is *conservative* and *propagandizes* for old beliefs and prejudices and social practices. This involves an insincerity which is often unconscious and is, therefore, the more invidious. Idealism aims primarily at a rational justification of things that have been previously accepted, instead of looking toward the future and finding new solutions for live problems. (ii) Idealism is purely formal. It magnifies the signs of rigorous thought whenever it finds itself unable to prove its contentions empirically. Unwilling to accept mere social convention as the basis for its beliefs, and not being able to find real inductive reasons for them, idealism hunts specious dialectical and formal arguments, and covers up its defects with a mass of verbiage. This is what causes so many present-day students to turn away with contempt from the serious study of philosophy. At its worst idealism is merely a lot of elaborate ter-

⁴ John Dewey: *The Quest for Certainty*, p. 257 (Minton Balch).

minology and hair-splitting logic that is purely formal. It is unwilling to admit, with Bishop Butler and William James, that probability is the guide of life. It seeks now, as it has always sought, an unattainable certainty. (iii) Idealism has made a fixed distinction between two worlds, the transcendent or noumenal world, to use Kant's term, and the world of everyday life and science, which idealism likes to call the world of mere appearance or description. And then it claims to have a special method of knowing the noumenal world, which differs from the ways of knowing of scientists and common men. This claim is false and it is coming more and more to be recognized as so, and the distinction between the world of phenomena and the noumenal world is rapidly being abandoned.

In reaching these three defects in idealism, or, as he calls it, classic philosophy, Dewey uses the genetic method. He shows how each defect has arisen because "the genetic method of approach is a more effective way of undermining this type of philosophic theorizing than any attempt at logical refutation could be." And here he states the characteristic attitude of many contemporary pragmatists towards idealism, which is to ignore its serious arguments, and to discredit it by branding it as an intellectual defense of the *status quo* in all fields of human knowledge and experience.

PART THREE
REALISM

CHAPTER I

WHAT REALISM IS

I. THE WORD REALISM

LIKE the word idealism the word realism has many meanings, especially when combined with other words. It is not easy to disentangle all of these meanings. Perhaps the best approach is to consider three related senses of the word as it is employed in literature and art, where it is also used as the opposite of the term idealism. Realism in art may mean deliberately neglecting the elements of harmony and beauty in a subject, and describing ugly things or elaborating sordid details. Or it may mean an excessive emphasis on individual and particular items, and devotion to meticulous details to the neglect of types and universal patterns. But the most exact meaning of realism in art and literature is the representation and portrayal of any and all facts just as they are, without any effort to idealize and interpret them so as to make the good outweigh the evil and the beautiful overbalance the ugly. Thus Thomas Hardy's novels are excellent examples of realism in this sense. The philosophical usage of the word realism is nearest to this third sense.

However, in philosophy the word is used to refer to a number of significant tendencies. The common element in all of them is the insistence upon realities that are entirely independent of the cognitive process by which they happen to be known to human beings. As George Santayana puts it: "Realism in regard to knowledge has various degrees. The minimum of realism is the presumption that there is such a thing as knowledge; in other words, that perception

and thought refer to some object not the mere experience of perceiving and thinking. The maximum of realism would be the assurance that everything ever perceived or thought of existed apart from apprehension and exactly in the form in which it is believed to exist: in other words, that perception and conception are always direct and literal revelations, and that there is no such thing as error." ¹ Thus there is a wide range between the minimum and maximum meanings of realism. The simplest form of realism is the *naïve realism* of the man in the street, who probably thinks that all of the objects experienced in his waking life are real, just as they are experienced, and whether they are being experienced or not. In his book entitled *A Theory of Direct Realism* J. E. Turner calls this "truncated realism" to distinguish it from the direct realism which he defends. In the first chapter of this book we dealt with this type of realism under the name of *Everyman's Philosophy* or the philosophy of the unphilosophical. The philosophical realist would not hold such a crude type of realism, but would substitute for sense objects various more refined "scientific objects," such as points and volumes, protons and electrons and what not.

2. HISTORIC FORMS OF REALISM

Realism is one of the most ancient of philosophies, but it has not always been called realism. Under the names of materialism and naturalism the realistic tendencies in human thought have always been more or less widespread and influential. Albert Lange's three volume *History of Materialism*, which has recently been reissued, should be read by all who wish to trace the story of the gradual emergence in the history of thought of the philosophy of realism. In the form of naturalism and materialism realism is as old as Heraclitus and the Greek atomists, especially Democritus. Among the Romans Lucretius revived this type

¹ George Santayana in *Essays in Critical Realism*, p. 163. Edited by Durant Drake, and published by The Macmillan Company.



Photo Brown Bros.

GEORGE SANTAYANA (1863-)

of philosophy in his *De Rerum Natura*, making use of the atomism of Democritus. Thomas Hobbes, the first great modern philosopher, is a typical representative of the naturalism and materialism which developed on the basis of the science of Galileo. Yet none of these types of philosophy were called realism, partly because they stood in rather sharp opposition to Platonism, which was then regarded as realism.

A. *Classic Realism*.—This is the name of the theory of universal ideas which arose in the Middle Ages, when a dispute arose among the schoolmen as to whether the kind or species names were just mere words or actual realities. Based on Plato's theory that ideas in the sense of universal types or patterns (archetypes) are more real than their actual embodiments in particular existents, classic realism held that universals or kinds are the only realities. Hence classic realism was a theory of the nature of universals and was primarily concerned with their ontological status. It is an interesting fact that many contemporary realists share the view of the scholastic realists that universals are real. (See Part V, Chap. II, 5.) Consequently the basic contention of classic realism has been incorporated in contemporary realism.

B. *Representative Realism*.—This is the name usually given to the dualistic philosophy of John Locke and sometimes to that of Descartes. On this theory there are certain objective qualities called the *primary qualities* of matter—extension, solidity, motion, rest and number, and certain powers—the power to produce changes in other bodies and the power to produce ideas in the human mind of *secondary qualities*, such as colors, tastes, odors, etc.,—which are objectively real independently of any percipient organism. We have ideas in our minds which copy or represent these real qualities and powers that are in objects, and hence the name *representative* realism. Because of the criticisms of Bishop

Berkeley and David Hume representative realism fell into disrepute, but it is now being revived, and some forms of contemporary realism are closely allied with it.

C. *Natural Realism*.—This type of realism arose as a reaction against Hume's sceptical conclusion as to the reality of any object independent of the sense impressions. Thomas Reid developed this theory most consequentially. According to Reid we have to accept certain common-sense principles which are suggested to us by *natural suggestion*. Only a fool or a madman, said Reid, would attempt to shake off his original belief in the reality of existences distinct from his sense impressions. But Reid was not a dualist like Locke. Under the name of the Scottish philosophy this natural realism has exercised a great influence, extending down to the present day. James McCosh, an able teacher at Princeton, promulgated it in this country. And T. Case, whose *Physical Realism* was published in 1888, admits that he holds the realism of the Scottish School.

D. *Herbartian Realism*.—This is a type of realism based upon the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. J. F. Herbart, who was for a time the successor of Kant on the faculty of the University of Königsberg, analyzed Kant's thing-in-itself and his transcendental ego into ultimate "reals," and he made these "reals" the basis of his metaphysics. Through various combinations of reals the ordinary sense-objects of everyday life arise. This Herbartian realism has also influenced contemporary realism, and Herbart deserves great credit for having developed the realism that was latent in Kant's philosophy.

E. *Transfigured Realism*.—This is the name which Herbert Spencer gave to his theory that there is an unknowable reality behind all of the manifestations of mind and matter. Spencer thought that every event in the world of the knowable was related to some mode of the unknowable reality, but that there was no resemblance between them.

There is also a close relation between the theory of Spencer and certain forms of contemporary realism.²

3. CLASSIFICATIONS OF THE CONTEMPORARY TYPES OF REALISM

A. Sellars's Classification.—In classifying contemporary types of realism in the English-speaking world R. W. Sellars adopts the principle of dividing them along national lines on the ground that "those who live together and know each other personally influence each other most strongly." Accordingly he deals with *English Realism* as represented by Bertrand Russell, G. E. Moore, Samuel Alexander, Percy Nunn, L. A. Reid, C. D. Broad, Lloyd Morgan, and A. N. Whitehead. He should also have mentioned J. E. Turner, L. J. Russell, Dawes Hicks, C. E. M. Joad, John Laird, and others. The difficulty with throwing all of these thinkers together in one group is that there are very significant differences among them. Sellars then takes up *American Realism*. This he divides into two types—the *New Realism* and *Critical Realism*. A similar division could be applied to the English realists. However, these names happen to come from the titles of two books written by groups of American thinkers who conferred together and developed a set of doctrines on which they agreed, whereas no such coöperative effort has ever been undertaken in England. Nevertheless the English realists do really fall into distinct groups. Then, too, there are a number of important American realists who did not coöperate in the writing of either book, and Sellars fails to take them into account. Chief among them are E. B. McGilvary, M. R. Cohen, G. S. Fullerton, J. Loewenberg, C. J. Ducasse, and

² Selections setting forth Hobbes's materialism, representative realism (Descartes and Locke), the natural realism of Reid, Herbartian realism, and the transfigured realism of Spencer will be found in my *Anthology of Modern Philosophy*. See also the selection from George Santayana on "The Unknowable of Herbert Spencer" in my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, for proof that Spencer's agnosticism is an important element in contemporary realism.

J. E. Boodin, each of whom has developed a distinctive realistic standpoint. Sellars's principle of division is therefore faulty in that it fails to take account of all of the realists of the English-speaking world. And to make the classification complete it would also be necessary to have a class of German and of French Realism, for there are similar movements in Germany and France. The Germans, Husserl and Meinong, are especially important because of their influence on British and American thinkers.

The six authors of the volume entitled *The New Realism* are Edwin B. Holt, Walter T. Marvin, William P. Montague, Ralph Barton Perry, Walter B. Pitkin and E. G. Spaulding. This volume appeared in 1912, but the realistic movement represented in it really began with the publication of Josiah Royce's *The World and the Individual*, in Volume I of which the realistic hypothesis that objects are entirely independent of the cognitive relation was carefully examined and rejected. In the *Monist* of 1901 and 1902 Perry discussed at some length Royce's critique of realism, and it was largely due to this attempt to answer Royce that the New Realism got under way as a separate type of philosophy. Perry there defined realism as follows: "The realist believes reality to be a *datum*, a *somewhat that is given independently of whatever ideas may be formed about it*. According to the realist, the real has a *locus*, a *habitat*, whether or no within some individual experience. Here the real primarily *is*, and *is*, regardless of whatever secondary meanings, symbols, relations, or ideas of any kind may be referred to it." Thus this type of realism arose as a polemic against Roycean Absolute Idealism and announced itself as a reform movement. Each of the six representatives drew up a brief separate "platform" which was approved by his colleagues, and these six platforms are published in the Appendix of *The New Realism*. They give a good idea of the basic tenets of the American New Realism.

Essays in Critical Realism was written by seven men—Durant Drake, Arthur O. Lovejoy, James B. Pratt, Arthur K. Rogers, George Santayana, R. W. Sellars and C. A. Strong. It was first published in 1921. The various essays were worked out separately by each man, but all agreed on the basic positions taken by each author. In the Preface it is made clear that the chief aim of these writers was to differentiate their brand of realism from that of the New Realists. They wrote: "Our realism is not a physically monistic realism, or a merely logical realism, and escapes the many difficulties which have prevented the general acceptance of the 'new' realism. It is also free, we believe, from the errors and ambiguities of the older realism of Locke and his successors." Thus critical realism actually arose as a reaction against the one-sidedly monistic and mathematical and logical tendencies in the new realism, and it is in the direction of the idealism which the new realists attacked. This does not mean that critical realism is an idealistic philosophy, but it does mean that it incorporates many more idealistic features than does the new realism. But Montague is also apparently leaning away from the new realism in an idealistic direction if one is to judge by his recent writings.

B. Zafarul Hasan's *Classification of Contemporary Realism*.—Zafarul Hasan, who studied in England and Germany, and who has written the best history of realism,³ has employed a much more logical principle of classification than that used by Sellars. He distinguishes first the "old era of realism" from the "new era." Under the former he discusses the origin of realism in Descartes, and briefly expounds the realism of Locke and Reid. Under the new era he deals with all contemporary types of realism. The common characteristic of all of these is the maintenance of the

³ Zafarul Hasan: *Realism—An Attempt to Trace Its Origin and Development in Its Chief Representatives*. With a foreword by J. A. Smith (Cambridge University Press). Cf. D. Luther Evans: *New Realism and Old Reality*.

dual thesis "that the external world exists and is directly apprehended in perception." But there are three "series." The *First Series* is represented by the German phenomenologists who developed the theory that the world is "pure experience"—Schuppe, Mach, and Avenarius. These thinkers stressed the fact that real objects are apprehended in perception, but they failed to make the objects entirely independent of experience. The *Second Series* is represented by Meinong in Germany, Stout in England, and the critical realists in America. It especially stresses the independence of objects, but it fails to bring out the directness of perception. The *Third Series* is a synthesis of the other two. It is "not simply realistic but realism" because it especially stresses both the independence of objects and the directness of perception. Here Hasan deals with Alexander, Russell, and the American new realists. He treats G. E. Moore's realism as the highest form of realism of this third series. He also includes H. W. B. Joseph, Prichard, and Cook Wilson in his third series, holding that they form a separate phase of that series. Whatever one may think of Hasan's opinion of Moore and his naming of Moore as the greatest contemporary realist, his classification undoubtedly has the merit of being based upon a genuinely logical principle of division, and it certainly helps to clarify the various present-day tendencies in philosophy which go by the name of realism.

4. WILLIAM JAMES AND OTHER FOUNDERS OF REALISM

Perry, Sellars, and Russell all treat William James as the real founder of the new realism. In his Preface to James's *Essays in Radical Empiricism*, of which he was the editor, Perry says that James's theory of *radical empiricism*, as finally developed by him, goes beyond pragmatism and really constitutes the germ of realistic metaphysics. And he quotes three statements from the Preface of *The Meaning of Truth* (Longmans) to prove his point, commenting

on each. This passage from James is undoubtedly an important source of American new realism, since most of the six authors of *The New Realism* were students of James, and shared his theory of radical empiricism and his hostility to Royce's absolute idealism. James wrote: "Radical empiricism consists (i) first of a postulate, (ii) next of a statement of fact, (iii) and finally of a generalized conclusion. (i) The postulate is that *the only things that shall be debatable among philosophers shall be things definable in terms drawn from experience.* (Things of an unexperienceable nature may exist ad libitum, but they form no part of the material for philosophic debate.) (ii) The statement of fact is that *the relations between things, conjunctive as well as disjunctive, are just as much matters of direct particular experience, neither more so nor less so, than the things themselves.* (iii) The generalized conclusion is that *therefore the parts of experience hold together from next to next by relations that are themselves parts of experience. The directly apprehended universe needs, in short, no extraneous trans-empirical connective support, but possesses in its own right a concatenated or continuous structure.*" According to Perry this passage is the real germ of the new realism. It proclaims that reality is an "experience-continuum." McGilvary has taken up this idea of reality as an experience-continuum and has made it the basis of his realism, and in so doing he explicitly bases his account of the continuum of duration, which is nature, on James's theory of the stream of consciousness.

In his *Treatise on Human Nature* David Hume suggested the possibility of assuming an independent existence for the experienced elements which make up what James called the stream of consciousness. But Hume rejected this hypothesis because it was incompatible with the basic assumptions of his philosophy. Now James took up this suggestion of Hume and defended it as true. These elements experienced by us are neither mental nor physical.

They are "neutral stuff" out of which both mental and physical objects are constructed. And these neutral entities are the only ultimates we know in experience. This theory of neutral entities, which are neither mental nor physical, but which form the basis for both mind and matter, has been generally accepted by the new realists. Holt developed it in his article in the *New Realism* and Russell has also adopted it. And its source is William James's doctrine of radical empiricism. Hence James should be recognized as the founder of realism, or, at least, of the type known as new realism or neutral monism.

Yet Zafarul Hasan denies that James was the founder of realism. He writes: "By his doctrine of radical empiricism, which he started to expound in print in September, 1904, James helped to give an impetus and a direction to neo-realism in America. The denial of the mind as subject, the reduction of all reality to a homogeneous objective material called 'pure experience' or 'neutral stuff,' the conception of knowledge as a relation between objects—doctrines for which he is profoundly indebted to Mach, and further the fight against intellectualism and the doctrine of internal relations, are elements of decisive importance for the neo-realist. But neither James nor Mach gives him *realism*. Perry indeed holds Mach's *Analysis of Sensation* to be a 'classic of realism', and asserts that James passed from phenomenalism to realism with his doctrine of radical empiricism (cf. *Present Philosophical Tendencies*, p. 365). Both conclusions seem to be mistaken." ⁴ Hasan holds that it was natural for Perry to assume that James was a realist when he made "experience (= objects of experience) the stuff of all reality," because he wanted to make James's view consistent. But the truth is that James was not consistent. His real view is that of Mach and Avenarius, and he does not assert that the elements of experience are independent of *all* minds. James raises this question, but when

⁴ *Loco citato*, pp. 303 f.

he does he goes over to panpsychism. For a perceptual element not experienced by any mind would have to be "an experience for itself." Consequently James was not actually a realist.

Hasan should have concluded that James was not a consistent realist as *Hasan defines realism*, rather than that he was not a realist. The founder of a new philosophy never is consistent if conformity with the latest development of his view be the test of consistency. He lays down principles which others take up and develop. In this sense William James will go down in the history of philosophy as one of the chief founders of the new realism, which originated among some of his most capable students at Harvard during the closing years of his life. But he will also go down in the history of philosophy as the founder of pragmatism. Thus he occupies the unique position of having been the founder of two of the most important types of contemporary philosophy.

However, it is not true to say that James was the sole founder of realism. James acknowledged his own indebtedness to the Englishman, Shadworth Hodgson, whom Hasan only mentions in a footnote as having influenced G. E. Moore. A. E. Heath has pointed out that the two forerunners of English new realism were Hodgson and L. T. Hobhouse, both of whom undoubtedly influenced G. E. Moore and Samuel Alexander, as well as other English realists. He writes: "Shadworth H. Hodgson, the forerunner with L. T. Hobhouse of English 'new realism', sought in his 'subjective analysis of what is actually experienced' to reach the reality of objects in 'face to face perception'. A thing is what it is known as—a reality independent of the existence of a perceiving consciousness."⁵ Perry mentions the similarity between the notion that "realities are what they are known as," which James "re-

⁵ Article on Realism in Hastings's *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. X, pp. 584 f.

peatedly attributes to Shadworth Hodgson'' and James's postulate which was quoted above. So far as English and American new realism are concerned, the chief founders are William James, Shadworth Hodgson, and L. T. Hobhouse. But Sellars also rightly mentions the fact that F. J. E. Woodbridge, who has been a close student of Hobbes, and is today one of the recognized leaders among the realists, was also influential in the early development of American new realism.⁶

' Bergson, the distinguished French vitalist, has greatly influenced the realists, especially in his theory of duration as the living reality of nature, but he is not himself a realist. He is much nearer idealism, as is shown by his theory that matter is a by-product of the *élan vital* or vital impetus, and his contention that the brain is the creation of the mind.

⁶ See especially his presidential address in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XII, pp. 367-385, quoted below, p. 175 (note). On Bergson see below, pp. 322ff.

CHAPTER II

THE METHODS OF REALISM

I. SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN PHILOSOPHY

REALISTS generally agree in stressing the need of making philosophy scientific. It is a common charge of realism against idealism that it has been unscientific in its method, and too closely related to the non-scientific aspects of culture, such as literature, art, and religion. A major part of the realistic program of reform consists in emphasizing the close relation of philosophy to the sciences and in stressing the ideal of a philosophic method that is genuinely scientific. Only in this way can the realistic goal of a truly scientific philosophy be realized.

As Morris R. Cohen rightly points out,¹ there are three ways in which those who would develop a truly scientific philosophy, and utilize the achievements of scientific investigations in their philosophizing, may proceed. (i) They may endeavor to synthesize the facts and laws of the various sciences, and thereby construct a new philosophical interpretation of reality that will be truly scientific. This is undoubtedly the aim of many present-day realists. Looked at from this point of view philosophy is the most general of the sciences and builds upon the results achieved in all of the special sciences. There are two serious difficulties in this procedure. In the first place, only specialists are capable of judging what the real results in a science are, and the philosopher can not possibly be a specialist in every branch of science. He must rely upon the more popular accounts

¹ See Morris R. Cohen, *Reason and Nature*, pp. 147ff. (Harcourt, Brace & Co.).

of scientific discoveries. Secondly, a synthesis of various sciences would not necessarily be scientific. In fact it could not be because of the many gaps in our knowledge just at the borderlines of the separate sciences. Any so-called synthesis either has to ignore these gaps entirely or fill them with pseudo-scientific hypotheses that are not verifiable by any of the methods of science. Hence such syntheses are bound to be more imaginative than they are scientific. (ii) Another way in which we may try to make philosophy scientific is to take as its special province the examination of the "first principles" or presuppositions on which the various sciences rest. This was the method of Kant, and many realists are willing to accept this much of the Kantian procedure. But there are two major difficulties in constructing a scientific philosophy by this method. A theory of the basic assumptions of science does not have any way of eliminating the possible errors in those assumptions. And the belief that we have an *a priori* knowledge of nature, prior to any investigation made in the special sciences, has been proved false by modern discoveries in mathematics and physics. Consequently, however useful and important a science of the first principles of science would be, it does not seem possible to develop such a science in the present state of our knowledge.² (iii) The third way is to extend the methods of science to philosophy. Philosophy is recognized as having its own unique subject-matter, but it is held to be possible to study that subject-matter scientifically instead of dealing with it speculatively. The goal of philosophy is to construct a special method of dealing with its subject-matter which will be an extension of the basic principles of scientific method as employed in the special sciences. This

² The most interesting recent attempt to develop such a science is F. S. C. Northrop's *Science and First Principles* (The Macmillan Co.). Northrop points out that there are three different theories of nature, each based upon a different set of premises, the mathematical, the functional, and the physical, and he defends the physical against the functional and mathematical. Although his book cannot be said to constitute a science of first principles, it contains an excellent philosophy of science.

is the most hopeful way of making philosophy scientific. But what is the basic principle of scientific method? On this question there is a difference of opinion among realists. Some look to the mathematical and physical sciences for this principle, and others look to the biological and social sciences.

C. D. Broad takes the position that there are two distinct fields of philosophical inquiry, and Cohen is inclined to agree with him. One of these fields is that of criticising and defining exactly and accurately the fundamental concepts or categories and beliefs of science. This gives philosophy a subject-matter that is different from any special science, yet that subject-matter can be investigated by the same methods of analysis, generalization, and abstraction that are effective in the special sciences. This type of philosophy Broad calls *Critical Philosophy*. It takes over from the sciences the methods that are fruitful there. It classifies the various types of propositions used in all of the sciences, and it defines fundamental scientific concepts. But Broad recognizes that philosophy must also go beyond science and get a total view of the world by bringing in the facts and principles of aesthetic, political, and religious experience. Here the synoptic method of seeing things in their total relations is essential. To this extent both Broad and Cohen, as well as other realists, are willing to use the dialectical method of Hegel. But *Speculative Philosophy* never reaches very definite results and must always wait for the advance of critical philosophy. Hence it must be strictly subordinated to critical philosophy. The speculative urge must not run away with itself, but must be continually held in check. We dare not construct arbitrary systems which are at variance with the empirical facts.

Generally speaking, however, the realists agree with Bertrand Russell that philosophy must make a "substitution of piece-meal, detailed and verifiable results for large untested

generalities recommended only by a certain appeal to imagination" if it is to become really scientific.³

2. REALISM AND MODERN LOGIC

Russell and other realists think that the best way to make philosophy scientific is to utilize in philosophy the results of the so-called modern logic. These results are based upon three important discoveries: (i) Frege, the German mathematician, investigated the concept of number and proved that the numbers which are used in arithmetic are neither physical nor mental existents, but belong to a purely logical domain. This established the existence or reality of a purely mathematical and logical world of relations. (ii) Peano, the Italian mathematician, was the first to point out the extremely important difference between the form of a singular proposition such as "Socrates is mortal" and the form of a general proposition such as "All men are mortal." This cleared up a confusion about "the relation of things to their qualities, of concrete existences to abstract concepts, and of the world of sense to the world of Platonic ideas" (Russell). The world of Platonic ideas, to which Russell here refers, would include Frege's domain of numbers. (iii) Georg Cantor, a German mathematician, solved the problems of infinity and continuity. He showed that we can reason about a collection that is infinite even though it is impossible to know all of its terms by enumerating them one by one. An infinite collection is given all at once when we know how it is defined, and an unending series may form a whole even though there are new terms which are beyond the whole of it. In showing that such infinite collections are conceivable, and not self-contradictory, Cantor undermined the dialectical arguments of the idealists which were intended to show that such concepts as space and time are self-contradictory.

³ Bertrand Russell: *Scientific Method in Philosophy*, p. 4. For the facts in the next paragraph see the article entitled "Realism and Modern Logic" in Hastings's *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*.

For example Cantor's theory solves the paradoxes of Zeno which were intended to show that motion is inconceivable. As Russell puts it: "The reasons for regarding space and time as unreal have become inoperative, and one of the great sources of metaphysical constructions is dried up."⁴

Now Russell, and other realists, think that the proper procedure for philosophy is to utilize this method of abstract reasoning that has been perfected in mathematics to deal with philosophical problems. This will lead to a rejection of the dogma of the internality of relations on which idealism is based, and the acceptance of modern logic's theory of the externality of relations.⁵ By developing a symbolism for the various mathematical and logical relations Russell and Whitehead have been able to combine and extend the discoveries of Frege, Peano, and Cantor. Undoubtedly one of the most important permanent contributions of realism to philosophy has been this creation of modern symbolic logic.⁶ Whether the assumption is justifiable that the method of reasoning by which symbolic logic has been developed is capable of extension to the more concrete subject-matter of philosophy is another question. The ideal of applying this method to all of the problems of philosophy has certainly not yet been carried out. Realists have not yet succeeded in rewriting the philosophy of science, metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics with the symbols of mathematical logic. They still find it necessary to write on these subjects with the less accurate and less precise language everybody uses.

3. THE METHOD OF ANALYSIS

The new realists have especially stressed the method of analysis as the fundamental method of philosophy. This

⁴ Bertrand Russell: *The Problems of Philosophy*, p. 229 (Holt).

⁵ On the internality of relations see above, p. 141.

⁶ See R. M. Eaton: *General Logic* (Scribners); A. E. Avey: *The Function and Forms of Thought* (Holt); and L. S. Stebbing: *A Modern Introduction to Logic* (Crowell).

method is emphasized throughout the *New Realism*, but it has been set forth in greater detail by E. G. Spaulding in *The New Rationalism*.

Spaulding recognizes that analysis and synthesis must be used together. And he makes the important distinction between analysis and synthesis as employed in experimental work and as employed in the mathematical sciences. By the former he means actually taking any existing whole apart and putting it together again, as a mechanician does in repairing a badly damaged machine. In philosophy we deal with wholes which cannot be so analyzed and synthesized. Hence what we must do is to *analyze in situ*. We observe and study a whole until we see its parts and we leave these *in situ* just as they are, but we discover by this analysis how the parts are related to form the whole they actually do form. When we use this latter form of analysis and synthesis we do not reach specific individual entities, but we reach *types* that we never see but which reason shows us to be implied. We can see this best if we use the example of space. We can analyze the space of physical objects into three dimensions, each of which is a straight line without dimensions, and which, therefore, cannot be represented by pencil or crayon lines because such lines have dimensions. And we can analyze any given line into smaller lines, as we do when we analyze a foot into twelve inches. If, now, we repeat this analysis until we reach the very limit of our instruments of measurement, we then find that we can still carry it on indefinitely, but we also find that there is a limit which the increasingly smaller lines approach and never reach. This limit is a point. It cannot be seen or touched. We reach it by implication. Now knowledge of a point is knowledge by type and not knowledge of a specific entity. We discover these types by analysis, and we discover what the relation is between points and their number in the same way. Hence this method of analysis is extremely fruitful in extending our knowledge beyond what we can observe even

with high-powered telescopes and microscopes. It is the essence of mathematical reasoning as employed in the special branches of mathematics, but also as employed in mathematical physics and chemistry.

In using this method of *analysis in situ* we must be on our guard against certain persistent fallacies. One of these is basing the analysis on *incorrect logical principles*. This is what underlies the famous antinomies of Kant. Or the *logic actually embodied in the entities reached by analysis may not have been discovered*. Then, too, the analysis may have stopped too soon and may, therefore, be *incomplete*. And finally a correct analysis may be *misinterpreted*. These four defects constitute *faulty analysis*, against which one who uses the method of analysis must be on his guard. The advantages of the new logic over the old are enumerated by Spaulding, but they amount to one, namely, that the new logic is a tool for correct analysis whereas the old yields only faulty analyses. Thus Spaulding would interpret the method of the new logic as being primarily a correct way of analyzing.

4. THE METHOD OF EXTENSIVE ABSTRACTION

There is a difficulty in the definition of a point as a limit we reach by implication and never reach by actual perception. This difficulty is due to the fact that our definition is a mathematical abstraction which does not fit the gross and crude objects of ordinary sense perception. Thus analysis, as defined by Spaulding, is a method of reasoning that takes us away from the world of actual experience and substitutes for that world the refined entities of mathematics. It does not provide a way of getting back again to the facts of experience. And even though these entities of mathematics be regarded as real independently of the knower, as Frege thought, they are nevertheless not the realities that are known in perceptual experience. This means that they do not provide us with a satisfactory real-

istic theory of the world of nature. It is for this reason that the definition of a point as a limit to the series of abstractions reached by analysis has been abandoned by A. N. Whitehead, C. D. Broad, and other new realists. These thinkers recognize that the method of analysis *in situ* is incomplete and unsatisfactory, and they have worked out a much more precise method which solves the problem of the connection between mathematical concepts and sense data.

The earliest suggestion of this method is contained in an interesting passage in Bertrand Russell's *Scientific Method in Philosophy* which was published in 1914. He there refers to a certain "principle of abstraction" which has proved extremely useful in mathematics and which can be extended to philosophy. He writes: "This principle, which might equally well be called 'the principle which dispenses with abstraction,' and is one which clears away incredible accumulations of metaphysical lumber, was directly suggested by mathematical logic, and could hardly have been proved or practically used without its help. . . . When a group of objects have that kind of similarity which we are inclined to attribute to possession of a common quality, the principle in question [he means the principle of abstraction] shows that membership of the group will serve all the purposes of the supposed common quality, and that therefore, unless some common quality is actually known, the group or class of similar objects may be used to replace the common quality, which need not be assumed to exist" (p. 42). Here is the germ of the method of extensive abstraction.

In *Scientific Thought* (Harcourt, Brace & Co.), C. D. Broad explains how this method originated. Mathematicians discovered that it does not matter at all what the internal nature of a term is, providing it can be used to explain things satisfactorily. "This important fact, that what really matters to science is not the inner nature of objects but their

mutual relations, and that any set of terms with the right mutual relations will answer all scientific purposes as well as any other set with the same sort of relations, was first recognized in pure mathematics. Whitehead's great merit is to have applied it to physics" (p. 39). It was the application to physics which produced the method of extensive abstraction. In his *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge* (Cambridge University Press), Part III; *The Concept of Nature* (Cambridge University Press), Chapter IV; and *Process and Reality* (The Macmillan Co.), Part IV, Whitehead has worked out this method in great detail, but Chapter II of Broad's book gives a much simpler exposition of it for beginners.

The fundamental principle on which the method is based Whitehead calls "the principle of convergence to simplicity with diminution of extent." By narrowing down what we are studying to the smallest possible extent we get it in a simple enough form so that we can handle it. But since all the events in nature are continuous and possess depth, it is extremely difficult to exclude and narrow down without an exact method for so doing. The method of extensive abstraction aims to supply that need. Its great value is that it enables the investigator to define the basic concepts essential to the understanding and interpretation of nature so that they correspond with nature as experienced in sense perception.

Suppose we want to define a point. To sense experience a point is a volume and therefore it has parts. But to Euclid, and in Euclidian Geometry, a point is "that of which there is no part." Hence Euclid's definition of a point conflicts with points as actually experienced volumes. Suppose we want to define a line. To sense experience a line has width. But to Euclid, and in Euclidian Geometry, a line is "breadthless length." Hence Euclid's definition of a line conflicts with lines as actually experienced. The usual way out of this conflict is that taken by Spaulding above, which

is to define a point as the limit of a series of smaller and smaller "breadthless lines." But, as we have already indicated, this way out lands us in an abstract conception which we cannot be sure exists. To use Broad's language: "We should like to say that points are the limits of smaller and smaller volumes, one inside the other, like Chinese boxes. But we cannot feel any confidence that such series have limits and therefore that points, so defined, exist. Now there is no doubt that such series themselves exist; ordinary perception makes us acquainted with their earlier and bigger terms, and the assumption that space is continuous guarantees the later ones. We see, on reflection, that it is of the very nature of any area or volume to have parts that are themselves areas or volumes. We therefore, boldly define points, not as the limits of such series, but as such series themselves" (p. 44).

This then, is the method of extensive abstraction applied to defining a point. But it can also be used to define such other fundamental concepts as straight lines and areas. We take series which are observable and identify such series with the concept, instead of identifying the supposedly last member of the series with the concept. In *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge* Whitehead calls such series "routes of approximation." He there writes: "The various elements of time and space are formed by the repeated applications of the method of extensive abstraction. It is a method which in its sphere achieves the same object as does the differential calculus in the region of numerical calculation, namely it converts a process of approximation into an instrument of exact thought. The method is merely the systematization of the instinctive procedure of habitual experience. The approximate procedure of ordinary life is to seek simplicity of relations among events by the consideration of events sufficiently restricted in extension both as to space and as to time; the events are then 'small enough.' The procedure of the method of ex-

tensive abstraction is to formulate the law by which the approximation is achieved and can be indefinitely continued. The complete series is then defined and we have a 'route of approximation.' These routes of approximation according to the variation of the details of their formation are the points of instantaneous space (here called 'event-particles'), linear segments (straight or curved) between event-particles (here called 'routes'), the moments of time (each of which is all instantaneous nature), and the volumes incident in moments. Such elements are the exactly determined concepts on which the whole fabric of science rests" (p. 76). This is a very fundamental passage because it gives Whitehead's own summary statement of the method of extensive abstraction. Elsewhere in *Principles of Natural Knowledge* and in *Process and Reality* Whitehead calls these 'routes of approximation' *abstractive sets*. In *Process and Reality* he writes: "By reference to the particular case of three-dimensioned space, we see that abstractive sets can have different types of convergence. For in this case, an abstractive set can converge either to a point, or to a line, or to an area. But it is to be noted that we have not defined either points, or lines, or areas; and that we propose to define them in terms of abstractive sets" (p. 454).

The method of extensive abstraction is still in the making, but it is undoubtedly a significant contribution of realism to philosophy.

CHAPTER III

REALISM'S SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXISTENCE

I. THE THEORY OF EMERGENT EVOLUTION

CORRESPONDING to the levels theory of reality of idealism the realists have developed an interesting theory known as emergent evolution. The word *emergent* was first given a technical philosophical sense by G. H. Lewes in the following passage: "There are many ways in which the properties of a mass differ from those of its molecules; the chief of these is that some properties are *emergents*, not resultants." C. Lloyd Morgan took the term over from Lewes, and Samuel Alexander borrowed it from Morgan. Morgan says that Lewes used the term in the same sense in which John Stuart Mill used the phrase "*heteropathic laws*," and that both men intended to "distinguish those properties (a) which are additive and subtractive only, and predictable, from those (b) which are new and unpredictable." In other words the term emergent evolution is the name of the theory that nature is a product of evolution in which new and unpredictable qualities appear, on the basis of what already has appeared, and that these new qualities form distinctively new levels of reality. Alexander says: "Mind has certain specific characters to which there is or even can be no neural counterpart. It is not enough to say there is no mechanical counterpart for the neural structure is not mechanical but physiological and has life. Mind is, according to our interpretation of the facts, an 'emergent' from life, and life an 'emergent' from a lower physico-chemical level of existence." And in a footnote he

explains that he took the word 'emergent' from Morgan and that "it serves to mark the novelty which mind possesses, while mind still remains equivalent to a certain neural constellation. Consequently, it contrasts with the notion that mind is a mere 'resultant' of something lower."¹

In his address at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy Arthur O. Lovejoy defines the word emergence more precisely by distinguishing five different senses in which one level may be said to contain novel features as compared with another that preceded it. One of these would be simply changes in the laws of existents but not in the existents themselves. If entities are related in a new way at one level from what they were at another and lower level we could speak of an *emergence of relations or laws*. A second way would be for new qualities to arise and attach themselves to what previously existed. This is *emergence of qualities*. A third way would be for new entities to arise which lack some of the characteristics of those of the lower level and which have some new ones. Let us call this the *emergence of existents*. Fourthly, a new type of event or process different from those at the lower level could begin to occur. This we may call *emergence of events*. And finally a larger quantity, either of events or qualities or entities or relations, than existed at the lower level might characterize the higher level. This may be called *emergence of quantities*. We may call all of the last four *existential emergence* as contrasted with the first, which is an emergence of laws. Lovejoy discusses both general types and concludes that the evidence is in favor of emergence of new relations or laws, and that there has also been an emergence of new

¹ See G. H. Lewes: *Problems of Life and Good*, Vol. II, Chap. IV, paragraph 49; C. Lloyd Morgan: *Emergent Evolution*, p. 3; and Samuel Alexander: *Space-Time and Deity* (Macmillan), Vol. II, p. 14. But compare F. J. E. Woodbridge: "The Problem of Metaphysics" in *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XII, p. 383, where he says: "Something new must add itself, must emerge, as it were, out of non-existence into being."

events and new entities. But he argues that there is no reason to believe, and that there are serious reasons for doubting, whether this has been at all general or at all frequent throughout the physical universe. So far as we can judge it is confined to the biological and social evolution we know here on the earth. Hence we have to reject the belief in "cosmic meliorism,"—the notion that there is a process of emergence of ever higher levels of reality throughout all nature. And yet we may well accept an earthly meliorism—the notion that before the millions of years that still remain to mankind have elapsed new and richer forms of being will emerge.²

Alexander and Morgan do not make the distinction between cosmic and earthly meliorism. For them the process of emergence is characteristic of nature throughout its infinite extent. Hence they make emergence a metaphysical principle. Alexander holds that there is a "fluency of time." Nature began as a Space-Time, a four dimensional manifold or matrix in which time was the moving principle. In this lowest level there was no matter and there were no qualities other than the four dimensions of Space-Time, including the fluency of Time. But Time was higher than Space even in this lowest level. The second level was reached when the primary qualities of matter emerged out of the original Space-Time matrix, due to its inherent urge or *nisus* to something higher. Then came the secondary qualities of matter. With the emergence of primary and secondary qualities came new kinds of relations, distinct from the purely spatio-temporal relations among events which characterized the lower level. What Alexander seems to have in mind here is the relations among the constituents of any element, say the hydrogen atom. But, as the table of elements suggests, the whole process of the emergence of elements was gradual, and the higher and more complex


² See the selection from A. O. Lovejoy in my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*. For the meaning of the term meliorism see below, p. 294.

elements had to wait for the lower. When the physical or material universe, with the elements, especially carbon, hydrogen and oxygen, had emerged, the basis was laid for the emergence of life. This brought with it new vital relations that had not before been in existence. When life attained the complexity exhibited in animals, mind emerged. Both life and mind were new and each had its own distinctive relations and qualities. And there were numerous stages in the emergence of each. Moreover, each level of reality has separate beings peculiar to it.

On the basis of this concept of emergence Alexander conceives of deity as the next highest level to be emerged out of any given level. Thus for beings on the level of life mind is deity, but for beings possessing minds there is a *nisus* or urge toward a still higher quality, and to such beings that higher and dimly felt quality is deity. Thus the quality next above any given level is deity to the beings on that level. For human beings deity has not yet emerged but there is a *nisus* towards its emergence. That is all that beings at our level can say about deity. But when deity emerges, there will be beings who possess that quality. Alexander refers to such beings, half playfully, as angels. But they will feel an urge to a still higher quality above them, and that quality above the angels will be deity to the angels. Here is an exceedingly interesting and novel conception of nature as an evolutionary process in which ever higher qualities, relations, and beings continually emerge, on the basis of the qualities, relations, and beings that have already emerged. And it is interesting to note that R. B. Perry accepts Alexander's theory of deity. He writes: "Samuel Alexander is, I think, correct in insisting that deity shall be conceived as a type of emergence which is *founded* on personal life, but which cannot be adequately defined in terms of such categories as mind, spirit or personality."³

³ R. B. Perry: *General Theory of Value*, p. 686 (note) (Longmans).

Morgan has represented this theory in a diagram which he calls the *synoptic pyramid*. D stands for deity at the apex



of the pyramid. S and T stand for Space-Time, which forms the base. N stands for *nisus*, and the arrow indicates that the direction of the urge is from Space-Time to Deity. *Mind*, *Life*, and *Matter* are names for the chief levels that have emerged. The pyramid should be thought of as extending upward indefinitely, since growth is the

essence of nature or reality. As Morgan says: "Such a diagram—for which Mr. Alexander is in no way responsible—is, so to speak, a synoptic expression, or composite graph, of a vast multitude of individual pyramids—atom-pyramids near the base, molecules a little higher up, yet higher, things (*e.g.* crystals), higher still, plants (in which mind is not yet emergent), then animals (with consciousness), and near the top, our human selves" (*Loco citato* p. 11).

2. THE THEORY OF SENSU

Realists have been very much concerned over the ontological or existential status of what they call *sensa*. This is a technical term obtained by shortening the expression *sense data*. *Sensa* are the actual objects we perceive. For example, when an organism or percipient being perceives an ordinary sense-object, such as a star, he never sees the actual star with all of its physical qualities, but he has before him as objects of his awareness visual *sensa* only. If the sense-object be nearer to him so that his other senses can operate, for example, if it be a tulip he is holding in his hands, in addition to the visual *sensa* there will be olfactory, tactual,

and cutaneous *sensa*. Since these *sensa* are the immediate objects that are before the mind in sense perception, the question arises as to what their status is in reality. Are they mental or are they physical in their internal nature? Are they mind-dependent or body-dependent? Or are they, perhaps, purely neutral and ultimate entities, more basic than either mental or physical entities? We learned above that James regarded them as the pure stuff of reality and held that the whole universe is reducible to such neutral stuff. Russell and many of the new realists hold the same view. But other realists have different theories of the nature of the *sensa*.

C. D. Broad holds that the *sensa* are real and not mere appearances of some physical thing. They are particular but short-lived existents. They have such properties as shape, size, hardness, color, loudness, coldness, warmth, in fact all sense qualities. The shape of a *sensum* is not necessarily the same as the shape of an object. Think, for example, of the elliptical shape of a penny when seen from a certain angle and the roundness of the real penny. The qualities of *sensa* are the basis of the qualities we attribute to objects, and the qualities of objects are correlated with those of *sensa*. The separate groups of *sensa* of all the observers who sense a certain object form the appearances of that object to those observers. *Sensa* may have other qualities that are noticed by the observer, but they certainly always have whatever qualities the observer discriminates in them. But even though *sensa* are the appearances of objects they are themselves real. Broad denies that *sensa* are physical and that they are psychical. They appear to have some characteristics of psychical and some of physical entities. But they are body-dependent rather than mind-dependent, being conditioned by the percipient organism. Here Broad is in agreement with the new realists. But do the *sensa* belong to the physical world? Broad takes the position that the *sensa* could be all the world there is, so far as we can

really know, and that they neither prove the existence of a physical world nor that of a mental world. We can only say that the belief that they are dependent on a physical world, more permanent and complex than they are, is (i) a primitive belief that we all have, (ii) it arises inevitably with *sensa*, (iii) it cannot be refuted logically or got rid of in any other way, and (iv) we cannot adequately systematize and properly coördinate the facts without it. Hence Broad would reject James's theory that the *sensa* are the only ultimate reality, and he would make them dependent upon physical nature, which he believes to exist but admits that he cannot prove.

Broad holds that the *sensa* are produced in some way. But the all-important question is, How are they produced? Is the production a *selection* which the organism makes out of nature, and do our *sensa*, therefore, constitute a cross-section of the physical world? Yes, say the new realists. Consciousness is the field of objects selected by a percipient organism. Or is the production *generative*? Do our bodies cause or create the *sensa*? Broad holds this generative theory, although he admits that there is no direct proof for it. Its chief advantage is that it offers fewer difficulties than the selective theories. Russell and some other realists attempt to combine the selective and generative theories of *sensa*, using one to avoid the difficulties of the other. But even though we accept the generative theory and treat *sensa* as the creations of percipient organisms, we still have on our hands the very difficult problem of showing how there can be one whole of nature, which combines the *sensa* of psychology and the physical objects of physics. This problem Broad holds to be one of the unsolved problems of philosophy, and its solution waits for a creative genius of the first rank.

3. THE THEORY OF ESSENCES

We learned above that the realists believe in the objective reality of a world of mathematical and logical relations

called universals. Russell claims that the realists have discovered relations as universals and that that is what distinguishes realism of the present-day from the classic form of realism. For classic realism was interested wholly in universal qualities. We saw that Broad, Whitehead, and Russell attempt to bridge the gap between the world of mathematical and logical relations and the world of sense experience by means of the method of extensive abstraction. But we have just learned that Broad thinks that no way has yet been found to organize the world of *sensa* and the world of physical objects into a single whole of nature. Thus the realists are left, by their own confession, with a certain unresolved dualism in their philosophy of nature.

The critical realists, who are not afraid of dualism as between mind and nature, do try to avoid it in their theory of nature. Under the leadership of George Santayana they have developed a unique theory of essences to explain what the world of reality is. This concept of essence is central in their philosophy, but it is exceedingly difficult to say just what they mean by it. It seems to be something quite unique and particular and yet something universal. It seems to be absolutely and unquestionably real and yet to lack existence. Santayana defines it as follows: "By 'essence' I mean a universal of any degree of complexity and definition, which may be given immediately whether to sense or to thought. Only universals have logical or aesthetic individuality, or can be given directly, clearly, and all at once. . . . [An essence is] an ideal individual, which being individuated only by its intrinsic quality, not by any external or dynamic relations (since none are given), is also a universal. This object of pure sense or pure thought, with no belief super-added, an object inwardly complete and individual, but without external relations or physical status, is what I call an essence." ⁴

⁴ George Santayana in *Essays in Critical Realism* (Macmillan), p. 168 (note). See also his *Realm of Essence* (Scribners).

In this interesting definition of an essence the following items should be especially noted. Essences are not simple but of varying degrees of complexity. They are not known just by perception or just by conception but by both, and immediately, without any process of inference. They are universals because they are wholly given all at once, whereas particulars come to us part by part or in succession. The individuality of essences may be either logical or aesthetic, but it is never moral. Elsewhere Santayana stresses the fact that essences are neither good nor bad, but that they are morally neutral. They are individuals constituted by internal relations and not by any external relations. This fact that essences are constituted individuals by their internal relations is what makes them universals. But these internal relations do not do anything which constitutes the essence. Dynamic relations are excluded from essences as well as external relations. Hence their complexity is more a matter of their intrinsic quality than it is of their internal relations. Essences do not exist: they have no physical status. Any belief about them or about their relations to nature or to mind or to one another is superadded to them. They are independently real apart from minds that know them, or physical nature, or one another. In other words, each essence is an original, unique, eternal, and independent reality. Each is inwardly complete. No essence needs another. There is an infinite number of such essences, some of which are known and some of which are not known, but knowing them makes no difference to them. They are the true objects of the philosopher's contemplation, because they provide the mind with a type of object which cannot possibly be doubted. Santayana says that the mind of the philosopher that has been enlightened by doubt and freed of noisy dogmatism "finds in the wilderness of essence a very sweet and marvelous solitude," a field "of endless variety and peace, as if through the gorges of death it had passed into a para-

dise where all things are crystallized into the image of themselves, and have lost their urgency and their venom."

C. A. Strong argues that the *sensa* can best be understood when they are treated as essences, rather than as either physical or psychical entities. Consequently *sensa* are not private, as many have held. If we take data to be essences "the *same* datum exactly might be given to another person, or to the same person at a different time and place; in such wise that the datum as such would not be in time and space."⁵ Thus the critical realist bridges the gap between *sensa* and universals by simply identifying the former with the latter. But he is left with a dualism between a mind and the essences which it knows. This, however, is an epistemological rather than an ontological dualism, since the only real world is the world of essences.

4. SOME REALISTIC THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE

The critical realists hold to epistemological dualism, the theory that ideas represent the objects which they know but are not identical with those objects. And how can an idea in the mind represent a physical object in nature? According to the critical realist it can do so because the essence of the idea and the essence of the physical object are identical. Thus on this view there are existing minds and existing physical objects. But there is also a non-existing but real world of logical essences. A particular idea of a particular mind can know a particular quality of a particular tulip because the essence of the idea is identical with the essence of the quality of the tulip. Thus for the critical realist the world of essences forms a bridge across which the mind passes to confer with nature. Hence, epistemological dualist though he admittedly is, the critical realist is an ontological monist, because he makes the world of essences

⁵ See the selection from C. A. Strong in my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy* where he gives proof for this striking theory. The quotation from Santayana above is from the selection from him in the same volume, p. 332.

unite the worlds of mind and nature. Or rather he is a metaphysical pluralist because the essences are as unnumbered and as innumerable as the sands of the sea, and they do not really form a world, but, as Santayana says, a wilderness.

The new realists, on the other hand, are epistemological monists. They hold that an idea is identical with its *ideatum* or object. Consciousness is merely a perspective or field, and the objects remain the same whether they are within or without this field. Even illusions, dreams, images of all kinds are *sensa* and objective and independent of mind. They are *subsistent* entities. When they become known they form a part of some mental perspective, and are, in that perspective, ideas. But when they are not externally related to a knower in this way, they are equally real. The cognitive relation does not affect their status in any way, since it is purely an external relation and does not do anything to its terms. Recently this view has been called *pan-objectivism*, because it makes absolutely everything objective, even dreams and illusions.

In expounding the idealistic theory of knowledge we found that Royce developed a theory of interpretation as a higher form of knowing than perceiving or conceiving. Similarly Montague, among the realists, has attempted to develop a theory of knowledge that is a synthesis of epistemological dualism and pan-objectivism, with an ingredient of what he calls subjectivism or idealism.

The truth in epistemological dualism can best be expressed, Montague thinks, in its basic assertion that "*the system of objects experienced by a self and the system of objects existing externally to that self and causing its experiences can vary independently of each other.*" This is in accord with common sense, and no one can question it. The truth in the idealistic or subjectivist theory is that "all entities are (selectively) relative to a self and *possible* objects of its experiences." Even so-called *imperceptible objects*,

like atoms and their protons and electrons, do not possess any other but perceptible qualities, such as size, shape, and weight. And *remote objects*, such as those that exist in far distant regions of space or those that existed before life arose on the earth, are *possible* objects of experience and are described by us in perceptual terms. The truth in the pan-objectivist theory or epistemological monism is that "all experienced objects have an independent meaning or essence that gives them a status of *possible* physical existence." Experience proves that many of our perceived objects (*sensa*) are identical with the object that we later discover to be real. And even illusions and imaginary objects have an independent meaning that is logically distinct from its place in any definite context. Hence the basic assumption of each of the three theories is true. We need a synthetic theory which will combine these three assertions and which will omit the extraneous and incompatible features in each theory. This is possible because these three assertions in no way conflict. On the contrary, they are mutually compatible and reciprocally supplementary. "Each expresses a different aspect of the knowledge situation—or rather, each expresses the whole situation from a particular angle, making clear and explicit certain values which the other two leave vague and implicit." ⁶ Montague thinks that his synthetic theory is a final and complete solution of the problem of knowledge.

⁶ W. P. Montague: *The Ways of Knowing* (George Allen and Unwin, Ltd.), pp. 292, 297, 306, and 315.

CHAPTER IV

REALISM'S SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH AND ERROR

THE formal consistency theory of truth, which was expounded above (pp. 101 ff.), is held by many realists. Some, like G. E. Moore, treat truth as a *quality* of purely formal propositions. It will be obvious from what follows that realists are by no means in agreement on a solution of the problem of truth, although the correspondence theory, in some of its forms, is the most widely accepted theory of truth among realists. But before dealing with these forms of the correspondence theory, let us consider a realistic form of the coherence theory.

1. A REALISTIC FORM OF THE COHERENCE THEORY OF TRUTH

In dealing with the idealistic theory of truth two basic questions were distinguished: What beliefs are true? and What is trueness? And it was pointed out that the second of these questions is the more fundamental for philosophy, and that idealism answers that question in terms of the theory of the coherence of our beliefs with reality. Samuel Alexander has developed an interesting form of the coherence theory that is more in accord with his peculiar type of realistic metaphysics, which was expounded above under the name of emergent evolution. To the two questions just stated Alexander adds a third: "What are the relations subsisting between the propositions of any science in virtue of which they assume their systematic form?" This, he holds, is the question of logic, but he admits that the strictly philosophical question of the nature of trueness is the really fundamental one.

In answering this question Alexander distinguishes the non-mental facts of the physical sciences and the mental facts accompanying these. The former he calls beliefs and propositions. They are *contemplated* by the mind. The latter are acts of the mind. "They are not the objects of belief but they are the judging itself," or "the contents of the act of judging." These mental propositions are *enjoyed*. The science which arranges them in a system is psychology. This distinction between contemplation and enjoyment, with correspondingly different kinds of propositions, is important, because it makes it necessary for Alexander to hold that there are two entirely different kinds of truth. One is the truth of beliefs about what is contemplated and the other is the truth of beliefs about what is enjoyed. Let us consider the first kind of truth more in detail and then briefly explain the second kind.

No matter what the subject-matter contemplated is, Alexander holds that the internal structure of that subject-matter determines whether a given belief is true. When that entire structure supports a belief, that belief is true. Hence true propositions may be said to be real, but "their truth is different from their reality." To explain this difference between the truth and the reality of true propositions Alexander brings in the social intercourse of minds. It is under "the guidance of reality" but through "the clash of minds" that one set of beliefs about a given reality gets accepted and another set gets rejected. Thus the coherence is a coherence among beliefs as determined by a collection or group of observing minds. Those beliefs which the collection of observers find coherent with each other and with reality are true beliefs. Hence truth is not identical with reality, yet it is "reality as possessed by minds." In Alexander's own words: "Beliefs get sorted out, and one set are real in themselves, the others belong to a different reality. But this distinction only comes into existence through the conflict and coöperation of many minds, and the reality, or

real propositions, are true only in their relation to the minds which have reality for their possession and reject the judgments of the erroneous minds. Truth and error are in this sense creations of mind at the bidding of reality. Moreover, they imply relation not to the individual mind as individual but to the individual mind in its attitude to the social mind, that is to the individual as a standard mind. The mind which has truth has it so far as various minds collectively contribute their part to the whole system of true beliefs; the mind which has error is so far an outcast from the intellectual community.”¹

The truth of mental propositions is later in developing than the truth of propositions that are contemplated. Before we can detect truth or error in our judgments we must be somewhat familiar with the truth and error of beliefs about external matters, and we must be fairly well socialized. Truth of mind arises out of our desire to communicate with our fellows. To the objection that enjoyments are purely private and that they are, therefore, incapable of truth or falsity, like contemplated propositions which are admittedly shared, Alexander replies that our coöperations with one another widen and deepen our enjoyments, and enable us to make clear to others what those enjoyments are. We learn to compare one mental process with another, and we also learn to compare ourselves with others as they tell us of their experiences. Hence truth of purely mental propositions is possible, and psychology is a real science.

Logic is concerned only with the purely formal aspect of truth. It investigates formal consistency of propositions with one another, entirely apart from their respective contents. It is the science of propositional forms, and deals with the ways in which different propositional forms may be combined so as to secure real consistency. Hence logic is the science of those aspects of truth that are common to

¹ Samuel Alexander: *Space-Time and Deity* (Macmillan), Vol. II, p. 258.

contemplated and to mental propositions. It is a general science, covering both the principles of the objective sciences, like physics and biology, and those of the purely mental science of psychology. Here, then, we have a peculiar realistic form of the coherence theory of truth, which embodies the essence of the formal consistency theory and stresses the coherence between propositions which constitute reality as known.

2. REALISTIC FORMS OF THE CORRESPONDENCE THEORY OF TRUTH

A. *The Correspondence Theories of Russell*.—Bertrand Russell has more than once attempted to formulate a consistent realistic interpretation of the correspondence theory of truth. In his earlier writings this took the form of a distinction between proposition or fact-complexes and beliefs. Believing is a subjective relating activity which ties things together for a believer. But fact-complexes or propositions consist of terms that are related by some one or more objective and external relations. A belief is true when it relates the facts of the total fact-complex together in the same order in which the objective relation relates them together. In his *Problems of Philosophy* Russell uses the illustration of Othello's belief that Desdemona loves Cassio to clarify this notion of correspondence. In order for this belief to be true the relation of loving would have to unite the two terms Desdemona and Cassio in the same way that the relation of believing or judging related them in Othello's mind. Since the fact-complex does not have love relating the two terms in that order Othello's belief is false. It does not correspond with the fact-complex.

In his *Philosophical Essays* Russell distinguishes judging from perceiving. Judging is the relation of a mind to a fact-complex or objective proposition, but perceiving is the relation of a mind to a single object or "objective," objectives being purely conceptual objects such as universals. When we perceive an object, we have *knowledge by ac-*

quaintance. Similarly, when we perceive an objective, say the relation of identity, we have knowledge by acquaintance. In these cases of perceptual knowledge there can be no falsehood. All knowledge by acquaintance is true. But we have to distinguish between a pure perception, like seeing light, and a *judgment of perception*, like "this light that I see is sunlight." Judgments of perception may be erroneous, but they are less likely to be so than more complicated judgments such as are involved in describing something we have experienced to some one else. This kind of knowledge Russell calls *knowledge by description*, and it may be false. Descriptions, however, differ in complexity.

In his discussion of truth and falsehood in *Philosophy*, which was first published in 1927, Russell has developed a different theory of correspondence, which he admits is crude but which he thinks is in the right direction. He holds that truth and falsity apply especially to statements, and statements are divided into *present statements* and *past statements*. The former are true when they correspond with a present perception or with a recollection of a past perception. The latter are true when the expectations they aroused are confirmed by present perception. Hence statements are closely related to beliefs. For they arouse expectations, and the feeling of expectedness is an emotion. A statement "is a form of words uttered or written with a view to being heard or read by some other person." Hence statements are intended to influence the conduct of others "by producing a belief." Now truth applies primarily to statements and only derivatively to beliefs. But since a form of words is a social phenomenon, "truth must be social." A statement is true when it corresponds to a certain fact. "A form of words is true if a person who knows the language is led to that form of words when he finds himself in an environment which contains features that are the meanings of those words, and these features produce reactions in him sufficiently strong for him to use words

which mean them. Thus 'a train leaves King's Cross at 10 A.M.' is true if a person can be led to say, 'It is now 10 A.M., this is King's Cross, and I see a train starting.' The environment causes words and words caused directly by the environment (if they are statements) are true" (p. 262). Here we have Russell's latest statement of the correspondence theory of truth.

B. *Eaton's Statement of the Correspondence Theory.*—Ralph M. Eaton has given a more technical and detailed statement of the correspondence theory in his *Symbolism and Truth*. He holds that truth cannot be defined without some reference to reality or existence, but that we must adopt a restricted concept both of existence and of truth, and be ready to change our concepts of both in the light of later criticisms and discoveries. Truth and falsity are especially connected with symbols as well as referring to reality. When we build significant structures of symbols and find them corresponding with reality, we have truth. But concepts are not identical with the existents to which they refer. There is an identity of structure only. The structure of the system of concepts and the structure of the system of objects to which it corresponds are identical. In Eaton's own words: "The notion that the structure of thought is found in the symbols it uses to express itself and that this same structure permeates the world of real objects, at least the real objects which can be presented in a consistent experience; the further notion that these real objects are not identical with concepts and yet can be apprehended only by the use of concepts, though they may in this way—even in perception—be apprehended falsely; these ideas give a complete and simple meaning to the definition of truth as the correspondence of concepts to reality. . . . Truth becomes in a literal sense a property of symbols, for propositions and concepts are symbols or symbolic groups as they function in minds." ²

² R. M. Eaton: *Symbolism and Truth*, p. 178f. (Harvard University Press).

C. *A Critical Realist's Interpretation of the Correspondence Theory of Truth*.—A. K. Rogers has developed the theory of correspondence which is especially characteristic of critical realism in his little book entitled *What is Truth?* (Yale Press). He distinguishes four aspects of the knowledge situation which he thinks everyone must recognize—the independently real object, the conscious state as an actually existing mental entity, the meaning or idea, and the mental act of referring the idea to the object. The meaning is equivalent to Santayana's concept of essence, which Rogers uses. Rogers finds it necessary to distinguish certain features of the meaning or essence. In the first place, a meaning may be passive or active, by which he means the distinction "between *a* meaning in the mind and *having* this meaning." Secondly, this meaning which we have is "actively *referred to* an external object." In this sense the meaning is said to belong to the object and not to the mind. These two senses of meaning—the particular content of a conscious state and the universal description of an independently real object—form an indivisible unity and that unity is the essence. Now this essence, being identical in the particular psychic or conscious state and in the object, the two may be said to correspond, even though there is "very little similarity" and even "a sharp discrepancy" between them. For example: "I *see* a round table as round—roundness is part of its essence; my image meanwhile may have the essence elliptical. So perceived distance—belonging to the object's essence—may be represented in the analysis of the mental state by characters far removed from its real nature" (p. 71). In fact there need be no *definite* psychical existent. The psychical or conscious state may be just a feeling of assurance that we will reach "a point where some specific experience will greet us as winding up happily and successfully the active process." Thus, so-called *imageless thought*, *i.e.*, thinking where there is no definite psychical image as a bearer of the meaning, is possible on this theory.

Rogers first applies this theory to a definition of *true perception*, for example, in actually perceiving such a quality as redness. If we are experiencing a sensation of redness at a given moment and are led to react to the stimulus, we automatically and instinctively characterize the existing object to which we react by redness, and in the future such an object always means redness when it arouses that sensation. In this case the essence of the psychical state and of the object are identical, and this is true of all cases of perception. "This character of the psychical state which the mind 'intends' in its ideas must really be identifiable with the character of the object to which it is referred, or else in so far our knowledge is in error; and if the essence in the two cases is identical, the things which have such an identical essence 'correspond' " (p. 68). Then Rogers applies the theory to memory where we have to reconstruct "the *true nature* of anything." In making such a reconstruction we find ourselves balked unless we can call back the experience from which we got the idea to begin with. And he also applies it to the knowledge of another person's emotions, using the example of fear. We can only know another's fear by interpreting it in terms of our own experience of fear. Then Rogers applies the theory to beliefs about the external world. In all of these applications he insists that it is identity of essence, as between the psychical state and the object qualified by judgment, that makes knowledge possible. And this is correspondence. It even applies to our knowledge of relations. "Unless the relationship can be translated into some *relational experience*, the word is seemingly left devoid of meaning; and apart from the supposition that just the character thus represented attaches somehow to the real world itself, we should have no ground for claiming that we know the relational structure of this world at all" (p. 74). In proof that there is such a thing as physical existence or nature Rogers falls back upon our common-sense attitude when we face a tornado or a flood.

In such experiences he cannot "resist the *practical* persuasion that there are real things and real forces that are existences beyond him, and that set active limits to his self-assertive will." And in the same way he falls back upon common sense to prove psychical existence or mind. In the experience of a vivid color sensation, or a painful toothache, or any great emotion one cannot get away from the fact that "there is existence here, stuff, brute fact that cannot be resolved into relations, or activities, or any of the philosophical devices for saving the ultimateness of dialectics." And since common sense forces us to admit both nature and mind as ultimately real, the correspondence between them by way of the identity of their essences is the only solution of the problem of truth.³

3. A REALIST'S DENIAL OF TRUTH

Wrestling with the problem of truth has convinced some of the realists that the only solution of the problem is the denial that there is any such thing as truth. And they claim that this denial is the *true* theory of truth! Here, then, is a genuinely paradoxical realistic theory of truth. The best representative of this extreme view is Theodore De Laguna, whose untimely recent death was a great loss to American philosophy. In what was probably the last paper that he wrote for publication De Laguna defended this view. The knowledge of real existence he regards as chimerical. All reflection begins with human prejudices and "habitual expectations," and seeks to justify them. We support one belief by appealing to others. "The only standard is the vague and shifting standard afforded by our beliefs in general." And further on he says: "One of the chief preoccupations of two generations of philosophers has been the nature of truth. It has been assumed without question that truth has a nature—that is to say, that there is a common property

³ See my criticism of Roger's theory of truth in *Principles of Reasoning*, 2nd ed., pp. 351ff. (Appleton).

which all true propositions possess and which all false propositions lack. I have become convinced that this assumption is groundless: that truth has no nature, and that there is no property whatsoever that is common to, and peculiar to, true propositions. Truth, I believe, is an expression which has meaning only 'in use.' When a given proposition is said to be true, we know what that means; but, as I understand the matter, there is no meaning of truth in general—there is no room for a theory of truth.”⁴ De Laguna explains that he reached this suspicion that there is no truth by observing the long drawn-out controversy between pragmatists and absolute idealists, a controversy which “died away in futile counter-charges and restatements.” Indeed De Laguna goes so far as to say that both sides “were guilty of radical inconsistencies”, and that “the controversy was over a shadow.”

4. A REALIST'S PLURALISTIC THEORY OF TRUTH

J. Loewenberg calls himself a problematic realist. In dealing with the problem of truth he develops a highly interesting and original pluralistic theory of truth, holding that there is a “fourfold root of truth,” and that each of the classic theories represents one of those roots.

He begins his exposition with an analysis of the nature of judgment—a question which he regards as one of the most crucial questions of philosophy. This is because judgment is a connecting link between truth and reality. It is “the vehicle of truth in pursuit of reality.” But it is by no means simple. It is a composite and complex whole, analyzable into four distinct fragments: (i) Every judgment is the expression of some one's *belief*. This *personal aspect* is a profound part of the nature of judgment and cannot be ignored. (ii) Every judgment is “the discursive *statement*” of the belief it embodies. It uses symbols to convey

⁴ Theodore De Laguna in *Contemporary American Philosophy*, Vol. I, p. 412. (Published by The Macmillan Company.)

the meaning of the belief. Hence this is the *formal aspect* of judgment. (iii) A judgment is what a person comes to believe and to assert as a result of *awareness*, and this awareness is the *noetic aspect* of judgment. (iv) Every judgment is a *description* of that of which the believer is aware, which may be either an object or a situation. Description is the *material aspect* of judgment. Loewenberg holds that all four of these aspects are always present in every significant judgment. They are "distinguishable but not separable."

Now when one of these aspects is isolated and made the whole of judgment we get one theory of truth, and that is the way the four traditional theories of truth have each arisen. The pragmatist theory of truth makes belief central. On this theory "that belief, the enactment of which is functionally efficacious, is *truly* efficacious." Practicality is here the standard. Since this emphasizes the adverb truly, Loewenberg calls it the *adverbial theory of truth*. The formal consistency theory of truth isolates the formal aspect of judgment. Those propositions or beliefs are true which are in "concordance" with one another. Here truth is an independent body or system of propositions, and hence Loewenberg calls this the *substantival theory of truth*. But those who make the aspect of awareness fundamental make truth "an inextinguishable quality of awareness itself." Here we have the traditional theory of self-evidence, which Loewenberg calls the *adjectival theory of truth*, because it makes truth a quality; and the names of qualities are adjectival rather than substantival. The traditional correspondence theory makes truth a relation between a judgment and the material asserted in the judgment. Hence it erects the material aspect of judgment into the fundamental nature of judgment. Loewenberg calls this the *bi-prepositional* and the *hyphenated theory of truth*.

Regardless of the correctness of these names, we must recognize that truth can never rightly be identified with

one of these types to the exclusion of the others. But we can only adequately recognize this by making truth essentially a plastic and variable relation between a "problem" and a "solution." On one level this variable truth-relation can be correctly interpreted as a relation of workability, on another as coherence, on a third as immediacy, and on a fourth as correspondence. "What is there so disconcerting about a diversity of incongruous views? It does not worry me to look upon the world and life from different standpoints, and I do not feel abashed because I cannot combine them into a total and absolute perspective. . . . I do not feel the need of making a drastic choice or of uniting them into a 'higher synthesis.' I find them equally relevant and equally important." ⁵ I have called Loewenberg's theory a pluralistic theory of truth, because he disclaims the view that there is a type of truth which unites all four types. His view is that all four types are equally true and must be accepted by the philosopher at their face value, without his attempting to synthesize them into one theory of truth. It is, I think, obvious from Loewenberg's discussion that the correspondence theory is regarded as a slightly higher form of truth than the other three, for he speaks of each theory holding true of a different level of experience, and the highest level seems to be that of establishing a correspondence between the judgment and the matter described in it.

5. REALISM AND ERROR

The student will be able to work out the various theories of error corresponding to these different theories of truth which have been advocated by realists. For Alexander error is "always in contact with reality and is partial truth." There is mental error when "the erroneous judging is itself a real enjoyment of the mind." For Russell and Eaton

⁵ J. Loewenberg in *Contemporary American Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 72 (Macmillan). See his essay entitled "The Fourfold Root of Truth" in the *University of California Publications in Philosophy*, Vol. X, pp. 209-241.

falsity is due to lack of correspondence between the statement or set of symbols and the reality to which it refers. Rogers says that "the definition which critical realism gives of error is briefly this: When we 'know' an object, we are assigning a certain 'essence'—a character or group of characters—to some reality existing independently of the knowledge-process. And as truth is the identity of this essence with the actual character of the reality referred to, so error stands for the lack of such agreement, and the ascribing of an ideal character to what we are mistaken in supposing to be real, or the ascribing to a reality of a wrong character instead of a right one."⁶ And it would follow from De Laguna's denial of truth, either that there is no error or that all human knowledge is erroneous. On a view like Loewenberg's error would be defined differently for each of the four theories of truth, but into these details we cannot here enter.

⁶ A. K. Rogers in *Essays in Critical Realism* (Macmillan), p. 117.

CHAPTER V

REALISM'S SOLUTIONS OF THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM

I. REALISTIC PANPSYCHISM

THE originator of realistic panpsychism was the English naturalistic philosopher, W. K. Clifford (1845-1879). He considered inner feeling to be the essence of all reality. What a person perceives as feeling is to an onlooker nervous tissue. But since we know our own brain to be continuous with nature, and we experience the inner side of it as feeling, we can extend this idea from the brain to all of nature, and look upon everything whatsoever as having an inner essence of feeling. Yet this feeling is not a single world consciousness like the mind of an individual human being. Such consciousness as we possess exists only in organisms with a brain. We must look on nature as consisting originally of separate, simple, tiny bits of *mind-stuff*. Evolution gathers these up into unities of various types and degree of complexity. This mind-stuff theory of Clifford has had a wide appeal, and it is undoubtedly a primary source of the panpsychism defended by contemporary realists.

Although William James subjected Clifford's mind-stuff theory to criticism and rejected it, we have already learned that he himself held that those entities not experienced by any experiencer were all capable of having experiences themselves (see above p. 161), thus giving a panpsychist interpretation to his radical empiricism. C. A. Strong, an ardent admirer and close student of James, has developed this suggestion into a consistent realistic panpsychism. In his recent *Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind*,

(Macmillan, 1930), Strong deals with James's objections to Clifford's mind-stuff theory, pointing out that they are due to James's failure to distinguish between perceptions or acts of awareness and feelings, and among the self, awareness, and sense data. Hence he attempts to reconcile Clifford's mind-stuff theory with James's panpsychism.

Strong's earlier book *Why the Mind Has a Body* (Macmillan, 1903) points out that Clifford's mind-stuff theory was a parallelistic form of panpsychism, since he denied any causal connection between consciousness and the brain. The two processes flow along side by side without influencing each other, and this is strict parallelism. Strong calls Clifford's view panpsychism, and he also acknowledges his indebtedness to Fechner, and more especially to Paulsen and G. F. Stout. And he adds: "What specially characterizes my treatment of the matter is the detailed working out of the conception in terms of the hypothesis of mental causality." (Preface.)¹

In his later *The Origin of Consciousness* (Macmillan, 1920) Strong makes an important analysis of the body-mind problem into two distinct questions: (i) Do mind and body act upon each other and, if so, what is the direction of the causal influence? this being the question of causality; and (ii) How are mind and body related as existents?, this being the existential question. The traditional theories have been principally concerned with the first question, parallelism denying causal influence, automatism asserting a one-way influence in its theory that the brain produces consciousness, and interaction insisting upon a two-way influence. Panpsychism is chiefly concerned with the second problem. Hence, as we learned in our discussion of idealistic panpsychism, one may be a panpsychist and hold to any of

¹ In his address at the 2nd International Congress of Philosophy, held at Geneva in 1904, on *Quelques Considerations sur le panpsychisme*, Strong acknowledges his indebtedness to the English panpsychist, Alfred Barratt. See Barratt's *Physical Metempiric*.

the various theories as to the causal relation of body and mind.

Nevertheless in dealing with the causal problem Strong treats panpsychism as a distinct theory from interaction, automatism, and parallelism. He especially recommends panpsychism because it is a higher synthesis of all three of these theories. He writes: "At the time when my other book was written I was aware that this fourth theory involved a reconciliation of parallelism, if not with interaction, at least with a species of interaction. For though, according to it, the mind, as parallelism asserts, never acts on the brain (since it *is* the existence or a part of the existence that appears as the brain), yet on the other hand it does interact with the existences that appear as the non-cerebral parts of the body, and is far indeed from being efficacious: so that the psychic efficacy which interactionism had at heart is at least firmly established. Since my book was published, it has become clear to me that if what we refer to is not the mind or psyche as an existence but consciousness, *i.e.* the function of awareness, then in regard to this the thesis of the 'conscious automaton' theory is true, and is by our fourth theory reconciled with the other two: consciousness (not the datum of introspection, but the function) is indeed a passive resultant of the operation of the brain or the existence that appears as a brain, and as inert and inefficacious as the most advanced materialist could desire. So that our panpsychist theory actually reconciles with one another and takes up into itself *all three* of the other causal theories—which is no small recommendation for a psychophysical hypothesis" (p. 3 f.).

Yet it is the second problem that panpsychism solves better than any other theory, and the solution of that problem is more fundamental to the solution of the body-mind problem than is the solution of the causal problem. Strong admits that his answer to this problem in his earlier book

was too idealistic. By substituting in his later book the doctrine of direct perception for that of representative perception he has been able to avoid this idealistic slant to the theory and to develop a consistent realistic form of panpsychism. "I used to think of consciousness in the prevalent way, as constituting the substance of the mind, but I now see that something which I should call feeling or sentience—and which is none other than mind-stuff—constitutes the substance of the mind, and that consciousness is only its function. What we introspect is not consciousness but feeling or sentience" (p. 11). This shows that Strong is now much nearer to Clifford's mind-stuff theory than he is to Paulsen's type of panpsychism. And this is further shown by his statement: "Hence there is nothing for it, if the theory is to be maintained, but to hold that the psyche is at once psychic and extended" (p. 13). At present Strong holds that there is but one existent, which, when looked at from the inside is feeling or sentience, and when observed from without is a brain process. "The essence of this theory [panpsychism] is the identification of the existence known to us in sense-perception, when what we perceive is the brain-process, with the existence known in introspection" (p. 12). This, then, is Strong's answer to the second question and the fullest development of the realistic form of panpsychism.

It is interesting to note that A. S. Eddington in *The Nature of the Physical World* also defends Clifford's mind-stuff theory. He quotes with approval Clifford's famous statement: "The succession of feelings which constitutes a man's consciousness is the reality which produces in our minds the perception of his brain." Eddington says that we are justified in interpreting the background of what we experience as physical as having "a nature capable of manifesting itself as mental activity," and as "something of a spiritual nature of which the prominent characteristic is

thought.”² It is a striking fact that recent interpretations of physical nature are more and more panpsychic, whereas recent interpretations of psychical life are more and more behavioristic and anti-psychic. This fact may be evidence in favor of Köhler’s contention that we are on the verge of a discovery of major importance as to the relation of mind and nature.³

2. THE CROSS-SECTION THEORY OF THE NEW REALISTS

E. B. Holt has especially developed the theory of the relation of body and mind which characterizes the American new realism. In his *Concept of Consciousness* he indicates briefly the sources of this interesting theory. One of these is the German philosopher, Avenarius, whose “philosophy of pure experience” was built upon a denial of the distinction between inner and outer experience. The new realists follow Avenarius in this denial. Mach’s *Analysis of Sensation*, especially the “anti-metaphysical preliminaries,” and James’s essays that are republished in *Essays in Radical Empiricism* are the other sources, especially mentioned by Holt. The basic idea in James’s essays is the conception of a stuff called “pure experience,” out of which all transient objects, including separate human consciousnesses, are constructed. In his Preface Holt gives H. M. Sheffer credit for having named this stuff of pure experience “neutral entities,” meaning by the word neutral that these entities are neither mental nor physical. We have already learned that this theory of neutralism, which was first stated by James, has influenced the American new realists and Bertrand Russell. Let us now consider the way in which Holt uses this theory to solve the body-mind problem.

We must abandon the notion that there is a common *substance* underlying all being. Clinging to this false as-

² This passage is quoted more at length and criticized by A. O. Lovejoy in *The Revolt Against Dualism*, pp. 270ff. (Open Court Co.). The passage from Clifford is quoted by Lovejoy on p. 271 (note).

³ See W. Köhler’s article in the *Yale Review*, Vol. XIX, pp. 560-576.

sumption is what has given rise to spiritualism on the one hand and to materialism on the other hand. The realm of being is not a realm of substances but a class of purely neutral entities, more logical or conceptual in nature than substantial or material. The problem, then, is how such a purely neutral universe can contain both mental and physical objects. We must think of these entities that make up the realm of being as graded in the order of complexity. The simple neutral entities are relations like identity, difference, number, negativity, and all entities that are "relatively universal," as contrasted with those that are particular and relatively concrete. Now as the entities become more complex, new objects arise. Physical objects arise when the complexity is that of the world of mechanics and chemistry. Living beings arise when the complexity is that of the world of biology. Minds arise when the complexity is that of the world of psychology. And Holt thinks that "these neutral entities are marvellously compacted in a united system such that the simple develop without break or discontinuity into the more and more complex, even down to the infinite diversity of concrete being" (p. 164). So much for the graded series of neutral entities, which is the background of Holt's cross-section theory of mind or consciousness.

By a cross-section Holt means "any definable part that is in no wise *organically* related to the whole." Here he is denying the idealistic doctrine of the internality of relations. His examples are: "the mauve-colored postage stamps in a philatelist's album, the particles of matter lying in the plane of the earth's orbit," etc. But every organism is such a cross-section, in that organisms respond to certain features of the environment and not to others. The mechanism of this response is the nervous system in animals having one, but even plants respond to their environment selectively. For example, there are numerous mechanisms of response in plants such as "baro-, helio-, thermo-, chemo-,

and galvano-tropisms," and each defines a certain cross-section of the plant's environment. But plants have organs of sensitivity, of conduction, and of contraction which also give other cross-sections of the plant's environment than those given by plant tropisms. If we put all of these cross-sections together and think of them as one, then in the case of some particular plant, "the complete cross-section that is so defined, constitutes all, or very nearly all, of the plant's environment that *for it* has any existence. *For the plant* any other portions of the surrounding world *are not*. Yet the plant remains itself an organism that is distinct from this effective environment" (p. 175 f).

Now an animal cross-section is similar to that of a plant, only its field is much more extensive. This is to say, it includes a much larger number of objects in the environment. But those objects to which a plant responds are not all physical, even though we call both the plant and its environment physical. Hence "the plant's cross-section is as neutral a manifold as any purely mathematical system; yet this cross-section, we have seen, is all that there *is* by way of environment for the plant. It is therefore not a stretching of the facts, but an inevitable concession to reason and to common sense, to say that the plant lives and moves in a purely neutral realm" (p. 179). And so of an animal organism. And so likewise of a human mind. Consciousness depends upon the nervous system, but it is not inside of the nervous system, or seated in the brain. Consciousness is a cross-section of the environment. "Now this neutral cross-section outside of the nervous system, and composed of the neutral elements of physical and non-physical objects to which the nervous system is responding by some specific response,—this neutral cross-section, I submit, coincides exactly with the list of objects of which we say that we are conscious. This neutral cross-section as defined by the specific reaction of reflex-arcs is the psychic

realm:—it is the manifold of our sensations, perceptions and ideas:—it is consciousness" (p. 182).

Holt thinks that consciousness is spatially and temporally extended. He uses an interesting analogy to clarify this. Imagine a sheet with a hole in it. Let the hole vary both in size and shape, and let the sheet be moved about over a map. Then "the sum of the places disclosed by the hole would be, like consciousness, a manifold having spatial extent and at the same time moving in space" (p. 211). On this view, then, the same neutral entities are consciousness or mind when they form the cross-section determined by the response of some nervous system, and physical when they form a cross-section determined by some other mechanism or focus. Both mental and physical cross-sections are parts of the same universe of neutral entities.

3. THE SOLUTION OF THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM OF THE EMERGENT EVOLUTIONISTS

Samuel Alexander admits that Holt's cross-section theory of consciousness (which he also calls the searchlight theory because Holt compares consciousness to the field of a searchlight) is "so simple as almost to compel assent." He also says that it is so close to the facts that he finds himself "perpetually being drawn back and persuaded to adopt it." Yet he does not adopt it. For he thinks that we know that every object of which we are conscious belongs to *our* experience. If consciousness is simply identical with the cross-section, how is it that we have self-consciousness in the sense that we enjoy our own mental acts? "Every act of consciousness is then self-consciousness, not in the sense of containing a reflection on itself, for this is just what is denied by calling it an enjoyment, but in the sense that whenever we know, we know that we know, or that knowing and knowing that we know are one and the same thing. Now if consciousness belongs not to the neural response but to the cross-section itself which it makes, as a

totality, how can any object be *my* object? And yet experience says that it is." ⁴ In other words, Alexander is unwilling to accept Holt's denial of inner experience or his reduction of inner to outer experience. If we take away from consciousness the specific relation to a self, and make it consist simply in a cross-section of objects in the environment, then any such cross-section would be consciousness, and there would be no distinct level of reality which emerges in mind.

Hence Alexander, Morgan, and other emergent evolutionists are committed to the view that mind emerges as one of the higher levels of reality, after lower levels have emerged as a basis for it. Morgan distinguishes three distinct levels of mind as an emergent. There is the subconscious level which lies below the level of sense perception, and there is the self-conscious level which lies above the level of sense perception. We should only use the word consciousness to refer to this highest level of mind. This exists only in human beings and in beings higher than man who are capable of reflection. But mind in the subconscious form is present in plants. Is it present in the levels lower down than plants? The emergent evolutionists are really committed to the view that there are two sides of every emergent level, one of which is like the mental life of human beings only in a much more rudimentary form, and the other of which is like the physiological side of human nature. Is this panpsychism? Or is it simply parallelism? Morgan calls it the theory of *unrestricted correlation*. But it is essentially the same as the parallelistic form of panpsychism. Thus Morgan writes: "There is a correlated psychological system in the atom, the molecule, the crystal, the bacterium, the fertilized ovum—in every differentiated physical system, according to its integral status in the evolutionary hierarchy." And further on he adds: "There is, at no level, any interaction between the physical and psy-

⁴ Samuel Alexander: *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol. II, p. 112.

chical attributes.”⁵ And these two statements epitomize parallelistic panpsychism.

4. PRATT'S INTERACTIONISM

In his Taylor Lectures, entitled *Matter and Spirit* (The Macmillan Co.), J. B. Pratt subjects parallelism, panpsychism, and materialism to criticism, and reaches the conclusion that “none of the theories opposed to Interaction are tenable, and none of the objections to Interaction are important.” Having eliminated all other theories and the objections to interaction, he concludes that interaction is the true solution of the body-mind problem. This leads him to the important question: What are they that interact? In dealing with this question Pratt develops the idea that the material world consists of one type of process, and that this process holds absolute sway throughout the infinite recesses of physical nature. But here on the earth we know that selves or personalities have evolved, and we also know that their behavior exhibits another type of process. Consequently we must recognize that human beings exhibit a dualism of process, and that the two types of process are in mutual interaction in human conduct. “Many of the activities of the body take place according to purely physical laws. But not all. The determining power in some of the acts of human bodies is to be found not in the physical and chemical processes but in processes of an utterly different nature, namely, those of the rational and purposive will. At many a juncture personal will, reason, purpose interfere with the working of mechanical law and contravene it. Of course the resulting action of the human body in question will be capable, *after the fact*, of being described in mechanical terms. But it was not caused by mechanical forces or conditions, it was not a part of any regular mechanical sequence, and it never could have been predicted by the

⁵ Quoted from the selection from Morgan in my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, pp. 403 and 404.

most miraculously omniscient mechanist, even if he had been in possession of all the facts and all the laws of the physical universe" (p. 186). Pratt holds that this dualism of process is "as old as man's thought." He calls it "the Philosophy of the Human Race."

5. COHEN'S THEORY OF AUTOMATISM

Years ago T. H. Huxley put forth the theory that mind is correlated with the brain and that consciousness is restricted to beings having a brain. Morgan calls Huxley's view *restricted correlation* to contrast it with the unrestricted correlation which he defends. It has also been called *epiphenomenalism*, by which is meant that the mind or consciousness is a mere by-product of the functioning of the brain. On this theory the causal relation between brain and mind is a one-way relation. Mind is the effect and brain is the cause. Never does mind act on the brain. It is a mere epiphenomenon of the brain. This is the theory which Strong called the "conscious automaton" theory.

M. R. Cohen, in his recent *Reason and Nature* (Harcourt, Brace & Co.) examines the different theories of the mind-body relation and reaches the conclusion that the conscious automaton view is substantially correct. He thinks there is no doubt that "if we bring about certain bodily states, we shall also have their mental accompaniments. And this is a most important fact of all human life, since all education and the influencing of our fellow men depends upon choosing the right physical expression or means to bring about the desired mental state" (p. 325). But Cohen immediately denies that the causality here asserted means what it means in physics or physiology. We do not know what the nature of this causality is, but the fact that consciousness is qualitatively different from the data of physics and physiology is proof that the causality by which the brain produces the mind is different from that by which it produces a bodily movement.

6. REALISM AND FREEDOM AND IMMORTALITY

We have space only to indicate the attitude of realists to the question of the freedom of the human will. Strong distinguishes between *empirical* and *speculative* freedom. By the former he means the experience which he thinks everybody has of choosing between various alternative actions and of taking one's own sweet time to do it. By the latter he means "the uncausedness of our decisions." We can never know this. We can only speculate about it. Empirical freedom is entirely consistent with universal causation and in no way depends upon speculative freedom. We only need to insist that "will, which is the active aspect of some parts of reality, must have the genuine though limited efficacy that belongs to it as a force among other forces." It is certainly strange that a panpsychist should admit that sentience or feeling belongs to absolutely every existent and should say that will is only "the active aspect of some parts of reality" and "a force among other forces," but that is exactly what Strong says. Pratt holds essentially the same view, but it is more consistent with his form of interaction than it is with Strong's panpsychism. Holt denies that there is any antithesis between free will and determinism, and insists that every one is free "whose acts fulfill his purposes." This he calls *practical freedom*. "The question whence come his purposes is as irrelevant and meaningless as some others that we have seen;—whither go the shapes of bursting bubbles?" (p. 295). Morgan and Alexander connect their theory of freedom with their theory of emergence. They believe that every *new* act, as well as every *new* emergent, has an indeterminate character. Each is unpredictable and therefore each is free.⁶ Cohen insists that the consciousness of human freedom is entirely consistent with the "discov-

⁶ See especially C. Lloyd Morgan's article entitled "Freedom and Emergence" in the *Hibbert Journal*, July 1929. For the quotation from Strong and on his theory of freedom in general see the Epilogue of his *The Origin of Consciousness*.

erable uniformities" which characterize human conduct. He accepts Peirce's *tychism*—the theory that there is absolute novelty both in physical and in psychical nature.

As far as belief in immortality is concerned few realists accept it. The word immortality seldom occurs in their writings. Their naturalistic conception of consciousness really precludes the acceptance of belief in personal immortality. Alexander frankly says: "If we are to follow the clue of experience, we must therefore believe that theoretically the claim for the future life is founded on error" (Vol. II, p. 424). Pratt comes nearer than any other realist to accepting the belief in immortality. He writes: "Only a dualistic philosophy is compatible with any significant form of immortality. But such a philosophy is not only compatible with it; it goes a long way toward making it probable." In fact Pratt thinks it is probable, and that Plato's arguments in the *Phaedo* are a sound proof for it.

CHAPTER VI

REALISM'S SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF VALUE AND EVIL

I. A CLASSIFICATION OF REALISTIC THEORIES OF VALUE

REALISTS have developed at least five distinct theories of value, three of which may be classified under one general theory, the *relational theory*. The first form of the relational theory is the *interest theory of value*. It defines value as a relation between any object whatever and the interest which that object satisfies. Value is created whenever any interest is fulfilled, and negative value arises from the thwarting of interest. John Laird calls this the "appreciative theory," since he identifies an interest with an act of appreciation; but R. B. Perry objects because "the term 'appreciation' encourages a confusion between liking, desiring, etc., and *deeming* good, *i.e.*, judging." So let us call this the interest form of the relational theory. Another form is to make value a relation of any entity to the self-maintenance of any other entity whatever. Those things that have natural affinities for each other stand in a value relation. Laird calls this the *elective theory of value*, because one thing is said to elect or prize the other in a natural way. A third form of the relational theory is the *comparative theory of value*. This has been briefly set forth by A. P. Brogan in articles which he has contributed to the *International Journal of Ethics*. It will be more fully developed in a book on the *comparative theory of value* which is to be published shortly. According to Brogan the fundamental value concept is the relation of betterness and worseness. There is no proof that the value series is finite,

or that there is an absolute best at one end of the series. If there were an absolute best, there would also have to be an absolute worst. Value is simply the comparison of one entity with another from the standpoint of betterness.¹ A fourth theory Laird calls the *timological theory of value*. The word *timology* is of Greek derivation, and means literally the science of honor or dignity or excellence. Hence this theory defines value in terms of wholeness, excellence, perfection. On this view value is the unique grouping of entities into a unified whole which has natural excellence. Those realists who find all of these four theories unsatisfactory fall back upon an *indefinability theory of value*. They hold that every attempt to define value involves one in an unavoidable equivocation between value as immediate experience and standard value, or between instrumental and intrinsic value.

We may summarize these realistic theories of value in a classificatory scheme:

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|----------------------------------|--|
| I. Relational Theories of Value. | { A. The Interest Theory.
B. The Elective Theory.
C. The Comparative Theory. |
| II. The Timological Theory. | |
| III. The Indefinability Theory. | |

Now let us expound each of these theories more at length, with the exception of the comparative theory, since it is not yet fully developed.

2. THE INTEREST THEORY OF VALUE

Among the American new realists R. B. Perry has given most attention to the working out of a realistic theory of value. In 1914 he published an important essay entitled *A Definition of Value* in which he laid down the funda-

¹ See especially A. P. Brogan's article "Objective Pluralism in the Theory of Value" in the *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XLI, pp. 287-295. See the articles in the same journal: Vol. XXXIII, pp. 119-134; Vol. XXIV, pp. 254-271, and Vol. XXXV, pp. 105-124. See my criticism of Brogan's theory in the same journal, Vol. XXXIV, pp. 175-194.

mental principles of the theory. And in 1926 appeared his *General Theory of Value*, with the subtitle: *Its Meaning and Basic Principles Construed in Terms of Interest* (Longmans). In the Preface he promises a sequel to be entitled *Realms of Value*, but that work has not yet appeared. The *General Theory of Value* is a monumental work which has produced a great deal of discussion, and Perry has since written some important articles to defend and to clarify his fundamental thesis.² Thus he has devoted the best years of his mature life to the working out of this highly original and important theory of value.

The whole theory is determined by the unique conception of *interest*, which some of Perry's critics persist in misunderstanding, in spite of his clear statements of the sense in which he uses the term. In his original statement of the theory he speaks of a "certain constant that we may call *bias* or *interest*," and he especially stresses the fact that this has "manifold varieties, conditions and relations." And he adds: "The central fact for this view is the polarity of affective-motor attitudes." These various attitudes, such as love and hate, hope and fear, desire and repugnance, Perry generalizes under the terms *liking* and *disliking*. And then he says: "I shall use the term *interest* to mean a subject's liking or disliking, including also their derived or dispositional forms."³ And in his *General Theory of Value* he writes: "It is to this all-pervasive characteristic of the motor-affective life, this *state, act, attitude* or *disposition of favor or disfavor*, to which we propose to give the name *interest*." Then, in a footnote, he points out that this is a technical use of the term *interest*, which is used by no one "in the precise sense in which it is employed here" (p. 115).

This shows how extremely important it is to an under-

² See especially *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XLI, pp. 429-442, and *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 447-484 and 519-526.

³ *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XI, pp. 149 and 150.

standing of Perry's theory to grasp exactly what he means by an interest. And from his two definitions it is perfectly clear that the term is highly elastic, applicable to the simplest conceivable case of liking or disliking, such as a plant's heliotropisms, or to a highly complex state of appreciation, such as a sage's enjoyment of the pure abstract idea of beauty, as described by Socrates in Plato's *Symposium*. Hence Perry's critics are undoubtedly wrong in restricting this term to human and higher animal likings and dislikings. But they are right in saying that it applies only to living phenomena. Perry's theory of value is predominantly a biological theory, and to call it a psychological theory, as Laird does, is misleading, unless one remembers that Perry shares Holt's view that there is a conscious cross-section defined by a plant's heliotropisms. For the new realists recognize no real gap, so far as valuing is concerned, between the liking of a plant and that of a sage. The satisfaction of either liking constitutes value.

However, Perry especially insists that the satisfaction of any interest by any object whatsoever defines *generic value only*. There are admittedly many modes or types of value. But on Perry's theory every one of these modes or types contains generic value or is constituted by the satisfaction of interest. Let us briefly consider three important modes of value at the level of plant life. Suppose a plant subject M, and let it have an interest r, say the plant's liking light. Let the object a be the falling of the sun's rays upon this particular plant. This gives us one mode of value. There is a single interest r and a single object a and a is in the relation of satisfying r. Now let us complicate the situation by adding another interest s and another object b and s may be the liking of the plant for water and b the gentle rain falling upon the plant. This gives us two values of the same mode. When the sun shines on the plant value is created, and when the rain falls on the plant value is created. But suppose, now, that there has been a prolonged

drought, and that the sun has been shining too intensely for too long a time on this particular plant. Then the interest *s* and its object *b* will take precedence over the interest *r* and its object *a*. This preference of one interest to another by a subject defines another mode of value. A third mode is defined by the relation of something to *a* or *b*, which is calculated to bring *a* or *b* into, or to put it out of, existence. Let us call this *c*. Suppose that rain is delayed, and a man turns a hose on the plant. Then turning the hose on the plant is *c*, since it brings water into existence for the plant. Now, if the plant could know that *c* could take the place of *b* it would have a liking for *c*. But even though it does not know this we can say that *c* has value in a derived sense. Its characteristic effect being the satisfaction of an interest, it has value. Here, then, are three modes of value, each of which retains the generic nature of value as the relation between any interest and any object. And we have exemplified all three modes at the level of plant life to show how erroneous those interpretations of Perry's theory are which restrict interest to man and the higher animals. It is not so restricted. The term interest applies to any kind of liking or disliking whatsoever, to any kind of affective-motor attitude whatsoever, even though it be that of a plant. That is why Perry italicised the words "*state, act, attitude or disposition of favor or disfavor,*" and that is why he uses the word affective-motor, instead of affective-volitional, and the word bias. Of course, the three modes of value explained above, and other modes, become highly important at the human level. One of the great merits of Perry's theory is that it enables him to treat economic, moral, aesthetic, cognitive, social, and religious values as species of generic value.

Perry uses his interest theory, therefore, as a new principle of classifying values. He especially condemns the *axiological classification* used by Urban and other idealists, and expounded above. (Part II, Chap. VI.) It is based

upon the norms or standards by which values are graded and validated. But the best way to classify values is in terms of the various modes of interest, or in terms of the different relations objects may have to interests. The three modes distinguished above are based upon the former. Other distinctions that are possible and valuable, each of which yields different classifications, are "positive and negative, progressive and recurrent, potential and actual, independent and dependent, playful and real, submissive and aggressive, subjective and objective, immediate and mediate, or personal and social" (p. 693). Using such principles of division we may classify, either the objects that are in relation to interests, or the interests themselves. Perry admits that the varieties of interest are so numerous that this method perforce becomes excessively detailed and schematic. So it is better to recognize that "the great *foci* of interest are science, conscience, art, industry, state and church," and to group the infinite varieties of value under these basic categories. Thus, so far as human values are concerned, there would be cognitive, moral, aesthetic, economic, political or social, and religious values.

3. THE ELECTIVE THEORY OF VALUE

John Laird, in *The Idea of Value* (Cambridge University Press), objects to Perry's view as being too narrow in that it restricts value to interest in the psychological sense. We have already made it clear that this is a misinterpretation of Perry's theory, if by value we mean generic value only. Perry's theory of generic value undoubtedly has a much wider scope than Laird recognizes. However, it does not extend lower down in the order of nature than living beings. The relation of a magnet to iron filings, for example, would not be, according to Perry, a value relation unless some interest were involved which would make it a derived value as defined above. But on the natural election theory such a relation would be a value. Consequently

Laird is right in holding that the natural election theory has a wider scope than, and includes, the interest theory, even though he is wrong in narrowing the interest theory down to psychological interest or to such interests as are found only among men and the higher animals. What the natural election theory does is to assume that all natural entities show bias or non-indifference towards some other entities. A crystal shows this non-indifference towards its environment and the process of crystal formation is an example of natural election. Another good example would be the process of osmosis in chemistry, or any other chemical process, for that matter. In other words, we know that non-living entities, as well as living organisms, exhibit the phenomenon of mutual attraction and repulsion for each other. This non-indifference of one entity for another, whether living or non-living, which is so general throughout nature, Laird calls natural election. And value is defined in terms of this relation by the natural election theory. Natural election is a principle of the widest possible extension, since there is nothing whatsoever that does not stand in the relation of non-indifference to something else.

Laird distinguishes two ways in which natural election works. One of these he calls *logical relevance*. If we are asked what logical relevance is, we cannot tell. "Discrimination of a subtle and orderly kind between what is relevant and what is immaterial presupposes the truth that there is such a thing as relevance; and relevance itself, being a condition of all logic, has ultimately to be accepted in its stark and primitive purity" (p. 96). Thus logical relevance is indefinable. Another form which natural election takes is *causation*. This is also ultimately indefinable, but in any case of actual causation we have to distinguish between what counts and what does not count, and this is equivalent to natural election. Some entities belong together, others do not. "A thing sustains itself by taking account of other things, assimilating some of them, neutralizing some of

them, assuming amicable or defensive relations with others—and all non-mentally (as Bacon showed) as well as (sometimes) mentally” (p. 99).

Laird goes on to show that this natural election may be “*altogether* infra-conscious, and discoverable in things that are not conscious at all, although, to be sure, it is also discoverable in conscious beings and in their conscious experience” (p. 100). It is obvious that Laird is not a panpsychist. The only characteristic of natural election necessary to value is active selection, plus a response on the part of that which is selected to that selection. The basis of all natural election is the specific varieties which actually exist in the universe. But “to speak of the ‘universe’ employing natural election is nonsense. The universe cannot take sides or take special account of anything. Natural election, on the contrary, describes the way in which particular things do take sides, and do take special account, not of everything, but of certain particular things and *not* of others” (p. 113). Evidently Laird is not a monist nor an absolutist, but a pluralist in so far as he accepts the natural election theory of value.

Thus this theory is wider in its scope than the interest theory. Yet it shares with that theory the character of being relational. On both theories every value is a specific relation of one entity to another. On the interest theory one of these entities must be an interest in the technical sense of biological bias. On the elective theory it need not be an interest in either the biological or the psychological sense. A magnet attracting iron filings, and their responding by clinging to the magnet, creates a value on this theory, as much as an amoeba engulfing a food particle, or a man appreciating Raphael’s Madonna. Laird says: “One natural election is just as specific as another,” and would this not mean that value is created whenever natural election occurs?

4. THE TIMOLOGICAL THEORY OF VALUE

The natural election theory defines value with special reference to some particular point of view. Thus, when a lion catches a child, value is created from the point of view of the lion. If the child escapes from the lion, value is created from the point of view of the child. Here, then, are two elective goods that are in contradiction. Now the timological theory of value is concerned primarily with what is good in itself, apart from any particular point of view. Can we say that the good of the child's escape is a higher excellence than the good of the child's capture? If so, we must have a rational insight by which we detect a greater excellence in one value than in another. From this standpoint we may have to condemn some natural elections as worthless or even as evil. Hence there is a fundamental and irreconcilable opposition between the theory which defines value in terms of natural election and interest, and the theory which defines value in terms of excellence.

How can we define excellence? That it is a fact of experience no one can deny. Laird quotes the beautiful lines of Ben Jonson to show that excellence does not mean spatial magnitude or long duration.

For what is life, if measur'd by the space,
 Not by the act? . . .
 It is not growing like a tree
 In bulk, doth make men better be:
 Or standing long an oak, three hundred year,
 To fall a log at last, dry, bald and sere:
 A lily of a day
 Is fairer far in May,
 Although it fall and die that night:
 It was the plant and flower of light.
 In small proportions we just beauties see;
 And in short measures life may perfect be.

How are we to define such excellences as this poem claims for the lily of a day, the small proportions of a Dürer's Crucifixion, or the short measures of a child's life?

More than any other realist G. E. Moore has wrestled with this problem. He thinks that *intrinsic value* or *good per se* is a predicate of wholes, of "organic unities." Yet there is no single predicate which all such wholes or unities have, except that any rational being would judge that it would be better for such a unity to exist quite alone and all by itself, than for it not so to exist. Hence every excellence, every intrinsic value, is absolutely unique, and is constituted by the peculiar organization which it has as an organic unity. Moore calls this the "internality" of value. Every intrinsic value is self-dependent. It is held together internally by relations which make it an organic unity. And the intrinsic value is the value of the whole in distinction from the values of the separate parts entering into its constitution. And "to hold that any kinds of value are 'intrinsic' entails the recognition of a kind of predicate extremely different from any we should otherwise have to recognize, and perhaps unique." This predicate Moore defines as follows: "*To say that a kind of value is 'intrinsic' means merely that the question whether a thing possesses it, and in what degree it possesses it, depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question.*" And he explains that he means by "*depends solely on the intrinsic nature of the thing in question*" two things: (i) "That it is *impossible* for what is strictly *one and the same thing* to possess that kind of value at one time, or in one set of circumstances, and to possess it in a different degree in another, or in a different set." In other words, once an intrinsic value always one and to exactly the same degree. (ii) "If a given thing possesses any kind of intrinsic value in a certain degree, then not only must that same thing possess it, under all circumstances, in the same degree, but also anything *exactly like* it, must, under all circumstances, possess it in exactly the same degree."⁴ Yet intrinsic value must not be regarded as a quality or property of a whole, for that

⁴ G. E. Moore: *Philosophical Studies*, pp. 26of. (Harcourt, Brace & Co.)

would make it a part of that whole which would have to be included in a *complete description* of it. But we can give a complete description of an organic unity which possesses intrinsic value without having to mention that value. Consequently the value cannot be a quality or property of the organic unity. And that is exactly why Moore said above, that it is a *unique* predicate.

What, then, does Moore's timological theory of value say that intrinsic value or excellence is? It is a peculiar predicate, different from any other, of organic unities. It is not identical with the values of the separate properties or constituents of such wholes, but belongs to the peculiar way in which they are internally organized. This is as far as we can go towards defining it. And it is obvious that this is a timological rather than a relational theory of value.

5. THE INDEFINABILITY THEORY OF VALUE

We saw that Laird admits that natural election is a principle that is ultimately indefinable, and that Moore admits that the unique predicate of organic unities which constitutes them excellences is ultimately indefinable. Thus both of these theories rest back upon an indefinable surd in the nature of value. Laird and Moore both admit this, and in the end both acknowledge that value is really indefinable. Laird says that "value is an ambiguous term which includes both elective or appreciative prizings and timological insight." By timological insight he means recognition of the excellence in any organic unity. And he adds: "In view of the admitted ambiguity of 'value' in the current speech of so many nations, it should not be at all surprising if the attempt to bring precision into the idea of value should end with a less extensive but more acute ambiguity. And I suspect that it does" (*loco citato* p. 322). Santayana also defends the indefinability theory of value. This theory has also been ably defended by S. C. Pepper in two essays entitled *The Equivocation of Value* and *Standard Value*

published in the University of California Publications in Philosophy, Vols. IV and VII. Pepper says: "The gulf yawns between immediate and standard value. It cannot be bridged from the former to the latter nor from the latter to the former. It cannot be bridged at all" (Vol. IV, p. 132).

Thus the realists are unable to solve the problem of value so as to do justice both to relative and to absolute value, both to instrumental and to intrinsic value. Either they reduce all values to the relational type, as in the interest, elective, and comparative theories, or they accept two distinct types of value and admit that they are incompatible and irreconcilable.

6. REALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

On the interest theory of value evil is negative value, and that means that it is the thwarting of a liking or the satisfying of a disliking. But there is no problem of evil except how to bring about a gradual betterment of the world so that the total quantum of interest satisfaction can be augmented. On the natural election theory evil is only evil from the point of view of the being that loses its existence in the struggle of each actuality to maintain itself. Thus what is evil from the point of view of the fly is good from the point of view of the spider which catches the fly in its web. On the comparative theory evil is defined by the betterness-worseness relation, and is simply a matter of degree of value in comparison with some other relative value. On the timological theory there are degrees of excellence, but there is no intrinsic evil. On the contrary, things that would be evil taken each by itself can each be good in some organic unity which has intrinsic value. In general realists are uninterested in the traditional problem of reconciling the existence of evil facts with the supposed goodness of God, since they either deny that there is a God or treat

deity as a quality yet to emerge and which is "beyond good and evil." In fact, the realists boast of the superiority of realism over idealism because of the fact that the only problem of evil that realism has is how to get rid of it.

CHAPTER VII

TYPICAL OBJECTIONS TO REALISM

I. GENERAL CRITICISMS OF REALISM

ONE of the fundamental defects in realism as a philosophy is its extreme and exaggerated emphasis on the critical function of philosophy. We have seen that the new realism arose as a polemic against idealism, and that critical realism arose as a polemic against the new realism. Both forms of American realism have been dominantly and pre-eminently critical of everything and everybody, often to the point of sheer dogmatism and absolute intolerance. And the English realists, Russell, Broad, Moore, and Laird, have been especially noted for their critical acumen. Only Whitehead and Alexander have proceeded in a purely constructive way, subordinating criticism to the building up of a consistent view. Other realists have relied too much on the type of argument which concludes that a view is true because other views are defective. And too often the other view is a "straw man." In traditional Aristotelian logic this type of argument is known as the fallacy of *ad ignorantiam*.

E. B. McGilvary, himself one of the ablest of the American realists, has well expressed this defect in realism. "There has without doubt," he says, "been too much cocksureness all around. The monist has been dogmatic in asserting his monism [he means realistic monism], and the dualist no less dogmatic in asserting his dualism. A more cautious, tentative, postulational attitude is in order, together with an attempt at a sympathetic understanding of the positions of opponents. This means of course trying to understand any concept of an opponent in the context of the

whole system of his concepts.”¹ Yet none of the realists enjoys exercising his critical acumen any more than McGilvary, and none has offered any more acute and trenchant criticisms of his opponents’ positions. And it was he who said: “I feel like the Irishman who, seeing a fight, took off his coat, rolled up his sleeves, and asked whether it was a private fight, or whether anybody might get in.” And judged by the volume of their critical output, most of the realists must feel like that same Irishman.

Now one may fully appreciate the value of philosophic controversy and polemics as a method of clarifying issues, of bringing new problems to light and of revitalizing philosophy, without erecting controversy into the fundamental principle of philosophic method, as A. O. Lovejoy, for example, does when he says “Effective coöperation among philosophers consists, it is true, primarily in disagreement.” As a matter of fact most of the really great philosophers, who stand out above the dust raised by their contemporary controversialists like a mountain peak above the clouds of mist which envelop its base, were thinkers who developed their original ideas constructively rather than critically. This is even true of Kant, the critical philosopher *par excellence*, as is indicated by his famous acknowledgment that it was David Hume who awoke him from his dogmatic slumbers. One has a right, if not a duty, to be suspicious of a type of philosophy which is always attacking the positions of its opponents. The sounder attitude is that of trying to see how much of the opponent’s position can be absorbed by the view which you hold. But few of the realists are able to rise above the controversial and to assume the synoptic or synthetic attitude. One can but wonder how much of the present-day popularity of realism may be due to that type of curiosity which makes one turn aside to watch a good fight. For does not all the world love a fighter, as well as a lover? But in the interest of

¹ *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XL, p. 265.

philosophy, is it not high time for some one to try to stop the fight?

In answer to this general criticism it may rightly be said that realism is a philosophy that is just in its infancy, and that it has had to do its fair share of kicking in order to win for itself "a local habitation and a name." Undoubtedly there is truth in this retort, for idealism was so strongly entrenched when the realists began their polemic of reform, that fighting was necessary to break the bonds of pedantry which were mumming philosophy. Yet is it not a confession of weakness to admit that your philosophy is still in its swaddling clothes? Hocking is unquestionably right when he says: "No consistent realistic system is yet forthcoming." Realism has yet to produce an intelligible, consistent and unified answer to the basic problems of philosophy. Some of these problems it deliberately shoves to one side and boasts of the fact. On others, as we have seen, conflicting interpretations and solutions are offered. This proves that realism is as yet in its infancy, and that it must sooner or later stop fighting and settle down to hard, constructive work, if it is to produce a durable system of philosophy.

Although realists have fought idealism vigorously, they have not infrequently attacked it from without, and then have attempted to incorporate its fundamental insights as though they were essentially realistic. Two illustrations of this attitude must here suffice. Santayana states the essence of absolutism as follows: "We are not really native to this world, except in respect to our bodies; our souls are native to a spiritual world, from which we fetch our standards of truth and beauty, and in which alone we can be happy." Then he subjects this position to his inimitable ridicule. Yet when he comes to state his own view, he writes: "Although intellect arises quite naturally, in the animal act of dominating events in the interest of survival, yet essentially intellect disengages itself from that servile office (which is not that

of its organ only) and from the beginning is speculative and impartial in its own outlook, and thinks it not robbery to take the point of view of God, of the truth, and of eternity." ² After all how different is the view stated in this sentence from the essence of absolutism? I see no significant difference whatsoever. And is it not the very soul and substance of idealism to argue that "this gift of transcending humanity in sympathy with the truth is a part, and the most distinctive part, of human nature?" ³ Why talk about the genteel tradition being at bay when you who claim that it is at bay assert what you say is its essence? Idealism is no less excellent when it is called realism.

What's in a name? that which we call a rose,
By any other name would smell as sweet.

The second illustration is Pratt's article in *Essays in Critical Realism*, where he first assails idealism, charging it with an error which is his own, and then states as his own view the essence of what he assailed. Idealism holds, according to Pratt, that the transcendent is a real thing, independent of and inaccessible to actual thinking. But this is critical realism's conception of transcendence, and not that of the idealism which Pratt is criticising. Then to meet this error in idealism Pratt lists various cases and types of knowledge that are transcendent and yet are accepted by everybody. Yet these cases and types are just what idealism uses to prove its own theory of transcendence. In calling attention to this way of criticising idealism, Bosanquet says: "A careful study of Professor Pratt's argument on this head (transcendence) reveals a state of mind that is really . . . amazing, incredible if it were not there in black and white." ⁴

² These passages are from George Santayana's latest book: *The Genteel Tradition at Bay* (Scribners, 1931), pp. 33 and 65.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Bernard Bosanquet: *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*, p. 144 (Macmillan).

These two illustrations indicate a root defect in realism, which is, briefly stated, that it attacks idealism from without, and then accepts the basic principles of idealism when it attempts to be constructive and to develop its own viewpoint. Not until realism recognizes how much of idealism is compatible with the realistic premises will realism become a sound philosophy. And when it recognizes this, it will change its method of criticism and controversy, and become more friendly to the great insights which have been won by idealists. There is ample evidence that this process is now taking place in realism, and that the next stage in the development of this philosophy will be the attempt to recover much of the truth which was won for the human mind by the idealism of the nineteenth century. For instance, Broad says: "I think it probable that some of the *summi philosophi* of our time tend to neglect much fine gold which was mined by Hegel and Kant." And it would certainly take a high-powered, metaphysical microscope to detect the difference between the later views of Pratt, Montague, and some of the other realists, and the essential doctrines of idealism.

2. REALIST VERSUS REALIST

In his Carus Lectures, entitled *The Revolt Against Dualism* (Open Court Publishing Co.), A. O. Lovejoy examines in detail the contemporary hostility to the two forms of dualism advocated by the critical realists—epistemological and psycho-physical dualism. Most of the philosophers criticised by Lovejoy are realists of a monistic persuasion on both of these issues. He divides the revolt against dualism into two main phases, an earlier phase, represented by the new realists in this country and most of the British realists, and a later phase, represented by Whitehead and others. Examining the technical arguments of these various philosophers, he reaches the conclusion that both forms of dualism are substantially sound, and that realistic monism is in fundamental conflict with common sense, is based upon

fallacious scientific concepts, and is logically self-contradictory. Lovejoy's slashing attack on those forms of realism that are opposed to dualism is one of the most significant movements in up-to-the-minute contemporary philosophy, since it has already provoked equally spirited rejoinders from some of those whom it attacked, and is certain to produce more in the near future. We cannot here enter into the details of this violent controversy, but it should be of value to indicate briefly the central point at issue.

A. E. Murphy, a promising young philosopher representing the second phase of the revolt, has invented a good label for the later form of monistic realism. He calls it *Objective Relativism*. By this phrase he intends to stress the connection between realism and the theories of relativity of Einstein. Utilizing the new physics a number of realists, under the leadership of A. N. Whitehead, have attacked what they call the "bifurcation of nature" into a subjective and an objective realm. In Whitehead's famous phrase "nature is closed to mind," and nature is looked upon as a relativity process such as the Einstein theory implies that it is. In other words "an ether of events" is substituted for the physical ether of the older physics, and this ether of events is made up of various time-systems which are of such a nature that measured time in one system differs from measured time in another system, when both are moving systems. Lovejoy attacks this reduction of the world of physical nature to relativity systems. He points out that the term *relativity* has three different meanings: (i) *conditionality*, or one entity being conditioned or caused by another, (ii) *respectivity*, or one entity being in relation to another by way of, or in respect of, some third entity, and (iii) *perspectivity*, or viewing nature from some one perspective or standpoint. In view of these three different senses of relativity Lovejoy thinks physicists and philosophers alike should abandon the term, and use in each case "one or an-

other of the expressions 'caused' or 'conditioned by,' 'respective to,' or 'appearing from the standpoint of.' The present fashion of employing a single term masks the fact that different sorts of 'relativity' are in question in different parts of the theory or in different interpretations of it" (p. 141).

Following up this attack in two papers entitled *The Paradox of the Time-Retarding Journey*, Lovejoy imagines twins, named Peter and Paul, being born at a certain date, at which date Paul begins a journey among the stars and later returns to his twin brother. The paradox of the twins results. Lovejoy states this interesting paradox as follows: "Imagine Peter to be on a flat platform extending as far as we please in either direction, and Paul to be on a similar platform immediately adjacent to Peter's and in uniform unaccelerated motion relative to it and parallel with it. If, while the two were at rest, synchronized clocks and automatic cameras were placed at intervals along the inner edges of both platforms, the event of any reading of any one of Peter's clocks will be simultaneous with the reading of any clock of Paul's which may be passing, for both clocks will be in this case virtually in the same place." And then Lovejoy changes the situation and introduces a further supposition "in order to avoid any complication involved in getting the motion started." "Peter and Paul, not now brothers, must be supposed to have been born simultaneously at points A and A' when these points on the two platforms were passing each other, and each remains throughout at the place of his birth on his own platform. In both directions from A and A', on both platforms, observation-posts are placed at wide intervals; at each of these assistant observers are stationed, duly provided with clocks originally synchronized. It is the law on each platform that no one can be appointed an assistant observer unless he was born at the same time as Peter and Paul. Assume that 70 years have elapsed on Peter's platform

up to the moment when he passes observation post P' on Paul's platform. Given sufficient velocity, he, an old man of 70 gazing at his coeval, the assistant observer at P' , will seem to that observer to be a young man of 21; and assuming, as is done in the customary story, that a retardation observed from one system is a physical fact on the other, Peter will *be* twenty-one as well as seventy. At the same time his coeval at P' will appear to Peter to be 21, and will therefore be of that age, as well as of the age of seventy." ⁵ This is Lovejoy's idea of the kind of paradox in which the Einstein theory of relativity involves the objective relativist.

In a long review of Lovejoy's book McGilvary answers him from the standpoint of objective relativism. The substance of this rejoinder is that Lovejoy operates with Newtonian ideas of time and space, whereas the objective relativist operates exclusively with Einsteinian concepts. McGilvary says that "the voice that speaks in Lovejoy's book is indeed the voice of the twentieth century, but the hand that writes the book is in many spots suspiciously suggestive of an earlier age." And in his reply to the *Paradox of the Time-Retarding Journey* McGilvary goes into detail to prove that the paradox is wholly due to the author's failure to understand the Einstein theory and to his insinuating "into the relativity problem a Newtonian postulate." We cannot enter into the details of this brilliant rejoinder, but he who fails to read it, and especially the concluding story of Peter and Paul, told as McGilvary thinks it should be, has missed one of the real gems of recent philosophical literature.

⁵ *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XL, pp. 63f. In the same journal and volume (p. 358f.), McGilvary quotes this passage with certain phrases italicised to show where he thinks Lovejoy uses ambiguous terms and "points at which Lovejoy introduces into the problem features that do not appear in it as it is faced in relativity-physics." McGilvary's review of Lovejoy's *Revolt Against Dualism* is in the same volume, pp. 246-265, and the second of Lovejoy's papers is to be found on p. 152. See also the articles by Lovejoy and McGilvary in the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vols. XXVII and XXVIII.

3. SOME PRAGMATIST OBJECTIONS TO REALISM

John Dewey has especially criticised Holt's cross-section theory of consciousness on the ground that it ignores the meanings that we use all the time but of which we are not really conscious. The theory takes consciousness "where there is a minimum of doubt and inquiry" as the standard form of all consciousness. This neglects reflective thinking as an element of consciousness. "It [the cross-section theory] assumes a knowing mind wholly guileless, and extraordinarily competent, whose sole business is to behold and register objects just as what they are, and which is unswervingly devoted to its business."⁶ But such a concept of the knowing mind is really a survival of the theological conception that "God is perfect mind and man is created in the image of his maker." Yet Dewey admits that science gives some justification to the theory of Holt. Nevertheless the theory holds only for the most gifted and highly intellectual minds. As a description of normal minds it is highly artificial. Most of the entities making up the content of a normal consciousness are not real at all but fanciful, imaginary, and sentimental. Holt's theory makes such entities a part of the realm of being.

Dewey holds that the alleged independence of objects from active, living mind is due to a false conception of the act of knowing. Realists have over-emphasized deduction as a characteristic form of knowing, that is to say, starting with postulates and deducing their consequences. All active thinking is inductive. "Knowledge or science, as a work of art, like any other work of art, confers upon things traits and potentialities which did not *previously* belong to them. Objection from the side of alleged realism to this statement springs from a confusion of tenses. Knowledge is not a distortion or perversion which confers upon *its* subject-

⁶ John Dewey: *Experience and Nature*, p. 309 (Open Court Publishing Co.).

matter traits which *do* not belong to it," (as realism asserts) "but is an act which confers upon non-cognitive material traits which *did* not belong to it" (*loco citato*, p. 381). So reality continually gets new accretions from the active cognitive processes that deal with it. The realist's doctrine of a complete independence of physical events, qualities, and relations from the act of knowing is fallacious. The meanings we give to events in our reflective thinking, as we deal with practical situations, are henceforth part and parcel of those events. No line can be drawn between what is physically real and what is due to the cognitive act.

C. I. Lewis, in *Mind and the World Order*, follows Dewey in this denial that there are such absolutely independent objects as the realists claim. He especially objects to Broad's theory of the *sensa*. He thinks that it is a superficial theory which does not get down underneath the real problem. To assume a sense datum which nobody is sensing, or one which is permanent and unaltered in the midst of the changes of cognitive awareness of it, amounts to retaining Kant's famous thing-in-itself. This leaves the facts of experience and plunges us into metaphysics, and substitutes for what we know and cannot doubt entities that are purely speculative and whose existence is doubtful.

Lewis also attacks the essence theory of the critical realists. He thinks it is based upon a fundamental assumption that is fallacious. That assumption is that there exists such a thing as immediate cognitive awareness of such essences, and that all the rest of human knowledge is somehow derived from this simple type. While we cannot deny that there is immediate awareness, nevertheless we err if we call this knowledge. For no concepts are involved in such awareness and without concepts, or meaningful symbols, there can be no knowledge. Hence Lewis prefers to call "*qualia*" what the critical realists call essences. Such *qualia* are universals, but they are not the properties of objects. It is a confusion of universals with properties of objects

which vitiates the essence theory of the critical realists. Qualia are subjective, but properties of objects are objective.

4. SOME IDEALIST OBJECTIONS TO REALISM

In addition to the general criticisms given at the beginning of this chapter let us indicate briefly some other idealist objections to realistic theories. Hoernlé has pointed out that the realistic metaphysics is not so much untrue and fallacious as it is inadequate. He writes: "On the whole, the tendency of Realists is to take man in a biological context, and to place him, as neither more nor less than an animal species and a late product of evolution, in an environment of which the permanent features are drawn by astronomy and geology, by physics and chemistry. But this context is not so much untrue as inadequate: it does not give us the whole truth, as little as does the context of introspective psychology. For, each context imposes its own characteristic pattern on the facts brought within its scope: it permits us to use these facts only so far as they fit into this pattern. It imposes its own distinctive valuation upon the fact."⁷ And he might have added that it excludes all other valuations of all other contexts.

This criticism even applies to the emergent evolutionist's theory. Emergent evolution applies to the entire universe a principle of growth which is properly applicable only to parts of the universe. The levels theory of reality of idealism is a much better principle of explanation. As DeWitt Parker puts it in *Contemporary American Philosophy*: "Individual systems rise, flourish and decay, but the universe 'has no seasons.' . . . The Greek worship of the stars and Plotinus's notion of emanation represent, I believe, a truer conception of man's place in the universe than contemporary naturalism, which places man at the pinnacle of reality." Leighton, and many other idealists, would

⁷ R. F. A. Hoernlé. *Idealism as a Philosophy*, p. 257 (R. C. Smith).

agree with Parker in substituting the theory that the levels of reality emanate from God, instead of emerging from an abstract Space-Time.

Idealists also object to the critical realists' theory of essences. In making absolutely everything real in a world of essences, or universals, where one entity has no more meaning than another, and each is eternally what it is, the critical realists have created a purely abstract and conceptual world, and have substituted it for the real world as it comes home to us in our concrete experiences. Hocking says: "Such an independent realm of universals or 'essences' appears to me, with all respect, as a piece of modern mythology without Plato's excuse, a striking instance of the extreme fancifulness which marks the irony of the realist's resolve to be supremely matter-of-fact." But let this doctrine of essence be replaced by the idealistic doctrine of the concrete universal and this abstractness will disappear. A valueless essence will then become "the principle of individuality and value."

PART FOUR
PRAGMATISM



CHAPTER I

WHAT PRAGMATISM IS

I. THE WORDS PRAGMATIC AND PRAGMATISM

THE Greek word *πράγμα*, meaning a thing done or a fact, the plural of which is *πράγματα*, meaning affairs, especially state affairs, is the source of the word *pragmatic*. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Immanuel Kant used the term to distinguish those rules of art and technique which are derived from, and which are applicable to, experience from those which he regarded as prior to or logically independent of experience. In Kant's technical terminology the latter are called *a priori* principles. The distinguished American mathematician and philosopher, Charles S. Peirce, borrowed the term *pragmatic* from Kant, and William James took it from Peirce.

The word *pragmatism* is formed from the same root by using the suffix *ism* instead of *ic*. George Eliot used this term in *Middlemarch* to refer to an officious and impertinent type of character. In history the term *pragmatism* is synonymous with the term *pragmatic method* and refers to the tracing of the causes and effects of historical events. There is, however, no evidence of any connection whatever between these two meanings of the word *pragmatism* and its philosophic connotations, which rather go back to the term *pragmatic* as used by Kant.

As a matter of fact the word *pragmatism* has come to have in philosophy a number of meanings of varying generality. Underlying these diverse meanings is the general notion of using the practical consequences of ideas and beliefs as norms for determining their validity, truth and

value. Thus James, who was admittedly the first to use the word in print, defined pragmatism as an attitude of mind which consists primarily "in looking away from first things, principles, categories, supposed necessities and of looking toward last things, fruits, consequences, facts."¹ And in the article in Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, entitled *Pragmatism*, Peirce refers to it as a method of clarifying conceptions. He writes: "Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the objects of our conceptions to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object."² Peirce later invented the term *pragmaticism* to differentiate his conception of pragmatism from that of James and his followers. In his contribution to the volume of essays in honor of James, entitled *Essays Philosophical and Psychological*, John Dewey defines pragmatism tentatively as "the doctrine that reality possesses practical character and that this character is most efficaciously expressed in the function of intelligence" (p. 59). However, Dewey preferred the names *instrumentalism* and *experimentalism* for the new philosophy. F. C. S. Schiller defines pragmatism as "the technical name of a tendency which can be traced throughout the history of philosophy, but has only of late grown self-conscious, systematic and general." Pragmatism "relies for its justification on the fact that everything we think and do has to be willed, and has ultimately some biological value as a vital adaptation, successful or the reverse."³ Schiller, however, strongly disliked the word pragmatism as a name for the new philosophy, saying that it was almost sufficient to damn any dog

¹ William James: *Pragmatism*, p. 55 (Longmans).

² See also Peirce's classic essay *How to Make Our Ideas Clear*, which was published in *The Scientific Monthly* in 1878 and has recently been reprinted in the volume of essays edited by M. R. Cohen under the title *Chance, Love and Logic* (Harcourt, Brace & Co.).

³ The two sentences quoted are from F. C. S. Schiller's article entitled *Pragmatism* in Hastings's *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*. See also his article in the new 14th edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* and the selection by him in my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*.




Photo Brown Bros.

JOHN DEWEY (1859-)

that bore it. He pleaded with James to adopt the name *humanism*, but without success, although he says that James later regretted that he did not follow his advice.

2. PEIRCE'S CONTRIBUTION TO PRAGMATISM

Schiller calls Charles S. Peirce the "putative parent" of pragmatism, but adds that he was actually driven to deny his paternity, referring to his adopting the term pragmatism as a better name for his philosophy than pragmatism. Schiller and some others hold that William James is the "real progenitor" of the movement. In an interesting letter from Mrs. William James to Schiller, she says: "You are right in what you say of confessing to obligations which he never owed. . . . When William was a student in the chemical laboratory and absorbed in philosophy, he found Charles Peirce a stimulating acquaintance; so when years after William sought to give a name to the faith he had long held, he glanced backward and said to himself, 'I must have owed Pragmatism to Peirce.' " ⁴ These statements of Schiller and Mrs. James have to be taken with a grain of salt. There can be no doubt that Dewey and others are right in holding that Peirce made an important contribution to the new philosophy. What was that contribution?

Peirce was primarily a logician especially interested in the methodological procedure of the laboratory sciences. He believed that when a prescription for an experiment is tested out in the laboratory it will produce a definite type of experience. Consequently he held that a complete definition of any concept is the totality of the experimental occurrences implied in that concept. The rational meaning of every concept lies in the future and consists "in that process of evaluation whereby the existent comes more and more to embody generals." Peirce did not think of this process as one of achieving a particular or a personal goal. He was

⁴ See my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, p. 458.

interested only in the *general* or *universal* meaning of the concept.

According to Morris R. Cohen, Peirce got this method of approach to the definition of a concept from Chauncey Wright, a distinguished Harvard professor who had done creative work in mathematics and physics, and who also had a deep interest in philosophy. Cohen quotes a letter from Peirce in which he says that the doctrine of pragmatism first saw the light in a "Metaphysical Club" which he organized at Harvard and of which Wright was the ablest member. James was also a member of this club. Peirce and Wright were in the habit of disputing and conversing together two or three hours daily, keeping this up for several years. Peirce's idea that the laboratory scientist translates general ideas into prescriptions for reaching new truths by experimentation came from Wright. The basic principle of Peirce's pragmatism is that the meaning of ideas is best discovered by putting them to an experimental test and by observing the consequences which result from such a test.⁵

3. WILLIAM JAMES'S CONTRIBUTION TO PRAGMATISM

M. C. Otto has rightly pointed out that William James's essay, entitled *Remarks on Spencer's Definition of Mind as Correspondence*, which was published in *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* in the same month and year as Peirce's essay on *How to Make our Ideas Clear* (January 1878), contains in germ many of the pragmatic ideas which James developed later. Among other things the essay emphasizes the active side of human intelligence, and especially stresses ideals and human preferences as genuine parts of experience. Otto refers to this essay as a *second* source of pragmatism and attempts to prove by the intimate and momentous personal experience which generated it, that for James the new philosophy was a *moral* and *religious* doc-

⁵ See Cohen's preface to Peirce's *Chance, Love and Logic*, the essential parts of which are reprinted in my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*.

trine much more than a *logical* one. Others have stressed this fundamental difference in interest between James and Peirce. Undoubtedly it is an essential difference but it must not blind us to the fact that there were two other important logical and psychological differences between these two great founders of Pragmatism.⁶

(i) James was a nominalist in logic whereas Peirce thought that universal concepts express a common meaning and are more than mere names, having an independent logical status.⁷ (ii) In psychology James was a sensationalist, believing especially in stressing particular sense data, whereas Peirce had little interest in psychology and especially emphasized logical and intellectual concepts. In other words, Peirce was much more rationalistic and more influenced by the Kantian tradition, whereas James was much more empirical and more influenced by the British tradition. It is not without significance that James dedicated his *Pragmatism* to John Stuart Mill. Hence, when he took up the principle of pragmatism he shifted it away from experimental tests of universal concepts and he also extended the notion of practical consequences in a way which Peirce did not approve. As Dewey points out, James's use of the principle "destroyed the importance attached by Peirce to the greatest possible application of the rule, or habit of conduct—its extension to universality." For James stressed the concrete, particular consequences of beliefs, regardless of whether these consequences result from laboratory tests. He would use any kind of consequences in everyday life as a test of the truth or falsity of a belief. James writes: "I should prefer to express Peirce's principle by saying that the effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down to some *particular consequence*, in our future *practical* experience, whether active

⁶ See Otto's essay *Instrumentalism in Philosophy Today*, edited by E. L. Schaub, Open Court Co.

⁷ See the discussion of nominalism, realism and conceptualism below, p. 256, and of classic realism above, p. 153. Peirce was a conceptualist.

or passive; the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be *particular*, than in the fact that it must be active."⁸ It was this shift which James made in Peirce's principle that caused the latter to repudiate pragmatism and to adopt the name pragmaticism for his own theory.

Yet it was just this shift which enabled James to extend and to popularize pragmatism. He applied it to various types of beliefs. An especially popular application of it was to religious beliefs. His well-known essay entitled *The Will to Believe* is not altogether unlike Pascal's famous religious wager.⁹ According to James the belief in God is a live option. Those who accept it as true find that it works by making them morally better and more optimistic. Those who reject it find that pessimism and despair overwhelm them. In practical, everyday life it is more useful to believe than not to believe. Therefore this basic religious belief is true. Its truth is constituted by its practical value. In *Pragmatism* James applied the pragmatic method to a number of thorny and traditional metaphysical problems, such as the problem of the one and the many, the nature of the Aristotelian categories, free-will versus determinism, design, et cetera. He also developed his doctrine of *meliorism*, that salvation is neither necessary nor impossible but may come to those who do what they can to make a better world. Thus James popularized pragmatism and applied it to the common-sense beliefs of mankind, as well as to strictly philosophical problems.

4. F. C. S. SCHILLER'S CONTRIBUTION TO PRAGMATISM

As he himself admits, F. C. S. Schiller owes his conception of pragmatism primarily to James. He is a devoted disciple of James, regarding him as one of the two supremely great men he has known personally, the other being

⁸ *Collected Essays and Reviews*, p. 412. Quoted by Dewey in my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, p. 435. Italics mine.

⁹ See the selection from Pascal in my *Anthology of Modern Philosophy*.

Lord Balfour. Schiller came to this country from England and studied philosophy at Cornell University, where the influence of Absolute Idealism completely dominated. While at Cornell he discovered James, and to him the discovery was like that of a weary and thirsty traveler in the desert coming upon an oasis. As a result he has spent a life time interpreting and expounding James's form of pragmatism. However, as has already been mentioned, he prefers to call it *humanism*.

Throughout his writings, Schiller has stressed the way in which all human beliefs and institutions, yes and even reality itself, are created by the activity of the human will. Human feelings, aspirations, and desires—in a word, the human will to live—is the ultimate fact which must furnish the explanation for all other facts. Human purpose is the primary reality. All truth is man-made and dependent upon human purpose. All reality is continually in the making and the force that is creating it is the human will. Schiller identifies philosophy with the process of evolution and seeks the goal of all evolution, cosmic and cultural alike, in a communal organism of perfected personalities. But although he has vigorously defended pragmatism for many years in the University of Oxford, England, and has written and lectured extensively, it can hardly be said that Schiller has succeeded in developing a significant pragmatist school in England. Idealism and Realism are the dominant types of philosophy there.

Dewey's statement of the difference between his own type of pragmatism and that of the humanists, among whom Schiller is a leading representative, is of the utmost importance to an understanding of pragmatism. He writes: "A *synthetic pragmatism* such as Mr. James has ventured upon will take a very different form according as the point of view of what he calls the 'Chicago School' or that of humanism is taken as a basis for interpreting the nature of the 'personal'. According to the latter view, the personal ap-

pears to be ultimate and unanalyzable, the metaphysically real. Associations with idealism, moreover, give it an idealistic turn, a translation, in effect, of monistic intellectualistic idealism into, pluralistic, voluntaristic idealism. But, according to the former, the personal is not ultimate, but is to be analyzed and defined biologically on its genetic side, ethically on its prospective and functioning side."¹⁰ Enlightened by this distinction let us turn to a consideration of Dewey's own contribution to pragmatism.

5. JOHN DEWEY'S INSTRUMENTALISM

John Dewey is today generally recognized as the most distinguished living pragmatist philosopher. He and his colleagues, especially George H. Mead, James H. Tufts, and A. W. Moore, formed a strong pragmatic centre at the University of Chicago. When he moved to Columbia University Dewey created a strong pragmatist following there. In these two graduate schools many teachers of philosophy in American colleges and universities received their training. Will Durant and James Harvey Robinson both came under Dewey's influence at Columbia. An influential teacher and a profound thinker, Dewey has recently been the recipient of high honors. He has given special lectures in China and Japan, was first lecturer on the Carus Foundation in this country, gave a series of lectures on the Gifford Foundation in Scotland, was granted an honorary degree at the Sorbonne in November of 1930, and he is now (1931-32) special William James lecturer at Harvard University. Dewey's philosophy of education has revolutionized the public schools of this and other countries. He has also had a tremendous influence in creating a new liberalism in the political and social philosophy of America. It is significant that he has been seriously considered as a third party candidate for president. Dewey certainly stands today second to none among contemporary American philosophers.

¹⁰ *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. V, p. 97.

He has a very large following among educators, philosophers, and the *intelligentsia* generally. For over a third of a century Dewey has vigorously defended pragmatism.

We shall have much to say about Dewey's philosophy in succeeding chapters, since he has written on practically all of the great problems of philosophy. It will suffice here to explain briefly what he means by *instrumentalism*, which is his technical name for the philosophy of pragmatism.

In addition to the experimental method of verification stressed by Peirce and the popular version of pragmatism given by James, Dewey stresses two other factors as being especially important. One of these is psychological and the other is logical. The biological drift of modern psychology, the interest in behavior and in a study of the continuity of behavior in animals and men, is a movement which has coincided with and greatly influenced the development of pragmatism. In fact, Dewey calls himself a behaviorist in psychology. As early as 1903, in *Studies in Logical Theory*, this aspect of the new philosophy was stressed. Dewey especially emphasized it in his *Influence of Darwin on Philosophy*. Thus pragmatism has absorbed a good deal of the evolutionism of the nineteenth century.

This new movement in psychology was really initiated by James when he replaced the ideas, sensations, and images of the traditional psychology with the notion of a stream of consciousness which is continuous. Moreover James laid down the criterion that mind is an instrument for realizing purposes, all ideas being regarded by him as "purely teleological weapons of the mind." All of this is to be found in James's *Psychology*, which both Dewey and Schiller think is more of a source of pragmatism than James's book of that title.

Yet instrumentalism is certainly not wholly due to James, and Dewey undoubtedly minimizes the significance of his own contribution to it. It was he who first stressed the biological function of thinking, treating mind as an instru-

ment for establishing control over the environment. By so doing he, more than any other pragmatist, has developed the distinctive logical theory of the movement. Caldwell is unquestionably right in saying: "It is through his (Dewey's) influence generally that pragmatists seem always to be talking about the way in which 'we arrive at' our beliefs, about ideas as 'instruments' for the interpretation and arrangement of our experience, about the 'passage' from cognitive expectation to 'fulfilment,' about ideas as 'plans of action' and 'mental habits,' about the growth and utility of truth, about the 'instrumental' character of all our thinking, about beliefs as more fundamental than knowledge, and so on." ¹¹

Otto calls attention to a paper by Dewey, written in 1888, in which he laid down a cardinal principle of instrumentalism, even though he was at that time an avowed neo-Kantian. This principle was a defense and an interpretation of democracy, and it has gradually been expanded until today it is one of the major tenets of pragmatism. In Otto's words: "One cannot read the writings of instrumentalists without sensing the depth of their democratic convictions. They think of Pragmatism as the philosophic counterpart of the democratic movement in modern society, and it would not be wrong to say that for most of them Democracy is Religion." ¹² Now there can be no doubt that Otto is right in making this idea central in instrumentalism and in giving Dewey credit for contributing to it. But James also contributed to this part of pragmatism, especially in his doctrine of meliorism. Moreover, the peculiar expansion of this idea represents a shift in the original teaching of pragmatism, which is due more to later writings than to Dewey's and James's earlier works. Before the World War, pragmatism was much less a democratic

¹¹ William Caldwell: *Pragmatism and Idealism*, p. 17. Published by A. C. Black, London.

¹² *Loco citato*, p. 46.

ideal which served as a substitute for religion. It was really the experiences of the World War which made it more of a social philosophy than a logical and metaphysical theory. Dewey, Mead, Moore, Otto, Ames, Bode, Tufts, T. V. Smith, and H. M. Kallen have been responsible for this shift, and, although its germs were latent in the pre-war writings of pragmatists, the significant development of it has come since the war. It is a part of the general drift towards socialism which has characterized post-war conditions. C. I. Lewis and H. C. Brown show less of this tendency. The former goes back to Peirce for his basic principles and the latter to James.

In conclusion a word should be added about George H. Mead's contribution to instrumentalism. Although he published little while he lived and died before his *Carus Lectures* were revised for publication, he has long been recognized as one of the profoundest thinkers this movement of thought has produced. In his oration at Mead's funeral Dewey said: "His mind was germinative and seminal. One would have to go far to find a teacher of our own day who started in others so many fruitful lines of thought; I dislike to think what my own thinking might have been were it not for the seminal ideas which I derived from him. For his ideas were always genuinely original; they started one thinking in directions where it had never occurred to one that it was worth while even to look."¹³

¹³ *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 310f.

CHAPTER II

THE METHODS OF PRAGMATISM

I. THE GENETIC METHOD

ONE of the basic methods of reasoning of the pragmatists is the genetic method. Generally speaking, this refers to the tracing of the evolution of any entity whatever from its original to its most complicated and most highly developed form. We may trace the unfolding of mental from bodily functions, showing how mind is dependent upon complexity of physical and neurological organization. Or we may trace the unfolding of social life from lower forms of mentality, where intercommunication is barely possible, up to its highest development in modern civilized nations, where language and other means of communication are smoothly functioning. Whenever we seek the origin, and trace the evolution from lower to higher forms of any phenomenon whatever, we are using the genetic method.

More specifically the genetic method in philosophy means the throwing of light on philosophical problems and beliefs by tracing them back to the concrete and practical situation in which they arose. Locating them in their concrete setting we may hope to find the *social pattern* of the general social order in which such beliefs were vital, and we may also discover the *genetic forces* which were at work to generate them. No philosophical theory can be understood when taken in complete isolation from the general culture in which it originally grew. The cultural ideas which were especially dominant at the time the theory was developed are the underlying forces working to produce the theory.

The individual philosopher who is supposed to have originated a given theory was really only an instrument of these social and cultural forces. Having traced a theory back to its social context we see that it was really an instrument by which the various conflicting ideas of the time were brought into some kind of harmonious adjustment. Hence pragmatist discussions of the history of philosophy especially stress the social and cultural background of the different systems of philosophy. The pragmatist regards a bare exposition of a philosopher's theories as entirely inadequate. We must turn our attention away from specific opinions of individual philosophers, and treat philosophy as essentially a product of vital needs and essential conflicts within the entire social order.

In *Pragmatism* James describes the process by which men settle into new opinions. The individual gets a new idea and then discovers that it is in conflict with his old ideas. He then adjusts the new idea with his old beliefs, in such a way as to conserve as many of his old beliefs as possible without abandoning the new idea. In this way he fits the new doctrine into his old beliefs with a minimum loss of the old. Now, says James, just as truth grows in the mind of an individual thinker, so knowledge as a whole, or viewed socially, is a continual marriage of new ideas with old beliefs and customs. Culture advances slowly by this perpetual process. And James argues that the genetic method of pragmatism is simply a generalization of this process by which knowledge grows in individuals and in the social mind of humanity as a whole. He writes: "Messers Dewey, Schiller and their allies, in reaching this general conception of all truth, have only followed the example of geologists, biologists and philologists. In the establishment of these other sciences, the successful stroke was always to take some simple process actually observable in operation—as denudation by weather, say, or variation from parental type, or change of dialect by incorporation of new words

and pronunciations—and then to generalize it, making it apply to all times, and produce great results by summing its effects through the ages.”¹ James later calls this a genetic theory of what is meant by truth.

Let us briefly summarize the kinds of entities to which this genetic method has been applied by pragmatists: (i) As early as 1898 James applied this method to *philosophic controversies*, showing that they are mere speculations until they are tied down to some definite situation which will give them meaning. (ii) James commends Peirce for having applied the genetic method to *objects*, when he held that the meaning of an object is to be found in the practical effects it may be expected to have in a given situation. (iii) James and others have applied the method to *ideas*, showing how they are the genesis of certain consequences which they intend. (iv) Pragmatists have also applied this method to *beliefs* of all kinds—religious, metaphysical, aesthetic and scientific. What is the origin of human beliefs and what actual consequences and alterations in social conditions have they produced? These constitute their meaning. Thus the genetic method of pragmatism is capable of a wide application, and Dewey holds that James was quite right in thinking that the beginning of the use of this method by philosophers means that “the center of gravity of philosophy must alter its place. . . . It will be an alteration in the seat of authority that reminds one almost of the Protestant Reformation.”²

We may agree with James and Dewey that the genetic method is of real value. Pragmatists certainly deserve great credit for having perfected it. Nevertheless it creates a kind of a paradox for a pragmatist. The essence of pragmatism is its look towards the future. Thought is always supposed to look away from the past and towards a better

¹ William James: *Pragmatism*, pp. 58f. (Longmans). See my exposition of the genetic method in *The God of the Liberal Christian*, Chap. II (Appleton).

² *Loco citato*, p. 123.

state of affairs which is to be developed. But the genetic method points pragmatists back to beginnings. Hence it points in the opposite direction from that in which the pragmatist wishes to go. Moreover, the ideal of going back to the beginnings of beliefs is difficult to realize precisely with respect to the most fundamental of human beliefs, since many of them began before recorded history. Thus the pragmatist advocates a method which is often impractical, and which turns thought in the reverse direction from that in which he is really most interested in going. And he soon discovers that the genetic method is sometimes in fundamental opposition to the treatment of ideas as instruments by which future adjustments are made. Ames and other pragmatists have made effective use of the genetic method in explaining the origin and development of religious ideas and customs, and Dewey and James were much influenced by this method at the beginning of the pragmatist movement. But in his recent writings Dewey has come out strongly against the basic assumption of the genetic method that complex social phenomena of the present-day can best be understood by going back to the simpler social contexts out of which they presumably emerged. He now recognizes that philosophy must take its data from the world as it is today, instead of trying to get back to a simpler condition of affairs which will explain existing complicated conditions.³

Hence it would be a serious mistake to treat the genetic method as the only method of pragmatism, or even as the most important. It has certainly been and still is of considerable influence in pragmatist reasoning. Pragmatists working in the fields of philosophy of religion, history of philosophy, and ethics make effective use of it. In fact one of the best examples of its use is to be found in Part I of Dewey and Tufts's *Ethics*, where the evolution of morality

³ See the quotation from Dewey below, p. 268.

is traced through three stages.⁴ Nevertheless this method is unquestionably gradually being superseded by other pragmatist methods.

2. THE DENOTATIVE METHOD

In his Carus lectures, published under the title *Experience and Nature* (Open Court), John Dewey devotes a chapter to the exposition of a method of philosophizing which he calls the *denotative method*. By this he means something very much like the method of intensive concretization expounded above as the basic method of idealism. Dewey makes a valuable distinction between approaching the goal of philosophy from the ordinary man's crude and gross experiences, trying to understand the world which generated these experiences, and approaching that goal from the refined concepts of scientists, working back from them to the original data. While each of these approaches is valuable, yet each has its peculiar limitations and dangers. Science quickly becomes out-moded and philosophers who make science the basis of their philosophy get lost in by-paths. The scientific philosophy of today is antiquated tomorrow. Scientific philosophers are too often led to interpretations of reality which so contradict the ordinary experiences of everyday life as utterly to condemn their philosophies. On the other hand, ordinary common-sense of everyday experience is so rich and so complicated, and past interpretations of it by previous philosophers are so intermingled with it that the philosopher who uses this approach almost invariably ends by following some one or some mixture of the traditional views. Consequently such philosophers are merely eclectics and syncretists and they utterly fail to produce any genuinely valid philosophy for

⁴ See the defense of the genetic method on pages 3 ff. Cf. Dewey's criticism of Spencer's use of the comparative method in the *Psychological Review*, Vol. IX, pp. 217ff., where he defends the genetic method against the comparative method as used by Spencer. See also James H. Tufts's article on the "Genesis of the Aesthetic Categories" in the *Decennial Publications of the University of Chicago*, Vol. III, for another application of this method.

their own day and generation. Dewey thinks that we need to take an intermediate position, but it must be admitted that his own method is nearer to the latter than to the former approach.

For he holds that experience should include "something at least as wide and deep and full as all history on this earth, a history which, since history does not occur in the void, includes the earth and the physical relatives of men. . . . History denotes both objective conditions, forces, events and also the human record and estimate of these events." And a little further on he says: "The whole wide universe of fact and dream, of event, act, desire, fancy and meanings, valid or invalid, can be set in contrast to nothing. And if what has been said is taken literally, 'experience' denotes just this wide universe."⁵ In other words, the true starting point for the philosopher is 'experience'; nothing stands outside experience but, on the contrary, everything is included within it.

According to Dewey the radical defect in all other philosophies is that they are based on some selection or other from experience, instead of being based upon experience as a whole. He calls his method the denotative method because it means "seeing what is pointed to and accepting what is found in good faith and without discount." The true conception of reality can only be reached by including all of every conceivable content of experience and by giving to each item its full and complete rights. "We must not start with arbitrarily selected simples, and from them deduce the complex and varied, assigning what cannot be thus reduced to an inferior realm of being. It [the notion of experience] warns us that the tangled and complex is what we primarily find; that we work from and within it to discriminate, reduce, analyze, and that we must keep track of these activities, pointing to *them*, as well as to the things upon which they are exercised, and to their re-

⁵ *Loco citato*, pp. 8 and 9.

finer conclusions" (p. 13). Thus the true understanding of reality comes from an insight into the intricate complexities of life and things, and includes the intellectual processes by which that insight is reached as part and parcel of that complexity. Any reality is, therefore, a highly complicated entity, which contains within itself the processes by which it is comprehended or understood. So much for Dewey's denotative method, which, it should again be emphasized, is strikingly like idealism's method of intensive concretion. Although Dewey never uses the expression "concrete universal," he was originally under the influence of Hegel, and, so far as I know, he has never definitely rejected the theory of the concrete universal. And how else can the entity reached by the denotative method be defined than as a concrete universal? That concept seems to be central in the last sentence quoted above.

3. THE REFLECTIVE METHOD

The most recent statement of pragmatist method, and one of the most suggestive and interesting, is that given by C. I. Lewis in *Mind and the World Order* (Scribners). He calls himself a "conceptualistic pragmatist," saying that he is especially indebted to Peirce, but also to James and Dewey. The term conceptualistic is from the term *conceptualism*, which was one of the three highly important theories of universal ideas developed by the scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages. *Realism*, taking its cue from Plato's theory of ideas, held that such universals are archetypes or patterns or models, and as such they must be much more real than the particulars which copy them. For example, a kind name such as elephant must be far more real than any particular elephant. *Nominalism*, on the other hand, held that all universal ideas are mere names or words and have no reality whatsoever. Particulars alone are real. Having no local habitation, elephant in general is merely a name. Jumbo and other particular elephants alone are

real. *Conceptualism* took an intermediate position and argued that universal ideas are concepts which are essential to thought but which have no reality independently of our human thought-systems. This is essentially Lewis's attitude towards the basic concepts or categories of human thinking. How far he goes in this direction is clearly shown by this statement in his Preface: "It is not too much to say, I think, that it becomes a matter of doubt whether the structure science builds is solidly based upon the earth, or is a mansion in some Platonic heaven, or is only a kind of castle in the air."

With regard to the distinction between gross or macroscopic and refined or microscopic experience, Lewis is inclined to stress the latter type as more important than the former, thus differing from Dewey, but he uses the term experience to mean the rationalized data after thought has done its work. He calls his method the reflective method to emphasize the overwhelming significance of the work of thought in experience. Thought can never be separated from the data it reconstructs, yet it is genuinely *a priori*, that is to say, prior to the particular sense data which it interprets. Lewis claims that his idea of *a priori* is original and unique and the essence of the reflective method. Let us illustrate what he means.

For example, "Physical things must have mass," is an *a priori* principle. Using this proposition as a criterion we can distinguish a pin from the mirror-image of a pin and from an illusion. Hence no particular datum of any kind could invalidate the principle. For such a particular datum would always be referred to some other category, such as image or illusion, instead of to the category of the physical. Consequently we may regard the truth of the principle as prior to and independent of every particular datum. Yet this would not justify us in treating the *a priori* principle as valid outside of our world of human experience. It follows that the content of experience can never interpret or

categorize itself. The mind always brings to experience all of the criteria used in making its interpretations. These criteria are pragmatically useful as guides to action and they make experience intelligible.

Lewis says that the reflective method has four essential characteristics: (i) It is *dialectical* in the Socratic but not in the Hegelian sense. By this he means that it makes the Socratic assumption that the mind already possesses truth implicitly, and that this truth needs only to be elicited and to be clearly expressed. Moreover some kind of agreement or accord between minds must be assumed. This accord is due to "the combined result of the similarity of human animals, and of their primal interests, and the similarities of the experience with which they have to deal" (p. 20). (ii) The reflective method is *pragmatic* or *instrumental*. All of our *a priori* principles of reasoning or categories are guides to action and they reflect human nature as well as the general character of reality. In fact the human mind is so thoroughly social that the social process may be said to have created the categories as guides to action. (iii) The reflective method is *empirical*. This means that philosophy is especially concerned "with that part or aspect of experience which the mind contributes by its attitude of interpretation." It should be noted that this is not the usual sense of the word empirical in philosophy. Ordinarily the word refers to that which comes to us through the senses. (iv) The reflective method is *analytic*. Philosophic reflection must analyze out of experience what is already there, and it should never concern itself with transcendent objects of thought. Lewis expressly states that the concrete universal is a myth. Reflection is an extension of the critical attitude by which we free our own constructions and interpretations from inconsistency and make them more useful. How we can free them from inconsistency without catching them up in a larger whole or concrete universal Lewis does not make clear.

4. SOME GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS OF PRAGMATISM IMPLICIT IN THESE METHODS

All of these methods bring to light certain basic ideas that are especially characteristic of pragmatism. The word experience, as used by both Dewey and Lewis, is the key-word of this philosophy. It can be truthfully said that anyone who reaches a real understanding of what pragmatists mean by this word will have a fairly complete knowledge of pragmatism. It is a general term into which they have poured all the meaning of their philosophy. And it can also be said that no non-pragmatist would ever think of using the word experience to mean what a pragmatist means by it. For the pragmatist experience is the all-inclusive reality outside of which there is and can be nothing whatsoever. Yet this whole is human and social. This peculiar use of the word experience is the most characteristic feature of pragmatism. But if the concrete universal of the idealists is a myth, as Lewis asserts, is not the experience of the pragmatist just as much one? Philosophers are quite likely to think that the basic concepts of opposing schools are myths, because they empty the meaning of them into their own basic concepts first and then, being unable to find any meaning left in them, they declare them to be myths.

In the prefatory note to the coöperative volume entitled *Creative Intelligence*, issued by a group of pragmatists, appears the following statement: "The significant points of agreement have to do with the ideas of the genuineness of the future, of intelligence as the organ for determining the quality of that future so far as it can come within human control, and of a courageously inventive individual as the bearer of a creatively employed mind." *Creatively employed mind*, as used here, is social and *creative intelligence* is social. Individuals are merely the bearers of this social mind. Thus the whole social philosophy, mentioned above

as a special post-war development of pragmatism, can easily be read back into the pragmatist term experience.

The genuineness of the future is an absolutely fundamental doctrine of pragmatism. Experience is a temporal process moving forward or upward. It equals creative mind and creative intelligence. Yet there is no goal outside of experience towards which it is moving. And the future is of interest to man only so far as it, too, is within experience. Moreover, experience carries the past with it. In fact, by the workings of intelligence within experience the past is always so married to the future as to make progress endless. The paradoxical motto of the pragmatist is: "The end is progress."

CHAPTER III

PRAGMATIST SOLUTIONS OF THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXISTENCE

I. THE GENERAL PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE AND EXISTENCE

PRAGMATISTS hold that knowledge and existence are not identical but that the distinction between them falls within experience. The problem is to explain how knowledge is related to existence within the larger whole of experience. *Unstableness* and *irregularity* characterize the events which make up existence. We see this especially among primitive conditions of life where all sorts of dangers such as plague, famine, disease, defeat in battle, death, et cetera, as well as abundance, strength, victory, festival, and song are always very near to man. These things are sporadic and episodic and they make human existence precarious. Now it must be especially emphasized that this aspect of existence is a primary datum for modern civilized man, just as much as it is for savages or was for primitive man. The nature of the world of existence in which man finds himself is a partly uncontrollable mixture of both good and evil events. It is an unfinished and a potential world in which nothing stays put and in which change is universal. Now it is just this mixture of instability and novelty in the world which generates the love of knowledge or wisdom which is philosophy.

Existence is thus *problematic* in every one of the actual and concrete situations which make it up. Reflective thinking or knowing is the process within experience which transforms this problematic situation—its confusion, its ambiguity, and its instability—into a reconstructed situation of

assured and definite and durable character. An analogy, borrowed from Dewey, may make this clearer. Natural material such as iron ore is transformed into finished steel by the use of other natural materials such as fire and foundry tools. Now the iron ore is analogous to the problematic situation and the fire and foundry tools used in melting and refining the iron ore are analogous to the reflective thinking. And the finished steel is analogous to the assured and durable character of reality which follows the reflecting upon a problematic situation. Thinking or knowing may, therefore, be defined as "a continuous process of temporal reorganization within one and the same world of experienced things" (Dewey). Thus reflection has the same character of change and instability as the events which make up existence. Indeed every cognitive process is an event having existence. So we may say that every existence is an event and that every cognitive process is an event.

Dewey uses the illustration of the discovery of America to make the relation between existence and knowledge clearer. It is a well-known fact that the Norsemen entered the Charles River and landed on its banks just west of Boston, centuries before Columbus landed on the island of San Salvador. Columbus and the Norsemen both dealt with essentially the same world of existence—a new continent. Yet the Norsemen did not use the newly discovered fact to modify their old beliefs and consequently the old map of the world was left just as it was. No process of reflective thinking was generated by their contact with the new fact. And since no transformation resulted from their landing on the shores of this continent they made no genuine discovery. Columbus's coming was entirely different. He changed the world and the map of the world when he established a contact with the new continent's outlying islands. He was led by the fact or problematic situation to a genuine reflection which transformed the science of geography. Consequently Columbus made the real discovery of America. Now

it is important to stress the fact that this changed the world of existence itself. That world was enlarged, new fields of adventure were opened, new lands were cleared, new homes were built, new nations and cultures were generated by this one discovery. And every real discovery made by human thought transforms existence in much the same way. Within the world of experience a problematic situation is seized upon by some act of reflective thinking which transforms the total situation into a known object. It is thus that knowledge and existence are related.

2. THE PRAGMATIST ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE

Let us now attempt a more detailed analysis of knowledge, as the pragmatist thinks of it. We have learned from the above discussion that there are two factors or aspects of knowledge—the *given*, or what are sometimes called the data of knowledge, and the *interpretative element*, which is constituted by the significant principles by which the data are ordered, or, to use the technical expression, categorized. For the basic principles of organization of knowledge are usually known as categories.

A. *The Given*.—The immediate data of the senses form the given. It is always something that thinking does not create, nor can thinking entirely displace or completely alter it. In other words the given comes to us from a region that is beyond our control. For example, a child, a savage and a civilized adult would each react to an object in an entirely different way. Yet the given in the experience of each is qualitatively the same and remains constant when the thinker's interest alters or shifts. To get at what the given is we must use the criteria of *unalterability* and *sensuous feeling* or *quality*. The given is really ineffable, unknowable.

Yet it would be a mistake to reduce the given to just what is immediately present to a mind when it thinks. Rather it includes all of the world of things. To put it dif-

ferently, data are not mere patches of color but trees and houses and such-like objects of sense. Consequently the given has to be included within experience and is not to be thought of as before or as prior to experience. And we must also be on our guard against taking the term sense datum in a purely neurological sense. When these qualifications are taken into account the given turns out to be "a specious present, fading into the past and growing into the future with no real boundaries." This does not mean that it is a smooth and even flux, for it contains the disjunctions, conjunctions and other diverse factors which our attentiveness makes explicit and definite.

For practical purposes we may ignore the integral and continuous character of the given, and think of each given as a separate object, although this is, strictly speaking, an abstraction. When taken in this sense each given is a presentation or a unique event. But while the given is, in every case, a unique event, the part of it which might recur is not to be included as part of the given.

What, then, is the given? Here is an ultimate category or pragmatist theory of knowledge which is difficult to define. Taken in the large it is the whole flux of brute factual occurrences just as they occur. Taken in separate units a given is a single event without its durable content. But in both senses the given is an abstraction within experience and never really exists in complete isolation from all conceptual or interpretative elements. All that we can say is that "certain items or aspects of the content of experience satisfy the criteria of givenness. These are, first, its specific sensuous or feeling-character, and second, that the mode of thought can neither create nor alter it—that it remains unaffected by any change of mental attitude or interest."¹

Let us put what Mead says over against this statement of Lewis. "[We] cannot maintain that we ever succeed in isolating data which must remain the same in the kaleido-

¹ C. I. Lewis: *Mind and the World Order* (Scribners), p. 66.

scope of our research science. . . . So little can a consistent line of cleavage between facts and ideas be indicated that we can never tell where in our world of observation the problem of science will arise, or what will be regarded as structure of reality and what erroneous idea." ² So there is a difference of opinion among pragmatists on the ultimate nature of the given. What Lewis asserts Mead denies. However, all pragmatists agree that there is an element in knowledge which does not come from the mind. This element they call the given or the datum of knowledge. Mead, Dewey and others assert that there is a change in the form of the data whereas Lewis holds that data are unalterable. Mead denies that there are any criteria to distinguish the given from the ideas used to interpret it, whereas Lewis holds that there are two such criteria. These differences are significant in that they show a lack of unanimity among avowed pragmatists on a fundamental issue. However, this is not to be taken as unfavorable criticism, since such differences are inevitable in a philosophy that is in the making.

B. *The Concept as the Interpretative Element in Knowledge*.—Every given takes on meaning. What is meaning? It is embodied in concepts. What are concepts? The answer to this question gives us the interpretative element in knowledge.

Let us rule out all individual differences of perception and imagery and treat the concept as being that which is identical in two or more minds when they understand each other. It is obvious that different people's impressions of weight, for example, are not identical. Consequently the concept cannot be a single sense datum. The two criteria of concepts are that they should express a common or shared meaning and that each person using the concept should mean the same thing by it. So defined the concept is an abstraction. It is the common or shared meaning and

² Quoted from my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, p. 473. The selection is from *Creative Intelligence*.

it is constituted by a pattern of relations. Yet this pattern of relations which is identical for many minds is always fused with unique individual feelings, and the separation of the shared meaning from this concrete content makes it an abstraction. All of the terms that we use in ordinary life, indeed, every term in the language of cultured people has two distinct meanings that are grafted on to the given. One of these is constituted by the unique feelings, essentially non-sharable, which the given generates in the private experience of some percipient being, and the other meaning is constituted by the sharable conceptual relations. All meaning is relational, but it may be either the pattern of relations shared by many minds or the pattern of relations peculiar to one mind.

Now why do we form concepts? Why is there an interpretation of the given by shared meanings? It is for behavior, conduct, activity. Here is the basic assumption of pragmatism. "The significance of common conception is for community of action. . . . Both our common concepts and our common reality are in part a social achievement, directed by the community of needs and interests and fostered in the interest of coöperation. Even our categories may be, to a degree, such social products; and, so far as the dichotomy of subjective and objective is governed by consideration of community, reality itself reflects criteria which are social in nature."³

3. SOME PRAGMATIST CATEGORIES

The most general and basic of the concepts we use in organizing our experience are known as categories. In *Pragmatism* James devotes a chapter to a consideration of our common-sense categories, such as *thing*, *identity and difference*, *kinds*, *minds*, *bodies*, *one time*, *one space*, *subject and attribute*, *causality*, and *the fancied or possible* and *the real*. In addition to these age-old, common-sense

³ C. I. Lewis, *loco citato*, pp. 90 and 116.

categories there are special scientific categories which have been developed since 1600 by scientific research. Examples of these are *proton* and *electron*, *relativity*, and *ether*. Moreover, every system of philosophy tends to develop a set of special categories. Thus the pragmatist term *experience* is such a philosophical category. Since categories are our basic principles of interpreting the given, the pragmatist theory of categories is an especially significant part of their solution of the problem of knowledge and existence.

James lays down the principle that "*our fundamental ways of thinking about things are discoveries of exceedingly remote ancestors, which have been able to preserve themselves throughout the experience of all subsequent times.*"⁴ He suggests that if we were lobsters or bees we might have developed an entirely different set of categories, which would have been just as useful as the set used today by common sense. Aristotle and his followers tried to make these common-sense categories eternal and static by treating them technically and articulately. The scholastic logicians vainly tried to do what Aristotle failed to accomplish. Kant's effort to formulate a complete table of categories was likewise a miserable failure. And Hegel's attempt to deduce one category from another, beginning with pure being and culminating in the Absolute Idea, was the sheerest speculation. The truth is that all of these various lists of categories are relative to a special point of view. No categories are absolutely true, none are eternally fixed and definite in meaning. The common-sense set is better for one sphere of life, that of science for another and that of philosophy for another. And each set has its defects. "All seem insufficiently true in some regard and leave some dissatisfaction," says James. And this fact awakens "a presumption favorable to the pragmatistic view that all our theories are *instrumental*, are mental modes of *adaptation* to reality." Note the characteristic biological terminology.

⁴ William James: *Pragmatism*, p. 170 (Longmans). Italics by James.

For pragmatists categories are biological instruments of a human type, the sole purpose of which is to conserve, and enhance life and to adapt it to its environment.

In an important article entitled *The Social as a Category*,⁵ Dewey attempts to establish the priority of the social over all other categories, as well as to demonstrate that it has a right to be considered a separate and distinct category. Of special interest are the other categories he names along with the social and his theory of their relation to the social. He begins by pointing out the utter impossibility of beginning reflection with absolute simples, since no such simples are ever discovered in actual experience. We must begin with the complex, but with what complex? The answer is the social. This fact alone is sufficient proof that the social is a category. The other three categories listed by Dewey are the physical or natural, the vital or organic, and the mental. We may regard association as a purely formal category which expresses the common factor in the four special modes of association, but these four special modes are the real categories of our thinking. Now the social includes the physical or natural and any separation of the two is a vicious abstraction. And the same is true of the relation of the vital and mental to the social. The social is certainly the most inclusive type of association which we find in experience. There is a "genetic continuity" between the natural, the vital and the mental which culminates in the social. "The social affords us an observable instance of a 'realm of mind' objective to an individual, by entering into which as a participating member organic activities are transformed into acts having a mental quality."⁶ Consequently the social is not only a category but the very highest category we know or can know.

Harold Chapman Brown has discussed three important

⁵ *The Monist*, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 161ff. Reprinted in *Philosophy and Civilization*, pp. 77ff.

⁶ *Loco citato*, p. 173. For a fuller elaboration of this theory see below, pp. 294ff.

categories, namely, *things*, *relations*, and *quantities*, and he has given a pragmatist interpretation of them which Dewey has accepted. Brown argues that quality is more fundamental than quantity. Quantity is just one kind of relation. But all relations, including quantitative ones, are derived from quality. "Thing" is also an abstraction due to our disregarding certain relations with the rest of the world. Hence things, quantities, and relations are all aspects of quality. But what is quality? It is ultimate and irreducible. It comes from and is "genuinely concatenated existence," that is to say, it is the stream of reality itself. This stream is "a qualitatively heterogeneous reality that can be variously partitioned into things." This qualitatively heterogeneous reality, this genuinely concatenated existence—what is it but Dewey's category of the social? What is it but the pragmatist's experience? In the end there is and can be only one category for a pragmatist and that is the on-rushing, creative whole of experience. All other categories are but abstractions from this continuous and ever-progressing and growing whole. The given is an abstraction. Every concept is an abstraction. Every category, save only the social whole of experience, is an abstraction. In the end, and in spite of the valiant effort of James to make it a pluralistic theory of the universe, pragmatism must be treated as a monistic metaphysics.⁷

Yet there is many a statement in pragmatist writings which shows that there is an irreducible surd of irrationalism in pragmatist metaphysics. The very idea of a given implies the existence of something that falls partly outside of experience. The ghost of Kant's thing-in-itself, which supplies the human knowing machine with its material, haunts this philosophy. Man has risen by a gradual process of evolution out of an unknown and unknowable and recalcitrant nature. What is his destiny when the eons of making the world over a little nearer to the heart's desire have

⁷ See the selection from Brown in my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*.

all unfolded? Otto concedes that there is much scientific knowledge to support a belief in man's final annihilation. But he insists that there is yet time to work for human betterment, ere the curtain falls and to him and his brother pragmatists "that is what matters." Yet the admission that "that is what matters" is at the same time an admission that there is a surd of irrationalism in pragmatism. This frequently expresses itself in agnosticism and positivism with regard to the ultimate problems of philosophy. In making the social their basic category the pragmatists seem to use what Nietzsche would have called an "all too human" ultimate principle to interpret reality.

CHAPTER IV

PRAGMATIST THEORIES OF TRUTH AND ERROR

I. TRUTH AND MEANING

DEWEY writes: "The realm of meanings is wider than that of true-and-false meanings; it is more urgent and it is more fertile. . . . Poetic meanings, moral meanings, a large part of the goods of life are matters of richness and freedom of meanings, rather than of truth; a large part of our life is carried on in a realm of meanings to which truth and falsity as such are irrelevant." Elsewhere he says: "Meaning is wider in scope as well as more precious in value than is truth, and philosophy is occupied with meaning rather than with truth. Making such a statement is dangerous; it is easily misconceived to signify that truth is of no great importance under any circumstances; while the fact is that truth is so infinitely important when it is important at all, namely, in records of events and descriptions of existences, that we extend its claim to regions where it has no jurisdiction."¹

These two statements are fundamental to an understanding of the pragmatist theory of truth. They show that the scope of the problem of truth is narrowed to beliefs dealing with actual events and to descriptions of actually existing entities. All aesthetic, religious and moral experience of meanings is excluded. Beliefs in these fields have meaning but not truth. All philosophical beliefs are excluded. They possess a value but not truth-value. The last word is im-

¹ The first of these quotations is from *Experience and Nature* (Open Court), pp. 410ff., and the second one is from Dewey's address at the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, reprinted from the *Proceedings* of that Congress in my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, p. 49.

portant. Pragmatists treat truth as only one species of value. There are other species that are more important. A knowledge of what truth-value is may be obtained without dealing specifically with other types of value. This distinction does not aim to exclude truth from value. It aims only to delimit the problem of truth as a problem within the more general problem of value.

2. JAMES'S STATEMENT OF THE PRAGMATIST THEORY OF TRUTH

William James's exposition of the pragmatist theory of truth in *Pragmatism* and in *The Meaning of Truth* is the best introduction to the more fully developed forms of this theory of later writers. He writes: "*True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we can not. . . . Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made true by events. Its verity is in fact an event, a process; the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. Its validity is the process of its valid-ation.*"²

To elucidate what he means James uses an interesting analogy. A bank-note is issued by a bank against gold that is held in reserve. Any one may spend the bank-note because it has the cash value of the gold held in the bank's vaults. Or he may take the note to the bank which issued it and get it redeemed. Now, says James, an idea or a belief is like a bank-note. It was issued by the bank of experience and its truth is the value it has in that bank. If we can use it to buy other experiences with, it has just that much truth. If we cannot, it is to just that extent false. Every idea or belief has just and only as much truth as it has cash value in experience. For example, the belief that there are tigers in India means that anyone going into the jungle of India will find actual wild tigers at large there. The going through the experience of finding the tigers would be the truth or the cash value of the belief. But, says James, we

² William James: *Pragmatism*, p. 201 (Longmans). (James's italics.)

hold many beliefs like this which are never actually verified by us. In practical everyday life we make use of a credit-system of truth. We know or think that our beliefs could be verified in the bank of experience, but we never really go there to get their cash-value. We only do this when the need arises. Hence many ideas are held true which are not actually verified. Other ideas James calls "petrified truths" because they were originally verified many centuries ago but are still useful on various occasions: for example, $2 + 2 = 4$.

Schiller and Murray, one of Schiller's pupils, have expressed this idea by distinguishing between *truth-claims* and truths. All ideas make a claim to truth, but only those which lead to definite practical consequences may be said actually to possess truth. The only way to test a truth-claim is to use the idea in question as a working hypothesis and note the consequences which result. If these are useful the idea is made true, and if they are not it is made false. Truths are claims which work well, and errors are either claims which do not work well, or claims which are superseded by other claims which work better. What was true becomes false when an idea which works better replaces the old idea.

3. APPLICATION OF JAMES'S THEORY TO VARIOUS TYPES OF IDEAS

In order to clarify still more his conception of truth James applies it to three special classes of ideas—matters of fact, purely mental (including mathematical) ideas, and historical ideas. Let us consider these briefly in this order.

A. Matters of Fact.—Since the world we live in is full of facts which can be either useful or harmful, ideas that tell us which we may expect are true. James calls matters of fact the "primary sphere of verification." For example he takes a fateful experience of his own, that of being lost in

the woods and of finding a cow-path.³ If in this situation I conceive the idea that there is a human habitation that can be reached by following the cow-path, and if I am thereby led to follow the path to safety, my idea becomes true. In this case the truth of the idea is not an end in itself but is only a way of reaching other vital satisfactions. The statements: "An idea is true because it is useful" and "An idea is useful because it is true" are identical. The words *true* and *useful*, or *truth* and *utility* simply express different aspects of the same process. The idea which starts the verification process is called true, and the beneficial effects in which that process ends are called useful. But the process itself is truth. "*A leading that is worth while*" is what we mean by the truth of an idea about a matter of fact. Having utility or being worth while may be interpreted either individually or socially, although beneficial social effects are rated higher than effects that are only beneficial to a single individual.

B. *Purely Mental Ideas (Mathematical Concepts).*—Definitions and principles are ideas that are purely mental, since their objects are purely conceptual. James gives these examples: 1 and 1 make 2, 2 and 1 make 3, white differs less from gray than it does from black, when the cause begins to act the effect also commences. In these and similar cases we see the relations involved by direct inspection, and sense verification is unnecessary. Yet in this realm of possible relations truth is also "*a leading that is worth while.*" For we first relate our ideas together into logical and mathematical systems, and then we subsume the facts of experience under them. These ideas are useful because we can use them to arrange the facts of experience, or, to put it differently, because they aid us in ordering our sense experiences. And, in the end, it is for this reason that they are

³ It is interesting to note that Dewey uses this same illustration in *Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 236f., evidently borrowing it from James. He elaborates James's view but accepts it in substance.

true, however much they may seem to be self-evident. "Between the coercions of the sensible order and those of the ideal order, our mind is thus wedged tightly. Our ideas must agree with realities, be such realities concrete or abstract, be they facts or be they principles, under penalty of endless inconsistency and frustration." (James.)

C. Ideas of Past History.—Ideas about the past, *e.g.*, the belief that Caesar crossed the Rubicon, offer the pragmatist a real difficulty. How can the truth of such ideas be identified with their function of leading? Both Dewey and James agree that such ideas are verified by leading to the effects of the past event which have continued into the present. The belief that Caesar crossed the Rubicon can only be verified by going to documents which are now in existence, and which are the effects of Caesar's having crossed the Rubicon. Thus James writes: "The stream of time can be recounted only verbally, or verified indirectly by the present prolongations or effects of what the past harbored." And Dewey says: "The true object of a judgment *about* a past event may be a past-event-having-a-connection-continuing-into-the-present-and-future. . . . The nature of the past event is subject-matter required in order to make a reasonable judgment about the present or future. The latter thus constitutes the object or genuine meaning of the judgment."⁴

4. DEWEY'S INSTRUMENTAL THEORY OF TRUTH

Although Dewey is in substantial agreement with James, his own theory of truth was developed independently. It is, therefore, worth while to note how far Dewey follows James and to what extent he differs from him in dealing with the problem. Fortunately Dewey has given us his reaction to James's theory in an article entitled *What Does Pragmatism Mean by Practical?*

⁴ The quotation from James is from *Pragmatism*, p. 214, and the one from Dewey is from the *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XIX, p. 312.

Dewey objects especially to the ambiguity in James's use of the word practical. He points out that this term has at least three different meanings: (i) the attitudes and conduct which objects induce in us, (ii) the capacity and the tendency which ideas have to bring about changes in existing situations, and (iii) the humanly desirable or undesirable quality of certain ends. Correlated with these three meanings of practical are three senses of meaning itself. In the first place meaning may be simply the conceptual connotation of a term—its essential attributes and qualities. But it may also be the denotative reference of an idea to existing things. The first of these meanings is sometimes called the intensive and the second the extensive meaning of a term, these being the same as connotation and denotation in logic. But in the third place, meaning may refer to the actual value or importance of anything for us. Now when James discusses truth it is not clear whether truth is the discovery of the true meaning of an idea, or whether it is discovering what an idea must produce and how in order to be true, or what the value of truth is once it is discovered. Sometimes James seems to mean by truth "just meaning that is genuine as distinct from empty and verbal." Sometimes he is obviously talking about the value of truths that already exist. But in other places James explicitly and unequivocally recognizes that "*only consequences which are actually produced by the working of the idea in coöperation with, or application to, prior realities are good consequences in the specific sense of good which is relevant to establishing the truth of an idea.*" Now it is this third meaning which Dewey holds, and he thinks that James should have held consistently to it. He writes: "Since Mr. James has referred to me as saying 'truth is what gives satisfaction' (p. 234) I may remark (apart from the fact that I do not think I ever said that truth is what *gives* satisfaction) that I have never identified *any* satisfaction with the truth of an idea, save *that* satisfaction which arises

when the idea as working hypothesis or tentative method is applied to prior existences in such a way as to fulfill what it intends." ⁵

James fails to define what is meant by satisfaction clearly enough to distinguish the satisfaction of an idea from agreeableness to the agent using the idea. Consequently he lays himself open to the charge of his opponents that his theory would make any idea true which anyone happened to find it agreeable to believe. This would make pragmatism the worst type of obscurantism. To be true, Dewey thinks, an idea must satisfy *both* personal needs of the person who uses it *and* the requirements of objective things. It is a mistake of James to have held that satisfaction of the former alone constitutes truth. We cannot minimize the importance of the personal element, and James was undoubtedly right in stressing the fact that temperament has a great deal to do with what a human being believes. But the requirements of objective things must also be met before an idea can be true. What are the requirements of objective things? Of course Dewey thinks that these are always concrete and definite, and that they grow out of some actually existing situation in which the idea which claims truth was generated. It follows that there are both natural and social factors involved in these requirements, or perhaps we should say physical and social, since social factors are also natural. The social factors are especially important from the standpoint of instrumentalism as developed by Dewey and his followers, as we have already indicated in preceding chapters. That idea is true which leads to a better state of affairs for the interests of all whom the idea concerns. Beneficial effects are never to be restricted to those which concern the agent using the idea to meet his own particular situation. They must include all effects of all individuals

⁵ *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. V, p. 94. Reprinted in *Essays in Experimental Logic*.

and groups concerned in the situation. Instrumentalism is predominantly a social theory of truth.

5. THE PREDICTION THEORY OF TRUTH

Recent statements of the pragmatist theory of truth have modified it still further into what has been called the prediction theory of truth.⁶ According to this theory the proper approach to a theory of truth is the general relation of thought to behavior. When an organism's behavior has been blocked, thought sets to work to solve the problem, and truth is a function of ideas at work solving behavior problems satisfactorily. So far we have the central idea of both James and Dewey. They had the right approach and the right clue to what truth is. But they got lost in wandering mazes when they tried to tell what is meant by the relation of truth to success in behavior. James especially "vacillated between an emphasis on personal satisfaction and on a satisfaction of the demands of the objective situation," as Dewey has rightly pointed out. But this same charge is true of some of Dewey's discussions of truth. At least there are, according to Morris, some passages in Dewey's writings "where truth comes perilously near to becoming a species of the useful." Let us then approach the problem of truth through the concept of prediction, and we shall be able to reach a clear and distinct idea of the relation of truth to behavior and an exact formulation of the pragmatist theory.

What is prediction? It is an interpretation in language of what will be found in some given region of experience. If such a predicted experience is obtained, as predicted, the prediction is true. Verified predictions are what we mean by

⁶ This theory is briefly but clearly stated by Charles W. Morris in an article entitled "The Prediction Theory of Truth," published in *The Monist*, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 386ff. C. I. Lewis's recently published *Mind and the World Order* shows a similar line of thought. See especially Chap. V. But my exposition follows the article by Morris. See P. A. Schilpp's criticism of Morris's theory in the same volume of *The Monist* and the rejoinder of Morris.

truths. And we may take it that unverified, or negatively verified, predictions are what we mean by errors. Now since the predictions arise in a reflective process, all truths must issue out of such processes. Most predictions require a long time for their fulfilment. These remain live hypotheses until the time of their fulfilment is at hand. But it is not necessary to restrict the term prediction to the future. Statements about the past imply that the experience would have been obtained as predicted, if certain conditions of space and time had existed and there had been an observer. Beliefs are secondary to predictions in the sense that they are predictions that another prediction is true or false. The statement: "Aristotle died in 322 B.C.," is a prediction. When anyone says that he believes that Aristotle died that year, we have another prediction which is a belief. The *primary prediction* is independent of the belief, but the truth of the belief is dependent upon the verification of the primary prediction. As a matter of fact most of our verifications are concerned with beliefs, rather than with primary predictions. This follows from the fact that a belief may have another belief depending upon it, making it theoretically possible to have a chain of beliefs, each depending on the other, with the first one dependent upon a primary prediction. While Morris does not state this, it is implied in his theory.

An important distinction is necessary. Some predictions are directly concerned with behavior, that is to say, they are either about behavior or the effects on behavior. Other predictions involve behavior only as a means of obtaining the predicted experience. While the latter predictions specify what must be done to obtain a certain end, the good or bad effects on behavior are not in question, so far as the truth or falsity of this particular prediction is concerned. Consequently "the more inclusive theory of truth which makes all judgments predictions of what is to be expected under specific conditions, holds both for ex-

pected experiences and for expected results on behavior. Prediction is a more essential category for discussions of truth than the categories of 'usefulness' or 'satisfactory' working. On the present theory nothing not predicted is relevant to the truth or falsity of the prediction" (Morris).

Thus the pragmatist theory of truth may be turned into a prediction theory, and the consequences of a prediction may be enlarged to cover both the effects on behavior and future experiences, at the same time that they are restricted to definite consequences issuing from a specific prediction. This appears to be the strongest form of the pragmatist theory of truth, although it is only in the making, and what the ultimate form of it will be no one can foretell. Moreover, one may well raise the question whether this prediction theory, if completely developed, would not require the abandonment of the basic principle of the James-Dewey theory.

CHAPTER V

PRAGMATIST SOLUTIONS OF THE BODY-MIND PROBLEM

1. GENERAL ATTITUDE OF PRAGMATISTS TOWARDS THIS PROBLEM

THERE is no distinction more deeply embedded in all language than that between the mind and the body. Scientists and philosophers have wrestled with the problem of their relation since the very dawn of human reflective thinking. For centuries mind and body have been held by at least some of the foremost philosophers of each age to be basic categories which cannot be reduced to anything more ultimate. And today, as we have already learned in our discussion of realistic theories, dualism of mind and body processes is still ably and vigorously defended. This attitude is well expressed by William Brown, distinguished British psychotherapist, in his article entitled *Body and Mind* in the last (14th) edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. He writes: "What exactly is the relationship between any particular form of mental activity and its corresponding physiological correlate, or brain-event? Let us take as a definite example the visual perception of a patch of red colour. The physiological correlate of this experience is some kind of protoplasmic change in a definite part of the occipital cortex—a change ultimately describable in terms of molecular, atomic and intra-atomic movements or vibrations. Obviously, the two sides of this relation are entirely different from each other." In this passage Brown simply takes the distinction between mental activity

and bodily activity to be ultimate and self-evident, as is especially indicated by his last sentence.

Not so the pragmatist. He starts by denying the validity of this distinction. Even though it is age-old and is still held by eminent authorities, it is none the less fallacious. Body and mind are not two, they are fundamentally and profoundly one—this is the general attitude of pragmatists towards this controversy. Moreover, the pragmatist insists that the treatment of body and mind as distinct has had the most disastrous consequences in human thought. For it has caused one group of thinkers to ignore mind entirely and to devote themselves wholly to the study of the body. This has produced a one-sided materialistic and mechanistic philosophy. Side by side with this group there has always been another type of thinker who has completely ignored body and who has developed a sentimental and false idealism. Such an idealism is ineffectual and deadening in its influence. It speculates, builds a world of dreams, and takes refuge in that dream-world from the insistent demands of the world of existence or nature which environs philosophers and all men alike. Thus the distinction between body and mind has been a breeder of opposed philosophies of life, each of which is one-sided and false. The only escape from these bad alternatives is to deny the premise on which they are based. Body and mind are unified in experience. How can this be demonstrated?

2. DEWEY'S THEORY OF THE BODY-MIND UNITY

Dewey takes two attitudes towards this question of demonstration. Sometimes he accepts the unity of body-mind as an axiomatic and self-evident principle which needs no other proof than the impractical and ruinous consequences of any theory which treats body and mind as entirely separate and distinct. In other words, the theory that the two are indissolubly one is far more practical, enables the thinker to avoid all the pitfalls and snares that are set by

distinguishing them, and consequently these highly pragmatic considerations are all the proof the unity theory needs or requires.

Yet Dewey is not really content to rest the matter there. He develops an interesting line of argument to justify the pragmatist form of the unity theory. This involves two distinct steps. In the first place, our approach to this problem must be genetic. We cannot take a cross-section of the body-mind unity and settle the problem by an analysis of that. We must treat this unity as a process of growth, which is one thing in a child, another in a youth, another in healthy maturity, and still another in senility. This process, however, must also be looked upon as social and as continuous between animals and men and plants and animals. This thorough-going genetic or evolutionary point of view is absolutely fundamental to the pragmatist solution of the body-mind problem. But in the second place, Dewey insists that there are distinct levels in this growing process and that an understanding of the body-mind problem depends upon distinguishing them. While there is no real distinction between body and mind, there are distinct stages in the evolution of the one process which is their unity. What are these stages? This is an extremely important question for the pragmatist.

The lowest level distinguished by Dewey is what he calls the *psycho-physical organism*. Plants represent this level, which is characterized by an organized activity of the *need-demand-satisfaction* type. These hyphenated terms are used in the strictly biological sense. Need means "a tensional distribution of energies such that the body is in a condition of uneasy or unstable equilibrium." Demand means "movements which modify environing bodies in ways which react upon the body, so that its characteristic pattern of active equilibrium is restored." Satisfaction is "this recovery of equilibrium pattern consequent upon the changes of environment due to interactions with the active demands of

the organism." Psycho-physical means that "physical activity has acquired additional properties, those of ability to procure a peculiar kind of interactive support of needs from surrounding media." What we have at this lowest level of the body-mind unity is organization of energies. We do not know the source of this organization but we have to accept it as an ultimate empirical fact. It is a recognizable trait of some events. To interpret this fact as proof of "a special force or entity called life or soul" is a fallacious interpretation. We have simply to accept the fact of a pattern which can best be called a psycho-physical organism. The student should note that this is a very special and technical use of the term psycho-physical organism, which would not be accepted by all philosophers who use this expression.

A slightly higher level is reached "whenever the constituent parts of an organized pattern of activity are of such a nature as to conduce to the perpetuation of the patterned activity." Dewey calls this level *sensitivity*. The basis for this is in plant life, but it is not fully realized until animals, with powers of locomotion and with distance-receptors, are evolved. In this stage of the evolution of the body-mind unity responses are such as to show discrimination favoring some ends and rejecting others. It is this discrimination which constitutes sensitivity.

The *feeling* level is next reached through the complication of the organism's responses to the point where both the distant in space and the future in time are responded to. For now the activities of the organism are of two very distinct types—those that are *preparatory* and those that are *fulfilling*, or, to use a different terminology, those that are *anticipatory* and those that are *consummatory*. This produces the peculiar tension which Dewey calls feeling. Once feeling has developed, it is capable of "receiving and bearing distinctions without end." The more complex and active animals have such rich feelings but they are not aware of them.

Mind is the next level attained by the body-mind unity. It comes when a creature, richly endowed with feeling, "reaches that organized interaction with other living creatures which is language, communication." Thus mind is social from the beginning. At this level feelings get sense and mean something. They get names such as pains, pleasures, odors, colors, noises, tones, tastes, and other sense qualities, and they are *objectified* as real traits of things. Yet this objectification is not a psychologizing of nature. These traits are there in things all the time just as much as they are in the organisms. When mind arises, it comes as a unity of physical and psychical. Mind does not originate as a purely psychical and individual soul, but as a unity of bodily and psychical constituents which is social through and through. Mind is "a moving stream, a constant change which nevertheless has axis and direction, linkages, associations as well as initiations, hesitations and conclusions." ¹

Dewey goes on to distinguish soul from mind. Soul is not a non-natural entity nor is it possessed by everyone. "Some bodies have souls preëminently as some conspicuously have fragrance, color, solidity. . . . To say emphatically of a particular person that he has soul or a great soul is not to utter a platitude, applicable equally to all human beings." Likewise some souls are spirits, but not all. "When the organization called soul is free, moving and operative, initial as well as terminal, it is spirit." But Dewey fears that such terms as soul and life and spirit are too encrusted with mythology and "sophisticated doctrine" ever to become scientific. However, he thinks the realities for which they stand are ultimate facts. Dewey also distinguishes consciousness from mind. There is a con-

¹ Compare this last statement with what Brown said above, p. 269, and also with what Lewis said, p. 265. All the quotations in the above exposition of Dewey's theory and those immediately following are taken from *Experience and Nature*, Chapters VII and VIII, and they are used with the permission of the Open Court Publishing Co.

sciousness at each level. At the level of psycho-physical organisms consciousness is "the totality of actualized immediate qualitative differences," but at the level of mind it is the totality of "actualized apprehensions of meanings." Mind is all meanings in general, but consciousness is those of which one is aware at the moment, so that the field of mind is "enormously wider than that of consciousness."

Thus Dewey has developed a strictly biological theory of the nature of the unified body-mind being. How far his view is from any transcendental conception of the soul is especially clear from the following statement: "Every 'mind' that we are empirically acquainted with is found in connection with some organized body. Every such body exists in a natural medium to which it sustains some adaptive connection: plants to air, water, sun, and animals to these things and also to plants. Without such connections animals die; the 'purest' mind would not continue without them" (p. 277 f.). Nor is there here any suggestion of angelic essences or of any higher beings who may emerge in future stages of evolution, such as Alexander's angels referred to above. It is an essential dogma of pragmatism that human organisms of the highest type are the apex of the evolutionary process. Such human organisms are body-mind unities and the highest among them may be designated spirits. Wordsworth wrote:

The Soul that rises with us, our life's Star,
Hath had elsewhere its setting,
And cometh from afar;
Not in entire forgetfulness,
And not in utter nakedness,
But trailing clouds of glory do we come
From God who is our home.

This may be beautiful poetry but it is sheer mythology to a pragmatist of the type of Dewey. James and Schiller, however, might be more friendly to Wordsworth's idea.

3. BODE'S TELEOLOGICAL THEORY

Boyd H. Bode, one of Dewey's disciples, has dealt at length with the body-mind problem in the article entitled "Consciousness and Psychology" published in *Creative Intelligence*. He there develops a view similar to Dewey's, but he approaches the problem from the basic distinction of the focus and margin of consciousness in psychology. According to Bode all consciousness exhibits this distinction in some degree, but traditional interpretations of the distinction are all fallacious. We must treat the marginal character of any given experience, say trying to recall a forgotten name, "as simply a reference to its function as a clue or cue to some further experience." In other words, every experience has a dual character. It "sets a task" and it "points the way." Hence the real distinction between what is focal and what is marginal in an experience is functional and not static. Intelligence is simply "the ability to modify behavior through the anticipation of possible consequences." The functional unity which has this ability is not a mind and it is not a body, but it is an integrated unity of both.

To make this clear Bode uses the illustration of a razor. If a razor edge appears sharp there is correlated with this appearance an "incipient response." If this incipient response were to become an overt act, it would be an act of cutting. But this actual or overt act is inhibited, giving rise to a perception of a razor blade as sharp. It is due to the blocking of the actual or overt response that a new kind of stimulus arises, namely, the quality "will cut" or what the object may do in future. Now exactly this is true of all perceived objects. They are stimuli which guide the organism to results, not yet real, but which may become real. Whenever a *contingent result* becomes a stimulus to an organism, that organism is a body-mind unity. It is "control by a future that is made present" which constitutes conscious-

ness, and consciousness does not exclude body, but the two are rather one unified whole. This is entirely in accord with Dewey's view and brings out another aspect of it.

4. SOME COROLLARIES OF THE PRAGMATIST THEORY OF BODY-MIND

Let us now consider some applications of the theory which has just been expounded to certain fundamental philosophical problems, the answers to which are determined by this general theory.

A. *The Problem of Freedom.*—What about man's ability freely to choose what he will do in a given situation, if the pragmatist theory of body-mind is accepted? Is human freedom real or illusory? If real, is it individual or social? These are ultimate questions of tremendous importance in ethics and religion, and the attitude of pragmatists toward them is rooted in their general theory of the biological body-mind unity.

Three things are necessary in order that man may have real freedom. The first absolutely indispensable condition is that he be not restrained or interfered with in carrying out overt actions. But freedom from restraint is purely formal freedom. Men must also have actual control over those energies required in the realization of purposes and the satisfaction of desires. Yet freedom to satisfy desire and to attain future ends is even possible, within limits, for beings at the levels of sensitivity and feeling. Real freedom implies both of these conditions, and also the possession by the organism of an integrated nervous system which makes possible powers of initiation and reflection sufficient for selection of far-reaching and far-off goals. Only human beings possess this kind of freedom. And there are varying degrees of it among men. Those with souls have it to a far greater extent than those who lack the finer type of organization essential to souls. And those with spirits have it to a still larger extent. Yet always this human freedom is lim-

ited by a world of nature. As Dewey finely puts it: "A mind that has opened itself to experience and that has ripened through its discipline knows its own littleness and impotencies; it knows that its wishes and acknowledgments are not final measures of the universe whether in knowledge or in conduct, and hence are, in the end, transient. But it also knows that its juvenile assumption of power and achievement is not a dream to be wholly forgotten. . . . When we have used our thought to its utmost and have thrown into the moving unbalanced balance of things our puny strength, we know that though the universe slays us still we may trust, for our lot is one with whatever is good in existence. We know that such thought and effort is one condition of the coming into existence of the better. As far as we are concerned it is the only condition, for it alone is in our power." ²

It follows that real freedom is social. It is through human coöperation that the highest human achievements are realized. Since mind is social even from its beginnings, freedom is social. We find the highest level of freedom realized in those social orders where creative work of all kinds can be done. Man accomplishes more when he works with his fellows to make a better world, and in such work he comes into the fullest possible realization of his freedom. One of the values of philosophy is that it teaches us that our common wants and ideals may be realized through coöperation. In the words of Justice Holmes, quoted approvingly by Dewey: "Philosophy does not furnish motives, but it shows men that they are not fools for doing what they already want to do. It opens to the forlorn hopes on which we throw ourselves away, the vista of the farthest stretch of human thought, the chord of a harmony that breathes from the unknown."

B. *Immortality*.—In view of his theory of the body-mind unity, what can a pragmatist say about immortality?

² *Loco citato*, p. 420.

We see that Dewey expresses a belief in the conservation of whatever values we realize in our efforts. This much seems to be implied in his statement "though the universe slay us still we may trust, for our lot is one with whatever is good in existence." There is, then, a kind of social immortality or an immortality of influence. Whatever changes are wrought in existence by mankind leave their permanent mark on nature. The whole would not be what it is apart from these changes. Hence the more values we realize, the more improvements we initiate and carry through, the greater the contribution we make to the meaning of existence. But personal immortality is out of the question on this theory. There are no pure minds dissociated from bodies. As dies the animal so dies man—without hope of immortality. For there is no

Living will that shall endure
When all that seems shall suffer shock.

Having turned its back on all forms of transcendentalism and having deliberately built its theory of mind, soul and spirit on biological foundations alone, pragmatism has no place for that city of celestial spirits, that home of eternal souls, whose builder and maker is God. Nor does it have any place for that faith in "a height that is higher," so beautifully expressed in Tennyson's *By an Evolutionist*:

I have climb'd to the snows of Age, and I gaze at a field in the Past,
Where I sank with the body at times in the sloughs of a low desire,
But I hear no yelp of the beast, and the Man is quiet at last
As he stands on the heights of his life with a glimpse of a height that
is higher.

For Tennyson is here obviously speaking of personal immortality, and the evolutionism of pragmatism is thoroughly incompatible with a belief in personal immortality, just as it is thoroughly incompatible with a belief in the preëxistence of the soul as expressed in the beautiful lines of Wordsworth which were quoted above. The rejection

of both of these ideas of the soul is one of the practical consequences of the pragmatist theory of a body-mind unity.

William James, and some of his pragmatist disciples, who are much more friendly to religion than the instrumentalists, refuse to accept this unity theory. In his famous *Ingersoll Lecture on Immortality* James defended the transmission theory of the relation of body and mind. On this theory the body is merely an instrument of the mind. But the mind may win its release from this instrument without ceasing to exist. It may even find another "celestial" or other kind of body through which to express itself. This faith of James is well expressed in an interesting letter to his dying sister in which he told her that her spirit would be better able to express itself after its release from the body.³ But to disciples of Dewey such a belief is utterly inconsistent with our biological knowledge of the continuity of life from plants to men and of the indissoluble unity of body-mind.

³ See the *Letters of William James*, Vol. I, p. 309.

CHAPTER VI

PRAGMATIST THEORY OF VALUE

I. THE GENERAL THEORY OF VALUE OF PRAGMATISM

IT is implied in the above exposition that theory of value is the chief and most inclusive interest of pragmatism. On this point all pragmatists may be said to be in substantial agreement. When Dewey distinguishes meaning or value from truth and treats meaning as the wider category, he is exhibiting this pragmatic bias towards theory of value. And when A. W. Moore speaks of truth-value as being merely one kind of value, he is showing the same tendency. In the words of James: "Truth is *one species of good*, and not, as is usually supposed, a category distinct from good and coördinate with it." Pragmatism might almost be defined as that philosophy which makes the problem of value the fundamental problem of philosophy.

Not only is there general agreement among pragmatists that value is the central problem of philosophy; there is also a general definition of value which all pragmatists accept. This definition was laid down early in the history of pragmatism and it may be regarded as an essential pragmatist dogma. When James said, in one of the essays of *The Will to Believe*, "*the essence of good is simply to satisfy demand*" (p. 301), he formulated a definition of good which he had long held and which is embodied in his *Principles of Psychology*. This principle was taken over by Schiller and became the cornerstone of his humanism. In one of his earliest works he wrote: "Good and bad also (in their wider and primary sense) have reference to purpose. 'Good' is what conduces to, 'bad' what thwarts, pur-

pose.”¹ And in the Graduate School of the University of Chicago, H. W. Stuart, working under the guidance and direction of Dewey, developed an essay which all instrumentalists recognize as being of cardinal significance to pragmatist theory of value. It was published in *Studies in Logical Theory* by Dewey in 1903 and is entitled *Valuation as a Logical Process*. In this important essay the thesis is laid down that all knowledge-getting, that is to say, all judgment and attention whatsoever, is for the purpose of obtaining some value or end. Accordingly the judgment process is described as follows: “First of all must come a sense of need or deficiency, which may, on occasion, be preceded by a more or less violent and sudden shock to the senses, forcibly turning one’s attention to the need of immediate action. By degrees this sense of need will grow more definite and come to express itself in a more or less ‘clear and distinct’ image of an end, toward which end the agent is drawn by desire and to which he looks with much or little emotion.” Here we have the earliest formulation of Dewey’s hyphenated trinity, *need-demand-satisfaction*, which was defined above as the essential criterion of even the lowest forms of living organisms.

Thus for the pragmatist the satisfaction of desire or demand or need, which may be experienced by organisms as low in the scale of life as the algae, constitutes a value. We may infer, *a fortiori*, that if such a satisfaction constitutes a value, then any satisfaction of need or desire whatsoever will also be a value. Dewey well stated this general theory of value of pragmatism, when he said: “Values of some sort or other are not traits of rare and festal occasions; they occur whenever any object is welcomed and lingered over; whenever it arouses aversion and protest; even though the lingering be but momentary and the aversion a passing glance toward something else. . . . Of immediate values as such, values which occur and which are

¹ F. C. S. Schiller: *Studies in Humanism*, p. 152.

possessed and enjoyed, there is no theory at all; they just occur, are enjoyed, possessed; and that is all.”² We can not go beyond or behind these immediate satisfactions of desire to any value that is more ultimate. But we can and must criticise these immediate values from the standpoint of their relation to one another. Such a criticism leads us to adopt some norm or standard of criticism. What is that norm for the pragmatist?

2. THE DOCTRINE OF MELIORISM

The place to look for this norm is in the pragmatist theory of *meliorism*. This term is of Latin derivation, having been built on the Latin word *melior*, meaning better. The word is used in two senses. First, it is the doctrine, opposed to both optimism and pessimism, that the world can be made better by properly directed human efforts. And secondly, it is the doctrine that the world is neither entirely evil nor is it as perfect as it can be, but it is gradually being improved and perfected. This second meaning is what Herbert Spencer had in mind when he spoke of “the meliorist view . . . that life . . . is on the way to become such that it will yield more pleasure than pain.” The first meaning was popularized by James Sully. He wrote: “By this I would understand the faith which affirms not merely our power of lessening evil—this nobody questions—but also our ability to increase the amount of positive good.” Sully says that he took the word from George Eliot, who said: “I don’t know that I ever heard anybody use the word *meliorist* except myself.”³

James took the word meliorism either from George Eliot or, more probably, from Sully, and gave it a special pragmatist interpretation. According to him meliorism implies that there are gaps in the world, and these have to be

² John Dewey: *Experience and Nature*, pp. 400 and 403.

³ See A. Lalande: *Vocabulaire de la Philosophie*, 2nd ed., Vol. I, pp. 450, from which the above information and quotations are taken.

filled by human beings coöperating with whatever other beings there are in the universe who are interested in making things better. Every gap that is filled, every linkage that is established between one part of this pluralistic universe and another, improves the world just that much. The non-human agencies coöperating with man in the filling of the gaps were not specifically listed by James, but he undoubtedly meant a finite God and the spirits of just men who have departed this life, for, as was pointed out above, James believed in immortality.

There is a norm or standard of valuation implied in the meliorism of James. We must rank immediate values according to the degree of improvement they make in the world. Those acts having the best consequences in the long run are better than others, that is to say they give a greater quantum of satisfaction and they contain more value. Thus meliorism may be used as a principle of criticising values and of ordering them in a better-worse series.

It is obvious that James took over this norm or standard of criticising values from British utilitarianism. According to this school of ethics moral value is constituted by the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number. John Stuart Mill held this theory and James dedicated his *Pragmatism*, in which he developed his meliorism, to Mill. When we shift our definition of value from mere sense pleasure to any satisfaction of demand or need, that is to say, when we abandon hedonism—the theory that pleasure is the only immediate value, and substitute a biological satisfaction of need for mere pleasantness, we get a slightly different theory of value. But the principle of the greatest happiness of the greatest number can readily be adapted to this biological theory. For then the norm becomes: the greater the number of needs satisfied the greater the amount of value. This is the principle of criticising values which is implied in the theory of meliorism. We make a better world by increasing the total quantum of satisfaction.

There is, however, another norm implied in James's meliorism and that is connected with his notion of co-operation in the filling of the gaps and in the increasing of satisfaction. To the extent that coöperation prevails over individual and group competition, satisfaction can be and is increased. Thus there arises in the very need-demand-satisfaction process a deeper kind of need, and that is the need for coöperation. The satisfaction of this need is really a unique kind of satisfaction for a pragmatist, since the satisfaction of so many other needs depends upon it. We may call this a need of a higher order than that of mere plant and animal need, although there is plenty of evidence of the existence of this need among plants and animals. However, this need only becomes conscious in men and therefore it may be said to be what specifically characterizes beings at the human level. All criticism of value from the human standpoint assumes that the need of coöperation must take precedence over all other needs. It is not self-preservation, but social coöperation that is the first law of human life.

There is, then, a deep-seated conflict in pragmatist theory of value. Sometimes value means to a pragmatist any immediate satisfaction of need or desire. But sometimes it means preëminently the satisfaction of the need for co-operation. Pragmatists make the tacit assumption that the satisfaction of the need for coöperation will also satisfy all other needs. They imply by their theory of meliorism that coöperation in the filling of the gaps in the world will *ipso facto* increase the total amount of satisfaction. It may do this in two ways. In the first place, it may satisfy more of the elemental needs already in existence. And secondly, it may create more needs and satisfy them. But, unfortunately for pragmatism, coöperation also demands the elimination of actual desires. Consequently one kind of value may destroy the other.

Later pragmatists have modified James's meliorism

chiefly by leaving out of consideration any non-human co-operating agents. We must rely wholly upon the coöperation of human agents in the making of a better world. As Otto puts it, God "may be left out of account" and "the only friends we human beings have" are "each other." Meliorism as the theory that human beings, through intelligent coöperation, are able to improve the world without limit, and that they need no help in the meliorising process is the generally accepted theory of value of contemporary pragmatists. It follows that pragmatism can never satisfy the deepest of man's needs which expresses itself in the longing for eternity. The greatest of the pragmatists admit the existence of this need but they consider it a weakness. Thus Dewey writes: "*Sub specie aeternitatis?* or *sub specie generationis?* I am susceptible to the aesthetic charm of the former ideal—who is not? There are moments of relaxation: there are moments when the demand for peace, to be let alone and relieved from the continual claim of the world in which we live that we be up and doing something about it, seems irresistible; when the responsibilities imposed by living in a moving universe seem intolerable. We contemplate with equal mind the thought of the eternal sleep." ⁴ From the viewpoint of a transcendentalist the longing for eternity is the deepest and the most worth while of all human needs, but from the standpoint of pragmatism it is a weakness that should be overcome by cultivating other interests that are more social.

3. THE CHIEF TYPES OF VALUE AND THEIR RELATION TO EACH OTHER

Stuart, in the article referred to above, has enunciated a principle which has come to be generally accepted by pragmatists, namely, that "all values properly so-called are either ethical or economic." The values of physical objects

⁴ *Essays in Honor of William James*, p. 79. For a fuller statement of the above theory, and a refutation of it from the standpoint of idealism, see my *God of the Liberal Christian* (Appleton), especially Chap. III.

and of science are usually reduced to economic values and the values of art and religion to ethical values. We must note how the reduction is accomplished in each case. But first let us consider the relation of ethical and economic value.

A. *Ethical and Economic Value*.—These two kinds of value are strictly correlative, since they are only the two ends of the same process of valuation. If we assume that every such process is an activity of adjustment of the organism to its environment, then the means used to make this adjustment may be regarded as equivalent to economic value, and the end attained, that is, the adjustment as a completed and realized end, constitutes ethical value. We can see this best in cases where ends or ideals conflict. Suppose we have some relatively permanent habit established by past acts. The end of this habit is a fixed and recognized value. Now let some new end appear which conflicts with the end of this habit. Such a new end also involves a large number of judgments, which together refer to the means of attaining the end in question. We thus have two sets of means and two different ends, and this enormously complicates the situation which we have to meet. To find an appropriate action to meet such a complicated situation one must have "not simply a clearly articulated knowledge [of these complexities] but also a knowledge of oneself." But it is important to note that the self we thus know in action is "the energetic self." In so far as the two ends are judged by the self to be mutually exclusive, an ethical mode of adjustment is made. But suppose that this exclusiveness is judged by the self to be purely external, and that the two ends are entirely compatible within the self. Then the mode of adjustment is indirect and concerns the means, and we may call this economic. Hence ethical value is concerned primarily with the direct adjustment of ends that are judged to be incompatible. It means choosing one of these ends and rejecting the other or moulding a new compromise

end which will take the place of both. But economic value is concerned with adjusting the means in such a way that both ends can be attained. Now when we choose or reject a given end we do it because it fits or conflicts with our whole system of habits and their respective ends. In this we never create any new values nor do we ever recognize pre-existing values. What we do is to fix or adjust values of the immediate need-demand-satisfaction type for the time being, knowing that this fixation or adjustment is continually subject to reappraisal as the self grows. In ethical reflection we do not create but rather organize values. "The ethical experience is one of continuous construction and reconstruction of an order of objective reality, within which the world of sense-perception is comprised as the world of more or less refractory means to the attainment of ethical purposes."⁵ And these more or less refractory means are economic values.

B. *The Values of Facts and Science.*—In the above account we have already implied that the particular facts of sense experience serve as means to ends in the valuation process. Hence they have economic value. But the same is true of the general laws of science. If some especially obdurate fact refuses to be organized as a means to our ends, we judge it to be subject to some law of necessity which thwarts our purposes. Such laws of nature, which are generalizations from experience, it has been one of the glories of science to have discovered. They express "aspects of experienced existence" and they give "insight into reality." But why do these laws of science have value, or what is their value? In answering this question the pragmatist points out that these laws make predictions of the future possible and consequently "they are instrumentalities enabling men to further their desires" (Otto). Thus the values of science are essential economic values. The laws of science are means to the realization of human purposes.

⁵ *Studies in Logical Theory*, p. 299 (University of Chicago Press).

Science was made for life, and not life for science. Science has value only to the extent that it satisfies the insistent needs of life. Just as the scholastic philosophers of the Middle Ages subordinated scientific knowledge to religious faith, so the pragmatist philosophers of today subordinate scientific knowledge to the needs of human conduct and behavior.

C. *Aesthetic Values*.—James H. Tufts, more than any other pragmatist, has developed a theory of the relation of aesthetic value to economic and to ethical value. Although his theory differs somewhat from Stuart's, it conforms with it. He distinguishes between two sorts of stimuli—those that are simple, monotonous and easily analyzed and those that are variable and complex and towards which constant adjustment and readjustment is necessary. The objects that satisfy our immediate wants we consume and throw away and they are valuable only in relation to our immediate wants. But objects of the second type are more durable and they are bi-focal. That is to say, such objects respond to us when we respond to them. They are social beings and the relations between them and us are personal relations. Between the economic value of things and the moral value of personal relations stands aesthetic value. Aesthetic objects are quasi-personal things. For they are works of art in which the artist has embodied his thought and feeling. The aesthetic object is an object of contemplation or of embodied meaning. Aesthetic values function in the valuation process sometimes as means and sometimes as ends, but they are always social. Hence we may say that aesthetic values are reduced to ethical or moral values rather than to economic.

C. I. Lewis would not agree with Tufts. He identifies aesthetic value with the satisfaction which accompanies the immediate experience of any given or datum. This satisfaction he calls pure *esthesis*. When the given is taken just as it is and for what it is, and is not judged or interpreted

in any way, we have esthesis. And this is what we mean by aesthetic value.

D. *Religious Value*.—The characteristic attitude of pragmatists towards religious value is the denial of its existence as a specific type of value. Religion is the belief in and the effort to secure the conservation and the enhancement of all socially recognized values. In this sense all values become religious values. We should not set up some one religious value and seek it. We should seek to conserve and enhance all socially recognized values. This is the essence of religious value. One might almost say that religious value is a kind of quality of optimism which accompanies the process of valuation. To believe that this process is itself worth while and that its ends are attainable—this is religious value.⁶

4. COROLLARIES OF THE PRAGMATIST THEORY OF VALUE

Let us now draw certain obvious inferences from the pragmatist theory of value, treating them as corollaries of that theory.

A. *Eternal or Transcendental Values*.—From the days of Plato and earlier to the present men have believed in the existence or reality of a supra-temporal and supra-spatial world of eternal spiritual values. To the Greeks truth, goodness, and beauty formed a special trinity of such values. They are the ever-recurring themes of Plato's *Dialogues*. And they have intrigued the mind of man through all the intervening centuries. But it follows from the pragmatist biological theory of value that there are no eternal or transcendental values. All values are transitory: they arise and they pass away in the process of adjusting wants and needs to the environment. Spinoza's surrender of such transitory goods as pleasure and honor and glory for the pursuit

⁶ Edward Scribner Ames in my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, p. 539, expressly says: "In stating what are the values of religion, it may be said at the outset that religion has no values of its own. The values of religion are also other kinds of values at the same time."

of a single, unchangeable and absolute good is to the pragmatist a surrender to weakness. This is clear from the quotation from Dewey above, to which may be added his statement that "the philosophy which tries to escape the form of generation by taking refuge under the form of eternity will only come under the form of a by-gone generation."

It is true that William James did not wholly share this absolute repudiation of all transcendental values. He recognized the need of a transcendent God, even though he conceived of Him as finite, to aid men in the work of social melioration. And, as we learned above, he especially applied the pragmatic method to prove the existence of such a God in his famous "will to believe" argument. But as early as 1908, in an article on Pragmatism published in the *Edinburgh Review*, Bertrand Russell pointed out the deep-seated contradiction in this line of argument and the basic ideas of pragmatism. Time has proved that Russell was right. Contemporary pragmatism has completely repudiated every transcendental value and the use of the "will to believe" as a proof of a transcendent God. It has revised its conception of God until every transcendent aspect of deity has been completely eliminated. God must either be identified with the process of valuation and of social melioration or be left entirely out of account. Some pragmatists do leave Him entirely out of account while others identify Him with the valuation process in its entirety.⁷

B. *The Nature of Evil*.—It is obviously a corollary of the pragmatist theory of value that evil is primarily negative. It may be defined as unsatisfied desire or as social maladjustment. The former corresponds to what used to be called physical evil and the latter to moral evil. Sin is not recognized as a scientific concept by pragmatists. A. Eus-

⁷ The essay by Russell has been reprinted in his *Philosophical Essays*. On the philosophy of religion of pragmatism see Edward Scribner Ames: *Religion* and A. Eustace Haydon: *The Quest of the Ages*. See my criticisms of their views in *The God of the Liberal Christian* (Appleton), especially Chaps. IV and V.

tace Haydon calls it a "primitive concept." Evil is to be faced realistically. It must be dumped overboard. It must be completely eradicated. "How are we to get rid of evil?" replaces for the pragmatist the traditional problem of "How are we to reconcile the existence of evil with a perfect God?"

CHAPTER VII

TYPICAL OBJECTIONS TO PRAGMATISM

I. THE DILEMMA OF PRAGMATISM

IN *Present Philosophical Tendencies* R. B. Perry calls attention to a dilemma of pragmatism. This dilemma has been elaborated more in detail by A. O. Lovejoy in his article entitled *Pragmatism versus the Pragmatist*. Let us first state this dilemma as Perry gives it and then show how Lovejoy elaborates it.

Pragmatism is fundamentally a naturalistic and biological theory of knowledge. Mind is subordinate to existence or nature or what Lewis called the given. There are "laws of necessity" to which man's mind must submit. There is an obdurate environment to which life must adapt itself. Knowledge is what changes. The structure of the world which generates the knowledge processes and the structure of the world in which that process ends does not fundamentally change. Yet, on the other hand, the pragmatist insists that existence itself is man-made. There are no fixed and static facts. The laws of nature come from our categorizing activity. They are our creations. Here is an irreconcilable contradiction in pragmatism. To escape it either the pragmatist must turn towards subjective idealism and treat nature as wholly the creation of the human mind, or he must turn towards realism and admit that nature is independent of and creative of mind. Thus it is the inevitable destiny of pragmatism to be absorbed by one or the other of the two great types of philosophy—idealism or realism. It cannot stick to its vacillating and wavering attitude on so fundamental an issue.

Lovejoy elaborates this argument by going through Dewey's writings and selecting two sets of quotations, one of which shows the idealism and the other the realism in pragmatism. Yet there are other passages in which Dewey sharply criticises epistemological dualism—the theory that ideas belong to a mental realm and that facts belong to a non-mental world. And there are others where he strongly denies the idealistic interpretation of his statements, and still others where he denies equally strongly the realistic interpretation. What, then, are we to conclude in the light of these various sets of passages? What is Dewey's real view? Lovejoy thinks that it is impossible to discover it, and he proposes to reconstruct pragmatism to show that it is inherently contradictory. "This does not mean that we shall make up a new doctrine out of our heads and name it pragmatism. We shall in every case reason from principles actually held, and insisted upon, by writers of this school. We shall find that these principles are incongruous with certain other principles, or at any rate with certain modes of argument and certain specific conclusions, which are put forward by the same writers. We shall discover a deep inner conflict in the 'pragmatism' of the pragmatists, an opposition of underlying logical motives, from which the ambiguities and contradictions that we have already noted in their utterances naturally enough arise. This conflict, we shall see, is incapable of adjustment; one of the opposing principles or the other must simply be abandoned. And we shall find reasons for holding that one of these principles is not only sound in fact, but is also, in a quite definite sense, the more profoundly and distinctively pragmatic."¹

Thus the new realist, Perry, and the critical realist, Lovejoy, agree that there are certain basic principles at the heart of pragmatism that are incurably contradictory. Yet these principles are essential to the philosophy. The critics think that the presence in pragmatism of such inherent and deep-

¹ *Essays in Critical Realism*, p. 63 (Macmillan). Edited by Durant Drake.

seated contradictions will ultimately force its disintegration. It cannot endure as a distinct type of philosophy, but its idealistic doctrines will ultimately be absorbed into idealism and its realistic doctrines into realism.

2. THE SUBORDINATION OF KNOWLEDGE TO ACTION

The charge has been made against pragmatism that it makes all of our needs practical, and that thought exists only for the sake of action. Thus Aliotta writes: "All the efforts made by Anglo-American pragmatism to reduce the cognitive function to the practical function and knowledge to action cannot fail to appear vain to the unprejudiced man who analyses the distinctive characters of the two functions."² Montague made the same charge against pragmatism and showed his criticisms to Dewey. The latter disclaimed teaching that all our needs are practical and insisted that he only meant to teach that no need can be satisfied without action. Originally all human needs were practical, but other kinds of needs have arisen in civilized life. For example there are aesthetic, scientific, and moral needs that are not primarily practical. Yet in satisfying them action is required. Dewey also denied that he ever said that thought exists for the sake of action. What he said was that activity is a part of the cognitive process by which we reach immediate and non-practical consequences. The modifications which Dewey here makes of these charges are interesting in that they show that he is aware of the seriousness of the charges. Montague published Dewey's answers, as well as his own criticisms, indicating that he regards the charges as holding good for pragmatism in general but accepting Dewey's reservations so far as Dewey's own instrumentalism is concerned.³

Yet, even though there is activity present in knowing,

² Professor Aliotta: *The Idealistic Reaction against Science*. English translation by Agnes McCaskill. P. 185. (Macmillan and Co., Ltd.)

³ See W. P. Montague: *The Ways of Knowing*, pp. 154f. (note).

Aliotta is undoubtedly right in stressing the basic differences, not acknowledged by pragmatists, between "cognitive doing," "artistic doing," and "practical doing." In the first type of activity we are opposed by something which has an independent reality and which will not yield to our wishes. Our activity may be one of the factors in reality but it is not the only one. To reduce all actions to practical doing, where we actually construct what we want, is to ignore this element of opposition which we find in cognitive doing. "Pragmatism, which accepts blindfold and dogmatically the biological origin and meaning of mental life, ends by contradicting its own postulate, when it denies the presupposition of all natural selection, that is to say, the objective physical order" (p. 187). Of course pragmatists deny that they do this. But if they really grant the existence of an independently real objective physical order, they must admit the ultimate impossibility of our remaking the world. All that we can do is to modify it up to a certain point. In the end we must submit to it. We can never change the objective pattern of relations. Thus if we see the mercury rise in a thermometer following a rise in temperature, we can make any modification we please in thought such as imagining one to increase without the other or one to increase and the other to diminish. All this does is to change the psychical relations to the facts. The external physical relations remain the same. But practical activity is not so restricted. It modifies things in their physical structure. Hence, even though Dewey's statement is accepted, and we hold that activity is present in knowing, we must recognize that it is not practical activity. Cognitive activity remains unique and the cognitive relation to an object can never be subordinated to the practical relation.

3. CRITICISMS OF THE PRAGMATIST THEORY OF TRUTH

No part of pragmatism has been more severely attacked than the pragmatist theory of truth. When James originally

stated it, there was a storm of protest. Idealists and realists vied with each other in riddling it with criticisms.

A. *Moore's Critique of James's Theory of Truth.*—In *Philosophical Studies* (Harcourt, Brace & Co.), G. E. Moore has republished his essay on *James's Pragmatism* in which he sharply criticised the theory of truth of James. The three basic assertions of James are (i) truth is connected with utility, (ii) truth is in some sense 'mutable' and (iii) truths are man-made.

Moore analyses the first of these assertions into four others: (i) that we can verify all of our true ideas, (ii) that all our ideas that we can verify are true, (iii) that all our true ideas are useful and (iv) that all of our ideas that are useful are true. He then proceeds to give examples that refute the first of these assertions. Thus we are often unable to verify a belief that we wrote something in a letter, even though it is true, since many letters are destroyed. Historians are often concerned with true ideas they cannot verify because the documents are lost. Moore is willing to accept the second assertion, but the third he attacks with examples to the contrary. Thus many true ideas, even such as $2 \text{ plus } 2 \text{ equals } 4$, are useful only at certain times. But it is true even when it is in the way and a hindrance. Men often dwell on their faults when it is not useful for them to do so, even though their faults are real. To the reply that every true idea is useful at least once, Moore cites examples of ideas that appear only once and that are not useful then. Thus idly counting the dots on a playing card is of no use yet culminates in our knowing how many there are. Our minds are continually noting details we never use. Turning to the fourth assertion, that all our useful ideas are true, Moore cites lies that are useful in wartime but that are not true. False ideas and absolute fictions are very often useful on the whole and in the long run.

Turning next to the general proposition that truth is mutable, Moore interprets this to mean that an idea could

be false at one time and true at another. Is this possible? No, says Moore, it is self-evident that an idea once true is always true. If it is true that *I am in this room* and we mean by this "the idea of the connection of my being in this room with this particular time—it seems to me evident that anybody who had thought of that connection at any time in the past, would have been thinking truly, and that anybody who were to think of it at any time in the future would be thinking truly" (p. 138). Here is at least one fundamental sense in which truth is not mutable.

With regard to James's assertion that our truths are man-made, Moore points out that this involves saying not only that we make our beliefs but that we make them true or false. It cannot be doubted that we make our beliefs. But do we make them true? Some of them we may make true, namely, those about acts that are within our power. Thus if someone believes that another person will do something, such as writing a book, and he writes it, then he makes his friend's belief true. But to say that we make all of our beliefs true would lead to such absurdities as saying that we had a hand in causing the French Revolution, or in building the pyramids, or in creating the Alps Mountains. We believe in the reality of these things, but we do not make these beliefs true.

B. *Royce's Critique of the Pragmatist Theory of Truth.*—In an article entitled *Error and Truth*, published in Hastings's *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, Royce points out an interesting difficulty in the pragmatist theory of truth. In order for that theory to be true we have to assume that an idea retains the same meaning from the time it is suggested until it is verified by its practical effects or consequences. Obviously there is often a very long time interval, since the complete effects of an idea take considerable time to happen. This is especially true of many scientific ideas. Newton's ideas of space and gravitation are still being verified in experiments now being made in connection with the

Einstein theories of relativity. The effects of these experiments have to be regarded as a part of the effects of Newton's idea. How can we verify the assumption that Newton's idea of space is identical with Einstein's idea of Newtonian space? "Nobody experiences, in his own person, or at any one time, the identity of the ideas, meanings, expectations, of yesterday and today, of himself and of another person, of Newton and of the later students of Nature who have tested what they believed to be Newton's ideas. One may, in each special case, doubt, therefore, whether the idea formed yesterday is the same in meaning as the idea tested today, whether two men mean the same by the hypothesis which they are trying to verify together, and so on" (Royce). But this has to be true, or the whole pragmatist theory is meaningless. Yet, if it is true, it constitutes a kind of truth that is not identical with effects or consequences. No man can test such a truth, and if it is true, as it must be in order for the pragmatist theory of truth to be true, then it is true for some other reason than its consequences. Hence there is involved in the very statement of the pragmatist theory of truth an assumption the truth of which cannot be determined by that theory. That theory rests back upon an assumption the truth of which is not what pragmatism says truth must be.

C. *Retrospection and Retroactive Judgments.*—Lovejoy charges pragmatism with making retrospection impossible. He gives three reasons why retrospection is "the Cinderella of the pragmatist theory of knowledge." It is not necessary here to go into those reasons, but Lovejoy is undoubtedly right in calling this denial of the possibility of retrospection a "fantastic paradox" to common sense. Lovejoy is especially interested in retrospection from the standpoint of an individual whose personal memory is the source of knowledge of the past, but he mentions also the "recorded results of empirical science" as furnishing a sound basis for a retrospective judgment about a past event that extends be-

yond the private experience of any one individual. Lovejoy argues that the pragmatist has to assume that "knowledge about the past is equivalent, within limits, to prediction about the future; but this, as Hume rightly showed, is a belief which is not itself susceptible of any empirical verification."⁴ There can be no question but that Lovejoy has here raised a fundamental issue from the standpoint of the pragmatist theory of truth.

However, he does not take into account the explicit statement of James that "new experiences lead to retrospective judgments, using the past tense," and "what these judgments utter *was* true, even though no past thinker had been led there." And a little further on James says: "This regulative notion of a potential better truth to be established later, possibly to be established someday absolutely, and *having powers of retroactive legislation*, turns its face, like all pragmatist notions, towards concreteness of fact, and towards the future."⁵ Lovejoy's criticisms were especially directed against Dewey's instrumentalism, yet what are we to think of these statements of James in the light of those criticisms? Does James's theory of truth make possible retroactive judgments, whereas Dewey's does not? Or was James here asserting what his fidelity to common-sense forced him to assert when it was actually in conflict with the pragmatist theory? I think that the latter is true. Retroactive judgments are not compatible with the conception that truth is constituted by the effects an idea has in the future.

Yet who can deny that scientific judgments are retroactive in the sense that they hold of individual instances which existed long before they were discovered? Who can doubt that the earth was revolving around the sun on the day of battle when Joshua is said to have made the sun stand still, even though that was centuries before Copernicus discov-

⁴ *Loco citato*, p. 70.

⁵ *Pragmatism*, pp. 223 and 224. (Italics mine.)

ered that the sun is the centre of the solar system? Who can doubt that the proposition, "Socrates's blood circulated in his body" was a true statement when Socrates lived and drank the hemlock, even though Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood was not made until after 1600 A.D.? Yet if truth is constituted by predicted effects which occur after an idea is suggested, how could any judgment be true before any previous thinker was led to it? Morris says that such predictions would have been true had there been the proper physical conditions and had there been an observer. But in the case of Socrates both these requirements are met. Surely Plato can be regarded as a competent observer. Yet he did not know that Socrates's blood circulated in his body. From the record Plato has left of the effects of the hemlock on Socrates, who walked about until his legs became numb and then sat down, we know that the circulation of the blood is what carried the poison through Socrates's body. Yet Plato, and the others who were present at Socrates's death, did not know this. Nevertheless it was true then, prior to the effects which Harvey used to prove his theory that the blood circulates in the human body. Hence the truth of such a theory cannot possibly be identified with the effects the idea produces, or with its verification and validation, to use the words of James. Retroactive judgments are so well attested that they alone are a sufficient refutation of the pragmatist theory of truth.

4. THE ILLICIT NATURALIZING OF VALUES

In a masterly essay entitled "*The Illicit Naturalizing of Religion*,"⁶ Hocking has pointed out the root defect in the pragmatist interpretation of religious values and beliefs. But his argument can be extended to all transcendental values—to those of art, science, and morality as well as to those of religion. By its biological theory of knowledge pragmatism is forced to deny the very existence of supra-

⁶ See *Journal of Religion*, Vol. I, pp. 561-589.

mundane values. Suppose that it be admitted that human beings have a biological structure which they share with animals. Suppose that it be further granted that at his best man has become so much more complicated in his biological functioning than other animals as to be capable of creating culture and all the values that accompany the highest cultures that we know. Let it be acknowledged that our cultural values are the outcome of centuries of biological and social evolution and that they are to that extent of the earth, earthy. Yet does this prove that they are *purely* human and *wholly* man-made? By no means. It still remains possible and plausible that some transcendental spiritual being was enough interested in this process of history to use it for the realization of these values. Who can say that these higher cultural values are entirely biological in their essence? Who knows that these values are not also appreciated by non-biological beings? Yet pragmatism is forced by its theory to say what it cannot prove. It dogmatically denies the existence of transcendental values. It restricts the world of value to earth and its creatures. It knows no reality that is alien to man and is non-human. The social in the human sense is its highest category. One might adapt Perry's egocentric predicament fallacy here and say that pragmatism argues from the socio-centric predicament that there are no transcendental values. We as human beings know ourselves to be part of a social order which has been reached through millions of years of biological and cultural evolution here upon the earth. Therefore all of our values are entirely relative to this process. But the fact that these values were attained by us in this process is no proof that they share the biological and sociological nature of the process. To say that they do is an illicit naturalizing of values. Such a position is due to our socio-centric predicament. The idealistic view that the whole evolutionary process has meaning only to the extent that it succeeds in creating ethical and spiritual personalities and in bringing them

into union with all other ethical and spiritual beings throughout the whole of reality is certainly just as plausible, once we refuse to be bound in our thinking by the socio-centric predicament. Pragmatism's root defect as a philosophy is, to use again the phrase of Nietzsche, that it insists on making everything "all too human." There are undoubtedly non-human realities, even though they enter into or are in relation with human beings. We must never lose sight of the fact that there may be a level of reality *above* the human level, which gives meaning to that level.

5. THE IMPRACTICABILITY OF PRAGMATISM

Finally, and paradoxically, in view of its insistence upon practicality, pragmatism is profoundly impractical. In restricting human efforts to what is achievable in the biological and social evolutionary process a profound and logical love of life is cut off. If this philosophy is true, the world certainly lied to a good many of its saints to whom a spiritual world of values which transcends our earthly finitude was eternally real. They turned their backs on the world and sought for a city whose builder and maker is God. And they tell us that they found it and we see by their labors and characters that the discovery enormously magnified their power, at the same time that it gave them an inner calm and an outward repose. Were they deceived? Has the world lied to its saints and its sages? Is it really impossible to solve the problem of problems, impossible to gain insight into the ultimate meaning of life? Must we treat the longing for eternity as a weakness and eradicate it from our minds? Then the ultimate incentive of all of our striving is removed. Then the basic postulate on which all philosophizing rests is nullified. And pragmatism must ultimately agree with Oswald Spengler that "the very *possibility* of a real philosophy of today and tomorrow is in question," and that "it were far better to become a colonist or an engineer, to do something, no matter what, that is true and real, than

to chew over once more the old dried up themes under cover of an alleged 'new wave of philosophic thought.' " There is indisputable evidence in the literature of pragmatism that practical activities and social reforms are the things that are treated as being of the most importance. But when this view is taken philosophy is already drying up.

Montague refers to a type of "up-to-date" student of philosophy who, tackling the classical literature of philosophy and lacking either the background of knowledge or the intellectual acumen to comprehend it, turns with relief to pragmatism. "If there is no objective reality apart from human interests and beliefs it may seem unnecessary to bother oneself about the problems of traditional philosophy. Philistine minds will be tempted to mask their incompetency with the boast that the puzzles that they have failed to solve were 'unreal,' 'old fashioned,' 'dialectical' subtleties with which a practical man in a practical age need not concern himself. Like the fox in the fable, if we fail to get the grapes we can save our face by calling them sour." ⁷ In so far as pragmatism lends itself to this interpretation and use it is impractical in the deepest sense of the word. For such a use of philosophy, and such an attitude toward the literature of philosophy, cannot be universalized without destroying philosophy.

⁷ *Loco citato*, p. 167. The quotation from Spengler in the paragraph above is from the selection in my *Anthology of Recent Philosophy*, p. 620. See the discussion of Spengler below, p. 339.

PART FIVE
OTHER TYPES



CHAPTER I

TYPES PREDOMINANTLY IDEALISTIC

I. NEO-IDEALISM

IN classifying contemporary idealism in Part II, Chapter I, mention was made of the idealism of Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile in Italy. Bosanquet and others have called this *Neo-Idealism*, and since it stands somewhat apart from other forms of idealism and practically no attention was given to it in Part II, let us give a brief resumé of it here.

Neo-Idealism has been developed on an Hegelian basis, and it shares with the other types of Neo-Hegelianism an acceptance of the fundamental principle of the concrete universal and the basic dialectical method of reasoning. But Croce points out that Hegel's use of the dialectical method is defective in that he ignored the underlying difference between a relation between entities that are merely distinct from each other, and that between entities that are real opposites in their internal nature. One type of concrete universal is a unity of opposites and the other type is a unity of distinct entities. For example, imagination and intellect form the unity of imagination as employed in Art and Poetry, and this unity is a concrete universal. But imagination and intellect also form the unity that is employed in philosophy, yet this unity comprises Art and Poetry, and hence it is a concrete universal of a higher order. Thus in the case of a concrete universal which is formed by a synthesis of distinct entities there are degrees of concrete universality, and the distinct entities are relatively independent. But this is not true of the concrete universals which are the

unities of opposites. Here both opposites are abstractions and neither has separate reality such as distinct entities have. Because Hegel failed to recognize this fundamental difference, he set up an illegitimate distinction between Spirit and Nature. This he was never able to overcome with his *panlogism* and his identification of reality with rationality. Spirit does not stand opposed to Nature but contains Nature within itself.

Consequently Neo-Idealism abandons the notion of a transcendental Absolute, and of a transcendental realm of reality which stands in sharp opposition to the world of appearance. The Absolute is an immanent Spirit, working itself out in history. Two forms of the mind's activity lead equally well to a recognition of this Spirit. One of these is the theoretical activity which produces art and philosophy. It yields the beautiful and the true as its basic values. The other is the practical activity which produces economics and ethics. It yields the useful and the good as its basic values. These four values are concrete universals and each one of them embodies the whole of Spirit under some one of its aspects. But they are not opposites or mere abstractions. Each is a distinct and independent entity, and the union of the four constitutes the concrete universal *par excellence*—the Absolute Spirit. Yet each of the four distinct values or concrete universals is itself a unity of opposites. Beauty is a union of beauty and ugliness, in which ugliness is overcome. Truth is a union of truth and falsehood, in which falsehood is overcome. Moral goodness is the unity of the good and the bad, in which the bad is overcome in perfection of character. Utility is the union of the useful and the worthless, in which utility overcomes worthlessness.

Hence Croce's interpretation of Neo-idealism makes two fundamental and original assertions: (i) Aesthetics or the philosophy of art is of central importance among the philosophical disciplines. (ii) The Absolute Spirit is an imma-




Photo Brown Bros.

HENRI BERGSON (1859-)

nent, indwelling process or activity, and not a transcendent, perfect and static intelligence. In developing these two fundamental doctrines Croce goes even further than Hegel in subordinating religion to philosophy. The latter gives us truth in pure logical and conceptual form, whereas the former is primarily a synthetical and symbolical representation of the Absolute Spirit. Hence religion is destined to be gradually displaced by philosophy as culture advances.

Croce's philosophy makes the Absolute Spirit, or the whole of reality, a concrete universal that is made up of four other distinct concrete universals, using the word "distinct" in the sense explained above. This raises the question of how all five of these concrete universals can be equally real. Giovanni Gentile attacks the distinction between the Absolute Spirit and the four values by denying that theoretical and practical activity are really separate types of activity. They differ only relatively. From the standpoint of theoretical activity the world is given ready-made, but from the standpoint of practical activity the world is yet to be made. Spirit is the unity of the *knowing-doing activity*, according to Gentile. Hence this thinker's philosophy is called *Actual Idealism*. He calls spirit or mind *pure act*. As Angelo Crespi puts it: "Gentile's idealism calls itself *actual* just because it starts from this initial concrete thinking act and proceeds to explain everything as due to the movement from concrete thinking to abstract thought."¹ But Gentile goes on to show that this thinking act is not the act of an empirical self, or ego, but that of a single immanent Ego or Spirit. Spirit thus begins as a subjective activity in which the thinking activity is the whole of the spirit. But it discovers its unity with all other spirit, and its freedom from all external limitations. And spirit is also a continual process of becoming and hence it is identical with history.

¹ Angelo Crespi: *Contemporary Thought of Italy*, p. 155 (Knopf). See Giovanni Gentile: *Theory of Mind as Pure Act* (Macmillan & Co.) and De Ruggiero: *Contemporary Philosophy* (Allen & Unwin).

Only spirit is also self-conscious. It knows its history and its nature. This self-knowledge of spirit is philosophy. Thus "Actual Idealism" offers itself "as the supreme vindication of the freedom and worth of the human mind, since, on these lines, Man as Spirit is his own world, and there is no world beyond Man" (Crespi). It will be obvious to the reader that there is a close similarity between Gentile's fundamental position here, and that of the social idealism into which pragmatism seems to be emerging in some of its younger disciples. But it is far from being indetical with the rigorous logical instrumentalism of Dewey.

2. VITALISM

One of the most significant features of the thought of the twentieth century has been the rapid expansion and enrichment of the biological sciences. One distinguished authority, J. S. Haldane, has argued that mankind is turning away from a civilization built primarily upon mathematical and physical science to one based essentially on biological knowledge, and that the next few centuries will mark far greater advances in biology than the past century. However that may be, there can be no question but that biology has been coming into its own in recent years. Now one of the philosophical expressions of this highly significant fact is the philosophy of vitalism. The term *vitalism* was formerly used to mean "the doctrine that ascribes all the functions of an organism to a vital principle distinct from chemical and other physical forces" (Century Dictionary). But vitalism has recently come to mean the metaphysical theory which makes life or the principle of life the essence, or a part of the essence, of all reality. Hocking has given this philosophy the name of *bioism*, but there is no particular reason why the established term vitalism should be displaced by the term bioism.

A. *The Vitalism of Bergson*.—Henri Bergson has developed the most influential type of vitalistic philosophy.

His doctrines have been widely accepted in England and America, where he still has many ardent disciples and admirers. But even more important has been the tendency for realists, pragmatists and idealists to absorb Bergson's vitalistic theories. He has especially influenced William James, the pragmatist; McGilvary, Whitehead, and Joad, who are avowed realists; and G. Watts Cunningham, H. Wildon Carr, and R. F. A. Hoernlé, all of whom are distinguished idealists. Although we classified Bergson as a monistic idealist in Part II, Chapter I, many writers regard him as a vitalist, rather than as representing any one of the three main types of contemporary philosophy. The overwhelming importance of Bergson in contemporary philosophy is indicated by Isaac Benrubi's unquestionably true statement: "Bergson's life work is at once the culminating point and focus of all the progressive tendencies in French philosophy of the present day." And he is also equally right in holding that "Bergson's philosophy is not to be pigeonholed under the label of any existing 'ism.' " ² Let us, then, recognize the many-sidedness of this distinguished French philosopher, who has been awarded a Nobel Prize in Literature, and who is undoubtedly one of the supremely great men of our age. But let us also emphasize the type of vitalism of which he is the founder.

This vitalism is expressed in Bergson's famous phrase, *élan vital*, which was first used by him in a technical sense in *L'évolution créatrice* (1907), which Arthur Mitchell has translated into English under the title *Creative Evolution* (1911, Holt). The phrase *élan vital* summed up for Bergson the doctrine that there was an original life force or vital impetus, and that it has passed from one generation of living beings to another by way of developed individual organisms, they being the connecting links between the generations. This life force is conserved in every line of evolution of living beings, and it causes all of the numerous varieties

² Isaac Benrubi: *Contemporary Thought of France*, pp. 169 (Knopf).

of living forms and creates all new species. It divides itself more and more as it advances. "All life, animal and vegetable, seems in its essence like an effort to accumulate energy and then to let it flow into flexible channels, changeable in shape, at the end of which it will accomplish infinitely varied kinds of work. That is what the *vital impetus*, passing through matter, would fain do all at once. It would succeed, no doubt, if its power were unlimited, or if some reinforcement could come to it from without. But the impetus is finite, and it has been given once for all. It cannot overcome all obstacles" (p. 253 f.).

According to Bergson the vital impetus creates matter as a by-product of its activity. He compares the movement of life to that of a sky-rocket, matter being the dead sparks that fall behind the advancing flame of the rocket. But the vital impetus is not moving towards any fixed, predetermined or final end. Bergson repudiates what he calls *finalism* or static teleology. The only purpose he is willing to recognize is an immanent teleology within the vital impetus itself.

B. *Driesch's Vitalism*.—Hans Driesch, German experimental embryologist who turned philosopher, has developed an original vitalistic philosophy which is quite different from that of Bergson. In the first place, Driesch's vitalism is much more restricted than Bergson's. He denies that creative evolution applies to the physico-chemical level of reality. Founding his vitalism on his researches in embryology, he argues that embryological development is non-mechanistic and chiefly determined by the presence in the developing embryo of a life principle called, after Aristotle, *entelechy*. But every organism has its own distinct entelechy, and there is no single entelechy, such as Bergson's *élan vital*, operating in all living beings. At least this is true of Driesch's *embryological vitalism*. He recognizes a more inclusive vitalism which he calls phylogenetic development. By phylogeny Driesch means the theory of descent in the

broadest possible sense, and he says that phylogeny is "composed of the sum-total of all embryologies." For this whole evolutionary process he postulates a "*superpersonal phylogenetic entelechy*." This entelechy is comparable to Bergson's *élan vital*, since Driesch regards phylogeny as "one coherent process," whose ultimate source is this superpersonal entelechy. But this whole evolutionary process has an ultimate end, even though men cannot say that the evolution of the human species is that end. What the end is to be we do not know. This whole phylogenetic process is the unique phenomenon of life. However, when we seek to explain the cause of so unique and distinctive a phenomenon we find that there are two equally good explanations of the emergence of phylogeny or the phenomenon of life, and that we are absolutely incapable of deciding which is correct. One of these explanations is that the Superentelechy created life after its own nature, which it had prior to the beginning of phylogenetic evolution. And the other is that the essence, or nature, of Superentelechy is being made or evolved with phylogenetic evolution. It is obvious that Driesch uses the term entelechy in two quite different senses. In his embryological vitalism it is the inner principle determining the growth and development of every living organism. In his phylogenetic vitalism it is a single principle of the whole evolution of life, called Superentelechy and identified with God and with Bergson's *élan vital*. In his *History and Theory of Vitalism* Driesch shows how important vitalism has been in the history of philosophy, from Aristotle to the present day, and he also states the chief proofs and *indicia*, or evidences, for the doctrine.

C. *Eucken's Activism*.—The only other philosopher ever to win a Nobel Prize in Literature is, like Bergson, usually classified as a vitalist, and that is Rudolph Eucken who called his philosophy *activism*. His starting point is much less biological than that of Driesch and Bergson and more historical. Eucken's chief interest was in the self-conscious

cultural life of human beings rather than in the life force in plants and animals. Hence his general doctrine is even nearer to other types of contemporary idealism than is that of Bergson. Nevertheless he shares with Bergson a hostility to the *intellectualism* of Absolute Idealism, and he shares with Driesch the attitude of irrationalism suggested by the impossibility of deciding between the two opposed interpretations of Superentelechy's relation to phylogeny. Eucken postulates the reality of a super-individual and super-social spiritual life. This spiritual life is absolutely independent of our experience of it. We come to know of its existence through the life of action. "Action," he says, "is the best defensive weapon against the dangers and tricks of human existence." And again: "Doubt is not cured by meditation, but by action." We must act in order to know the deepest truths, even though our activity entails suffering. "Not suffering, but spiritual destitution is man's worst enemy." It is the power of the spiritual world of activity which is alone able to arouse man to spiritual activity. And in this activity he reaches a fuller realization of what life is and of life's ideals. Eucken expressly condemns those interpretations of life which make it a mere process—"a soulless mechanism." The ethical must be made "the motive and progressive power of the spiritual life itself," if we are to avoid interpreting life as a mere process. And this is the essential feature of Eucken's activism as set forth in his most important systematic work.³

D. *The British Vitalists*.—A number of prominent philosophers of England are defenders of vitalism. Joad has adapted the vitalism of Bergson to a realistic type of metaphysics. J. A. Thompson has argued that life is inexplicable

³ See Rudolph Eucken: *Life's Basis and Life's Ideals*, especially pp. 255 ff. The German title of this work is *Grundlinien einer neueren Lebensanschauung*. The English translation was made by A. C. Wiggery and published by Adam and Charles Black. Note the similarity between Eucken's activism and Gentile's actual idealism, and see the discussion of religious pragmatism below, p. 351.

if we deny the existence of some kind of vital impulse or creative energy within each organism. J. S. Haldane has stressed the need of recognizing the wholeness and organic coördination of the organs and cells of every living being. J. C. Smuts, in *Holism and Evolution*, has invented the term *holism* as a name for the vital principle, and he goes so far as to argue that this principle of holism is present at every level of reality. Both Thompson and Smuts are panpsychists to the extent that they assert the presence of a non-mechanical vital activity in every natural object. In the personal statement of his philosophy in *Contemporary British Philosophy* Thompson calls his view *methodological vitalism* and defends what he calls the "heresy of panpsychism."

3. INDIVIDUALISM AND SELF-EXPRESSIONISM

Another widespread tendency in contemporary philosophy, ably represented by a number of gifted thinkers in different countries, is known as individualism. It especially protests against the tendency of so many modern philosophers to exaggerate the importance of the social and of the physical sciences, and to make them the basis of philosophy. According to individualism the personality of each independent thinker,—including his prejudices, sentiments, and emotions,—must be made the basis of all sound philosophizing. Out of the actual crises of individual experience arise the problems which lead to the development of that person's philosophy. According to the individualists, "Express thyself!" is the first law of life. Find out what your peculiar life work is and enter upon it with enthusiasm, for you are the most ultimate reality you will ever discover. In the words of Thomas Carlyle: "Blessed is he who has found his work; let him ask no other blessedness."

In this country Warner Fite has long defended this viewpoint with especial vigor, most recently in his essay entitled "The Impersonal and the Personal" in *Contemporary*

American Philosophy. But Fite refers especially to the distinguished Spanish philosopher, M. Unamuno, in whose *Tragic Sense of Life* this point of view has been persuasively presented. The same general doctrine has been most interestingly presented in the writings of Count Hermann Keyserling, especially in the widely read *Travel Diary of a Philosopher* and in *The World in the Making*, in the latter of which he gives an excellent autobiographical sketch, showing how he worked out his own philosophical position.

Fite holds that the fundamental question is: What is it to live?, not What is life? And he quotes his own earlier *Moral Philosophy*: "It seems to me that he who in this human sense is at home in the world, who in the circle of family and kin finds an ever-satisfying affection and understanding, and in his friends an intelligence ever responsive to his tastes, has the best that life has to offer; and that he who lacks these lacks everything" (p. 286). And according to Unamuno the flesh and blood men, who stand behind the bookish and pedantic caricatures of the great philosophers, built their systems to satisfy the urgent vital yearnings of their souls. The will to live, the hunger for immortality, self-love, if you like, identifies itself with all that lives, and ardently longs to survive this earthly life. Precisely this longing is the tragic sense of life. Keyserling lays down the basic principle of all individualism and self-expressionism when he says: "The best method by which a man can find out the truths which apply to all is to study his own mental processes; and he can therefore best serve the needs of all by realizing his own ideal of spiritual personal increase."⁴ In the end all individualists would agree with Fite's credo: "Having in mind what it is to live, I feel that to think of this human life as 'social progress'—from the 'public' point of view—is inconceivably trivial. I

⁴ Hermann Keyserling: *The World in the Making*, p. 8. Translated by Maurice Samuel (Harcourt, Brace & Co.). The quotation from Fite is from *Contemporary American Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 380f. Edited by G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague and published by The Macmillan Company.

can think only of the countless men and women who have been passionate and have expended time and zeal; for whom, as for you and me, life has been a tragic experience. And then I think that if I could conceive of a realm of being in which none of those lives would ever lose its vitality, in which no soul which has been passionate would ever cease to live—a realm of being not by any stretch of imagination to be put within the boundaries of the natural world—if I could see this, then I should know that I had found a rational universe, a real universe, a spiritual universe, and a universe religiously significant." Verily a stirring statement of the *modern* longing for immortality, and a striking proof that that longing has not yet been destroyed by naturalistic thinkers!

4. SOME NATIONALISTIC PHILOSOPHERS

In addition to Unamuno, who is generally recognized as the true symbol of his beloved Spain, there are some other distinguished contemporary philosophers who have identified themselves with their national culture, and who have especially interested themselves in interpreting philosophy in terms of their particular culture. Foremost among these is T. G. Masaryk, President of the Republic of Czechoslovakia, who is also President-elect of the 8th International Congress of Philosophy, which will convene in Prague in 1934. Masaryk's philosophy is essentially a cultural idealism. He is favorably known because of his critique of Marxianism. In Poland Lutoslawski has long been recognized as the expositor of a cultural idealism based upon Polish culture. He is an extreme individualist who believes that the souls of men are eternal, and who has developed a unique form of spiritual pluralism. And in India the gifted philosophers S. Rhadakrishnan and Dasgupta, have re-interpreted the classic idealism which is so deeply rooted in the culture of India. Into the details of

these philosophies of distinct cultures we cannot here enter, but they are destined to exercise a permanent influence upon the intellectual growth of the peoples among whom they have originated.

CHAPTER II

TYPES PREDOMINANTLY REALISTIC

I. PHENOMENOLOGY

THE most important philosophy of the twentieth century in Germany is known as phenomenology—the science of phenomena. It was founded by Edmund Husserl and its earliest form is found in his *Logische Untersuchungen*, originally published in two volumes in 1901, but republished in four volumes in 1928. Husserl gives Franz Brentano credit for having made important contributions to the basic principles of phenomenology. But Husserl himself is the real originator of this type of philosophy, and a number of his able disciples have elaborated and applied the phenomenological method to every branch of philosophy. Among these contemporary German phenomenologists are M. Scheler (died in 1928), who especially applied the method to ethics and general theory of value; M. Geiger, who applied it to aesthetics; M. Heidigger, who applied it to ontology; Jean Hering, who applied it to the philosophy of religion; and A. Pfänder, A. Reinach, E. Stein, and others, who have written important treatises expounding various aspects of the doctrine. In 1913 Husserl founded the philosophical periodical entitled: *Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Forschung*, and it has appeared regularly since then. In the volumes of this journal that have been published there are numerous valuable technical discussions of this philosophy. Husserl's *Ideas* has recently been translated into English and he wrote a valuable article on *Phenomenology* for the new (14th) edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Phenomenology has estab-

lished itself firmly in Germany and it is now spreading to other lands. It is generally recognized as one of the major tendencies in contemporary philosophy, and as being more closely related to realism than to idealism or pragmatism. Yet it certainly contains many idealistic doctrines. In *Implication and Linear Inference* Bernard Bosanquet subjected Husserl's logical theories to criticism and indicated their relation to the logical theories of Absolute Idealism. Undoubtedly Husserl is greatly indebted to Kant and to Hegel, but phenomenology may be regarded as a modern epistemology constructed to replace the Kantian. Nevertheless it is in the direction of realism. This philosophy is so technical and intricate that we will only attempt to characterize briefly the chief types. But first let us define a few of the important technical terms used by phenomenologists.

The original meaning of the Greek word for phenomenon is *that which displays itself*, and this sense is retained by the phenomenologists. Phenomenon is a perfectly general term which refers to what ever displays itself to any consciousness. It means "the being present of an object." The term is used in a different sense in natural science, where it refers to the appearance of some real thing. In phenomenology there may be phenomena when there are no real things of which they are the appearances. For example, the null class in logic, fairies, round squares, centaurs, et cetera. In fact any conceptual object displays itself whenever it is thought about, and is, therefore, a phenomenon. Phenomenology is the science of all phenomena, whether they are the appearances of real things or are purely conceptual and fanciful. Brentano's term *intentional*, which he adopted from the scholastic philosophers, plays an important rôle in phenomenology. By this term the phenomenologists mean "the essential 'reference' character of the phenomena," *i.e.*, the fact that we always intend objects and that each object which we intend has its own intentional structure. To use Husserl's own example: "The perception

of a cube reveals a multiple and synthesized intention: a continuous variety in the 'appearance' of the cube, according to differences in the points of view from which it is seen, and corresponding differences in 'perspective,' and all the difference between the 'front side' actually seen at the moment and the 'backside' which is not seen, and which remains, therefore, relatively 'indeterminate', and yet is supposed equally to be existent." Phenomenologists use the term *noetic* to mean experiencing and the term *noematic* to mean the experienced. And they use the term *eidetic*, from the Greek word *εἶδος*, to mean the essence or form of any phenomenon as distinct from its factual character. *Eidetic reduction* means the treatment of phenomena with respect to their pure form, ignoring their factual character entirely.

A. *Psychological Phenomenology*.—Husserl thinks that there is an absolutely universal, pure and *a priori*, or rational, psychology, parallel to natural science. Its chief task is to investigate the various types of intentional structure of phenomena, with a view to reducing these to what he calls the *prime intentions*. These constitute "the nature of the psychical" and "the being of the soul." But we may also discover the intentions of which the social life consists. Phenomenological psychology is the first level of phenomenological interpretation of reality.

B. *Eidetic Phenomenology*.—The intentional structures dealt with in psychological phenomenology still retain an objective and empirical content. To reach a more formal phenomenology it is necessary to abstract this away, purging the phenomena of absolutely every empirical and psycho-physical element. By so doing we arrive at the bare essence, or form, or eidetic structure of phenomena. As Husserl puts it: "The phenomenology of the perception of bodies, for example, will not be an account of actually occurring perceptions, or those which may be expected to occur, but of that invariable 'structure,' apart from which

no perception of a body, single or prolonged, can be conceived. The phenomenological [psychological] reduction reveals the phenomena of actual internal experience; the eidetic reduction, the essential forms constraining psychical existence." (*Encyclopedia Britannica*, 14th ed., Vol. XVII, p. 700.) Later Husserl calls this process the "rationalization of the essential."

C. *Transcendental Phenomenology*.—Husserl defines the transcendental as "the quality of that which is consciousness." And he says that we have to recognize that "relativity to consciousness is not only an actual quality of our world, but, from eidetic necessity, the quality of every conceivable world." Now transcendental phenomenology deals with the ultimate structure of all consciousness, and takes us a stage beyond eidetic phenomenology. At this stage the subjective "I" and the social "we" are completely replaced by the "transcendental I" and the "transcendental we," and both of these are unified in one concrete transcendental consciousness. This is undoubtedly pure transcendental idealism.

D. *Ontological Phenomenology*.—Yet we may go a step further and develop a universal "first philosophy" that will combine all sciences—mathematical, logical, natural, and social. Since phenomenology is the science of all phenomena, it is the science of all possible existence and existences. As such phenomenology studies the formal structure of all being whatsoever. In this ontological phenomenology are included all rational and intelligible problems of every science whatsoever. "Phenomenology is not less than man's whole occupation with himself in the service of human reason." Here, again, Husserl seems to be almost wholly an idealist.

Yet he at once adds that "phenomenology demands of phenomenologists that they shall forego particular closed systems of philosophy, and share decisive work with others toward persistent philosophy." And there can be no doubt

but that he regards Absolute Idealism as a particular closed system. The phenomenologists share the conviction and the assurance that it is now possible, in the light of recent advances in knowledge and using the phenomenological method, to rebuild the ancient citadel of "first philosophy," and to establish on a permanent foundation, that is neither idealistic nor realistic, the "science of the sciences."¹

2. IRRATIONALISM

One of the most influential philosophies of the twentieth century was originated by Émile Meyerson. He was born in Russian Poland, but he has lived most of his life in Paris and his writings were originally written in French. His philosophy has come to be known as *Irrationalism*. In his epoch-making *Identity and Reality* (1908), an English translation of which appeared in 1930 (by Kate Loewenberg) from the third French edition of 1926, *L'explication dans les sciences* (1921), *La déduction relativiste* (1925), and in the article entitled *Explanation* in the 14th edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Meyerson has worked out this theory in great detail, supporting it with his amazing knowledge of the history of natural science. Einstein has referred to Meyerson's "brilliant studies in the theory of knowledge." Lord Balfour, J. H. Muirhead, and others have praised Meyerson highly. As a result of the high quality of his writings his theories are gaining wide recognition at the present time.²

¹ See also Paul A. Schilpp's article "Max Scheler 1872-1928" and the references to his other articles on Scheler contained therein, *Philosophical Review*, Vol. XXXVIII, pp. 574ff. Another good account of phenomenology is Marvin Farber's *Phenomenology as a Method and as a Philosophical Discipline*, University of Buffalo Studies, Vol. VI, 1928. Farber studied with Husserl after studying logic at Harvard. He has a thorough understanding of Husserl's system, as well as of the symbolic logic of the mathematical logicians. Hence his monograph is of special value to the student of phenomenology. See also W. Tudor Jones: *Contemporary Thought of Germany*, Vol. I, Chap. VI, for a more popular account of phenomenology.

² See the article on Meyerson in the *Saturday Review of Literature*, Vol. V, p. 1171. See also George Boas: *A Critical Analysis of the Philosophy of Émile Meyerson*. For a French critique see M. Gillet: *La Philosophie de M. Meyerson* in *Archives de Philosophie*, Vol. VIII, 3.

Meyerson's fundamental theory is that true scientific explanation is reached, not by finding laws or even causes, but by using the principle of identity or *the schema of identification*. He holds that the work of the scientist in making any scientific explanation is the establishing or, in any case, the affirming of identity between an event and its antecedents, and that this holds in spite of the acknowledged differences between them. In other words, all scientific explanation presupposes that reality is rational, that there are separate fibres, to use Lord Balfour's term, in reality, which the mind can single out and follow through, and that "the schema of identity constitute the eternal framework of the mind," so that all the sciences are thoroughly pervaded by these schema. So far Meyerson seems to be accepting the idealistic thesis of the identity of the structure of the real and the rational.

Yet it is just at this point that he introduces his doctrine of irrationality. For the differences the mind seeks to ignore in using its principle of identity refuse to be left out of account. When a principle of explanation is carried through to the very end it confronts these differences. They require another principle of explanation. And this conflict, in which all scientific explanations end, is due to an irrationality in reality itself. In *Identity and Reality*, Chapter IX, and in *De l'explication dans les sciences*, Book I, Chapter VI, and Book IV, Chapters XVI-XVIII, Meyerson discusses at length the nature and the diverse forms of this irrationality. A single illustration must here suffice to illustrate what he means.

Suppose that we think of a wave motion of light stimulating the retina of the human eye, and setting up a current in the sense organ which terminates in the cortical area of the brain. Corresponding to this purely mechanical motion in the nerve and brain tissue there is a sensation of light or color. Science can explain what motion is in mechanical terms and it can explain what a sensation is in psychical

terms, but it can never explain "the *manner* by which mechanical movement is transformed into sensation." We can never make the relation between such diverse entities as mechanical movements and sensations intelligible. Yet this relation is an actual fact which nobody can question. And this fact Meyerson calls an *irrational*. This term, he says, "has the advantage of clearly indicating that it is a question of a *fact*, which we believe to be certain, but which remains and always will remain incomprehensible, inaccessible to our reason, irreducible to purely rational elements." And he then adds that "in admitting the existence of this limit we affirm not only that we shall never succeed in understanding this 'irrational,' but that we shall never approach this understanding—that we shall approach only the limit." ³

3. MECHANISM

In sharp contrast to vitalism stands contemporary mechanism. Many thinkers defend a purely mechanistic theory of mind and of vital phenomena. Behaviorism in psychology is really a metaphysical mechanism. But one of the most interesting types of contemporary mechanism is that set forth by the distinguished Italian positivistic philosopher, Eugenio Rignano. He calls his theory vitalistic finalism, but it is not like any of the vitalisms discussed above.

Rignano assumes that the physical world is constituted out of energies of various types. He speaks of "all the energies of the inorganic world" being differentiated from nervous energy solely by the presence in the latter of *the mnemonic property*. Adaptation to environment is not a distinctive characteristic of vital energy, since even chemical systems reestablish their equilibrium when it is disturbed. What physico-chemical systems lack is the mnemonic property, and that means the capacity to reproduce the ways of adapting themselves "solely through internal

³ Émile Meyerson: *Identity and Reality*, p. 298. Translated by Kate Loewenberg and published by The Macmillan Company, 1930.

causes." It is this property which makes living energy capable of being influenced from in front instead of merely from behind. The mnemonic accumulation in the living organism functions as an inner force which directs the organism's development and behavior. From this fact there arises an eternal conflict between "the essentially finalistic microcosm and the purely mechanical macrocosm." Reason makes us affirm the universality of mechanism, but feeling makes us affirm the reality of purpose and of directedness towards an end. "This opposition between reason and sentiment will never have an end, unless perhaps man resigns himself to search for the ultimate reason of his conduct, the supreme purpose of his existence, no longer in the whole universe but rather in the narrower domain of life, with which he has community of origin and nature."⁴ But that Rignano thinks that man should so resign himself is clear from his claim to have proven the utter futility of metaphysical speculation, as well as from his praise of the life of altruistic service of mankind as a substitute for religion and all other transcendental values and interests. Thus in the end Rignano follows what he thinks are the dictates of reason, and holds that the sway of mechanism is absolute in the universe.

4. CULTURAL PLURALISM

For many years students of human culture and history have simply assumed that cultural evolution has been linear and single. Let us call this view *cultural monism*, a popular exposition of which will be found in James Harvey Robinson's *The Mind in the Making*, as well as in a number of other popular books of recent years. In technical form cultural monism was defended in the philosophy of history of the Hegelian School, and it is the part of Hegelianism which the pragmatists have never questioned. In

⁴ Eugenio Rignano: *The Psychology of Reasoning*, p. 392. Translated by Winifred A. Holl and published by Harcourt, Brace & Co. See also his *Nature of Life*, translated by N. Mallinson.

fact cultural monism is the basic dogma of pragmatism. It was also strongly supported by evolutionists like Herbert Spencer and by the positivists, following Auguste Comte's famous law of the three stages.⁵ According to cultural monism, Greek culture was absorbed by Roman, and Modern European culture absorbed the Graeco-Roman, along with Hebraic-Christian and Arabian elements. The whole evolution of history has been a single temporal process in which each succeeding culture absorbed that which preceded it. No dogma was ever more deeply rooted as a basic part of culture than the dogma of cultural monism has been in the culture of the western world during the past half century.

For anyone to call this strongly entrenched dogma into question, and to brand it with epithets that belittle it, would not have been thought conceivable twenty years ago. And yet before and during the World War a young German scholar was actually engaged in the Herculean task of marshaling all possible evidence against it. Branding this current dogma "the Ptolemaic theory of history," Oswald Spengler set up, in his monumental *Decline of the West*, the opposing thesis of *cultural pluralism*, calling it "the Copernican theory of history." He argued that cultural monism is based upon a false analogy. If we study organic evolution as it is exhibited in the plant and animal world we find everywhere that there are many separate lines of evolution, and that each goes through definite stages of birth, youth, maturity, and senescence. We may observe this fact among species as well as among individual organisms. Nature does not reveal a single linear evolution for plants and animals. Yet cultural monism assumes that such an evolution is a scientific fact so far as human culture is concerned. This is a false analogy. The true inference is that

⁵ See the second selection from Hegel, and the first selection from Comte, in my *Anthology of Modern Philosophy* for classic statements of cultural monism.

human cultures, like animal species and individual organisms, are genuinely temporal realities which rise, flourish and pass away. Instead of human history constituting a single evolutionary process, culminating in modern West European culture, we must recognize that there have been several great cultures in the world, and that the stages of our West European culture can be compared with the stages in these other cultures. Spengler calls such a study the comparative morphology of world history.

When this comparison is made, Spengler thinks that one at once discovers that West European culture is in the stage of old-age. He gives it only three or four more centuries of life and these centuries will be marked by a rapid decline and disintegration. In proof of this Spengler cites the similarities between West European culture and the classical culture at the period when that culture declined and disintegrated. One of these similarities is the concentration of life in a few great world cities, and the draining of the energies of the country-side into these cities. When this happens a culture has become a civilization, and that means that it is on the decline. Another group of similarities between West European culture and classical culture is that each aspect of our culture—art, science, religion, and philosophy—is now in the stage in which these same aspects of culture were during the last years of classical culture. Spengler goes into great detail to indicate these similarities. He especially points out the difference between the great modern philosophers who constructed the important systems of philosophy when West European culture was at its height, and the puny pygmies who are philosophers today. He concludes that our culture is incapable of producing any great system of philosophy, or any great art, and that our science will become more and more an applied science in which knowledge will be used to exploit nature. All that is left for contemporary philosophers to do is to work out a consistent type of scepticism.

Spengler's cultural pluralism has aroused a storm of criticism from the defenders of cultural monism, and the staunch believers in the ideals of internationalism. Yet no philosophical conception of the 20th century has been more widely disseminated. Thousands upon thousands of Spengler's two massive volumes have been sold since the work first appeared in 1918, and a voluminous Spenglerian literature has been produced. What the ultimate outcome of the controversy between cultural monism and cultural pluralism will be no one can predict. Spengler has at least set the modern world to thinking.

5. SPIRITUAL REALISM

There are several contemporary philosophers who have attempted to develop a spiritual interpretation of reality that is genuinely realistic. These thinkers are theistic in that they assert the reality of God. But they are also pluralistic in that they hold to the relatively independent reality of human souls. And they are realistic in that they insist that the objective reality dealt with by science is constituted out of elements that are relatively independent reals. The chief representatives of spiritual realism are the neo-scholastic philosophers. Their philosophy is often called The New Thomism, after St. Thomas Aquinas, whose philosophy has long been recognized as the official philosophy of the Roman Catholic Church. Pope Leo XIII, in a famous *Encyclical*, gave Roman Catholic thinkers permission to modernize the system of St. Thomas by incorporating into it as many of the new scientific ideas as could be made consistent with the basic principles of Thomism. Since Thomism is itself a re-interpretation of Aristotelianism, the New Thomism continues the Aristotelian type of philosophy. Another name for this philosophy is Neo-Scholasticism. It has numerous vigorous defenders in this country and in Europe, and publishes important philosophical journals.

Spiritual realism, however, is not confined to the neo-scholastic philosophers. Aliotta, De Sarlo, Martinetti, and Varisco are not orthodox scholastics, but they have developed a spiritual realism in Italy which stands in rather sharp opposition to the neo-idealism of Croce and Gentile. And there are important Protestant thinkers who would not object to being called spiritual realists, so much are they opposed to the current types of idealism.⁶

⁶ See the coöperative volume entitled *Religious Realism*, edited by D. C. Macintosh and published by The Macmillan Company, 1931.

CHAPTER III

TYPES PREDOMINANTLY PRAGMATIC

I. FICTIONALISM

WHEN Josiah Royce was studying in Germany he met a young privatdocent whom he describes in an interesting paragraph of his exposition of the philosophy of Kant. "The Kant devotee never knows when to stop. When I studied in Germany as a young college graduate, some fifteen years ago, it was my fortune to meet one of the most learned and many-sided of the new philosophical doctors of the day, who was just then preparing for a docentship. He was a man who promised, as one might say, almost everything; who wrote and published essays of remarkable breadth and skill, and who was especially noticeable for his wide range of work. Some years later, it unhappily occurred to him to begin printing a commentary on Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason." He planned the commentary for completion in four volumes octavo. Of these four he published, not long afterwards, the first, a volume of several hundred large pages, wherein he deals—with Kant's introductory chapter. Since then my former acquaintance is lost. The final volumes of the commentary have never appeared, although he has now been at work upon them more than ten years. How many volumes will really be needed to complete the task, only the 'destroyer of delights and terminator of felicities,' whom the Arabian Nights' tales always love to mention as they close, to wit, Death himself, can ever determine."¹ Royce does not name this remarkable

¹ Josiah Royce: *The Spirit of Modern Philosophy*, 2nd ed., pp. 104f. (Houghton Mifflin Co.).

scholar, but his description exactly fits a man who is today recognized as one of the world's most distinguished living philosophers, Hans Vaihinger. For he began his career as an ardent admirer and disciple of Kant, planned to write a complete commentary on Kant, the first volume of which appeared in 1884 and the second in 1892, and then founded the *Kantstudien*, a philosophical journal devoted to the Kantian philosophy.

Vaihinger's profound knowledge of Kantian literature fructified in his monumental work, *The Philosophy of As If*, which went through several editions in German before it was translated into English by C. K. Ogden. In this work Vaihinger develops a theory, based upon various passages of Kant's writings, that all scientific, religious, ethical, and metaphysical concepts, in fact, all concepts whatsoever, are fictions which have *value* but which lack absolute truth. Hence his philosophy has come to be known as *fictionalism*. He traces the history of the doctrine, showing that William of Occam was the first thinker to give an exposition of the fictional nature of general ideas and to stress the practical necessity of *ficta*, as the scholastics called them. And he points out that Hobbes, Leibniz, Condillac, and Wolff were modern precursors of Kant in the development of fictionalism. But he also traces the doctrine back to the Greeks, and he shows how it was developed after Kant by Herbart, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and others.

Vaihinger is a great admirer of Schopenhauer and of von Hartmann, and accepts pessimism as the best philosophy of life. In justification of this he refers to Kant's theory that there is a radical evil in human nature, and he calls attention to von Hartmann's having called Kant "the father of pessimism." Vaihinger thinks that pessimism in no way weakens biological and moral energy. On the contrary it makes one fight all the harder for himself, and it also makes him eager to serve others and to relieve their distresses. Then, too, it makes one less subjective and more

objective in his general attitude. Vaihinger's fictionalism is thus closely allied to the irrationalism and pessimism of Schopenhauer.

In the course of his exposition of the theory Vaihinger makes a detailed classification of all the different types of fictions. At first he thought of fictionalism only as a method, and he merely collected cases of fictions which are of special value in various fields of knowledge. Then he came to see the metaphysical side of fictionalism, and the view developed into a "universal system of philosophy," which Vaihinger called *Idealistic Positivism*, because he thought that it was a just compromise between the prevailing idealism of German philosophy and the positivism developed by Laas. He summarizes the doctrine under fifteen headings. The more important of these are: (i) the irrationality existing between the two spheres of physics and psychology; (ii) voluntarism or the insistence that the primal reality is striving and willing; (iii) the complete subordination of all thinking to the will to live; (iv) the notion that the importance of the conceptual world constructed by thought is due entirely to its fictional character, since it constitutes a world of values in which we may take refuge from the world of change and becoming; and (v) the fact that the world as a whole is meaningless and that "a mind sublime puts greatness into life, yet seeks it not therein" (Schiller).

Vaihinger makes a great deal of what he calls *the law of the preponderance of the means over the end*. He thinks that it is a general tendency for whatever is a means to some end to get the upper hand and to become an end in itself. Thought is really only a means by which we adapt ourselves to the environment and satisfy our biological needs. Yet thought gets divorced from its function and is made an end in itself. Then it sets up problems of all kinds that are absolutely insoluble. Such questions are endless and senseless. All that we can do is to explain how they

arose psychologically. When we try to answer them we are led into bypaths. "In this light many thought-processes and thought-constructs appear to be consciously false assumptions, which either contradict reality, or are even contradictory in themselves, but which are intentionally thus formed in order to overcome difficulties of thought by this artificial deviation and reach the goal of thought by round-about ways and bypaths."

Vaihinger discusses the relation of fictionalism to pragmatism and denies that they are identical. The principle of pragmatism is that ideas which are useful in practice are necessarily true, or that "the fruitful is thus always true." But the principle of fictionalism is that ideas which are known to lack truth may nevertheless possess a high degree of utility. However, Vaihinger admits that in practice fictionalism and pragmatism have much in common. Certainly all pragmatists would accept his law of the preponderance of the means over the end, as well as many other of his doctrines. M. C. Otto speaks of the "striking affinities" between pragmatism and fictionalism, and expresses regret that American pragmatists have not received Vaihinger's book more warmly. He writes: "The reception of Vaihinger's work by the American pragmatists has scarcely been hearty. He, on his side, seemed anxious (in the Preface written nearly a generation after the completion of the book) to avoid being classed with the pragmatists. In a letter to the writer in the spring of 1925, Vaihinger explains that his objections were not aimed at James, Dewey, or any form of 'critical Pragmatism', but at the 'uncritical Pragmatism' which ignorantly distorts and exaggerates what is valuable in this philosophy. This regrettable failure in mutual acquaintance and understanding is well considered in James Gutmann's recent review of Vaihinger's Book (*Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXIII, pp. 77-80). I think with him that 'there seems to be here an interesting and unconsidered instance of a significant

community of thought.' And I hope with him that it may be replaced by 'an international comparing of notes.'"² And the fact that both fictionalism and pragmatism rest back upon similar Kantian ideas is evidence in favor of Otto's position.

2. IMAGINISM

A few contemporary thinkers, foremost among whom is Douglas Fawcett, defend a philosophy which they call *imaginism*. Fawcett invented this term. In *The World as Imagination* and *Divine Imagining* (Macmillan & Co.), as well as in his essay entitled *Imaginism* in the second series of *Contemporary British Philosophy*, he has given a complete exposition of the doctrine, discussing its relation to other views and indicating the ways in which it solves special problems.

Imaginism is based upon an interesting passage from Kant. "We have to inquire whether imagination combined with consciousness may not be the same thing as memory, wit, power of discrimination, and perhaps even identical with understanding and Reason. Though logic is not capable of deciding whether a fundamental power actually exists, the idea of such a power is the problem involved in a systematic representation of such a multiplicity of powers." (Cited in Norman Kemp Smith's *Commentary*, p. 474). But Kant never developed this pregnant suggestion. Fichte showed the connection between productive imagination and constructed nature, thus giving the principle of imagination cosmic standing. Froschammer recognized that *Phantasie* is a universal force permeating all nature, but neither Fichte nor Froschammer made imagination the sole creative, all-inclusive, all-explanatory principle of reality. This Fawcett claims to have been the first to do. And he was led to this view because of his dissatisfaction with the

² M. C. Otto in *Philosophy Today*, edited by E. L. Schaub, p. 43 (note), Open Court Publishing Co.

rationalistic principle of Hegel and the British Neo-Hegelians.

"Do we desire now to escape (*a*) from the concept of the block-universe which still holds the field, and (*b*) from the further concept which identifies this block-universe with Reason? We can do so by supposing that the world-principle is (*a*) at once conservative and creative, and (*b*) that it resembles, at a distance, what is conspired as pure imagining in ourselves. I say 'pure' imagining, since imaginal constructs which are used to represent *other* reality, which are thus under the control of this 'other', have become, in virtue of their function, portions of instrumental conceptual thought. They belong thereby to the story of reason which opens in connexion with the needs of finite sentiments adjusting themselves tentatively to surroundings in a divided world."³

Fawcett is careful to distinguish imagination in this broad sense from imagining narrowly so-called, which is merely one of the phases of the deeper imagining. Of the two aspects of cosmic imagining—the conservative and the creative—the latter is much more fundamental. "Conservation implies sustaining activity; to be is to be created or create or both." And this creative force of cosmic imagining is identical with time and includes duration, simultaneity, and succession. Moreover, it is conscious. In its active self-conscious aspect imagining is *consciring*. This is a technical term invented by Fawcett to name the conscious creativity of the cosmic imagining. He says that it is identical with Fichte's "infinite activity," thought of as being aware of its own contents.

Consciring, however, is not rational or intellectual activity. Truth is relational and is at a lower level. Thinking is purely instrumental. On this point James and Dewey and Schiller are right. Concepts and scientific laws are mere

³ Douglas Fawcett in *Contemporary British Philosophy*, 2nd series, p. 93. Edited by J. H. Muirhead and published by The Macmillan Co.

truth-shadows, whereas the reality with which conspiring is identical is wider and more real than truth. Thought only takes place in finite centres. Rignano is right in holding this theory. All thinking arises out of the necessity of an organism facing an obdurate environment and it shares the finitude of the organism. But divine imagining rises above truth and thought and includes all reality and all unreality. Just as James treated pragmatism as an adequate synthesis of empiricism and idealism, so Fawcett treats imaginism as such a synthesis. It excludes the subjective forms of idealism and the irrational and positivistic forms of realism. Hence it is at one and the same time the true idealism and the true realism. And although imaginism has not yet worked out a satisfactory solution of the problem of immortality, it fully recognizes that a philosophy which cannot solve this problem, and offer to men a reasonable assurance of future existence, is in the end worthless.

3. PANCALISM

A distinguished American scholar, J. M. Baldwin, editor of the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, has developed a view which he calls *pancalism*, which is similar to Fawcett's imaginism. The origin of the term pancalism is interesting. Baldwin wrote a three volume work entitled *Thought and Things or Genetic Logic*, Vol. III of which was devoted to *Real Logic*, Part I, *Interest and Art*. He has never published the remainder of *Real Logic* but he followed this third volume with an independent work, entitled *Genetic Theory of Reality*. He adopted as the motto for his *Genetic Logic* the Greek phrase τὸ καλὸν πᾶν, which means literally the beautiful is all. But at the end of Volume III of that work he reached the conclusion that this motto accurately expresses the nature of all reality. Hence he turned the phrase into the term pancalism as a name for his philosophy. He explains in the Preface of Vol. III how he formed the word and gives in a footnote a Greek

schoiar's justification of the formation, which is a little irregular, although there is a Greek word *πάνκαλος*.

Aesthetic immediatism is another name Baldwin uses for his philosophy. He holds that aesthetic experience is the highest form that knowledge can take, for the reason that it reconciles the opposition between truth and utility or practicality. The aesthetic whole conserves both truth and utility. "All the judgments of truth and value which the prosaic actualities permit are reconstituted in the aesthetic judgment: valid relations are depicted; moral predicates are reinstated; ideal suggestions are enforced; common acceptance is enjoined in the synnomic values of the art work." (Vol. III, p. 254.) But "aesthetic experience presents the profounder significance of which truth and utility are partial and immature factors." And further on he adds: "The theory which . . . issues in the reasoned view that in aesthetic contemplation we have the fullest revelation of what reality means, I shall venture to call Pancalism, rendering in a single term—which has analogies of derivation in the terms Pantheism, Panpsychism, etc.—the meaning of the motto affixed to the first volume of this treatise, *τὸ καλὸν πᾶν*" (p. 257). This theory is elaborated more at length in Part IV of a *Genetic Theory of Reality*, but we cannot here enter into the more detailed exposition.

Baldwin recognizes the kinship between his philosophy and pragmatism. In an essay entitled *Aspects of Contemporary Thought*, contributed to the *American Year Book* for 1910, and republished as Appendix C to Vol. III of *Genetic Logic*, he discusses this relationship. He accepts the word instrumentalism as the right term to use, if we want to stress the similarity between his view and pragmatism. For he agrees with the pragmatists in their polemic against idealism, in their theory that all knowledge is experimental in character, that ideas are instruments of action, that thought is an organism and a growing system that is essentially social in character. What he objects to

in pragmatism is its failure to make meaning an intrinsic value and a part of reality itself. Pragmatism stresses one side of human experience and neglects others, and it is especially weak in its aesthetic theory. Yet Creighton is undoubtedly right in saying: "Though there are some important differences between Professor Baldwin's views and those of the pragmatic evolutionists, they belong together in general standpoint and aim. Not only do they both approach the problem of logic from the psychological point of view, but both alike derive their working conceptions from the biological formulation of evolution rather than from post-Kantian idealism."⁴

4. RELIGIOUS PRAGMATISM

In a thesis for the doctor's degree at the Sorbonne in 1893, entitled *L'Action*, Maurice Blondel, a young Roman Catholic philosopher, and one of the founders of Catholic Modernism in France, argued that the will and the total active side of life is fundamental in determining what we accept as true. And in a letter which was published in 1902, in the *Revue du Clergé Français*, Blondel suggested that the name pragmatism was an exact description of his doctrine, and said that he had been using the term for a decade or more. But when the word pragmatism came to be used as the name for the new Anglo-American philosophy of Schiller, James, and Dewey, Blondel ceased to use the term because of the basic differences between his doctrine and theirs. However, as Caldwell and others have pointed out, there is much in common between the doctrines of the French modernists and the interpretation of religion of the pragmatists of England and America. Voluntarism, or the making of the will to believe fundamental to religious truth, is the chief point of agreement. But this voluntarism expresses itself in a pronounced anti-intellectualism in Blondel and his followers, who even attack Neo-Scholas-

⁴ *Psychological Review*, Vol. XVI, p. 179.

ticism for its excessive reliance upon human reason, and this is another point of agreement. The French religious pragmatists, however, differ from the Anglo-American pragmatists in defending *tradition* as necessary, and as a creative force which keeps alive the unconscious, but vital, beliefs of the past. The French thinkers especially stress the notion of the immanence of God. And the experience of God is not an outer experience but comes to man through the activity of his entire inner life. In this respect they hold a view which is quite similar to the *activism* of Eucken.

Édouard Le Roy has developed French religious pragmatism more fully than Blondel by combining it with the philosophy of Bergson. He denies that scientific knowledge is legitimate and treats scientific laws and facts as mere conventions and instruments of practical life. Philosophy, on the other hand, is concerned with the living spirit of man. Proofs of God's existence and the attempt to comprehend God intellectually are utterly worthless, and even sinfully presumptuous. Yet we know God through prayer, which renews the spirit and makes life an ever new creative process.

Le Roy uses the word pragmatism in an entirely different sense from the Anglo-American pragmatists. He does not identify truth with utility, but thinks that the fecundity of an idea is a sign or criterion of its truth. He insists that the verification of an idea should always be a deed and not simply an argument. "The supreme criterion is success: thought is satisfied whenever it springs from a very strong, rich, and luminous experimental test. In a word, verification is a sort of crisis in the growth of thought."⁵

5. SCIENTIFIC PRAGMATISM

Somewhat like Le Roy in his philosophy of science, although entirely independent and original in his viewpoint,

⁵ É. Le Roy in A. Lalande's *Vocabulaire de la philosophie*, 2nd ed., Vol. II, p. 612. My translation.

is Henri Poincaré, the distinguished French mathematician, who turned philosopher and made important contributions to the philosophy of science. In *La Valeur de la science* he distinguishes two components in the empirical laws of science: (i) a *convention* that is neither true nor false but that is simply laid down as a definition, and (ii) the law itself, which serves as a basis for a prediction about future events. Poincaré holds that the conceptual symbols used to express laws are often purely fictitious, and that whole systems of natural law may be suspended and be replaced by other systems. Hence science is relative to man, although it is not purely artificial but rather the result of social agreement. But Poincaré does not identify the truth of science with its practical utility, nor does he treat one science, say mathematics, as merely a servant of another, say physics. The value of a science is to be determined by its spiritual uplift rather than by its mere utility. Hence Poincaré opposes Le Roy's reduction of science to the value that it has in meeting the needs of action. Science has an objective character which Le Roy denies to it. Underneath all the fictional character of our conceptual symbols there is the World-Harmony—the total, unified whole of reality. And the scientist who can feel this deeper harmony of nature can conquer selfishness, and coöperate with other scientists in that prolonged effort to attain the truth, which is the essence of the scientific spirit. This feeling is, for Poincaré, the basis of ethics, and the principles follow that "there can be no scientific Ethics" and "there can be no unethical science."

Other representatives of scientific pragmatism, who differ somewhat from Poincaré and from each other, are Karl Pearson, who set forth this theory in *The Grammar of Science*, and F. Enriques, the distinguished Italian philosopher, who has developed interesting logical theories and a unique philosophy of science.

CHAPTER IV

THE TRUE PHILOSOPHY

I. ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM

IN expounding the three chief types of contemporary philosophy the author sided with the idealists because he believes that they have a better method of philosophizing, and a more satisfactory general basic principle than any of the others. But in concluding the discussion it seems essential to bring this assumption up for stricter examination and closer scrutiny. For all of those who have read thus far in this book must be genuinely interested in the all-important question: What is the true philosophy? Let us, then, try to lay away every prejudice in favor of one type or another, and abandon entirely the controversial attitude which characterizes him who takes sides. Let us make a final attempt to take the purely objective attitude of the real philosopher and the earnest seeker after the dizzy utmost of philosophic truth. And in this calm but impassioned attitude of the honest truth-seeker, let us face the question: What, after all, is the true philosophy?

When we face this question impartially and fairly we find that it may be approached from two different directions. One of these directions is relative and the other is absolute. But the relative approach will differ according to the viewpoint from which we construct our philosophy.

What is the true philosophy for me as an individual thinker, faced with the particular problems of my personal life? This is the form the question takes for every reflective person. A man's personal philosophy of life, as G. K. Chesterton and William James rightly emphasized, is the most

fundamental thing in him. In James's words, it is his "more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means," it is his "individual way of just seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos." Let each individual reader of this book seriously raise for himself the question: What is my philosophy of life? What philosophy is true for me? Now, when the question is raised in this personal form, it at once becomes clear that the answer to it cannot be that worked out by some other person, for example, by the author of this book. For each thinker must ultimately answer that question by thinking out his philosophy for himself. Hence the author's favoring idealism cannot and ought not to determine the answer which each reader gives to the personal form of the question: What is the true philosophy? And it goes without saying that no other philosopher's favoring any other type should determine that answer.

What is the true philosophy for America, or England, or France, or Germany, or Italy, or Russia, or China, or India? Born a citizen of a great national culture, every individual who is at all reflective must be deeply interested in finding out what is the true philosophy for his culture, for the people of whose deeper aspirations, hopes, convictions, and prejudices he must have more sympathetic understanding than for those of any other people. What is the true philosophy for the culture of which he is a part and in whose throbbing life he participates? Is pragmatism or realism or idealism the true philosophy of American culture? Or must we look for another, as yet unformed?

We may go farther and take the viewpoint of humanity as a whole. We may rise to the profound insight of the pragmatist and view all mankind as a unified totality of intellectual and spiritual life. From this all-inclusive human viewpoint our question becomes: What is the true philosophy for this our age and for the generations of men that are as yet unborn? What will humanity finally adopt as the

best philosophy for all mankind? Is William James right in thinking that "the finally victorious way of looking at things will be the most completely *impressive* way to the normal run of minds?" Or will the ultimately true philosophy be like the Einstein theory of relativity, something that only half a dozen supreme thinkers alone can understand?

When we reach this viewpoint of humanity as a whole we are close to the absolute approach to our question. But we have not yet reached that absolute viewpoint. Suppose we imagine some being who is the spectator of all time and existence; whose time-span covers all temporal reality, all relativity time-systems; whose penetration fathoms all mysteries, all hidden meanings; whose mind is absolutely omniscient. For such an omniscient being what would be the true philosophy? To put it in terms of the pregnant phrase of Spinoza, which we have so often quoted: What is the true philosophy to him who sees all things *sub specie aeternitatis*, from the viewpoint of eternity?

Now the author believes that no individual will ever be satisfied in his own thinking until he transcends all relative viewpoints, and finds what he thinks is the answer to the question from the viewpoint of absolutely perfect insight. That is why all great philosophers have a tendency to claim finality for their own view. That is why they all try to show that their view is the natural outcome of the whole history of philosophic reflection and that their system supercedes all other systems. That is why they tend to treat the views of all others, past and living, as only approximations to the truth, while claiming an absoluteness for their own deeper insights. All the great philosophers have what Hocking has called "the prophetic consciousness." They are sure, sometimes too sure, that they have the true philosophy. Now it is because idealism, more than any other philosophy, has honestly tried to take the viewpoint of eternity that the author favors idealism. But he is well aware of the fact that many idealists have woefully failed

to take that viewpoint, and that some philosophers of other schools have succeeded in taking it.

2. ECLECTICISM

However, there is a way of answering the question: What is the true philosophy? that is almost as old as philosophy. It is known as the principle of *eclecticism*. From the days of the Greeks to our own day there have always been thinkers who have said: "There is truth in all of these philosophies of my contemporaries. The only difficulty is that each man is onesided and refuses to see what his opponents see. My philosophy will be more tolerant to all truth. It will be constructed by picking the best from each great philosophy. These truths which I take from the various thinkers I will mould into my philosophy. And this will give me the true philosophy." Whoever proceeds in this fashion develops what philosophers call *eclecticism*.

Among contemporary philosophers a right noble representative of this position is D. C. Macintosh. He was trained in philosophy at the University of Chicago when pragmatism absolutely dominated the philosophic instruction in that institution. Upon graduation he had the good fortune to be called to Yale Divinity School as professor of systematic theology. For many years he has ably taught philosophy in that great institution. He is recognized today as one of the most acute and astute critics of idealism and of realism, and he has gradually separated himself from pragmatic naturalism because of its deep-seated hostility to religion. In feeling his way toward a philosophy that would do justice to all viewpoints he has adopted the eclectic method. In his Bross Prize Essay, entitled *The Reasonableness of Christianity*, he has worked out this position in considerable detail. Perhaps his view is nearer to that of the critical realists than to any other type that we have discussed. He was originally considered a member of this group of philosophers, but he now recognizes certain

defects in that type of realism. So he has developed his own position independently, calling it *critical monism*, and trying to incorporate into it the best insights of all contemporary and historic types of philosophy.¹ Another eclectic philosopher is G. W. T. Patrick. His *Introduction to Philosophy* embodies this point of view, and largely for that reason it has been very popular with teachers of courses in introduction to philosophy.

The author does not favor eclecticism as a method of answering the question: What is the true philosophy? He recognizes that it has a certain value for the beginning student, in that it prevents him from being indoctrinated too soon with some one type, and causes him to keep an open and tolerant mind toward all truth. But in the end eclecticism is sure to result in an internally inconsistent philosophy. It is really impossible to combine all of the good points of all types of philosophy, and at the same time to exclude from this construction all of the defects of each. The attempt to do so is worth making, and the eclectic philosophies of each age have undoubtedly served a useful function. But few of them have ever succeeded in gaining a recognition for themselves as first class philosophies. Because it refuses to adopt a definite principle of unification for the diverse elements it selects from various thought-systems, eclecticism stands condemned as a method.

3. A SYNTHESIS OF THE TYPES

Another way of answering the question is to use some one general principle to make a real synthesis of the various types. The most persuasive recent attempt at such a synthesis is to be found in W. E. Hocking's *The Types of Philosophy*, Part IV. In this excellent book the author distinguishes the following historic types of philosophy, all of which, he thinks, are to be found ably represented among

¹ Professor Macintosh's views are well summarized in his essay entitled "Experimental Realism in Religion," contributed to the volume *Religious Realism*, which he edited.

contemporary thinkers: *Naturalism, Pragmatism, Intuitionism, Dualism, Idealism, Realism, and Mysticism*. In our reduction of the types to three we have included Naturalism and Dualism under Realism and Intuitionism and Mysticism under Idealism. But there is justification in Hocking's classification, as is shown by the fact that we were forced to distinguish different forms of realism and of idealism. After expounding and criticising each of these seven main types, Hocking attempts in Part IV to make *his* synthesis. It consists in adopting the fundamental principle of idealism, and then of including as much of each of the other six types as is consistent with that principle.

This suggests the chief defect in a synthesis of the types. It inevitably becomes the type accepted by the philosopher who makes the synthesis. A realist would certainly make an entirely different synthesis from an idealist, and a pragmatist still another. As a matter of fact every great philosopher looks upon his own philosophy as the true synthesis of the types. Yet there is great value in Hocking's method, which makes it superior to eclecticism. And that value is that it adopts some one principle of unification. If it were possible to get philosophers to agree on a set of postulates of the whole philosophic enterprise, we might be able to create a body of philosophical knowledge which every philosopher, regardless of the type he represented, would be willing to accept. We dealt with Hocking's own statement of these postulates in Part I, Chapter IV, and accepted them as essential to philosophy. Yet we there acknowledged that they were the set formulated by an idealist, and that they were prejudiced in the direction of idealism. Is it possible to make an analysis of the general structure of philosophy on which all philosophers will agree? Probably not, but let us consider the metaphysical triangle that is naturally suggested by the three types of contemporary philosophy, to see whether it will aid us in answering the question: What is the true philosophy?

4. THE CONVERGENCE OF THE TYPES

Suppose that we think of life, and its highest development in man, as forming one base angle of the triangle; of physical nature and its constituents as the opposite base angle; and of God or the Absolute as the apex. At the very beginning of modern philosophy, and under the direct influence of the mechanistic science which was founded by Galileo, three great philosophers developed their respective philosophies by starting from different angles of this metaphysical triangle. Thomas Hobbes was a materialist and as such he argued that nothing is real but bodies and their motions. Thus he started from the physical nature base angle, and elaborated his philosophy from that starting point. He is the progenitor of all forms of modern materialism. René Descartes started at the other base angle, and elaborated his philosophy from that point, which he thought was the only absolute certainty, and which he expressed in his famous maxim: *Cogito, ergo sum*—I think, therefore I am (or exist). He was forced to recognize nature as an independent reality, and he thus became a dualist and the progenitor of all forms of modern dualism. Baruch de Spinoza started at the apex of the triangle and defined God or Substance as that which exists by itself and can be conceived by itself. From this definition of God he derived his famous absolute monism, which Leibniz straightway transformed into spiritual pluralism. And these two thinkers, Spinoza and Leibniz, have become the progenitors of all modern idealistic monisms and pluralisms.²

In contemporary philosophy this triangle is still in operation. The new realists derive their philosophy from the physical nature angle of the triangle. They have greatly re-

² For key selections from each of these thinkers see my *Anthology of Modern Philosophy*.

finer the conception of physical nature. In fact they have substituted for the old idea of matter and motion, which dominated the thinking of Hobbes, the idea that physical nature is an infinite set (or aggregate of sets, each of which is infinite) of mathematical and logical relations between events. This is the logical atomism of Russell and Whitehead, and the world of neutral entities of Holt. It is the highest culmination of monistic realism or objective relativism. The critical realists have asserted the equal reality of both base angles of the triangle. Life and mind are real—just as real as physical nature. They have emerged out of physical nature and are really higher than that out of which they have emerged, because of their greater complexity and intricacy. Nevertheless, physical nature preceded them and will be here when they are gone. Thus critical realism will be forced to go over to the position of the new realists and make physical nature the only reality, or turn towards the other base angle of the triangle and make mind or life ultimate. If it makes life ultimate it becomes identical with the vitalism of Bergson. If it makes mind ultimate it becomes identical with the humanism of pragmatism. For both pragmatism and vitalism make life and mind their starting point, and develop a metaphysics which subordinates physical nature to life and mind.

Idealism is the only type of contemporary philosophy, except Scholasticism and some forms of Eclecticism, which makes God or the Absolute the starting point of philosophy, and which defines experience as inclusive of the whole intelligible order of the universe. It does not reach God, or the Absolute, at the end of a series of steps of reasoning. It begins with the fact of God as revealed in experience, and builds its philosophy of the universe on that fact, just as pragmatism begins with the fact of social solidarity and realism with the fact of "an ether of events," and build their respective metaphysics thereon. Hence the ultimate question for the student who would formulate his own phi-

losophy of life is: Which corner of the metaphysical triangle shall I make my starting point?

Now, when we raise the question in this form, it is easy to see that *a synthesis of the types can be made by starting from any corner of the triangle*. Hocking's and Royce's syntheses start with God and interpret the whole triangular universe of reality in terms of God. Starting from the same angle, Bosanquet, Bradley, and other absolutists posit an impersonal and logical intelligence, and interpret the whole of reality as the manifestation of the workings of this intelligence. Hocking's *Meaning of God in Human Experience*, the Gifford Lectures of Royce and Bosanquet, and Bradley's *Appearance and Reality* all aim to show how impossible it is to understand any form of human experience unless we treat all these forms as expressions of God or the Absolute, manifesting Himself or itself in finite existence. Realists have made syntheses which start from the nature angle of the triangle, and interpret God and man in terms of logical essences and of the ether of events. Samuel Alexander's *Space, Time and Deity*, Whitehead's *Process and Reality* and Santayana's *Realms of Being* (of which only two volumes have appeared) are excellent examples of realistic syntheses. Dewey and Bergson start from the life angle: Dewey, in his greatest book—*Experience and Nature*, interprets it merely from the human viewpoint, while Bergson, in *Creative Evolution*, interprets it in terms of all life, including the human as the highest form of the living. But what everyone wants to know is: Which synthesis is the right one? What, after all is said and done, is the true philosophy?

It seems obvious, at least to the author, that none of these syntheses gives the real answer to this question. And yet it is also equally obvious that in such works as those we have just cited, and a few others that we have not here mentioned, one comes as near to an answer as it is possible to come at the present stage of our knowledge. Certainly

these writings embody the deepest and profoundest philosophical wisdom of our age. Yet none of these thinkers wholly succeeds in viewing the world *sub specie aeternitatis*. Even these greatest writings of contemporary philosophical literature are infected with human frailties, and they show at various points the limitations inherent in all finite accounts of what reality is.

Let us consider our metaphysical triangle as the base of a crystal pyramid. Let us imagine an omniscient mind looking down from the apex into the depths of the crystal. If we could be where we have supposed that being to be we would know what God and man is. But we must say to that being:

Yes, Heaven is thine; but this
Is a world of sweets and sour;
Our flowers are merely—flowers,
And the shadow of thy perfect bliss
Is the sunshine of ours.

And yet we also dare say:

If I could dwell
Where Israfel
Hath dwelt, and he where I,
He might not sing so wildly well
A mortal melody,
While a bolder note than this might swell
From my lyre within the sky.³

Is it possible, while a denizen of time, to see the universe from the viewpoint of the denizens of eternity? Certain supremely great philosophers have made this attempt, and to them we owe the richest treasures of our philosophical literature. And the author believes that those philosophers who succeed in throwing off the *Zeitgeist* or spirit of the age, who get a perspective on the various scientific concepts

³ These lines are from Edgar Allan Poe's poem, *Israfel*, which was inspired by the following verse from the *Koran*: "And the angel, Israfel, whose heart-strings are a lute, and who has the sweetest voice of all God's creatures."

and social institutions of their own day and of other days, who can see where the extremes of philosophical positions meet, and where the streams of thought embodied in each type of philosophy converge to make the whole ocean of philosophic truth, are the supremely great philosophers. But whether our age has any such philosophers cannot be determined by one who stands where we stand. As time passes a new system of philosophy will arise. It will be fed by the streams of our contemporary thought. And it will embody higher truth than any of our present-day philosophies. That system of philosophy towards which all our contemporary types are converging will not be identical with any of them, because it will contain only what is durable and eternal in the thought of our age. But that new system which is now in the making is the answer to our question. It is the true philosophy.

SUGGESTED SUPPLEMENTARY WORK

SUGGESTED SUPPLEMENTARY WORK

1. In studying philosophy it is essential to go to the original sources. My *Anthology of Recent Philosophy* (Crowell) contains sixty-eight selections from sixty-five philosophers of the twentieth century, and my *Anthology of Modern Philosophy* (Crowell) contains ninety-seven selections from thirty-two of the great philosophers who lived between 1600 and 1900. An analysis precedes each selection and biographical sketches and bibliographies will be found in the Appendix of each volume. Students will get a much better knowledge of living philosophy by supplementing each chapter of this book with a reading of one or more of the selections in these two anthologies. Benjamin Rand's *Modern Classical Philosophers* (Houghton Mifflin Co.) and A. E. Avey *Readings in Philosophy* (Appleton) also contain excellent supplementary material.

2. J. H. Muirhead is the editor of two volumes entitled *Contemporary British Philosophy*, and G. P. Adams and W. P. Montague are the editors of two volumes entitled *Contemporary American Philosophy*. The latter was sponsored by the American Philosophical Association. These four volumes contain personal statements of their philosophy by sixty-two of the leading British and American philosophers and the books should be in every public library. A biography, and a bibliography of each man's chief writings, accompanies each personal statement. These philosophers are classified below under the types discussed in this book. The letter B is an abbreviation for the British series, and the letter A for the American series. The Roman numerals indicate the volume. Let each student select one representative of each type and write an exposition of that man's philosophy, based upon a reading of his personal

statement and of something else that he wrote. The teacher should supplement this list by adding the names of other representative philosophers, and especially those of other lands. The volumes in the *Library of Contemporary Thought*, edited by W. Tudor Jones (Knopf), will be found most useful, and should also be in every public library.

A CLASSIFICATION OF CONTEMPORARY BRITISH AND AMERICAN PHILOSOPHERS

Idealists

Adams, G. P. (A I)
 Alexander, H. B. (A I)
 Armstrong, A. C. (A I)
 Baillie, J. B. (B I)
 Bosanquet, Bernard (B I)
 Calkins, M. W. (A I)
 Carr, H. Wildon (B I)
 Cunningham, G. W. (A I)
 Everett, W. G. (A I)
 Haldane, Viscount (B I)
 Hocking, W. E. (A I)
 Hoernlé, R. F. A. (B II)
 Inge, Dean (B I)
 Leighton, J. A. (A I)
 Mackenzie, J. S. (B I)
 McTaggart, J. E. (B I)
 Muirhead, J. H. (B I)
 Palmer, G. H. (A I)
 Parker, D. H. (A II)
 Sorley, W. R. (B II)
 Smith, J. A. (B II)
 Taylor, A. E. (B II)
 Urban, W. M. (A II)
 Ward, James (B II)
 Webb, C. C. J. (B II)
 Wenley, R. M. (A II)

Pragmatists

Brown, H. C. (A I)
 Dewey, John (A II)
 Lewis, C. I. (A II)
 Schiller, F. C. S. (B I)
 Tufts, J. H. (A II)

Realists

Boodin, J. E. (A I)
 Broad, C. D. (B I)
 Cohen, M. R. (A I)
 De Laguna, T. (A I)
 Drake, D. (A I)
 Ducasse, C. J. (A I)
 Hicks, G. D. (B II)
 Hobhouse, L. T. (B I)
 Joad, C. E. M. (B II)
 Laird, John (B II)
 Loewenberg, J. (A II)
 Lovejoy, A. O. (A II)
 McGilvary, E. B. (A II)
 Montague, W. P. (A II)
 Moore, G. E. (B II)
 Morgan, C. L. (B I)
 Perry, R. B. (A II)
 Pratt, J. B. (A II)
 Rogers, A. K. (A II)
 Russell, B. (B I)
 Santayana, G. (A II)
 Sellars, R. W. (A II)
 Singer, E. A. Jr. (A II)
 Strong, C. A. (A II)
 Woodbridge, F. J. E. (A II)

Other Types

Bax, E. B. (B II)
 Fawcett, Douglas (B II)
 Fite, W. (A I)
 Read, Carveth (B I)
 Temple, William (B I)
 Thomson, J. A. (B II)

3. For several years I have obtained excellent results by requiring my students to write an essay on the subject "My Philosophy of Life" at the end of their course in philosophy. Where there is a philosophy prize available, as there should be in every college and university, it may well be awarded to the student writing the best essay on this subject. Following are the instructions which I have used in making this assignment to my own students. It may be of interest to some to learn that this was used as one of the examinations given in the final elimination of senior contestants from Indiana high schools for the Edison scholarship.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR AN ESSAY ON "MY PHILOSOPHY OF LIFE"

a. Read carefully the following statements:

"There are some people—and I am one of them—who think that the most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger it is important to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy, it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but still more important to know the enemy's philosophy." G. K. Chesterton in *Heretics* (Preface).

"I think with Mr. Chesterton in this matter. I know that you, ladies and gentlemen, have a philosophy, each and all of you, and that the most interesting thing about you is the way in which it determines the perspective in your several worlds. You know the same of me. . . . The philosophy which is so important in each of us is not a technical matter; it is our more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means." William James in *Pragmatism* (Longmans), page 3.

"At adolescence there is at least one task of creation which the will cannot escape, that of constructing one's

philosophy. The youth finds himself, at his own estimate, for the first time an equal among equals. There is a change in the order of authority . . . a sense of competence and a disposition to be critical. The conceit of opinion in the adolescent is not empty; it is based on a readiness to assume responsibility, and on an actual assumption of responsibility in the work of *mental world-building*. . . . He appreciates for the first time that he has his own life to lead; he finds himself morally alone; he can no longer endure to see through the eyes of others." W. E. Hocking, *Human Nature and Its Remaking*, 2nd ed. (Yale Press), page 273. See also W. D. Hyde: *Five Great Philosophies of Life*.

b. Make your discussion as sincere as possible, and original in the sense that it reflects your own outlook on life. Do not be afraid of saying exactly what you think.

c. Describe any experience of your own in which you assumed responsibility for your own choice and first began to see things through your own eyes. Do you think that this experience was the beginning of your philosophy of life, as Hocking suggests?

d. State briefly what you regard as the essential ideas of your own philosophy of life—your ideas of right and wrong, happiness, God, immortality, the social order, internationalism, education, marriage, science, art, etc.

e. State what you think have been the chief sources of the ideas making up your philosophy of life. For example, parents, teachers, preachers or priests or rabbis, schools, religious organizations, patriotic organizations, books, etc. What philosophers have most influenced you in this course?

f. You may write in the third person, or you may make your essay autobiographical, or you may use any literary form you like. Quote poetry or other material, if it expresses your ideas, but give the exact reference in each case in a footnote.

g. Your essay should be between 2500 and 5000 words in length. It should be as serious and as solid a piece of writing as you are capable of doing, and something you will take pride in keeping to read over in later years. It need not be typewritten, but it should be *clearly* written, with ample margins for comments. The essay is due one week before final examinations begin.

4. After each part of this book is completed it will be found a good plan, if the class or quiz section is small enough to make it feasible, to divide the students into discussion groups. Let one group criticise and the other defend the type of philosophy under consideration in a discussion contest or debate. This is sure to stir up a great deal of interest, if capable leaders are selected for each group.

5. Bishop Berkeley's *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*, George Santayana's *Dialogues in Limbo* (Charles Scribner's Sons), W. P. Montague's dialogue at the end of *The Ways of Knowing*, and J. B. Pratt's *Adventures in Philosophy and Religion* (The Macmillan Company) are excellent models of philosophical dialogues. Let those students who are interested in so doing prepare a short dialogue setting forth the various attitudes of the different types of philosophy on one or more of the great problems, after a study of one or more of the dialogues just mentioned. This may take the place of the more formal report on one man's philosophy. It might be a coöperative piece of work, if there are two or three fairly gifted students who prefer to work out a dialogue together. The dialogue method of teaching philosophy has been used successfully by some teachers, and it should prove valuable with selected groups. Any method that will encourage students to discuss the problems together in the so-called "bull sessions" which they hold outside of the classroom, should be most helpful.



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